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ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
The War on Paper
Coast Guard Day, 1995
Rx for Contingency Medical Support
Nuclear Torpedoes
Accountability Afloat
The Emotional Cycle of Deployment
The Maritime Strategy
Orion the Hunted
Enemies No More
The A-B-Z of L-T-A
“The War on Paper”
(See R. T. Soule, pp. 34-39, January 1987;
R. L. Crossland, pp. 16-17, March 1987
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Stephen Surko, U. S. Navy— Having recently completed my division officer tour on board the USS Elliot (DD- 967), 1 was interested in Lieutenant Soule’s views on the administrative burden felt by junior officers. I fully agree that the “war on paper” must be won.
I also agree that we spend too much shipboard time meeting administrative requirements. However, the chain-of- command must be informed of the unit’s status.
Lieutenant Soule bemoans the use of formatted reports that can be read by computer and entered into a data base. As gunnery division officer, I regularly submitted computer-formatted Ammo Transaction Reports (ATRs). This was neither difficult nor a waste of time. My chief petty officer would normally draft the ATR, and I would review it with the appropriate publications at my side—one to verify the format and one to verify the ammunition logistic codes. I would then run the message up the ship’s chain-of- command, with the publications, and clearly explain what the report stated. This was also a good opportunity for me (although it didn’t always seem so at the time) to answer questions about ammo availability, remaining expenditure allowance, and weapon status. Tracking down superiors to “chop” the ATR message was the most time-consuming part of the process.
Yes, I did make some errors in my formatted reports. The ship’s parts control center computer would detect my errors, and 1 would receive an order for a corrected ATR. Since my ship’s command did not consider occasional computer- format errors to be serious “blasts,” 1 was not distracted from running my division properly. Formatted computer reports are not, in and of themselves, an administrative burden.
“Coast Guard Day, 1995”
(See C. A. Abel, pp. 38-42, February 1987 Proceedings)
Lieutenant William B. Baker, U. S. Coast Guard—Senator Hobbes: Before we recessed, we were discussing the new direction of the Coast Guard under “Project 200.” We have now heard the first wire-service reports of the Charter Princess disaster. I am shocked and saddened by the initial estimate that all 35 people on board are feared lost. Does this dampen your enthusiasm for the changes you’ve implemented?
Admiral Shoemaker: We, too, are saddened, Senator. As a service dedicated to saving lives, we feel a kinship to all those whose loved ones perish at sea.
Senator Earl: Then you don’t feel that the Coast Guard’s abandonment of search and rescue (SAR) as a primary mission led to this disaster?
Admiral Shoemaker: Absolutely not. We have never lost sight of our humanitarian goals. Our policy of “commercial assistance first” for disabled vessels is designed to ensure that the Coast Guard responds to all cases involving possible loss of life.
Senator Rodriguez: Why, then, did the system fail today?
Admiral Shoemaker: From what we know, the weather was good when the Charter Princess reported her engine casualty. She was only 26 miles out on her charter fishing voyage, and had no other problems. As soon as the casualty was reported, the Coast Guard station at Point Randolph contacted the nearest commercial franchise, which dispatched a 25-foot vessel to investigate the situation. Senator Mustain: A charter boat with 35 people on board is disabled and the situation is investigated? Why didn’t the Coast Guard station insist on immediate action? Admiral Shoemaker: Hindsight is always clear, Senator. But the vessel did not subscribe to the commercial franchise system. The towing company has the right, under current statute, to make sure it will be paid for its services. Most charter skippers have purchased the “Ameriboat” towing insurance plan, which covers all commercial service. The investigating boat was on its way home with the Charter Princess's signed insurance contract, and a 45-foot towboat was preparing to go to her rescue when the squall line formed offshore.
Senator Mustain: This is contrary to the guidance we gave you in this very room last year. Admiral. When we passed the Commercial Enterprise Act of 1990, we stipulated that the Coast Guard was still
responsible for responding to all distress calls that could result in loss of life. It seems you chose the letter of the law over the intent.
Admiral Shoemaker: Thunderstorms develop with little warning at this time of year. Our station at Point Randolph is barely able to drill its crews in SAR, because we are not allowed to handle routine tows for SAR crew training. The Congress directed us, and I quote, “Not to take food off the tables of commercial salvors.” You can’t have it both ways. Senator Earl: That excuse won’t do here, Admiral. Point Randolph is in my district, and we had two brand new 107- foot cutters assigned there just last year. Admiral Shoemaker: As you know, Senator, those ships are participating in ‘Operation Bulkhead,” the inshore, Underwater warfare exercise off our southern coast. This exercise has been Planned for more than a year, and is important to our coastal defense mission. Senator Hobbes: Well, who was response for this incident? Fingerpointing doesn’t bring back the victims of this tfagedy. When the weather turned bad, what did your people do?
Admiral Shoemaker: The commercial towboat decided to wait for the squall to clear.
Senator Hobbes: Admiral, I must not have made myself clear. What did you, fhe Coast Guard, responsible for lifesav- ,n8 at sea—what did you do?
Admiral Shoemaker: There wasn’t uiuch we could do. Our decision not to JUplace the 44-foot motor lifeboat was used on the changing roles of the ser- Vlce. With one commercial franchise for every 2,000 boaters, the Coast Guard c°uldn’t justify spending $2.5 million upiece for heavy-weather SAR boats. The w° 41-foot utility boats at Point Ran- °lph are not designed for heavy-weather ujje- Normally, we could have used one °f the 107-foot cutters, but as I just exPained, they weren’t available. ei>ator Reed: So American citizens ^ere left to perish in the storm! I have not uard an acceptable explanation. Mr. uairman, I want to go on the record as ,, Ousting a formal Senate inquiry into ., e s'nking of the Charter Princess with j e '°ss of 35 lives. Admiral, I supported ^ransferring the Coast Guard to the Navy, j. 11 warned several times that American f‘Ves were not to be the price for the defuse buildup. Within the limits of the °ast Guard budget, you are ultimately s P°nsible for ensuring our citizens’
V ety ut sea. As you may recall, it was Au*r *^ea t0 disband the Coast Guard biliary and transfer safety education to e department of Transportation’s Boating Safety Administration.
Admiral Shoemaker: We really had no choice, Senator. Since the Non-Interference Act was passed, there wasn’t much that the Auxiliary could do without fear of lawsuits by the commercial salvors. Auxiliary morale suffered, and the transformation to a purely educational unit was inevitable. Our people are proud of their humanitarian mission. We stand ready to protect lives at sea. But given our military missions and the constraints of the commercial assistance policy, there will inevitably be marine accidents that the Coast Guard will be unable to respond to.
Senator Rodriguez: Maybe now is the time to reconsider “Project 200.” Was the frenzy for privatization we all felt ten years ago worth compromising the safety of millions of Americans who enjoy our beautiful waterways? Encouraging maritime capitalism was never meant to excuse the Federal Government from protecting its citizens.
Senator Hobbes: Admiral, in your prepared statement you said that the U. S. Coast Guard continues to set world standards for emergency service afloat. This incident casts some doubt on that capability. I understand you are at some disadvantage today, since this disaster is still unfolding. It is not the intent of this panel to grill you unfairly over past decisions, nor to make this Coast Guard Day any worse than it is. I intend to ask the Senate Majority Leader to call for a formal inquiry. Admiral, I would also ask you to report to this committee within 30 days with concrete changes designed to prevent a repeat of this tragedy. In your report, please also tell us how you intend to replace the thousands of search-and- rescue specialists who felt disenfranchised and quit the Coast Guard during its initial reorganization. I realize it’s getting late, so we will adjourn.
“Rx for Contingency Medical Support”
{See A. M. Smith, pp. 56-63, January 1987 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Thomas S. Maddock, Civil Engineering Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Ns a former Commander of the Reserve Naval Construction Force, I was particularly interested in reading Captain Smith’s update on the Fleet Hospital Program.
The article did not mention the nine Reserve Seabee hospital units that are part of the 18,000-man Reserve Naval Construction Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Dick Smith, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), in
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Greensboro, North Carolina. Your readers might be interested to know that the Camp Pendleton training facilities referred to in the article were constructed by Reserve Seabees in 1986. I understand Plans are in progress for the Reserve Sea- bees to construct other hospital training facilities, as well.
“Nuclear Torpedoes”
(See N. Polmar and D. M. Kerr, pp. 63-68, August 1986; D. A. Paolucci and J. H. Patton, PP- 91-95. November 1986; M. Amedick, p.
19, December 1986; J. J. Engelhardt, pp. 1920, February 1987 Proceedings)
David Brady, Senior Engineer, NKF! Sesco—While Mr. Polmar and Dr. Kerr Provide a bounty of interesting informa- l|on, they argue weakly for adding nuclear-tipped torpedoes to the U. S. Navy’s arsenal.
First, the authors warn that when the United States reaches its goal of 100 nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), there "'ill still be a four-to-one ratio of Soviet submarines to U. S. SSNs. This oft- quoted number overstates the problem. Of the more than 374 active and 60 reserve Soviet submarines listed in the 1986-87 Combat Fleets of the World, 229 are more than 20 years old, and 113 °f those are aging Whiskey diesel boats, most of which have served more than 30 years. (By comparison, only 16 U. S. SSNs are more than 20 years old.) So the ratio of viable-threat Soviet submarines j°ll. S. boats is substantially lower than f°ur to one.
The authors also maintain that we can- n°t expect the Soviets to reduce their submarine force. Technically, this may be true, given the Soviet propensity for put- lng severely overage diesel boats in re- <’,Crve rather than decommissioning them, mce the useful life of a submarine— Specially a nuclear-powered boat—is Approximately 30 years, the Soviets will e retiring or “putting in reserve” 222 of oday’s active submarines by the year It) 2° make up this shortfall, in the k 20s and 1980s the Soviets have been tiding an average of nine submarines J^r year. (Department of Defense publi- Ds°n, Soviet Military Power—1986, p. 8; and James T. Westwood, “The So- 'ct Navy—What Will Its Meticulous . anning Lead to Tomorrow?” Sea t orver, 15 March 1986, p. 38.) Unless e Soviets drastically increase their submarine output, the authors overestimate ‘■aiming the Soviets will have 400 Dr !Tlarines >n the year 2000; they will a n, ably have closer to 290. (Qualified p avsts [e.g., James T. Westwood, Sea o\vert 15 March 1986, p. 46] have indicated that no one expects the next three Soviet five-year plans to mandate large increases in submarine production.) Adding NATO and French submarines (about 20 SSNs and 120 SSs) to the equation further reduces the Soviets’ probable submarine lead.
Though the numbers are less awesome than Mr. Polmar and Dr. Kerr project, the authors are correct in saying that the Soviets have considerably improved the quality of their submarines. But these improvements are not reason enough for the United States to develop, deploy, or use nuclear torpedoes.
The authors state that U. S. commanders need nuclear-tipped torpedoes to penetrate the double hulls of Soviet submarines. In the January 1986 issue of Submarine Review, Vice Admiral Robert C. Gooding, U. S. Navy (Retired), demonstrates that the double hull’s protection is overstated:
“It is true that a torpedo warhead exploding a few feet from the pressure hull may not blow a hole in the hull” ... but “any respectable warhead [exploding] a few feet away will leave the interior of the boat (including the ship’s force) in a shambles.”
An adversary need not sink a subma
rine to neutralize her.
It is also questionable whether titanium pressure hulls will make the Alfa submarines (and their possible successors, Mike or Sierra) more resistant to weapons damage. Given an HY-80 steel hull and a titanium hull of equal thickness, the interior of the titanium-hulled submarine will sustain more shock damage, because titanium has a higher shock factor than steel. Hence, unless the Soviets have substantially thickened their submarines’ pressure hulls, their titanium affords them no more protection than Western steel.
The authors and several other naval analysts believe that most future submarine dogfights may well occur at ranges within 10,000 yards. A nuclear-tipped torpedo’s usefulness at this distance depends on what nuclear yield the skipper selects and how the submarines maneuver. Both variables present problems.
The authors propose arming U. S. submarines with a variable-yield torpedo, with payload choices from sub-kiloton to 125 kilotons. But should the commander select the yield manually before the weapon goes into the tube, or electronically, after the weapon is loaded? It is unlikely that the SSN skipper will have finalized his target range when the torpedo is being loaded, so a manual preload selection would depend on guesswork.
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Once the skipper has selected the yield he can no longer choose when and at what range to use the torpedo. But electronic yield selection has problems, too. The selection command rides a signal sent either through the umbilical or through tens of thousands of yards of wire. A spurious dectrical signal or signal error (highly Possible, given the problems of wire- guided torpedoes) could be fatal.
In either case, the SSN commander must select the yield based on the expected range of his target. With a submarine target moving at 30 knots and a torpedo moving at 60 knots, these ranges can change 3,000 yards in a minute.
Consider the following example: A Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear submarine trails an Oscar SSGN at 5,000 yards. At the time of firing, the Los Angeles commander estimates that his Mk-48N (nuclear-tipped) torpedo will overhaul the Oscar at about 9,000 yards (assuming a torpedo speed of 60 knots and an Oscar sPeed of 33 knots). So he selects the maximum 125-kiloton yield. This works fine, so long as the Oscar doesn’t turn toward the Los Angeles. If that happens, the Los Angeles may find herself within the blast-damage radius of her own tor- Pcdo; at best, the SSN commander would have to evade the Oscar while both dodg- lng and guiding his own Mk-48N.
Add countermeasures to the scenario, and the nuclear torpedo’s usefulness Stows even more doubtful. Assume that me Los Angeles trails the Oscar by 7,500 Vards. The Los Angeles fires a Mk-48N. Yalf a minute later, the Oscar recognizes ne threat, maneuvers away at top speed, and drops an “effective” countermeasUre. (if the countermeasure is effective ?|a'nst a Mk-48, it will work against a r*k-48N, as well.) Running from a 60- n°t torpedo at 33 knots, the Oscar could escape the 125-kiloton warhead’s 2,500- yard lethality radius even if the torpedo °csn’t detonate until it is right atop the °untermeasure.
So the Oscar escapes, and the Los An- j5 es skipper has yet another problem. f.ls nuclear blast has blinded his subma- e s passive sonar, which is bad ^nough. But it has also given excellent y. a °n the Los Angeles's, position to the 'ct°r SSN that probably cruises nearby, porting the high-value Oscar. The rted Victor promptly launches a tor- 0 at the “blued-out” Los Angeles. rue> a Mk-48 fired from 7,500 yards °uld have affected the Oscar no more the Mk-48N, but the SSN skipper tj ab|y would not have fired a conven- hay31 torPeri° at 7>500 yards. He would e maneuvered for a closer shot.
The authors also propose fitting a nuclear tip to the Mk-50. They claim the Mk-50 shaped-charge, jet-penetration warhead is only “marginally lethal.” The Mk-50N is certainly less risky to the launcher than the Mk-48N, since the detonating Mk-50N is unlikely to damage the launching platform—a LAMPS helicopter. But shaped-charge, jet-penetration warheads have performed impressively against armored land targets—even those with spaced armor—so it may be premature to discard them for nuclear- tipped torpedoes.
It is astonishing given current events for the authors to urge the U. S. Navy to put convertible nuclear torpedoes on its submarines. That the Soviets have had nuclear-tipped torpedoes for many years is irrelevant. First, the Navy’s new Seawolf (SSN-21)-class SSNs will carry revolutionary enhanced-range sonar, and a fire control system capable of providing nearer to real-time fire-control solutions. The improved Los Angeles, the Seawolf combat system, and ADCAP (advanced capability) Mk-48 can more than maintain the U. S. Navy’s undersea advantage (assuming the weapons live up to their advertised performance).
Second, in a world finally resolved to reducing strategic nuclear arms, the authors advocate a dangerous nuclear proliferation. The Navy has bought more than 3,500 Mk-48 torpedoes. Imagine the interest of terrorists if the Navy paired a third of these torpedoes with insertable 20-pound nuclear packages, each capable of 125 kilotons of nuclear yield. Think what it would cost Gould and the Navy to protect these torpedoes and their nuclear components. Think of the headaches each nuclear-capable torpedo would inflict upon the SSN commander tasked with safeguarding it from theft and accident.
Mr. Pol mar and Dr. Kerr argue strongly that the United States must meet the threat of improved Soviet submarines, and they are right to do so. But the U. S. Navy’s challenge is to detect Soviet submarines at longer ranges, and to determine how much force makes a torpedo lethal. Marvelous technical achievements though they are, nuclear-tipped torpedoes with selectable yield do nothing to answer these challenges. Worse, their limited utility and their drawbacks make them positively undesirable. The Navy already has programs (the improved Los Angeles, the Seawolf, the Mk-50 and Mk-48 ADCAP torpedoes, and the Sea Lance) that should be adequate for defeating improved Soviet submarines. Let’s develop these systems quickly, instead of urging the Navy to use possibly self-defeating nuclear torpedoes.
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“Accountability Afloat”
(See G. B. Powell, pp. 31-35, August 1986;
P. J. Doerr, M. S. Smith, E. E. Marlatt, M. E. Duffy, pp. 12-15, October 1986; L.A. Griffin, p. 10, November 1986; G. Carson, W. D. Leventhal, pp. 17-18, December 1986; J. M. Thomson, p. 23, February 1987; D. A. Timm, pp. 20-21, March 1987 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Penrose Lucas Albright, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Doerr considered Captain Powell’s article important and timely, but was embarrassed that the “line should have to be informed of these events and lessons by an officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps.” Colonel Marlatt “was appalled at the vindictive tone” of the article. He pointed out that in the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps he learned quickly he was not to tell commanders “what they could do or not do.”
These comments suggest it may be easy to overlook that commissioned officers of the armed services are officers irrespective of their status—line, specialist, or staff. A principal responsibility of every officer is to take care of his men before taking care of himself. This is not purely altruistic. We fulfill our duties to them so they will discharge those we require of them. All are strengthened by the close association; it provides a collective courage and self-confidence that wins battles and wars.
When a commanding officer fails to care for his men to the point that their lives are needlessly endangered, any officer who intervenes at the time or speaks out after the fact should not be criticized. An Army colonel may find it impossible to imagine a commissioned officer not ensuring that enlisted men under his command had food, shelter, and medical treatment before satisfying his own needs; this tradition is strong in the Army. In the Navy, these needs are almost always satisfied by routine shipboard organization. Accountability still exists. But a naval officer could serve an entire career with very few incidents wherein his personal intervention becomes necessary. Thus he has more need to be reminded of the important commitments to his men’s welfare that his commission demands of him.
Captain Powell is to be commended. Line officers should not be embarrassed that Captain Powell is an officer of the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps. To the contrary, officers of that corps are often in the best position to advise us of obligations we all have as officers of the armed services.
“The Emotional Cycle of
Deployment”
(.See K. Vestal Logan, pp. 43-47, February
1987 Proceedings)
Anne Roy croft—Thank you for Ms. Vestal Logan’s thorough analysis of the emotional cycle of deployment (ECOD). So often during a deployment, Navy spouses ask themselves, “Am I normal?” The roller coaster of emotions they experience is confusing and frustrating, even to veteran Navy wives and husbands. The ECOD provides Navy spouses and the professionals who help them with a valuable tool for interpreting the emotions displayed before, during, and after separations, and for anticipating difficulties.
As a Navy wife and a program coordinator in a Family Service Center, I believe that we must be aware of the cyclical stresses that Navy children experience, as well. In addition to their own emotional disorganization, children are drawn into the deployment cycle of their parents—-as observers, and often, as recipients of misdirected anger and frustration. Navy children become listeners and consolers, and frequently assume adult household responsibilities while Dad (or Mom) is away. Increasingly, reading materials, coloring books, parents’ guides, and group and individual programs are being offered to help Navy families cope with deployments. The Navy should develop more aids and programs, and encourage families to use them.
Deployments are a fact of Navy life. But with pre- and post-deployment briefings, wives’ club meetings, and through Family Service Centers, we can create structure—and therefore, control—in our hectic Navy world.
The Maritime Strategy
(See Supplement, January 1986; G. M. Hamed, pp. 26-28, February 1986; J. M. Collins, pp. 18-22, March 1986; R. N. Griffin, p. 25, May 1986; R. S. Hibbs and W. Pendley, pp. Si- 89, June 1986; D. M. Ulmer, pp. 24-27, July 1986; J. M. Collins, p. 29, August 1986; A. Gurnee, pp. 25-30, January 1987 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. T. Pendley, U. S. Nav)'< former Director Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division, Office of the Chief Naval Operations (now Commandri Naval Forces, Korea)—The Navy’5 leadership (and seemingly Mr. Collins by the nature of his questions) recognize5 that the Maritime Strategy gives the Navy the means to retain the strategic initiative- It ensures the integration of fleet opera' tions, wargames at the Naval War Col'
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lege, Navy programmatics, range planning.
The Maritime Strategy also meets th' challenge of the Secretary of Defense competitive strategy described in his F1- cal Year 1987 Report to Congress. F1 reported:
“Another area where competin'; strategy has produced beneficial results1 in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). 0f\ ASW capability has reinforced the SoVf Navy’s defense orientation, keeping the" close to their homeland in order to prote1 their ballistic missile submarine fie" This limits the Soviet Navy’s threat to o' sea lines of communications with 01 European and Asian allies in the eat'.' period of war ... if possible, we sho? try to move the competition into areas1 which we have natural advantages and1 channel Soviet defense efforts into aie: that are less threatening to us and less d‘ stabilizing to the overall milita" balance.”
The Maritime Strategy describes ? Navy’s role across the spectrum of c°f flict, and prescribes how the Navy fulfill its responsiblities in the execut? of the national military strategy.
The strategy is a current forces stfl egy, but it also will impact on fu£l,r force structure and employment ^
changing threat which Mr. Collins hi? lights. The professional dialogue get? ated by the periodic updating and rev? of the Maritime Strategy, and its role the focus of the annual Navy flag-R' long range planning conferences, res? in revised operational requirements meet the future U. S. Navy needs n? tioned by Mr. Collins. Future strata development projects are under way develop the Maritime Strategy furth regarding peacetime missions and 1 strategy in the event that NATO fa1? are attacked with nuclear weapons.
How to deal with Soviet mine wart5 and coastal defense capabilities, h°.
time Strategy is not a “cookbook' 1 the tactical employment of the Nav? wartime, but a strategic blueprint *. strategic options. It will always be c"1 cized for not giving enough detail reg"1 ing this or that specific Soviet capabd1
specific U. S. Navy or U. S. combi" arms capability. Such tactical quest'1 are dealt with more properly in camp"" plans, tactical doctrines, and operati" concepts developed at fleet level. ", porting both the plans of the un'
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Many of Mr. Collins’s comments seem t0 question less the Navy’s current-forces strategy (i.e., the Maritime Strategy) than the Navy’s “strategic visions.” The Navy’s strategic forethought is exempli- tted by the weapon systems in or entering |he fleet now—Aegis air defense system,
' hoenix missile, vertical-launch missile system, P-3C Update III aircraft, Los °\"geie.s-(SSN-688) class submarine, b'gh-speed antiradiation missile, Har- P°°n missile, Tomahawk cruise missile, rident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic tttissile, etc. These weapon systems can ^tsily handle the current threat at sea. 'with the continued support of the Secre- )Jry of Defense, the President, and the °ngress, the next generation of weapon systems and sensors will be equally ef- ective. As the Air Force continues to t"ld fighters and bombers, and the Army Continues to build tanks and artillery, the avy-Marine Corps team will continue to Ul'd ships, aircraft, submarines, and arnPhibious warfare systems. This does Jjot reflect a lack of strategic vision regarding the future of naval warfare; it is ^nipiy a realization that it will not be the eaPon-delivery platforms that undergo cautionary changes, but rather the eaPons themselves and the sophisti- ed sensor systems that they carry.
I agree that there is a need for a better cat'°nship between military maritime, y'n'inental, and space strategies. The sudlf ^’scusses strategy 'n order to foster hav.
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“Orion the Hunted”
(,See K. Sherman, pp. 90-92, October 1986; J. Bray, p. 14, E. C. Moore, pp. 14-17, December 1986; M. Skinner, pp. 21-23,
January 1987; S. E. Jasper, T. M. Brasmer, pp. 78-79, February 1987 Proceedings)
Commander G. T. Hodermarsky, U. S. Navy—Proceedings is to be applauded as a forum for controversial opinions and the questioning of accepted doctrine. Lieutenant Commander Sherman’s article certainly falls into this category. However, to be controversial is not necessarily to be correct. To anyone familiar with modem P-3 capabilities, it is obvious that Commander Sherman’s facts are dated and his conclusions are wrong.
Although Commander Sherman’s estimate of the P-3’s ability to attack an unalerted submarine may have been accurate during his early 1970’s Western Pacific experience, the community has made vast strides in the ensuing 15 years. A submarine with a Mk-46 homing in on it today may not want to pause long enough to target and launch a surface-to- air missile (SAM) at the torpedo delivery platform.
Commander Sherman also envisions the world’s seas filled with Forger- equipped carriers that could deny huge areas to P-3 operations. But neither current Soviet carrier inventories nor longterm intelligence estimates support that scenario.
Surface-ship launched SAMs can certainly threaten the P-3, but the Harpoon- equipped aircraft is hardly defenseless; in fact, a Soviet destroyer guarding a submarine could well find itself targeted by the multirole Orion. Against an alerted submarine, the antisubmarine warfare aircraft’s best defense is clearly an offense. Any submarine busy evading homing torpedoes will be unlikely to launch SAMs, for the launch would further resolve the aircraft’s data for re-attacking.
Commander Sherman holds the astonishing belief that the P-3 should be withdrawn in wartime because it is vulnerable. Take this argument to its logical conclusion: surface ships, carriers, even submarines are vulnerable—so let’s keep them all in port during hostilities lest they go in harm’s way. No naval aircraft is totally safe from SAMs or air-to-air missiles. That the P-3 lacks armor and is rel-
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atively weak structurally is true but irrelevant. And its defenses continue to improve. Defensive tactical maneuvering for patrol squadron (VP) crews is being developed through the much-appreciated cooperation of the tactical air community on both coasts. Enormously improved electronic support measures and countermeasures equipment is being evaluated. With these defenses the modem P-3 crew is not invulnerable, but neither is it trapped in the helpless “barrage balloon” Commander Sherman describes.
No senior VP or fleet commander would recommend that the Navy withdraw its most potent open-ocean ASW platform in wartime. In a shooting war the VP community may take some losses—what combat forces won’t? But it will launch regardless to be where the action is.
supplies, and ammo, and returned with casualties. The men were horribly wounded—a Marine sergeant had had his legs blown off at the knees by a “daisy- cutter” bomb, a berserk soldier beat his head against our steel deck until his skull cracked. And there were more.
Shortly after, I was flown into Koli Point to help build a radio station. There I endured more than 50 bombing raids and saw many more casualties. On 30 June 1943, I lost more shipmates when we invaded Rendova. A Mitsubishi 101 torpedo plane threw a fish into the McCawley; she subsequently sunk.
I also served on the USS APC-25 and APC-38, supporting the 4th Marine Raiders on Munda, and evacuating their casualties. On board the USS Irwin (DD- 794), I served in raids on Saipan, Guam, Tinian. Palau, and Formosa. We rescued 646 survivors from the burning USS Princeton (CVL-23), escorted the personnel carriers onto the Iwo Jima beaches in February 1944, and took part in the Second Tokyo Raid and the invasion of Okinawa. The hell that destroyer sailors caught during the Okinawa operation is well-documented. My destroyer squadron went into Okinawa with nine ships- Three were sunk and three damaged (one of them twice by kamikazes). The squadron took more than 700 casualties.
It’s not that I carry a grudge, but I still feel pain after 40-odd years. Perhaps the 1-19 submariners were “just doing their job,” but so were the guards at Santo Tomas prison and on the Bataan Death March. That war the Japanese started left me with no wounds and no Purple Hearts- But it did leave deep scars. I cannot and 1 will not forget.
“The A-B-Z of L-T-A”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 102-103, February 1987;
D. A. Frasier, pp. 104-105, June 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Sean P. Walsh Mr. Polmar’s statement that the ship designation AZ (lighter-than-air aircraft tender) was established but never used >s in error.
According to the Dictionary ofAmerr can Fighting Ships, the USS Wright was designated AZ-1 when commissioned if 1921. Presaging Commander Frasier5 proposal for using a tethered blimp, the Wright initially carried a kite balloon f°r observation work. The balloon wen[1] [2] ashore after only a few months, however, and the Wright tended seaplanes aft®r that. But she retained the AZ designate1, until 1925, when she underwent conversion and emerged as the AV-1.
“Enemies No More”
(See B. W. Blee, pp. 56-63, February 1987
Proceedings)
Radioman First Class Jon A. Holiday, U. S. Navy (Retired)—To set the record straight: Not all former crewmembers of the USS North Carolina (BB-55) entirely approved of meeting with the crewmen of the Japanese submarine 1-19 that torpedoed us on 13 September 1942.
I served on the North Carolina from 7 May 1941-1 January 1943, and was on board on that fateful day. I and many of my shipmates had strong reservations about taking part in ceremonies that seemed to honor the Japanese submariners. I was shocked when the Imperial Japanese battle flag was displayed during the proceedings. Others felt the presence of the Japanese was a “slap in the face” to the memory of men killed in the attack and to their families.
[2] understand why Captain Blee contacted our former enemies to pursue historical data, and why some of my shipmates and officers felt that the Japanese “were just doing their jobs—same as us.” But most of those shipmates served on battleships during the war, and few, if any, viewed combat “up close and personal.” My battle station in “Sky One” gave me a ringside seat during combat, including the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. I watched the Wasp (CV-7) burn fiercely and the O’Brien (DD-415) gallantly try to survive.
But it was later service, both in the Solomons and in several other campaigns, which gives me a perspective different from that of my “showboat” shipmates. In January 1943, I sailed to Guadalcanal on the USS McCawley (APA-4). We carried reinforcements,