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Since the United States remains the Soviet Union’s “main adversary,” it shouldn’t surprise anyone that the Soviets would probe for U. S. weak spots—and they may have found one to exploit right in our backyard.
The Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear and conventional military capabilities have spurred a concomitant interest: projecting Soviet influence into countries far removed from the Eurasian landmass. Although Moscow had taken a strategic interest in Latin America and the Caribbean since the 1920s, it failed to make significant incursions in the region for fear of swift retaliation for overt meddling in the “backyard” of the United States. Not until Fidel Castro’s successful revolution did Moscow recognize the vulnerability of the Caribbean owing to Washington’s seeming inability to secure the U. S. southern flank.
Out of this new awareness, the Soviet Union developed a sophisticated strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of the Caribbean’s geopolitical environment and a realistic understanding of the Soviet strengths and weaknesses in the region. The Soviet Caribbean strategy incorporates five major objectives:
► Erosion of the U. S. historical predominance in the Caribbean region
► Expansion of Soviet influence and power ► Establishment and maintenance of Soviet proxies ► Proliferation of Soviet military and command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities ► Forced withdrawal of U. S. influence from other parts of the world in response to the greater security threat along its southern flank
All of these objectives are related, although the tactical means of achieving them may vary depending on the prevailing geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances. The first four are short-term goals which theoretically should create the conditions for the Soviets to achieve their last objective.
The Soviets are fully aware of U. S. strategic dependence on what Boris Ponomarev, former chief of the Conj munist Party of the Soviet Union’s International Depart ment, has called “seemingly quite reliable rear bnes 0 American imperialism.”1 A Soviet article noted t a “U. S. industry draws a considerable share of its raw n13 terials” from shipping routes in the Caribbean, “including 40 to 100 percent of its imports of various strategic als.”2 Another Soviet geostrategist commented that t Caribbean’s importance “can hardly be exaggerated. • • ' In military-strategic terms, it is a sort of hinterland 0 whose stability freedom of United States action in ot e parts of the world depends.”3
The Caribbean is more than a U. S. hinterland. It c°ve 4,000 linear miles, from Bridgetown, Barbados, ^ Tijuana, Mexico, and is really the fourth and longest 0 der of the United States. History demonstrates that a gre power maintains the global balance of power only by c ^ suring the security of its borders, including its 1'ttor zones. The natural moat of the English Channel protec the borders of Britain from invasion attempts by its c0 ..g nental enemies, allowing it to govern its vast empire w engaged in numerous international conflicts. Soviet str gists know that if the United States is to keep its seC^f-(j. commitments to areas of strategic importance in the IV die East, Europe, and Asia, it must consider its own ders secure. Soviet officials have remarked that the Sov Union’s global competition with the United States wo be easier if U. S. energy was diverted by a Western Hf sphere analogy to the threat the Soviets face along 1 border with the People’s Republic of China.4 l0
Although Leonid Brezhnev’s March 1982 thre3^ “take retaliatory steps that would put ... the U° . States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position^, has been interpreted as meaning the Soviet deployme!1
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sPher 6 late~ran8e nuclear missiles in the Western Hemi- be e ’ 11 ls far more likely that nonnuclear means would furced °^ed t0 acblevc the final strategic objective—the the World's^3^ H. influence from other parts of miljta/ ^ .^e use °f subversion, surrogate forces, and ibbean baSS*StanCe t0 tbe *Per'pheral theatres” of the Car- states ' aslProven far more effective in placing the United Nikita Ru an anal°g°us position” to the Soviets’ than nuciea hrushchev’s 1962 attempt at placing strategic Aar forces in Cuba.6
nated hntr^ ^mer'can isthmus (including Mexico) dominates ^ ^0Vlet client states would confront the United UndefeWJt*1 3 P°Pulous enemy along what is currently an Such a° contiguous border some 2,000 miles long, be j "ational security crisis for the United States would °^jecti CaSUrab>y more beneficial to other Soviet global the wJCS dlan w°uld the stationing of Soviet SS-20s in m°st CeSrtern Hemisphere—a deployment that would al- the unj ain‘y provoke another nuclear confrontation with age^ States, thereby negating the entire Soviet strat- ^°rces , orcin8 the Soviets to withdraw their global N°tjn°t .‘"'cud their Eurasian borders. l97os o* • ^oss international prestige during the
t'°nal wTi'?^ t0 a Perce*ved deficiency in American na- lhe Sov' wb'cb the Soviet Union was quick to exploit), ^Uierica1615 ^now that a communist-dominated Central a,t(l nona|W°U^ ^3Ve a catamitous effect on U. S. allies ^r°Pagand^neC* nat'ons in °ther parts of the world. Soviet s*ve evj tsts would announce such an event as conclu- ckably that the ‘‘correlation of forces” had irrevo-
. Huickive *n *avor °f “socialism”—a thesis that would fCc°mnioyHaCCePted vulnerable governments seeking to irnm atS t*1G ^oviet Union. With the United States ersed in a region which Andrei Gromyko de-
in8s / April 1987
scribed as ‘‘boiling like a cauldron,” Moscow would be free to impose its will on myriad countries which before had felt protected not only by actual U. S. defense commitments, but by the overall balance of power that these commitments maintained.7
From the Soviet vantage point, this process may be already well underway. The deployment of U. S. carrier battle groups off both the Pacific and the Caribbean coasts of Central America in military exercises during tjie past three years could become a permanent necessity if Caribbean regional security deteriorates further. According to the U. S. Army’s Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham, Jr., U. S. military commitments overseas already exceed existing force capabilities. Forty-three percent of the U. S. Army is now deployed abroad, while five of the 15 U. S. aircraft carriers are currently in foreign waters, with two of the remainder immobile in port for refitting. Of the roughly 30 E-3A/B airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in the inventory of the U. S. Air Force, approximately half are deployed overseas. Among those deployed in the United States, one is with the North American Aerospace Defense Command, eight are in training or flying narcotics interdiction missions, and another six are either undergoing depot or routine flight-line maintenance. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), among others, has pointed to the widening gap between the forces on hand and those needed to meet U. S. national security commitments as an indication that U. S. “military strategy far exceeds our present capability and projected resources.”8 And, as the Soviets well know, any serious threat developing close to the borders of the United States would probably lead to a retraction of U. S. forces from Asia and Europe.
The perception by Soviet leaders—based on their re-
gOVfOT0
In reviewing the Soviet Union’s relationship with ^ America, more particularly with the Caribbean,>
1920, there are eight readily distinguishable eleme the Soviet Caribbean strategy:
- Opportunism
- Subversion
- Use of proxies
- Deception
- Tactical probes
- Incremental power projection
- Confrontational avoidance
- Military assistance . . jn
Opportunism: Fidel Castro’s turn to the Soviet ^
1959 was not anticipated by Moscow: Castro s ag ^ began courting the Soviet Union seven months a Cuban Revolution. During this time, the U. S. ° :ts ment had few doubts that Cuba was still firmly W1 j sphere of influence: neither the existing Cuban structure nor many members of the revolutionary g° ment can be said to have been receptive to Soviet i ^ ence at first. The Soviets saw the opportunities o er j Castro’s overtures and exploited them. The groW .^g, Soviet influence in Cuba would not have been p°s^ however, without the use of subversion, deception. ^ proxies—all provided by the Cuban Communis jy. which functioned as a Soviet proxy by forging an,..,[rat'' alliance with Castro’s 26th of July Movement and tta ^ ing key positions in the revolutionary regime. Simi^ in portunities were exploited in a more sophisticate [ted Grenada and Nicaragua, where political discontent the populaces and essentially transcended ideo ogy I The successful and generally unimpeded conso of what were initially genuinely popular revolution^ ^ gimes in Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua suppo jjyf contention of Soviet geostrategists that certain odj (f and subjective conditions” must exist in a c°u . araC' render it “ripe for revolution of a deep social ^ ter.”11 The failure of Marxist-oriented governmei ^ Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973, as well as t ^ tive Dominican Republic coup of 1965, appeare ^
firm this theory for the Soviets.1- Since 1973, 0 ^
portunism has been heavily tempered by aroat^rV ypU11
Proceedings /
markable politico-military gains in the Western Hemisphere—that their objectives are steadily being achieved in the Caribbean makes it even more unlikely that a military confrontation with the United States would be allowed to occur. Thus, they emphasize the buildup of the military capabilities of Soviet proxy forces, such as in Cuba and Nicaragua. Regardless of its policy ot avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States, the Soviet Union seeks to cover all possible strategic contingencies by establishing its own military facilities in Cuba and planning for similar bases elsewhere in the Caribbean. The use of Cuba for intelligence collection, servicing of Soviet submarines, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare support has a more universal strategic application than that of supporting Cuba’s regional role as a base for the export
of revolution. . IT •* a
The proliferation of Soviet proxy bases in the United States’ “strategic rear’’ would imperil U. S. and allied sea lines of communication. Logistics planning for the U. S. military estimates that almost half of the shipping tonnage needed to reinforce NATO, and about 40% of that required by a major East Asian conflict, would have to pass from the Gulf of Mexico through the Caribbean/Central American zone. These same routes also carry roughly 50% of all foreign cargo, including crude oil, imported to
the United States. , _. .
The 1984 Report of the President’s National Bipartisan Commission on Central America pointed out that today the Soviets have a greater capability to interdict shlPPin§ than the Nazis had in World War II, when German U-boats sank 260 merchant ships in the Caribbean in six mont s. At that time, the Allies had more submarines in the area than the Germans did and used Cuba for resupply and basing. Currently, the Soviets have twice as many submarines in their entire fleet as the United States does, and they also have access to operate and to receive air cover from Cuba. Thirteen sea lanes pass through four choke- points at Cuba, leaving them vulnerable to interdiction.
The decline of the United States’ historical political and economic predominance in the Caribbean, regardless of the increase in Soviet influence, creates regional instability that fosters the growth of leftist insurgent movements^ The economic crises besetting nearly all Caribbean and Latin American countries have led to anti-U. S. sentiment and economic nationalism, both of which the Cubans are actively exploiting to create an even greater rift between the United States and its southern neighbors.
To date, the U. S. Government’s much-vaunted Caribbean Basin Initiative has largely failed to fulfill its promise of economic revitalization for the region. As a result, Caribbean Marxists are regaining some of the political ground lost after the 1983 U. S. intervention in Grenada, where remnants of the People’s Revolutionary Government have regrouped to enter the political arena again under the guise of the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement. Recent polls in Jamaica indicate that the apparent failure of the Edward Seaga government’s economic policies has engendered a surge in popularity for Michael Manley’s People’s National Party, which some analysts believers now dominated by the party’s pro-Cuban left wing.10
io*1
and closer attention to the laying of “revolutionary -s dations” through subversion and the work ot p Subversion: The subversive element of Sovie ^ ^ bean strategy takes many forms. In the early days
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oviet Union’s relationship with Latin America, there '''ere clumsy attempts at creating civil unrest through j. es and riots, or employing the equally counterproduc- *Ve efforts to infiltrate governments with Comintern/ ominform agents. Even an attempt by Soviet agents to u vert the Marxist-Leninist regime of Fidel Castro back- th i kac^ in the late 1960s, and could have resulted in ase oss °f Cuba for the Soviets had the United States been s skillfully opportunistic as its antagonist, jj "hversive operations in Latin America and the Carib- aj3n are generally the responsibility of the KGB’s Havana junct, the Direction General de Inteligencia, and the u an Communist Party’s Western Hemisphere intelli- tio CC arm’ t^leDepartamento America. The identifica- asn’ cuhivation, and training of potential revolutionaries, yjjln cases of Grenada’s New Jewel Movement and the _ 'cantguan Sandinistas, appear to be the favored forms of pli 3tlng subversive operations. This is usually accom- s h ^ inviting young Caribbean leftists to conferences 0fC as the first Consultative Meeting of Anti-Imperialist w ^aaizati°ns of Latin America and the Caribbean, which tjeiS 'n Havana in June 1984 and attended by 28 par- Cou’ ronts> and other organizations from 21 Caribbean nes. - Several hundred young people from Central
traditi0n t”le Caribbean, many of them from moderate, tended ^ anti'c°mmunist political parties, also at- d’cating 6 July-Augnst 1985 Moscow Youth Festival, innext Poiy11101^ overt trend by the Soviets to influence the Vse f'J leal generation in the Caribbean.14 °f succes^^0^^' Soviet Union enjoys a high degree *'SVe thaT T‘tH *tS Caribbean surrogates because they be- ?,°viets i t lC^ are Partners with—not proxies of—the s°cialisn a,^°”)ai crusade to replace “imperialism” with 01 • Although some members of the Cuban,
Grenadian, and Nicaraguan governments had undoubtedly given their primary allegiance to Moscow, the nationalistic leaders of these countries willingly accepted Soviet support and resources in pursuit of their personal revolutionary goals. The fact that the objectives of Fidel Castro, Maurice Bishop, and Daniel Ortega coincided with those of the Soviet Union is considered completely natural given their shared ideologies. As demonstrated by the collection of documents found after the U. S. intervention in Grenada in October 1983, Moscow is adept at manipulating the egos and aspirations of those countries’ leaders that it regards, albeit secretly, as its proxies.15
Even more valuable to the attainment of Soviet strategic objectives in the Caribbean is the proxy system—again stemming from shared ideological sentiments and political goals—through which a wide variety of leftist groups, some of which are unfriendly to the Soviet Union, coordinate their activities. These organizations, ranging from the powerful Cuban armed forces to the tiny Worker’s Party of Jamaica, carry out actions that serve Soviet interests yet which the Soviet Union could not openly engage in without jeopardizing its international standing or risking a confrontation with the United States. The most striking example is the presence of tens of thousands of Cuban troops in
■■■■
Proxies—or “partners”—Cuba’s Castro and Nicaragua’s Ortega, sharing Ortega’s inauguration platform, above, do the Soviets’ bidding. From Cuba and Nicaragua, the Soviets operate a subversive campaign in Latin America and the Caribbean, which includes proselytizing students—1985 Moscow Youth Festival, facing page.
75
The arrival of Soviet-supplied Mi-24 Hind gunships in Nicaragua hardly caused a stir in the United States. Once again, the Soviets successfully used their tactic of incremental power projection.
nations as diverse and dispersed as Nicaragua and Angola, arousing only mild Western reaction. Large numbers of Soviet soldiers in their place would undoubtedly serve, at least briefly, to unite the West in ways similar to those provoked by the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
The Soviet proxy system is sustained and coordinated by conferences such as the 1984 Consultative Meeting on Anti-Imperialist Organizations in Havana and the First Latin American Congress on Anti-Imperialist Thought in Managua in February 1985.16 These meetings are all attended by Soviet delegates and function as strategy sessions, allowing Caribbean revolutionaries to develop “close unity, diverse means of rapid communication, mutual support, encouragement and shared criticism in order to survive, struggle and win.”17
Deception: As evidenced by the Grenada Documents and Sandinista Commandante Bayardo Arce’s remarks to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party in May 1984, deception features as prominently in Soviet Caribbean strategy as it does in Soviet strategic nuclear and other strategies.Is Penetration of the traditional U. S. sphere of influence requires the most sophisticated deception techniques. Once pro-Soviet regimes have been installed, continuing forms of deception are used to prevent American intervention during consolidation. The cases of Cuba and, increasingly, Nicaragua demonstrate that Soviet strategists believe that the United States will eventually accept a Marxist-Leninist regime as part of the regional status quo after it has survived beyond a certain point, thus allowing the “democratic socialist” facade to crumble gradually and the Soviet presence to become more overt.
Deception is a vital part of military as well as political strategy. While the most graphic example of this is the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union has also attempted to deceive the United States by constructing military installations in Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua which were ostensibly under the sovereign control of these client states. The introduction of both tactical and strategic military assets into the region is accomplished in much the same way, as illustrated by the reported basing of Soviet Tu-95 Bear-D aircraft in Cuba under the guise of Cuban Air Force markings,19 and the plan to provide the tiny island of Grenada with its own air force as a means of legitimizing a military presence at the island’s Cuban-built “international airport.”20
Tactical probes: Demonstrably, Soviet strategy for the Caribbean is a synthesis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, superpower rivalry, and unbridled imperialism. The continuing influence of V. I. Lenin on Soviet strategic policy can not be underrated, particularly in its application to the Caribbean. One of Lenin’s basic tenets—“If you strike steel, pull back; if you strike mush, keep going”—constitutes the most enduring factor in Soviet Caribbean strategy: tac
tical probes. The Soviet policy of tactical probing appeared in 1969 with the introduction of Soviet naval an naval air units in the Caribbean, designed to test the U. > reaction during a watershed period in U. S.- Soviet relations resulting from the historical coincidence of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Vietnam, a new administration, and the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear parity wt the United States. When such probes encounter Lentms “mush,” the strategic thrust is maintained via the cautious projection of power.
Incremental power projection: The Soviet use of tacti cal probes continues unabated and exhibits increasing s° phistication through the use of disinformation and deliber ate leaks of genuine material to the Western media to tes the U. S. Government’s reaction. The cases of allegeu MiG and Czechoslovakian L-39 Albatros aircraft ship ments from Bulgaria to Nicaragua in late 1984 and ear) 1985 may have been part of this strategy, which also has more subtle purpose of forcing the U. S. Government to adjust unknowingly its criteria for the unacceptable intro duction of offensive weapons into the Caribbean—there ) facilitating the Soviet tactic of incremental power projec tion. For example, the public outcry over the possible u1 traduction of fixed-wing Soviet aircraft allowed Mi'-
helicopter gunships—the most lethal counterinsurgent’)
weapon in the Soviet arsenal—to be landed in Nicaraga with negligible comment by the U. S. Department of $ta and the media. The same tactic has been successfully usC^ in Cuba for more than 20 years: Combat aircraft, such a the MiG-23BN Flogger-F, have a far more potent offea sive capability than the 11-28 aircraft that President John • Kennedy ordered removed in 1962, yet the nuclear-cap ble MiGs have been based in Cuba for nearly ten yeaf Incremental power projection in the Caribbean continU with the introduction of successively more powerful viet warships, such as the Leningrad helicopter carrier aIL Golf- and Echo-class submarines, and the development seaport projects in Nicaragua for “peaceful” purp°se^
Confused U. S. responses to direct and indirect S°vj\ aggression in Africa, Asia, and Latin America during1 1970s encouraged Soviet expansionist tendencies, as ^ viet theoreticians pointed to the seeming powerlessnes^ the Carter Administration as evidence of the inevita decline of the West. With the “correlation of forces’ P j ceived as visibly shifting in their favor, Soviet strateg1 awakened to the full strategic potential of the Caribbe
Confrontational avoidance: Tactical probes and su quent incremental power projection are facets of a s
76
Proceedings / Apr'*
“Perinh ’ assistance: Although military assistance to beeil fo' theatres” of the Third World seems to have in tbe0rn,Ully lncorporated into Soviet strategic doctrine bazardl 'f 970s, it had been employed somewhat hap- Gerterai > °r several years before being enunciated by Academ 24^bavrov’ Chief of the Soviet General Staff stat£(j th^ Cuban armed forces minister Raul Castro factor” 31 S°Viet m'htary assistance was the “decisive Czech0 ,|ln tke Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, and re§inteS °'lak'an arms were sent to the pro-Soviet Arbenz assign'0 ^Uatemala as early as 1954.25 Cuban military Whiie the V'ta‘ ‘° tbe ^an<dinrsta victory in 1979,
8ents inCpi °w °f arms and equipment to Marxist insur- C°ntinue ■ ^a‘va^or and other Central American nations netvvork S t0 suPPort a large and well-organized guerrilla
^at prcP' assistancc to the Grenadian New Jewel Move- to seiZeVl ^ by Cuban proxies enabled Maurice Bishop tary dep0? <- Power in Grenada, forming another mili- Caribbe. training and direct arms shipments to other Ustcrn c- , ?rx‘s‘s' "fbe fact that U. S./Organization of an bean States forces encountered greater-than-
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edi„.
°viet policy of avoiding, until a propitious time, a direct IJ11 itary confrontation with the West. This policy also has 1 s basis in a Lenin admonition of not depriving “our- j6 ves in advance of any freedom of action” by openly n orming “an enemy who is at present better armed than e are whether we shall fight him and when.” Direct °n rontation with the United States during the Cuban ls^'e Crisis resulted in a temporary strategic setback for S|ie 0viet Union and a political liability for Nikita Khru- teC ev- This experience had a deep impact on Soviet stra- vglc bought, thus accounting for the concern over pro- hi h*n^ tbe * ‘imperialists,” as expressed by such °lai 'onking ^oviet officials as Andrei Gromyko and Nik- q 1 Agarkov during their meetings with members of aj^nac*a s People’s Revolutionary Government.21 It is tan probably the underlying reason for the Soviets’ reluc- ad ^ l° b)rge a formal defense pact with Fidel Castro or Th <' Uba t0 tbe Warsaw Pact- nient6 ^°v*et Union seeks to reassure the Cuban Govem- such 0^JtS 'fraternal support” by ambiguous warnings con ^ ^ashmgton . . . should be clearly aware of the isla 5Uences whh which aggressive actions against the exPe ' ^reec*om are frought.”22 But Fidel Castro is too WouMlenCeC^ a geopolitician to believe that the Soviets fense fVer en§a§e in war with the United States in de- hy M °. (“uba- Similar assurances were given to Vietnam Chin °SC0W ln 1978, yet when the People’s Republic of Pebruap n^ert°°k ‘tS "Punitive” invasion of Vietnam in of Qaat? ^ in response to the Vietnamese occupation Pr°ntati tbe ^oviet Union carefully avoided a con- ness j°n Wlth China, and did not even increase the readi- The b°. *tS ^ divisions along the Sino-Soviet border.23 Cuba COrnProm*se that Moscow can make in defense of t° S to huild up the island’s own defensive capability Castro ^°mt wbere anY U. S. military action against the Womj re8lrne short of an attack with nuclear weapons States resub ln a Pyrrhic victory, at best, for the United
Military
8S / April 1987
expected difficulty in securing Grenada after the October 1983 intervention is a sobering example of the problems that would be posed by the proliferation of other, far stronger, Soviet proxy bases throughout the Caribbean.
The Soviet Union’s strategic ventures in the Caribbean are part of a single greater strategic objective preoccupying Soviet strategists since the end of World War II: the destabilization and subordination of the Soviet Union’s “main adversary,” the United States. As long as the United States remains an international power, the Soviet Union will approach its goal of global hegemony cautiously. To defeat “imperialism,” the Soviets have brought the struggle to the often overlooked, and therefore most vulnerable, U. S. southern flank.
‘Boris Ponomarev, “Topical Problems of the Theory of the Revolutionary Process,” Kommunist, October 1971, p. 75.
2Kommunist, No. 10, July 1970, p. 93.
3Quoted by John Bartlow Martin in U. S. Policy in the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 138.
4Time, 3 August 1983, p. 25.
5Pravda, 17 March 1982.
^he term used by General I. Shavrov in his article, “Local Wars and Their Place in the Global Strategy of Imperialism,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 17, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 56-58.
7“Record of Meeting Between Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko at the Kremlin, April 15, 1983,” (Grenada Documents #104261, National Archives, Washington, D. C.).
*The New York Times, 10 August 1983, pp. 1 and 3A.
9Report of the President’s National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, January 1984, p. 92.
l0The Sunday Gleaner (Kingston), 8 September 1985, p. 3.
"A. F. Shulgovskii, “Rasstanovka Klassovikh sil v bor’be za osvobozhdenie,” in Ekonomicheskie problemy stran Latinskoi Amerikii (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1963), pp. 482-484.
12M. F. Kudachkin, ed., Velikii oktiabr’ i Kommunisticheskii partii Latinskoi Ameriki (Moscow: 1978), p. 175.
13Richard F. Staar, ed., 1985 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 76-77.
X4La Nacion (San Jose), 17 July 1985, p. 6A.
15U. S. Department of State and Department of Defense, Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection (Washington, D. C., September 1984). l6Managua Radio Sandino Network, February 19, 1985; FBIS Latin America, 21 February 1985.
l7Staar, 1985 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, p. 76.
18U. S. Department of State, Commandante Bayardo Arce’s Secret Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), Washington, D. C., March 1985.
X9Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1985 (Washington, D. C.: Perth Corporation), p. 158.
20Grenada Documents, “Summary of Prime Minister’s Meeting With Soviet Ambassador—24th May, 1983,” p. 3, No. 21.
2‘Ibid., in several documents.
22Pravda, 24 November 1981.
-3Mose L. Harvey, “The Russian Bear’s Southern Migration,” Sea Power, 15 April 1983, p. 101.
_4I. Shavrov, “'Local Wars and Their Place in the Global Strategy of Imperialism,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 17, No. 3. (March 1974), pp. 56-58.
25Red Star, 2 December 1970.
Dr. Ashby holds a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California. He lived in Grenada, off and on, from 1967 to 1980, during which time he witnessed firsthand the Cuban militarization of Grenada. He has had two other articles published in Proceedings: “Grenada: Soviet Stepping Stone,” in December 1983; “Nicaragua: Soviet Satrapy,” in July 1984. He also is the author of The Bear in the Back Yard: Moscow's Caribbean Strategy, scheduled for publication by Lexington Books this year. Dr. Ashby is a senior policy analyst for Latin American Affairs with The Heritage Foundation.