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er’s Mate Klims'l First Class' Jeffrey K. Bray, U..S.* Navy
’ The ‘‘weapons that wait” could keep.these carriers tied up ih* Norfolk until the mines are cleared. With the U. S. Navy’s current niihe.auiiitei - measures capabilities—or lack thereof-^-sudr a-
It was a typical June afternoon when Convoy KN 109, consisting of 18 merchant ships and their escorts, rounded Cape Henry, Virginia. After waiting for the local pilot to arrive, the convoy entered the Chesapeake Bay. Several minutes later, one of the tankers was shaken by an explosion. The convoy dispersed immediately, to avoid a possible submarine. Convoy escorts and circling airplanes began to search, but the sub was long gone.
In the hours that followed, four more ships were rocked by explosions. But it was now clear that there were no submarines firing torpedoes; Hampton Roads had been neutralized by a clandestine minefield. The area was closed to shipping for approximately four days. After the minefield was finally cleared, shipping returned to a cautious norm.
The date was 15 June 1942. During 1942-43, 338 mines were laid by German submarines along the East Coast of the United States, resulting in 14 ships sunk or damaged. Various ports along the East Coast were closed for a total of 40 days as a result of submarine-planted minefields.
Today, the Norfolk-Hampton Roads area presents a very tempting target—a modern-day Pearl Harbor. Norfolk is the largest U. S. naval base complex, home port for 123 vessels. The International Marine Terminal, with numerous deep-draft merchant vessels present most of the time, is also located in Norfolk. In addition, merchant shipping destined for Richmond and Baltimore must also transit through this area.
Norfolk is such a vulnerable area because both military and merchant vessels are required to transit through the same choke points—the Chesapeake pilotage area, Thimble Shoals Channel, and the Hampton Roads Tunnel. The shallow water in these areas intensifies the destructive force of an underwater explosion. The lack of underwater visibility and excessive sea current also make mine countermeasures (MCM) difficult at these choke points.
Current Soviet literature reveals an increasing interest in mine warfare. The Soviets claim that post-World War II conflicts—notably the Vietnam War, which saw successful U. S. mining of North Vietnamese ports in 1972— 73—have validated the increasing importance of the mine as a weapon.1
Soviet naval theoreticians have stressed that the naval mine’s main advantage over other weapons is its simplicity, high reliability, and low production cost. The Soviets claim that sea mines will be extremely useful for blockading enemy bases.2 It also has been emphasized that the use of sea mines forces an adversary to carry out extensive and costly antimine activities.3
During the Red Sea mining incident of 1984, 18 ships were damaged and international shipping was disrupted by a clandestinely laid minefield. Even with a multinational
The people tasked to keep the fleet from being bottled up by mines require lots of hands-on training with the latest equipment and replicas of Soviet mines.
MCM force of approximately 40 vessels, 60 days were required to investigate all mine-like contacts prior to declaring the area safe for shipping. Many of the contacts were identified as unexploded ordnance, some of which dated back to World War II, which theoretically could pose a threat.
One item of special interest was the previously unknown Soviet mine type—-marked “99501”—found by British personnel while clearing their search area. It was a combination influence/bottom mine.4 The mine was loaded with a “moderate” explosive charge but had the capability to accommodate a larger explosive package- This particular mine appeared to be an export item, and it showed that Soviet mine technology has become quite advanced.
The “99501” mine can be submarine or surface launched. In this case, it was probably laid by a surface ship. A suspect Libyan merchant vessel was seen in the vicinity of the Red Sea minefield prior to the detonations- After Western officials had examined the Libyan vessel closely, they concluded that the mines were simply allowed to roll down the ship’s stern ramp and into the water.5
Could such an operation occur along the coast of the United States? The U. S. Coast Guard maintains a close vigil on “special interest” foreign merchant vessels- These vessels are not allowed to transit through certain areas. Vessels of questionable intent are boarded and inspected before they transit a restricted area. Therefore, the threat from merchant vessel mining, as in the Red Sea incident, appears to be minimal.
However, submarine-laid mines pose as much of 3 threat to the United States today as they did 40 years ago- The Soviet Union possesses the world’s largest fleet of
submarines, and Soviet naval leaders consider the submarine to be the perfect platform for laying mines. In addition, the Soviet Union maintains the largest and most varied stockpile of sea mines in the world. Many of its mines are state-of-the-art, like the “99501” mine.
Modern Soviet diesel-electric submarines have become increasingly difficult for current antisubmarine sensors to detect. A single dedicated Tango-class submarine, with a load of approximately 30 mines, has a high probability of success in an offensive mining mission. As few as three of these boats could effectively secure the East Coast of the United States, with Norfolk as their main target.
The Soviets’ primary goal would be to immobilize the fleet in Norfolk, and the clogging of a choke point by a damaged ship would further complicate the situation. Once the minefield was cleared, salvage crews would still have to clear the restricted passage to permit the fleet to exit. During this time, the fleet would have to remain pier- s‘de-—vulnerable to other types of threats.
The capability of the U. S. MCM force has reached an aH-time low. A limited minesweeping force is immediately available at Norfolk, the most vulnerable area. To c°rnplicate this situation, part of this force could be deployed at any time or be unavailable because of equipment casualties or maintenance periods. Production problems in |he Navy’s mine warfare shipbuilding program further aggravate this weakness. The Navy’s new class of mine countermeasures ships, behind planned schedules, now appears to be on track, and the first ship of the class, venger (MCM-1), will enter the fleet this year. The sur- ape effect mine hunter program has been cancelled and ^dl be replaced by a U. S.-built version of the Italian erici-class mine hunter. In the short term, U. S. mine countermeasure assets will be stretched thin. To offset ese delays, the U. S. Navy might do well to procure '’Ome new NATO minesweeper hulls, such as the Tripar- lte class, and install U. S. equipment on board.
. foe Hampton Roads shipping area is extensive, consist- of more than 100 square nautical miles. Our meager CM forces will have to carry a heavy burden in clearing ^Uch areas. With such limited resources, Hampton Roads °uld be closed by mining for an extended period. Having be0st °f the Atlantic Fleet bottled up in one location would a major accomplishment for the Soviets. tr. • w do we prevent this from occurring? First, we must a,r> our personnel. Current MCM exercises use U. S. fjlnes and mine shapes, which create a false sense of con- t- ence- The current Soviet mines are highly target-selec- j?e’ Very reliable, and quite difficult to sweep or neutral- re' addition, most of the exercise minefields have been cently seeded and, therefore, are easier for the MCM rj"es to detect.
evePbca or mock Soviet mines should be used in training jjj.0 ut*°ns. Several Western nations have recovered Soviet g'nes’ including the most recent one in the Red Sea.
(r act copies could be fabricated and used in future MCM the'ning evolutions- Our personnel could then experience true threat and identify weaknesses that may have des °?ed through inefficient training. The delay between m§ the drill mines and the beginning of mine-clearing
exercises should be increased, to present more of a challenge for the MCM force. No-notice drills should also be used, to reflect real-world threats and to enhance MCM preparedness.
Another important option is the Navy’s strategic homeporting program. This program is intended to disperse the fleet and lessen the risk of another Pearl Harbor, but its proposed scope appears to be insufficient. Norfolk is still too congested.
A third option, also current, is the channel survey program. Channel surveys involve searching for and charting all mine-like objects in channels and harbor approaches, prior to a threat of deliberate mining. A simple comparison of past surveys with more current ones would reveal possible mines and their locations. Going hand-in-hand with this procedure is channel conditioning, a process that involves the systematic removal of all mine-like items, leaving a “sterile” channel. This reduces the number of contacts that would require investigation during a suspected mining incident. Channel conditioning should be actively pursued to eliminate any of the mine-like objects that exist. If a true threat should develop, the channel conditioning would speed up the investigation of all suspect items.
Channel surveys and channel conditioning are not to be confused with the current “Q” system. The “Q” system or “Q” route, originated by the British, was adopted by the United States during World War II and modified to meet the needs of both countries. The “Q” route normally begins at the harbor entrance buoy and extends out to sea, ending at a designated depth where the mine threat is no longer significant. These routes are not as critical as choke points and are flexible to operational planning. Channel surveys would cover the deep-water passages from the channel entrance buoy to the port.
Our MCM forces need a dramatic boost. The current defense budget-cutting trends cannot be allowed to affect current or projected programs. Increased funding is essential to correct our deficiencies and to counter any present or future threats. In a future conflict, having our naval forces inactive for several days could be disastrous, and the decisive factor in the outcome.
'Adm. V. Sysoyev, "Morskaya Blokada” (Naval Blockade), Morskoy Sbornik December 1976, pp. 35-36.
2CaPt- G. Morozov and Capt. L. Fish, ”Form'i 1 sposob'i s blokada na more” (Ways and Means of Conducting a Naval Blockade), Morskoy Sbornik, February
-’Capt. A. Kondratovich and Yu. Skorohod, "Minny-oruzhiye universaFnoye” (Mines Arc Universal Weapons), Morskoy Sbornik, December 1976 p 31
1985" TTo9 "MinCS °f AUgUSt: A" IntCrna,ional Whodunit,” Proceedings ', May 5Ibid., p. 112.
Petty Ofticer Bray is currently a senior explosive ordnance disposal technician currently assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Two at Fort Story, Virginia. He is also a senior at Old Dominion University, majoring in history. Upon graduation in May, he intends to apply for a naval commission and become either an intelligence or a cryptology officer.