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Contents:
Scratch One Flattop?
Where Are the Carriers?
Fitness You Can See
One SAR: ‘That’ll Be $159.99 Plus Tax’
Nuclear Torpedoes
Becoming a Female Aviator
Organizing Ships for Battle
The Tailhooker’s Wife
Accountability Afloat
Navy Medicine: A Second Opinion
Scratch
Requiem for the DDG-2s?
SWATH: Advanced Technology or Mythology?
ASW: Revolution or Evolution
Crossroads at Bikini
Admiral Thompson Interview
To Fly Safely
Old Gimlet Eye
Employing the PHMs
One Seat Versus Two
Bang-less Tank Killer
The Right Stuff—Blue Angels Style
Large Carriers: A Matter of Time
Sky Hook: Tactical Air for Smaller Ships
Orion the Hunted
Putting the P-3 Reserve to Work
The F4D ‘Ford’: A Better Idea?
“Scratch One Flattop?”
(See W. J. Luti, pp. 55-60, October 1986 Proceedings)
“Where Are the Carriers?”
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 61-67, October 1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander T. J. McKear- ney, U. S. Navy—If the Soviets assign a sea-control mission to their carrier as we do to ours, their navy’s strategic mission must be similar to ours. Commander Luti seems to agree with this argument by casting the expanding Soviet Navy in a global power-projection role, including a Third World presence mission similar to our Navy’s. I do not agree. Although the Soviet Navy has developed platforms and tactics strikingly similar to ours, the impact of these developments on its strategic maritime capability doesn’t indicate a major shift in the Soviet Navy’s basic mission. For example, the impressive numbers of Soviet “gator” hulls that Commander Luti cites are limited in their ability to project forces in a hostile situation because the Soviets do not have enough amphibious platforms—such as the Ivan Rogov-class amphibious transport ships—to launch the landing craft for an ocean-borne assault.
The primary Soviet naval mission remains defense of the homeland, and their current naval building pro'gram supports this traditional role. The Kirov-class battle cruisers and Slava-class guided missile cruisers are powerful antisurface and antiair platforms, capable of interdicting our forces attempting to execute the maritime strategy tasks against the Soviet homeland. Admittedly, the Soviets now have the forces to build a formidable carrier battle group around their new carrier. However, their strategy to date does not indicate that they will do so, and a change is unlikely now that the proponent of a global Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, has been replaced.
Commander Luti has focused on the imminent reality of U. S. carrier versus Soviet carrier confrontations. As Scott Truver’s article in the same issue illustrates, the rise of the Soviet carrier fleet will occur just as the U. S. carrier fleet is declining because of old age. The response to this problem must focus on more than carrier size; it must focus on the capabilities and missions of both the U. S. and Soviet 21st-century fleets.
“Fitness You Can See”
(,See D. Huber, pp. 97-98, August 1986; A. M- Ratner, pp. 15-16, October 1986; D. Franklin, B. R. Kellish, pp. 90-91, December 1986 Proceedings)
Sergeant First Class Frank W. Leslie, U. S. Army—Mr. Ratner obviously missed a basic point of Lieutenant Coni' mander Huber’s article. The U. S. armed forces have standards that one must meet to enter. If you cannot meet all the standards, you do not enter. Once in the armed forces, one must continue to meet the standards to stay. Here again, if you do not meet all the standards, you do not stay. Passing the physical fitness test is one standard. Meeting the weight requirement is another.
“One SAR: ‘That’ll Be $159.99
Plus Tax’ ”
(See M. Adams, pp. 89-90, December 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Thomas A. Nies, U. S. Coast Guard—While Commander Adams argues convincingly against charging user fees for some Coast Guard missions, his logic falls short when addressing fisheries protection. For several years, the Coast Guard has been collecting user fees from foreign vessels for each ton of fish they harvest in the U. S. exclusive econornie zone. Since 1982, these fees have been based on the costs of carrying out the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which directs Coast Guard involvement in “management, fisheries research, administration, and enforcement. ...” The Coast Guard’s annual costs of roughly $100 million have been the largest single portion of these costs.
The Act also requires foreign vessels to pay at least the costs the Coast Guard incurs in managing foreign as opposed to domestic catch. The National Marine Fisheries Service has kept these fees artificially low by refusing to charge the amount the Coast Guard actually spends
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on foreign enforcement.
Why shouldn’t domestic fishermen, too, pay the price of administering programs from which they benefit? Fish are common property, in effect owned by the nation and managed by the government for the benefit of all. Other similar resources—offshore oil, timber on public lands, western grazing rights—are not left free for the taking. Users must pay a government lease for the right to harvest those resources. No such program exists tn federal fisheries policy; fishing permits are often issued free, without a fee to cover administrative costs. Many fisher- *es managers, biologists, and economists Predict that U. S. fishing resources are tearing the “tragedy of the commons”— exhaustion of a shared resource because to one has an incentive to limit harvests for future use. Already, too many domes- hc fishermen are chasing too few fish. This creates a need for expensive regula- hon and enforcement, subsidized by the taxpayers.
Charging domestic fishermen for Coast Guard enforcement of fisheries policy would cause a political uproar. But the ■dea is logical, and could be implemented through permit fees or a landing tax.
‘‘Nuclear Torpedoes”
(See N. Polmar and D. M. Kerr, pp. 63-68, August 1986; D. A. Paolucci and J. H. Patton, PP- 91-95, November 1986; M. Amedick, p.
19, December 1986 Proceedings)
John J. Engelhardt, Naval Architect— An article on the questionable effectiveness of U. S. torpedo warheads against Soviet submarines has long been overdue- I congratulate Mr. Polmar and Dr. Kerr on their assessment of the problem and their proposal for an insertable nu- dear component (INC) warhead.
The principal question is whether hghtweight—and, in some cases, heavyweight—U. S. torpedo warheads can rupture the pressure hulls of Soviet submarines. Many experts believe that even when U. S. torpedoes fail to rupture a ‘mil, they will cause sufficient shock damage to force most Soviet submarines to abort their mission. However, a shock kill” is an unacceptable measure °f torpedo-warhead effectiveness. It may d°t deal a fatal blow to the submarine and her crew. Lethal shock damage typically affects only a small volume of a subma- r'ne> meaning that a submarine with shock-impaired propulsion systems could stlU manage to launch its torpedoes or Cruise missiles.
Most antisubmarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes in the U. S. fleet today were designed to counter the Soviet submarine threat of the 1960s and early 1970s. It is thus no surprise that some of them probably could not rupture the Soviets’ most recently designed pressure hulls.
The good news is that the Mk-46 and Mk-48 torpedoes are still effective against most Soviet submarines. The bad news is that the new, mammoth Oscar- class nuclear-powered guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) and the Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), along with the introduction of several other highly survivable submarine classes (the Mike, Sierra, and Akula SSNs), will soon change all of this.
Constant references in their literature to submarine “unsinkability” show that the Soviets believe combat survivability is the most important element in submarine design. The Soviets build those deep-diving, multiple-compartment, double-hulled submarines precisely because they are tough enough to survive modern combat. Through 30 years of evolutionary design the Soviets have combined the combat-survivability features of the double-hulled design with advances in quieting, dive depth, and speed.
Recent Soviet submarine designs incorporate two features which together have degraded the effectiveness of U. S. ASW torpedoes:
- Soviet submarine standoff distance between the pressure hull and outer hull has increased because the size of submarines has grown, and because cruise- and ballistic-missile launchers are being mounted externally in the Oscar SSGNs and the Typhoon SSBNs.
- The Soviets have certainly increased the strength of their submarine pressure hulls since the 1960s, probably by using high-yield-strength steel and titanium alloys (i.e., similar to U. S. HY-100 and HY-130 steels or Ti-100 titanium). Submarines using these steel alloys should be capable of test depths of about 400-500 meters, and those built of the titanium alloys should be able to achieve depths of 800-1,000 meters.
Four approaches to the torpedo- warhead effectiveness problem are currently possible:
- We can accept that U. S. torpedoes will not rupture the pressure hulls of many modem Soviet submarines, and hope that the warheads cause sufficient shock damage either to sink the submarine or abort its mission. This option is unacceptable. Engineers have always designed torpedoes to rupture pressure hulls and sink submarines because we cannot guarantee that equipment shock
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damage will render a submarine “mission-killed.”
- We could double or triple the weight of the Mk-48 warheads by introducing a new heavyweight torpedo. This option warrants serious attention, especially since the torpedo tubes of the new Seawolf (SSN-21)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine will have a larger diameter. However, even a triple-weight Mk-48 warhead carries no guarantees; it could detonate in proximity to a Soviet submarine and still fail to rupture the pressure hull.
- We could design lightweight, medium- weight, and heavyweight torpedoes with “follow-through” warheads that would penetrate the outer hulls of Soviet submarines and hurl small, high-explosive warheads against their pressure hulls. This option offers the best hope for defeating Soviet double-hulled submarines with a conventional warhead. Unfortunately, the follow-through warhead will take several years to develop, it will be expensive, and its success will depend greatly on how much “structural clutter” exists between a Soviet submarine’s pressure hull and outer hull.
- We could develop a sub-kiloton (less than 0.1 kiloton) INC warhead for heavyweight and, possibly, lightweight ASW torpedoes. This option holds the most immediate promise. INC technology is available today; its kill probability is high; and it can be retrofit into current torpedo designs. The INC warhead offers U. S. submarine commanders maximum flexibility. They could use the weapon in “conventional mode” against older Soviet submarines, in “nuclear mode” against the modern, highly survivable submarines, or as an explosive countermeasure against incoming Soviet torpedoes. Most important, we can easily modify the INC torpedo to match future Soviet submarine threats. Finally, the Soviets probably could not identify so small a detonation as a nuclear rather than a conventional, high-explosive attack. This reduces the likelihood that an INC- warhead detonation would trigger nuclear escalation.
The prudent route is to pursue both conventional high-explosive and nuclear- warhead torpedo designs. I am optimistic that U. S. engineers can develop a conventional high-explosive warhead, but skeptical that we can do it in time to counter the Soviet threat. The U. S. should develop the sub-kiloton INC torpedo in case we do fail to develop an improved conventional warhead; but even with a better warhead, we will need the INC to offset Soviet attempts to counter our conventional-warhead technology. However, I doubt whether Navy officials have the political leverage or inclination to field a nuclear-armed torpedo; Fielding it amounts to admitting that Soviet deep-diving, double-hulled submarines are seriously challenging the pressure-hull rupture effectiveness of U. S. conventional torpedoes.
“Becoming a Female Aviator”
(See C. A. Lewis, pp. 104-107, October 1986
Proceedings)
Midshipman Fourth Class Karin Mul- lane, U. S. Navy—This is the first realistic article on flight training I have ever read. All other articles, coincidentally all written by males, convey a cocky attitude and contain descriptions of exaggerated dramatics and pilot antics, as if the authors had something to prove.
One point in Lieutenant Lewis’s article that keeps me thinking is the possibility of women prisoners in prisoner-of-war camps. This is a touchy subject that many people in the armed services try to avoid. I do not see a difference between the male and female situations as prisoners of war. Everyone in military service follows the Code of Conduct, and women are no exception. If women choose this dangerous career, they should be willing to give their lives in defense of the nation.
“Organizing Ships for Battle”
0See D. S. Appleton, pp. 30-37, July 1986;
P. J. Ryan, p. 22, November 1986 Proceedings)
Commander William C. Keller, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Harold E. Holt <FF-1074)—Aware surface warfare officers won’t argue with Captain Appleton’s allegations that too many Navy ships are unprepared for war. The captain has indeed described a menacing problem. He also has good ideas about training. But Captain Appleton fails to identify the real sources of the problem, and consequently, misses the solutions.
First, let’s get the Standard Organization and Regulation Manual (SORM) off the hook. Granted, it is imperfect and needs updating. However, the SORM ' was never intended to detail battle organization and fighting procedures. It is an organization manual that covers routine in-port and peacetime tasks, as well as important maintenance and training functions. We cannot blame the SORM for our shortcomings in combat capability. The fault lies elsewhere:
► Our ships lack a battle doctrine. In the “old days,” each ship had her own battle organization manual. It identified billets
for battle and wartime steaming, as well as the functions and relationships of key control centers (command, ship control, combat information center, weapons, engineering, damage control, etc.). Commanders also had doctrines that clearly outlined fighting procedures. Together, the battle organization manual and the doctrines gave crews the data and instructions they needed to fight their ships. Today, Navy ships have no sound battle doctrine-—and that is the source of our current organizational problems.
The ship manning document (SMD) is designed to replace the battle-bill portion of the battle organization manual. But the SMD has little value as a battle bill: the billets listed in the SMD invariably exceed the personnel actually on board ships; and the SMD covers only readiness conditions I and III, overlooking condition II and special situations. For the classic ship-fighting doctrines the Navy has substituted generic procedural guides, such as the combat systems doctrine and the engineering operational casualty control (EOCC). These are not comprehensive enough. For example, the frigate EOCC addresses propulsion casualties that occur at speeds of up to 15 knots when one boiler is on line. What, then, does a commander do about high water on 1A boiler when both boilers are on line at 27 knots? The EOCC doesn’t say. To compensate for this lack of guidance, some ships develop their own manning plans and fighting procedures for all contingencies. This is time consuming, and commanders are unlikely to do it as long as ship inspections emphasize material readiness first and foremost.
► We've lost sight of the objective- combat readiness. It’s no secret that ship COs are currently graded and promoted for passing inspections that stress material readiness, not overall ability to fight. How the ship does on operational propulsion plant examinations (OPPEs), inspection and surveys, nuclear weapons inspection—this determines the CO’s fitness report. These are good tests. For the most part, they objectively assess the ship’s capability to maintain herself and to perform some operational requirements. But no equally demanding tests exist for other important capabilities: ship control, physical security (beyond that needed for nuclear weapons), damage control, antisubmarine warfare, command and control, and antiair and surface warfare functions. Operational readiness evaluations try to test these capabilities, but in fact, the trials are poor mimics of the wartime environment. For example, a frigate can win a Missile “E” award (thereby proving “excellence”) merely
by firing one missile on a sterile, highly controlled range.
I think most surface warriors share Captain Appleton’s sense of urgency. That good battle training demands expert team training is undeniable. But a new SORM will not solve the problem. For that we need:
► Comprehensive organizational doctrine: Every ship should have complete watch assignments, detailing duties, responsibilities, and relationships, for every watchstander in every readiness condition. Explicit equipment requirements and detailed, integrated fighting procedures should exist for all operational capabilities. Compliance should be strictly inspected and enforced. Commanders who have insufficient fighting procedures should rank with those who flunk the “programs” portion of the OPPE.
^ Full evaluations of ship performance: The second step is to test—realistically and completely—whether ships can fight. Again, let’s use the frigate as an example. In a realistic combat-readiness evaluation, she would set to sea in a battle-group environment. Surprise air raids and real torpedo attacks would be sprung on the condition III watch teams. Do the teams respond according to tactically sound procedures? Does the equipment work? Does the ship communicate effectively with the warfare commander? Do the people know their jobs? If not, they need more training and, maybe, a new commanding officer.
Obviously, some such testing must °ccur in a trainer. The details are less important than the bottom line: We must expand our evaluation of a ship’s performance to test her full capabilities.
“The Tailhooker’s Wife”
(See B. Snevely, pp. 102-105, October 1986;
L. C. Timon, p. 14, January 1987 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Jeanne M. McDonnell, U. S. Navy—Mrs. Snevely’s article offended ttte as both a naval officer and a Navy w'fe. I am surprised that it slipped past the usually keen and fair eyes of the ProCeedings editors. Mrs. Snevely makes some viable points regarding the hardships of being married to a carrier-based ^avy pilot, but she makes them at the ®xpense of all other Navy spouses. I be- heve she is insinuating that the wives of surface and submarine officers are timid, c°lorless, and stuffy.
Whether married to an admiral or a seaman recruit, Navy spouses share many °f the same problems, although different communities and ranks have unique con- cems. I am not sure that Mrs. Snevely has a clear understanding of the overall Navy mission and the important contributions of each community within.
“Accountability Afloat”
(See G. B. Powell, pp. 31-35, August 1986;
P. J. Doerr, M. S. Smith, E. E. Marlatt, M. E. Duffy, pp. 12-15, October 1986; L. A. Griffin, p. 10, November 1986; G. Carson, W. D. Leventhal, pp. 17-18, December 1986 Proceedings)
“Navy Medicine: A Second
Opinion”
(See D. L. Sturtz, pp. 127—129, December
1985; R. D. Tobey, p. 26, September 1986;
K. L. Pehr, pp. 18-19, December 1986
Proceedings)
James M. Thomson, M.D., Vanderbilt Medical School—More than 20 years ago, I was the medical officer on an amphibious cargo ship, but worked with corpsmen operating independently on other Navy vessels. My experiences with them were always pleasant, and I consider Navy corpsmen one of the secret weapons of Navy medicine. Many become civilian physicians.
However, independent corpsmen often work outside Navy medicine’s mainstream—the Navy hospitals—and have little opportunity to hone their medical skills under a physician’s supervision. The solution? Let the Navy offer nursing- school scholarships to enable male corps- men to become registered nurses. Ships too small to carry medical officers could then be staffed by nurses, who are better trained than corpsmen and thus, better able to assist a commanding officer. Because they would rotate through Navy hospitals, working closely with medical officers, male nurses would stay in the mainstream of Navy medicine.
But Navy medicine itself may have drifted out of the main current of U. S. medicine—our medical schools. When I served, the draft and the Barry Plan gave the Navy a steady stream of doctors fresh from their residencies in excellent university hospitals. With them came the latest medical techniques. Now these excellent sources are cut off, and the Navy must find other ways of keeping abreast of medical trends. One way is to emulate the Veterans Administration hospitals, which have wisely tied themselves to American medical schools, resulting in benefits to both. The Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery should encourage medical schools situated in Navy hospital locations to grant faculty status to Navy medical staff, and possibly encourage the Navy hospitals to use the civilian faculty.
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“Scratch”
(See M. Badham. pp. 55-63, July 1986; C. L.
Maney, p. 22, September 1986; K. S. Peterson,
pp. 16-18, October 1986 Proceedings)
Commander Michael Badham, Royal Navy (Retired)—Indeed, as Commander Peterson states, my fictional offering “Scratch” does not “have much value as a professional aid.” But then, of course, it wasn’t meant to.
Nevertheless, I did submit the manuscript for checking to the “omniscient tutor” of my own commanding officer’s qualifying course. (In case you’re wondering, I happened to pass satisfactorily!)
Vice Admiral Sir Ian McIntosh (Knight Commander of the British Empire; Companion, Order of Bath; Distinguished Service Order; Distinguished Service Cross; and five Mentions in Dispatches for his legendary achievements as commanding officer of Her Royal Majesty’s submarine Sceptre during World War II) approved “Scratch” unconditionally.
Perhaps he refrained from correcting me about the bearing not having ‘ ‘drifted left more” because he understood that the astute destroyer commander, having gained contact, had altered toward the submarine rather than doggedly holding course and belting resolutely off.
Peterson concedes that “Scratch” was a good read; and for that, I thank him. He also says “it’s exciting,” on the one hand, but “telegraphs its endings,” on the other. As a wordsmith, I take due note of that and am suitably humbled.
If “Scratch” is “. . . not what I want in my Proceedingshowever, I accept no responsibility (only the check).
Finally, Commander Peterson’s comment that “killing submarines from destroyers is easier today ...” came as a genuine surprise. Well ... if you can keep up with the sub, and there’s a mole on board playing xylophones with a hammer against the pressure hull . . .
“Requiem for the DDG-2s?”
(See K. King and J. A. Sanford, pp. 91-94,
July 1986 Proceedings)
Senior Chief Gunner’s Mate Robert J. Eisenberg, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commanders King and Sanford accurately portray the problems and potential of the DDG-2-class warship. I have spent the past four and a half years on the USS Richard E. Byrd (DDG-23), and she superbly performed every assignment given her. Pound for pound, this ship class is among the best-balanced weapon platforms the Navy has ever produced.
This DDG-2 class’s further service will depend solely on solving her engineering problems. The engineering plant’s 1,200 pound-per-square-inch (psi) steam pressure has been its biggest drawback. The high temperatures generated by this much steam accelerate the entire steam plant’s deterioration. One solution is to reduce the operating pressure to 900 psi. The West German Navy DDG-2s operate at this pressure with fewer maintenance problems than the U. S. ships suffer at the higher level.
If the Navy decides to invest the funds necessary to keep this class operating, the weapon systems must be updated. These improvements would allow the DDG-2 class to fulfill the assignments the authors discuss:
- Upgrade the Mk-68 gunfire control system to the Mod-19 digital upgrade. This replaces the Mk-47 analog computer with the AN/UYK-20 digital computer. The upgrade increases the accuracy and reaction time of the five-inch Mk-54 42- gun batteries. With Mod-19, the Richard E. Byrd has achieved a mean gunfire dispersion of less than 11 meters during her naval gunfire support qualification trials. And the Mk-42 Mod-10 gun can also shoot the new high fragmentation projectiles and super-charge powders, thus increasing ranges up to 15% and giving the ship over-the-horizon gun capabilities.
- Fully upgrade the Mk-74 missile system to the Tartar “D” level with the Mk-13 weapons direction system. This Link-11 receive-only Navy tactical data system capability allows the DDG-2s to integrate fully with the Aegis ships. In fact, it makes the DDG-2s extra missile magazines for the CG-47 cruisers. The Mk-11 and Mk-13 Mod-10 launchers should be replaced with a Mk-13 Mod-5 launcher. This change would reduce the missile system’s maintenance and manning levels. The ship could also then be armed with the SM-2 missiles. Introducing the SM-2 would greatly increase the range and reaction times of the antiair warfare battery.
- Add a close-in weapons system (CIWS) to the fantail to protect the ship against cruise missiles. The fantail has ample room to mount a Vulcan-Phalanx CIWS.
- If the DDG-2-class lifespan can be extended to 30 or more years, a Mk-41 vertical launch system could replace the Mk-13 missile launcher. Removing the existing missile magazine would create enough space for the Mk-41 systems. This modification would allow the DDG-2 class to carry a more flexible combination of Standard and Harpoon missiles.
“SWATH: Advanced Technology
or Mythology?”
(See W. C. Barnes, pp, 119-121, September
1986 Proceedings)
Captain T. H. Sherman, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In my involvement with advanced naval ships during the past several years, I noted that ship concepts are discussed only in an atmosphere of either boyish enthusiasm or jaded pessimism. There is never a middle ground, whether the subject be hydrofoils, air cushion vehicles, or small waterplane area twin hull ships (SWATHs). Admiral Barnes clearly establishes his position as a jaded pessimist.
In the early 1970s while serving in the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, I was constantly bombarded by advocates of various advanced concepts touting 3,000-ton surface effect ships, 70,000-ton SWATH carriers, and the like. These ships were advertised as all things to all people. We skeptics kept our sanity by weighing the technical risks and taking a cautious approach. Only the patrol missile hydrofoil (PHM) then, as now, made sense in the near term. It took an act of Congress to Push us into the 20th century by directing us to purchase the last five PHMs.
Where have we gone wrong? The advanced ship community has taken its own blue-sky sales pitch as gospel—an oversell to ourselves, if you will. Through the years, this emotional approach has polar- >zed opinions into extremes. For a change, let’s try to take a more objective view of the concepts. In the maritime uiarketplace, let’s look for marketing °Pportunities just as industry does. This 's providing, of course, that there are fnission areas where the advanced ship concepts have more advantages than conventional hulls. There are mission areas where conventional hulls have no competition, but I believe there are payoffs to be had with advanced technology.
Admiral Barnes yields ground when he juentions that the SWATH concept could be desirable in ocean surveillance and Coast Guard applications. In these mission areas, the attributes of the SWATH °ffer enough advantages to overshadow (he purported “excessive” constraints of the design. This is the real question for all bWATH applications: whether or not the ^vantages of SWATH—better seabeeping, quietness, and larger deck areas—outweigh the penalties one must Pay to achieve them. This question can be answered only by the operators, not the engineers. If fleet operators need it, then We engineers should provide it.
. Today our attention is drawn increas- lngly to the northern latitudes where an important part of the next war is likely to be fought. Having sailed the Northern Pacific and Norwegian Sea in late fall, I know that today’s Navy can survive in those environments, but it can’t operate aircraft and weapons effectively there. We will never meet the Northern challenge with conventional ships. So I believe that SWATH is the solution. How big or how small is not an issue at this point. We should look at the missions the Navy must perform there, and design a SWATH to do it.
“ASW: Revolution or Evolution” '
(See H. A. Jackson, W. D. Needham, and
D. E. Sigman, pp. 64-71, September 1986;
R. H. Smith, p. 32, December 1986
Proceedings)
Captain Edward S. Arentzen, U. S. Navy (Retired)—As a designer of the submarine classes the authors discuss (with the exception of the Los Angeles [SSN-688]),
I must take issue with the statement that the designs for the Triton (SSN-586) and Tullibee (SSN-597) were mission- controlled.
After the Nautilus (SSN-571) proved highly successful. Admiral H. G. Rick- over established a program to develop four different nuclear reactor plants for submarine use. One, desired by submariners, was intended to power a submarine with characteristics similar to the Guppy- I type submarine. This became the Skate (SSN-578)-class. The second plant was an improved Nautilus-type reactor. This was used with great success in Skipjack (SSN-585), George Washington (SSBN- 598), and Thresher (SSN-593)-classes. The other two nuclear reactor plants were definitely controversial.
The nuclear plant installed in the Triton used the submarine advanced reactor, developed by General Electric. These reactors each generated about 13% more power than did the reactor on the Nautilus. Most of us designing a submarine to carry this plant believed that the reasonable approach was to use one reactor. However, Admiral Rickover insisted that two reactors must be employed.
Given that directive, the submariners then decided that a radar-picket mission would be the only possible use for a submarine carrying this plant. We proceeded to develop a high surface speed ship whose real purpose was to carry two reactors. Then, after lengthy sessions, the Ships Characteristics Board (SCB) concluded that building this ship was not in the Navy’s best interest. In response, Admiral Rickover flew to Colorado Springs, where President Dwight D. Eisenhower was recovering from a heart attack, to advise the President that the
Navy was torpedoing his program.
Later, at a final meeting on the subject, the SCB again determined that the two- reactor program should not proceed. Those of us present were told to stand at ease while our board chairman, Rear Admiral Mendenhall, reported the recommendation to Admiral Arleigh Burke. About one hour later, Admiral Mendenhall returned to announce that he had had the last words on the subject: They were, “Aye, Aye, Sir.” The Triton was then built over the objections of all those di-
Housing Admiral Rickover’s coveted two-reactor plant was Triton's only real mission, says Captain Arentzen, left, on Triton's bridge with Gordon Brown, former dean of engineering at MIT, and Captain E.L. Beach, then the giant sub’s commander.
rectly concerned, merely to satisfy the powerful Admiral Rickover.
The nuclear-power plant developed for the Tullibee was supposed to produce 10% of Nautilus's power, while fitting into a 1,000-ton submarine. Admiral Rickover assigned the design contract for this plant to Combustion Engineering. Early in the design development, it became apparent that the nuclear plant would be about the same size and weight as the plant already being incorporated in the Skate-class submarines. At this point. Admiral Rickover’s project officer, Lieutenant Merson Booth, composed a lengthy, logical paper concluding that the Tullibee project should be restarted or canceled. The ink was hardly dry on his signature before he was fired by Admiral Rickover. The Tullibee was then built not to fulfill a mission, but to carry a controversial power plant.
Technically, the authors are correct in stating that these ships were mission- controlled designs; the final characteristics authorization for the ships did specify missions. But the real truth is that these submarines were carriers for nuclear reactor plants Admiral Rickover had predetermined would be built; they were ships in search of missions.
(Continued on page 74) 29
Comment and Discussion
“Crossroads at Bikini”
(See T. B. Daly, pp. 64-72, July 1986; R. D.
McWethy, pp. 84-89, August 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Millard F. Kirk, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Captain Daly mentioned that Operation Crossroads required construction of towers on Bikini Atoll to house radio-controlled cameras to record the event, and that the time to prepare for the test was limited, especially because postwar demobilization was diminishing the number of personnel available to the construction battalions.
The 53rd Naval Construction Battalion (NCB) located on Guam under the command of Commander John Burkey, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy, received orders in February 1946 to construct the towers, along with any other required facilities ashore or related docking facilities, on Bikini Atoll. Because of the reduction in personnel owing to demobilization, special construction techniques were required. Accordingly, I was placed in charge of the NCB’s advanced survey party, consisting of two officers and ten enlisted men. We were ordered to proceed at once to Bikini, to arrive there ten days prior to the arrival of the remainder of the battalion.
We left by C-54 transport for Pearl Harbor with stops at Kwajalein and Johnson to outfit with field gear and equipment. We then reported on board LST- 881 for transport to Bikini. The LST served as our headquarters, while we accomplished our survey work until the rest of the battalion arrived in the USS St. Croix (APA-231), which then became our headquarters.
We were provided a map of the atoll by the Los Alamos facility. The map showed the required locations of the nine towers (five on Bikini, two on Enyu, and two on Amen). The towers had to all face the common, “Ground Zero” test point in the middle of the lagoon.
We completed the survey work on schedule in spite of some creature discomforts, such as the swarms of flies (similar to the household kind) which attacked each item of food we tried to eat— we had to wave them off continuously with one hand while eating with the other. The flies were eventually eliminated by a plane spraying DDT from above—while we were directly below doing our survey work!
After the locations of the towers were staked out, the battalion began erecting them. They were similar to Forest Service fire-watch towers, and they were about 100 feet high (ten stories). These towers were normally erected piece by piece like an erector set, requiring a team of four experienced steeplejacks, who would scale the tower as the work progressed. The battalion was short of steeplejacks—we had only one such crew, yet had to work on several towers simultaneously, so we devised two alternate methods of tower erection:
- The building-block method: Vertical sections of the tower (about 15 feet each) were assembled on the ground. Then, with a crane, the sections were placed on top of each other, like a child builds a tower with wooden blocks, with just two men (instead of four) up in the tower to make the connection.
- The rotate method: The tower was completely built lying on its side on the ground. By providing a hinge connection for the two tower legs in contact with the ground (the “bottom” end) and rigging many cables from two cranes and a bulldozer to be connected at the two-thirds point on the tower, the tower was rotated to its final vertical position. This required very deft and coordinated handling by the crane and bulldozer operators. The two cranes would first raise the “top” end of the tower off the ground to a point where the cable to the bulldozer was in proper alignment to continue the lift. Then, at the precise moment when the weight-shift would cause the tower to continue rotating by its own weight, the cranes would take up the slack on their cables and gently let the tower settle on its footings in its final position.
The nine towers were erected and completed on schedule so others could install the recording equipment in time for the bomb tests.
By that time, I had accrued enough demobilization points to be eligible for release from active duty. I accepted this in spite of the eloquent pitch made by Commander Burkey during an assembly
Members of the 53rd NCB used the building-block method (top and middle) to erect a tower on Bikini. The commander gathered his men (bottom) to ask them to stay, instead of returning to the States during postwar demobilization.
of all battalion personnel on Bikini’s beach for people to extend their tours of duty. But at that point in my life, having been in the Southwest Pacific for several years, I was more interested in returning to civilian life than witnessing a historic event.
Admiral Thompson Interview
(See D. C. Thompson, pp. 167-174, October
1986 Proceedings)
Chief Warrant Officer Dale E. Bartels, O. S. Coast Guard Reserve—I read the interview with Admiral Thompson with great interest, but his statement that “• . . we have no organized reserve aviation units” is incorrect. U. S. Coast Guard Air Stations Clearwater, Miami, and Savannah each has an organized aviation reserve unit. Additionally, the aviation reserve unit at Air Station Miami Provides the local active-duty command with aviators and aircrewmen to man the search and surveillance HU-25A Guardian aircraft.
“To Fly Safely”
(See R. Rausa, pp. 69-73, August 1986; V. T. Pagan, p. 12, October 1986; W. F. Coret, p.
22, November 1986; D. C. Smith, p. 20, December 1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Dennis J. Sinnett, U. S. Navy—I am an active-duty naval aviator who disagrees with Captain Rausa. While he may have more flying time than I do ar>d makes some valid points, his comparison of Navy and Air Force aviation safety records sets a dangerous precedent. If we try to emulate the Air Force by changing our maintenance practices and methods of operating, we will leave °urselves open to a myriad of problems.
The crux of Captain Rausa’s article is based on a 1985 questionnaire completed by 93 exchange pilots. I take exception to the results of that questionnaire and the inclusions drawn from them, which c°ver the following disparities in safety Practices between the two services:
th ^ra'n'n£: The exchange pilots stated hat the operational tempos and nature of avy cruises and deployments were more etrimental to a naval aviator’s profi- jdency than those in the Air Force. Cap- ain Rausa points out that the Navy sPends too much time practicing carrier andings, and does not structure its training or have standardized training within 1 s various communities. Captain Rausa aad the exchange pilots are misinformed— ey are mistaking inherent differences for Navy shortcomings.
Naval aviators have a demanding job: they must safely operate a multi-million- dollar aircraft in an environment that has no comparison. Of course, the Navy spends numerous hours practicing carrier landings. When deployed, Navy pilots do not have the luxury of land-based divert fields as their Air Force counterparts do— they must land their aircraft on that “postage stamp.”
Naval aviators do not dictate the operational tempo of deployments and cruises; the enemy does. The ever-changing operational tempo has a positive—not a detrimental—effect on pilot proficiency: it provides for dynamic squadron training. Our pilots are prepared for anything, and the more they are flying, the better they get. Because each deployment is different, static, structured training will not prepare the pilots for the operational requirements they will face on their next deployment.
The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) manual is an exceptionally useful document. In contrast to the Air Force’s Stan- dardization/Evaluation (Stan/Eval) Program, the Navy’s NATOPS manual does not try to cover all conceivable circumstances. It is a guide that promotes individual judgment. The NATOPS program allows the aircrew members to use their common sense and knowledge of, and experience with, the aircraft and its systems to make the proper decisions. Not everything can be covered by a book— pilots must make decisions while flying.
- Tasking: In this area, the exchange pilots imply that naval aviators are haphazard pilots with no regard for safety who bend the rules whenever they see fit to do so. They give the “can-do” spirit a negative connotation, and nothing could be further from the truth. The “can-do” spirit is an enviable characteristic and the backbone of naval aviation. I do not understand why the exchange pilots think the ability to adapt to changing circumstances is an undesirable trait. War is not a predictable environment: It requires a pilot who can adjust to changing circumstances, make split-second decisions in the air and on events that he wasn’t briefed on, and successfully and safely complete the mission.
- Aircrew duties and fatigue: 1 disagree totally with the exchange pilots’ argument that the Navy should give its pilots fewer “collateral duties.” Granted, these ground duties may interfere occasionally with an aircrew’s flying duties. However, the advantages gained by collateral duties far exceed the disadvantages: An officer learns to deal with enlisted personnel;
learns to make decisions affecting the well-being of his troops; and becomes a well-rounded naval officer, not just a pilot. This is a fundamental difference between the Air Force and the Navy: The Air Force develops great pilots, while the Navy develops great leaders. A great pilot will never win a war, while a great leader may.
Captain Rausa suggests that the Air Force devotes more time to flight planning than the Navy. I believe the Air Force devotes too much time to flight planning. All events cannot be foreseen: instead of trying to brief pilots on every possible occurrence before a flight, the Air Force should ensure that its pilots are confident enough in their own abilities to make the right decisions when the situation dictates. Navy pilots have this confidence: they know their personal limitations in addition to those of their aircraft, and therefore they are much safer than Air Force pilots.
Finally, the Navy gives its junior officers much more responsibility than the Air Force does. This is why the naval officer is a much better pilot under pressure. He can make tough decisions because he has been making them since the day he was commissioned.
► Material condition of the aircraft: The exchange pilots imply that the Navy’s maintenance system needs to be improved to bring it up to par with the Air Force’s. I disagree. One reason for the Air Force pilots not tolerating as many “up-gripes” as Navy pilots may be because the pilot does not personally know the technician who worked on that gripe. The Navy’s system of maintenance affords every pilot the opportunity to be his technician’s boss. We realize how professional our maintenance technicians are. And these technicians share the feeling of success when their aircraft returns safely from a mission. This is part of the “can do-will do” mindset that Captain Rausa inaccurately portrays.
Captain Rausa’s mistake is getting caught up with the statistical differences between the Navy and Air Force safety programs. The areas that he suggests need improvements may well be the reasons the Navy had such a safe year in 1984. Both the Air Force and the Navy can be proud of their safety records, but let us not forget the differences in operating environments and methods. The Navy approach to safety as a team effort is successful. Let’s continue striving for that zero-accident goal, but let’s not abandon the principles and methods learned during 75 years of operating aircraft on the cutting edge of freedom.
p
“Old Gimlet Eye”
(See M. L. Bartlett, pp. 64-72, November 1986
Proceedings)
Earl A. Cosgrove, former U. S. Marine— I served with General Smedley Butler in the 3rd Brigade in China 1927-28, and at Quantico from 1929-30. I have many fond memories of him. He was a colorful and interesting speaker, and I’ll never forget the speech he made on the Marine Corps birthday, 10 November 1927, in Tientsin. (He had first served in China in Tientsin and Peking as a young officer in the Boxer Uprising of 1900.) Once, he had the leader of a scientific expedition lecture to us about the discovery of dinosaur eggs in the Gobi Desert! He loved to show off for the various foreign dignitaries. I remember how we had to/fuckel plate our bayonets, sandpaper and shellac our helmets, and wear gold colored Marine Corps emblems on our green and khaki uniforms. We wore no blue over there.
At Quantico, General Butler was real tough on drunkenness and the Quantico “moonshiners.” (Remember, these were Prohibition days.) He was also very sharp on troop inspections. I can still hear him shouting to our captain, “You have a man out of step!”
One of my favorite memories of General Butler is how much the frequent retirement ceremonies at Quantico meant to him. At these ceremonies, he had the adjutant read out the names of the retirees, who were usually old-time “Non Corns,” and then give them the command, “Front and center, march!” While the retirees were marching to where General Butler was standing, the band played “Alte Genossen,” one of my favorite marches. The retirees received our salutes as we passed in review.
“Employing the PHMs”
(See L. G. Williams, pp. 79-87, September
1986; M. J. Szablak, p. 26, December 1986; A.
Gurnee, pp. 21-26, January 1987 Proceedings)
Commander W. Scott Slocum, U. S. Navy—As an enthusiastic supporter of patrol combatant missile hydrofoils (PHMs) and the commissioning commanding officer in USS Taurus (PHM- 3), I read Lieutenant Commander Williams’ article with chagrin, although he does manage to convey the sense of urgency needed to develop PHM capabilities. However, his piece revives old myths about PHM shortcomings that were dispelled years ago. I took the Taurus to sea in late 1982 for 11 days specifically to challenge the belief that “after five days the crew routinely requires two days’ rest.” As Commander Williams states later in his article, these ships have remarkable stability for their size. Those foils are heavy, deep keels when hull- borne. Crew fatigue was not an issue; only fuel constrained us from staying out longer. It’s a red herring regrettably republished as truth.
He also touts the PHM’s “almost total dependence” on the mobile logistic support group (MLSG). It wasn’t true in 1983; I hope it isn’t true now. All the original commanding officers worked hard to develop self-sufficiency in their PHM crews so these ships could react quickly to tactical requirements without an overriding concern for logistics and maintenance support. The MLSG shared our goal and provided superb maintenance support only in situations that required at least one of the three following characteristics: labor intensive efforts, the unique skills found only in the MLSG, or test equipment not carried by the PHMs.
1 appreciate the continuing interest the Naval Institute has shown in the PHM. Young surface warfare officers will read the articles and think about a PHM tour, in which the Navy offers one of the few appointments for junior command at sea. They offer a thrilling alternative for division officers and department heads now.
“One Seat Versus Two”
(See T. W. Trotter, pp. 75-81, October 1986
Proceedings)
Major Robert R. Zimmerman, U. S. Marine Corps—Lieutenant Trotter fails to address key elements of the perplexing question, “How many aircrewmen should man our next generation of tactical fighter/attack aircraft?” First, he illogically compares the single-seat FA-18 to the dual-seat F-14s and A-6s. A better comparison would be between the Hornet and its two-seat FA-18D counterpart.
Second, Lieutenant Trotter thinks that advancing technology will compensate for the second crewman—that extra pair of eyes and ability to share tasks on a high-threat battlefield. Other services have concluded otherwise. The Air Force has procured two-seat F-15E Eagles, the Marine Corps the two-seat F/A-18D, and the Royal Air Force the two-seat Toronados.
Moreover, 18 major studies conducted since 1968 by defense contractors, the Department of Defense, and our allies have universally concluded that the two- seat fighter is best suited to counter future surface and airborne threats.
Only one of Lieutenant Trotter’s consequences is valid: there is more expense in training a second crew member. His other points are irrelevant (exposure of two lives rather than one) or insignificant (the two-seat aircraft presents a larger target profile). Arguments about relative capabilities (multi-mission and all weather/low altitude/night strike) actually favor dual-seat aircraft more than single seaters.
The single-seat fighter is adequate for peacetime operations. However, if we’re deadly serious about succeeding on tomorrow’s battlefield, we should equip the Navy’s next generation strike/fighter with a second crew member. There’s too much at stake to answer the question any other way.
Commander J. P. Jones, U. S. Naval Reserve—As an ex-radar intercept officer (RIO) with 1,800 hours in the F-14 Tomcat and the F-4 Phantom, I share Lieutenant Trotter’s admiration for the F/A-18 Hornet’s performance and weapons suite. However, Lieutenant Trotter allows his infatuation to lead him to the wrong conclusions.
Mindful that tactics can change dramatically in a single day (much less in the years since I last strapped in for an air-to- air training event), I nevertheless recall that in a simulated air battle among pilots of equal capabilities, the survivability of technologically superior aircraft declines as the number of participants increases. An F-4 was likely to lose to an F-16 Falcon in a 1:1 test because of the F-16’s eye-watering performance and the simple tactical problem involved. When more planes entered the fray, the F-16’s success declined.
I attribute this decline to a fighter pilot’s aggressiveness. He tends to fixate on the targets in his windscreen, trying for a shot. He often becomes oblivious to the threat behind him as he pursues his own kill. Afterwards, the single-seat pilot is reminded of his own mortality when he refers to telemetry. Training to make periodic belly-checks reduces this blind- side risk, but only marginally. Training in inter-fighter radio communication and coordination (“I’m high at your seven, your six is clear.”) assumes that the radio will be unjammed. In a single-seat aircraft, nobody watches the back and keeps track of the wingman. In a two-seater, I monitored the other bogeys and friendlies while my “stick” (pilot) maneuvered for a kill—or an escape.
Given numerous bogeys and reliable missiles, stand-off shooting does not change my opinion, even when the en-
gagement rules permit shooting without visual contact. Electronic countermeasures will likely necessitate flying to a visual confirmation even after the skies have filled with forward-quarter missiles.
By comparing the survivability of a section of F/A-18s with that of a single two-seater, Lieutenant Trotter begs the question. It is expected that when two aircraft are free to maneuver in a multithreat environment one aircraft will survive. Whether two single-seated aircraft will survive two two-seaters is dubious.
The difference in hardware costs between a single-seater and a two-seater is small, and the difference in crew costs is less than double. The Navy doesn’t waste a pilot in the RIO’s seat. The RIO is not trained, and often not physically qualified, to pilot. Increased pilot survivability offsets RIO training costs, in terms of dollars and delay. If I can bring my pilot back, he flies again that day. The war can be over for a depleted squadron of single- seaters by the time the replacement pilots arrive.
“Bang-less Tank Killer”
(.See R. K. Mar, pp. 112-113, September 1986 Proceedings)
Dale G. Smith—It appears from Mr. Mar’s article that the main experimental emphasis has focused on disabling the engines of land vehicles. He describes an experimental design that uses a warhead containing one pound of calcium carbide to achieve a “kill zone” of seven feet.
Since ships are much larger targets than tanks and are normally attacked from greater distances, this effective radius is much too small against a ship. Being a chemist, I ran some calculations to see how much calcium carbide would be required to cover larger areas. The results should interest both weapons-devel- opers and military professionals estimating the threat posed by a foreign version of this technology.
According to the article, 3% acetylene is sufficient to wreck a diesel engine. However, 16% was used when figuring the kill zone mentioned above. I will give figures based on both concentrations.
One mole (64.1 grams) of calcium carbide will produce 0.864 cubic feet of acetylene when exposed to water. The necessary equation is:
Lbs of CaC2 = {(64.1 g) x (cu. ft. in kill zone) x (.01 x % acetylene)} + {(454 g/lb) x (0.864 cu ft.)}
Assuming a hemispherical kill zone with uniform acetylene concentration, the following pounds versus radius values are obtained:
Radius (in feet) | Pounds of CaC2 at 3% acetylene | Pounds of CaC2 at 16% acetylene |
3.5 | 0.44 | 2.35 |
50 | 1,283 | 6,845 |
100 | 10,268 | 54,760 |
300 | 277,224 | 1,478,532 |
The table shows the enormous amounts of calcium carbide needed to establish a kill zone larger than 50 to 100 feet in radius. A ship traveling at 20 knots would spend only three seconds crossing a 50- foot radius, so timing and location of the warhead explosion are obviously critical. Clearly, current missiles and torpedoes can carry only enough calcium carbide for limited kill zones. A large warhead guided close to a target might do better to carry a standard explosive charge.
The table also points up a minor error in Mr. Mar’s article. He says that one pound of calcium carbide yields a 16% concentration of acetylene in a seven-foot sphere. A hemisphere 3.5 feet in radius is half the size of a seven-foot diameter sphere. According to my calculations, it would take 4.7 pounds to yield a 16% concentration, and 0.88 pounds to yield a 3% concentration in a seven-foot sphere.
I find the possiblities of this weapon system intriguing.
Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest
The United States Naval Institute and the Vincent Astor Foundation take pleasure in announcing the Eleventh Annual Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest for Junior Officers and Officer Trainees of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The contest is designed to promote research, thinking, and writing on the topic of leadership in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
FIRST PRIZE: $1,500, a Naval Institute Gold Medal, and a Life Membership in the Naval Institute.
FIRST HONORABLE MENTION: $1,000 and a Naval Institute Silver Medal.
SECOND HONORABLE MENTION: (two to be awarded) $500 and a Naval Institute Bronze Medal.
The first prize essay will be published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The Institute’s Editorial Board may elect to publish any or all of the honorable mention essays in any given year, but is not obligated to do so. The Editorial Board may, from time to time, publish collections of the award winning essays and other essays in book or pamphlet form.
This contest is open to:
- Commissioned officers, regular and reserve, in the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in pay grades 0-1, 0-2, and 0-3 (ensign/2nd lieutenant; lieutenant (junior grade)/1st lieutenant; and lieutenant/captain) at the time the essay is submitted.
- U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officer trainees within one year of receiving their commissions.
ENTRY RULES
1. Essays must be original and may not exceed 4,000 words.
- All entries should be directed to: Executive Director (VAMLEC), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
- Essays must be received on or before 1 March 1987 at the U.S. Naval Institute.
- The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author shall assign a motto in addition to a title to the essay. This motto shall appear (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title, in lieu of the author's name and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. The sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank, branch of service, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the motto. The identity of the essayist will not be known to the judging members of the Editorial Board until they have made their selections.
- The awards will be made known and presented to the successful competitors during the graduation awards ceremonies at their respective schools, if appropriate, or at other official ceremonies. Mrs. Astor or her personal representative will be invited to present the first prize each year.
- Essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8’/2 x 11”. Submit two complete copies.
- Essays will be judged by the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board for depth of research, analytical and interpretive qualities, and original thinking on the topic of leadership. Essays should not be merely expositions or personal narratives.
Deadline: 1 March 1987
WIN $1500
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402 (301)268-6110
“The Right Stuff—Blue Angels Style”
(,See T. F. Epley, pp. 7-10, October 1986
Proceedings)
Stephen Coonts, author of Flight of the Intruder (Naval Institute Press)—I got a real kick out of the Blue Angel story. The deftest touch was the expression of the sense of slicing through the air and the precision that makes possible. That ability to control the craft precisely, to keep exactly the right airspeed, exactly the right wing and nose attitude, is what gives the pilot the sense of absolute mastery that one rarely gets in light planes— or any prop plane, for that matter.
I think that sense of being in absolute control is what makes flying jets so addictive. In no other thing you do are you so much the master of it. Marriage, work, writing, relations with people—nothing is so crisp and clean and free as driving that jet.
I’m glad Tom Epley wrote that story for all of us.
“Large Carriers: A Matter of Time”
(See E. J. Ortlieb, pp. 48-51, October 1986
Proceedings)
Captain Peter J. Doerr, U. S. Navy (Retired)—A critical deficiency in Commander Ortlieb’s otherwise excellent article is the proponent’s failure to answer the critic’s charge that too much of the modem carrier battle group (CVBG) is purely defensive. This is a common problem in this continuing debate that deserves more thorough treatment.
The anecdotal answer to the charge that most of a CVBG’s weapons are defensive is to cite the Marianas turkey shoot. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, 19-20 June 1944, was initiated by the Japanese in order to stop Task Force 58’s advance toward the Marianas and the Philippines. The Japanese action was therefore tactically offensive but strategically defensive; the U. S. response (if even that word is appropriate, since the United States held the overall initiative in 1944) was tactically defensive but strategically offensive. Some of the actions of the Pacific Fleet were also tactically offensive, since air-to-ground strikes against Guam were conducted during the two-day battle. The outcome was unquestionably offensive: the virtual annihilation of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s air arm. It is rightfully difficult to determine what was offensive and defensive on both sides in this classic sea battle involving both sea control and power projection (using the terms of the 1970s).
The concepts of offense and defense are meaningless (and therefore useful to debaters, of course) in the absence of specific and concrete situations. The putative Battle of the Norwegian Sea—the centerpiece of the maritime strategy in the Atlantic theater should a NATO- Warsaw Pact war ever occur—would be a defense within an offense within a defense. The overall NATO strategy is defensive: we won’t start the war; we won’t invade the Warsaw Pact. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic’s missions for the Norwegian Sea are defensive at the highest level of abstraction: to help the Commander-in-Chief Northern Europe’s forces prevent the Soviets from establishing themselves in the Norwegian Sea littoral and to keep the Soviet Navy’s long-range strike forces—antisurface, missile-equipped aircraft, warships, and submarines—from attacking the NATO sea lines of communication. At the next lower level of theoretical mission analysis (an increasingly lost art, by the way, in U. S. military circles), however, the operations are offensive indeed: to challenge the Soviet Union’s maritime power near its bases and destroy it; to sink its ships and submarines, and destroy its long-range aircraft; to help the Norwegian and U. S. Air Force destroy the attacking Soviet ground forces; and eventually, to carry the war to Soviet military bases in the Kola Peninsula. Whether this would be an acceptable, feasible, and suitable course of action is not the point; but if it were, who would characterize a “Lofotens turkey shoot” as defensive and as the dying gasp of an obsolete weapon system?
To characterize any military action as either offensive or defensive is to ignore the fact that offense and defense are inevitably intermingled in every military action. To use such a characterization in any debate on strategy or programs is to concede victory to the critic who asserts the negative and leaves the proponent of the status quo to untangle the semantic fallacies hidden in that assertion.
“Sky Hook: Tactical Air for Smaller Ships”
(See J. Fozard, H. Frick, and D. J. Mottram, pp. 60-63, November 1986 Proceedings)
Griffin T. Murphy—I found the article on SkyHook interesting, but it seems to me that the designers left something out. While this Harrier is hanging on the hook for six hours, what about the salt spray coming into the intakes? Who’s going to climb out there and plug in the intake covers in the first place? (Admittedly they could be yanked out by line for takeoff.) And what about corrosion damage to the rest of the airframe?
Photos of the Falklands War indicate that had SkyHook been available, Harrier pilots hooked on frigate-sized vessels could have qualified as submariners during the usual high seas, even when hooked at funnel-top height.
“Orion the Hunted”
(See K. B. Sherman, pp. 90-92, October 1986;
J. K. Bray, E. C. Moore, pp. 14-17,
December 1986; M. Skinner, pp. 17-19,
January 1987 Proceedings)
Lieutenant S. E. Jasper, U. S. Navy, Patrol Squadron 31—Commander Sherman’s recommendation that the Navy transfer the P-3 Orion’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) duties to our attack submarines, surface units, ship-based air- assets, and subsurface or space-based tracking systems is unacceptable. The P-3 is the best platform for quickly converting subsurface and space-based tracking data into direct path contact and subsequently, effectively conducting target turnover to a surface or subsurface asset. Its current ASW sensor package is phenomenal: the AQA-7 V10-12 directional acoustic frequency analysis (DIFAR) enhancement/passive tracker algorithm modification, and the single advanced signal processor (SASP) on the new P-3C Update III can track the most sophisticated Soviet submarine.
The solution to the survivability issue is not to scrap the Navy’s premier ASW hunter, but to improve the aircraft’s survivability. During wartime, the P-3 will be threatened by subsurface targets, surface ships, and intercepting aircraft. To counter the subsurface threat, P-3 crews currently strive to remain electronically, aurally, and visually undetected on station to maintain a first-strike advantage- Soviet submarines have limited subsurface-to-air capability and are not routinely in a position to launch. If a situation occurs in which a P-3 is detected, it could be vulnerable owing to the short acquisition range of its current ASW weapons. However, the Navy currently is developing stand-off ASW weapons that will virtually eliminate the subsurface threat to the P-3.
The addition of the Harpoon missile makes the P-3 an effective antisurface platform. The Harpoon’s range allows the P-3 to stand off from all Soviet weapon systems, but targeting in a dense threat environment remains hazardous. However, the new ALR-66 electronic support measures system operates independently of the on-board computer and
Provides necessary threat radar coverage; the APS-137 radar presents target imagery for classification; and the AAS-36 infrared detecting set provides night identification of surface threats. Employment °f these systems on all P-3 aircraft will greatly reduce hostile missile-envelope exposure time and improve the P-3’s survivability in a dense-threat environment.
The P-3 might be a large target and relatively slow compared to tactical jet air- oraft, but it is not a pigeon for interceptors. The P-3’s ability to maneuver at low airspeeds in a constant three G turn and Us low-altitude endurance boost its sur- v>vability against adversary aircraft. Defensive tactical maneuvering is taught at the fleet replacement squadrons.
The strength of the P-3 Orion is ASW. The Soviet subsurface threat is too great to allow inhibitions to drive tactical deci- S|ons. Losses can be expected in war- llnie, but current tactics and technologiCal advances make the P-3 more survivable today than ever before.
Lieutenant T. M. Brasmer, U. S. Navy, atrol Squadron 17—As a P-3 mission commander and aircraft commander. I’d 'he Commander Sherman to fly with my pfew- As my squadron’s tactics officer, h like to tell him about the tactical ren- nissance occurring in the fleet. I’m cer- ain he’d revise his opinions.
Putting the P-3 Reserve to Work”
iSee A. Sullivan, pp. 93-94. October 1986 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Douglas Oard, U. S. Naval eserve, Patrol Squadron 91—The aval Reserve P-3 force is more capable j*n(l mission-ready than ever before as a Csult of both an aggressive force mod- rnization program and the improvements ade in reserve force training and man- §ement. In the resource-constrained environment in which we operate, we must be sure to reap the best possible return from our investments, while also employing our forces in the most effective manner. Unlike Lieutenant Commander Sullivan, I am not convinced that it would be in the Navy’s best interest to transfer the responsibility for any deployment site from active to reserve forces.
Although Naval Reserve squadrons are similar in structure to active-duty squadrons, there are unique constraints imposed upon them. By law, the Naval Reserve exists solely to prepare for mobilization. Peacetime functions can be performed only to the extent that they enhance wartime readiness. This “mutual support” function is fulfilled during the annual two-week active duty for training (AcDuTra) period, monthly weekend drills, additional drills, and special active duty for training periods.
Naval Reserve squadrons cannot deploy 12 crews for extended periods as active-duty squadrons can. Each squadron has an allowance for 15 crews and can deploy each crew for up to two weeks each year. Thus, the maximum number of crews a squadron could deploy over a four-week period is seven, although five is a more reasonable estimate given the need to send some crewmembers to school during their annual AcDuTra period and the continued manning shortage in some aircrew positions. In some years, one or two squadrons are unable to deploy at all because their AcDuTra period is devoted to transitioning into a new model of aircraft. If the introduction of the P-3C into the Naval Reserve proceeds as planned, this situation will most probably continue.
Naval Reserve squadrons typically deploy during the summer. Many reservists who have recently been released from active duty use their education benefits to attend college, and deployments during summer vacation allow them to participate with a minimal impact on their studies. Other reservists hold full-time jobs in addition to their reserve assignment, and
Despite appearances, the P-3C Update III isn’t much like the P-3A (foreground) when it comes to ASW; the P-3 reserves shouldn’t be assigned certain patrol responsibilities.
most businesses can more easily make arrangements to deal with employee absences during the summer months. Because the Naval Reserve depends on members who can commit substantial portions of their free time to their reserve duties, AcDuTra can be planned to minimize its impact on their careers and personal lives. Imagine the retention figures for a Naval Reserve squadron assigned to deploy during the Christmas holidays!
An active-duty squadron should not be completely replaced by a squadron with reserve assets. A reservist typically makes a maximum of 12 annual two- week deployments during his reserve career. This is little time in which to develop and maintain proficiency in deployed operations. Thus, tactical development should remain the purview of the active-duty force. AcDuTra provides the primary interface between active-duty and Naval Reserve squadrons. To eliminate this opportunity for tactical interchange by removing the active-duty squadron from the deployment site could eventually result in declining performance from the Naval Reserve P-3 force. For the already heavily tasked training and administration of reserves (TAR) cadre to be solely responsible for tactical instruction would require a significant increase in manning
Removal of active-duty forces from reserve deployment sites would also significantly undermine the ability of active- duty personnel to understand the capabilities and limitations of the Naval Reserve—an understanding essential to rapid and effective utilization of the Naval Reserve upon mobilization.
Finally, if the P-3 reserves were to assume complete responsibility for an antisubmarine warfare sector, there would likely be an eventual marked decline in reserve performance because operations would then have priority over training. Although operational missions provide excellent training opportunities, it is the active-duty forces on hand that allow for optimum matching of reserve crews to missions that maximize their operational training. Locking the P-3 reserves into one sector ignores the possibility that training opportunities for operational missions might decline at that location owing to changing threats or technology. The current arrangement allows the P-3 reserves to “go where the action is” to maximize their training.
“The F4D ‘Ford’: A Better Idea?”
(See G. G. O’Rourke, pp. 123-126, June 1986 Proceedings)
Edward H. Heinemann, chief engineer of the Douglas F4D Sky ray—The editor’s note that prefaces Captain O’Rourke’s article explains that the feature “is the third in a ‘Fighters that Never Got to the Fight’ series, attempting to set the record straight.” I appreciate that note and what I believe Proceedings is trying to do, and I agree that there were some good airplanes that did not develop good reputations because they did not see combat. However, after reading two negative articles on the F4D in other magazines—in addition to this article, which faintly praises the F4D—I must comment for the record.
The F4D Skyray had its beginning right after World War II, when the Department of the Navy believed, and justifiably so, that the threats then menacing our nation required an interceptor airplane. The Navy approached Douglas El Segundo to see if our company could develop an airplane that would meet this challenging need.
The requirement was simple: The airplane had to be a single-place jet with an afterburner that could climb to 40,000 feet in two-and-a-half minutes. It had to carry two 20-mm. guns, air-to-air missiles, and, of course, in an emergency, 2,000 pounds of bombs or drop tanks. It also had to fit on the Navy’s two carriers that had smaller elevators, which greatly limited the size—particularly the length— of the airplane. The wings, naturally, could be folded, but it did not seem sensible to fold the fuselage.
It was soon apparent that the rapid rate of climb could not be met using a conventional wing-loading. This requirement behave. Douglas did not want to commit itself beyond two experimental airplanes, but as our monthly reports were submitted, the Bureau gained more confidence in the success of the design and gradually increased the order to a total of 421 F4Ds.
The Douglas team consisted of myself, as the chief engineer, Leo Devlin, chief designer, Nate Carhart, and other fine engineers. These same men had worked on other famous El Segundo airplanes, such as the SBD Dauntless, the D558-1 Skystreak, the D558-2 Skyrocket, the AD Skyraider, the A3D Skywarrior, and the A4D Skyhawk.
At the time, no airplane could exceed the speed of sound. Great Britain and the United States had been nibbling at sonic speeds, but the few attempts made had met with little or no success. Nevertheless, with the time to climb to 40,000 feet as a principal requirement and speed a
The F4D may have been “a fighter that didn’t get to fight”—but its designer remains convinced, as he was in 1952 when he had his photo taken beside the Skyray, that had there been a fight the F4D would have proved itself a capable fighter.
led to a large wing and a low wingloading—the F4D’s main design feature.
Members of the Bureau of Aeronautics, including Captains A. B. Metsger, Sid Sherby, Walter Diehl, and Turner Caldwell, and Mr. Bill Frisby, met with Douglas El Segundo Engineering numerous times during the formulation of the preliminary design. No one knew at that time how an airplane such as this might secondary requirement, we proceeded to build two airplanes. As the design progressed, we became convinced we had a winner. Originally, the F4D was powered with a Westinghouse jet, but when that engine did not come up to power, we changed to the Pratt and Whitney J57.
The design of the F4D Skyray proceeded in a normal fashion. There were the usual design problems, and, natu-
^Donnell douglas (harry gann>
rally, some problems were made more difficult because of the absence of a tail. These were solved by the incorporation °f elevons at the wingroot. There was also a problem of high stick forces because we had no power controls and also because Douglas Company policy in lb°se days called for manual reversion in the event of power failure. In addition, the jet engines were new and caused a lot °f problems.
Nonetheless, the first flights showed 8reat promise and the flight test program, Under the capable hands of test pilot Bob Rahn, soon gave the Navy Department and the Douglas Company a great deal of encouragement, eventually resulting in the procurement of 421 F4D-ls. The air- Piane, however, still had problems. The 4D-ls were made of a double-wing skin Wlth both an outer skin and an inner skin niade of a thin aluminum alloy sheet. rhis sheet averaged 30- to 40-thousandths of an inch thick, and after exten- Slve panel testing, was thought to be s°und. But this was before skin-panel Gutter had been experienced.
during one of the early flights, Rahn "'as making a high-speed pullout and experienced a high-load factor on the Jfder of 12 Gs, considerably in excess of ue airplane wing strength. Because of his §reat skill, he brought the airplane back 111 one piece, but the wing was so badly "’•'inkled that the airplane had to be j'Crapped. It was at this point that we were poking into the F5D Skylancer and decided that it had to have a much heavier , !n- Therefore, we gave up the double- ^ln pillow construction of the F4D and Cnt to a stronger skin approximately ne-tenth of an inch thick. Stringers were achined into the skin so that when it was finished, the skin could be walked on with hobnailed boots and show no damage. In addition, the F5D was designed for supersonic speed and therefore required a much thinner wing.
The Douglas Company built four F5Ds. But, instead of buying the F5Ds without a competition, the Navy Department advertised for a new airplane, and it turned out that Vought was the principal competitor. Vought built the F8U and won the competition based on the understanding that the F8U was two-tenths of a Mach number faster than the F5D. The Navy then directed us to send the four F5Ds to Moffett Field for tests. After some months of testing on both the F5D and the F8U, Moffett Field called to inquire why the F5Ds had been cancelled in favor of the F8Us. I replied that the Navy Department had informed us that the F8U was two-tenths of a Mach number faster. The Moffett Field representative responded: “I’ve got news for you. The F5D is two-tenths faster than the F8U.” Well, that news was nice to hear, but Vought had the contract.
The F5D had a flight data computer and an automatic pilot, both built by Douglas El Segundo. It also had a modem control system, and even though it had a flight data computer, it had manual reversion. The F5D was, therefore, the world’s first airplane with no vacuum tubes except in the communication equipment. I remember saying at that time that “Vacuum tubes in the control system were strictly for the birds,” and I guess they were.
It was while the F5Ds were undergoing tests that a French Navy captain arrived with a letter addressed to me and signed by a senior U. S. Navy admiral, that granted him access to “confidential” information on the F4D and F5D. After making extensive notes on the two Douglas airplanes, he returned to France. About a year later, while in France, I visited Dassault and was not surprised to see their first attempts to develop what has become a long line of good airplanes—a line that is still going strong.
Their design, the Mirage, was a good airplane. It had problems, of course, as all new airplanes do, but the basic design was sound, as was the design of the F4D. Dassault and the French Navy, however, did not give up. Their current version, the Rafale, complete with a “moustache” or canard, appears to be a winner after a 30- year production run of various related tailless airplanes, which, I believe it is fair to say, got their start from the F4D-1. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the F5D, had it been continued, could still be an attractive airplane in the U. S. Navy.
As for the F4D, its success with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was outstanding. NORAD had Air Force squadrons all over the continental United States and Alaska to defend our country. The exception was one Navy squadron at Naval Air Station San Diego; this was operated by Commander Gene Valencia. Valencia won the NORAD operations prize two years in a row—quite a record. He loved the plane.
There were many other fleet comments, both good and not so good. At the time, such reports were normal. When a problem came up, we fixed it.
Perhaps one of the nicest personal experiences I had at that time was being awarded the Collier Trophy together with my old friend (and the man who gave me my first job in aviation), the chairman of the board of North American, Howard “Dutch” Kindelburger; he for the F-86 and myself for the F4D.
The F4D, the pioneer in the field of tailless airplanes, was, indeed, a good airplane. For its time, it was fast. It held the world’s speed record. Its rate of climb was perhaps also the best. The F5D was even better. In the last 30 years, the design has been followed by the French Mirage and Rafale, the Swedish Viggen, the Israeli Lavi, and others. Thus, history has shown that there is nothing wrong with the principle: an airplane can be built and perform either with or without a tail.
Naturally, I was sorry to see the F5D cancelled. It would have made a superior airplane for the period ahead. I would have stood behind it. And if it hadn’t been cancelled, I am certain we would still be building it.