This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
At some point, it may come down to one man and his rifle to save a Navy ship from terrorists. Off Beirut in 1983, the Pensacola took steps to counter the threat.
During the afternoon of 5 February 1983, the USS Pensacola (LSD-38) arrived off the Rock of Gibraltar guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea and set course to the east as a unit of Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) 2-83. This five-ship task force was headed for war-tom Beirut and five months’ duty as part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force. On board the Pensacola, the tranquil, ten-day Atlantic crossing had settled both the ship’s crew and the embarked Marines into the routines of shipboard life.
That tranquility was rudely interrupted at 1900 when 17 black-clad, heavily armed terrorists stealthily made their way out of the Pensacola's welldeck and burst through the interiors of the ship. Less than nine minutes later, the terrorists were in effective control of the Pensacola, having secured access to both main machinery rooms, the armory, after steering, radio central, the combat information center, the signal shack, and the bridge. The captain was being held at gunpoint on the bridge; the executive officer as well as most other key officers had been gunned down in the exec’s cabin where they had just gathered for eight o’clock reports. The embarked Marines were barricaded into their berthing spaces while a good portion of the ship’s crew members were corralled in the messdecks where they had been waiting for the start of the evening movie. Numerous sailors and Marines lay dead throughout the ship, but so sudden and unexpected was the assault, that not one terrorist had been wounded.
Fortunately, this was not an actual terrorist attack. With
the prior knowledge of only myself (commanding officer), the exec, and the U. S. Navy SEAL (sea-air-land team) “terrorists,” the mock attack was staged to dramatize to all hands the nature of the terrorist threat we would be facing in our deployment, and to kick off an intensive week of drills, weapons practice, skull sessions, discussions, and planning at every level of the command. Before this surprise drill, counter-terrorism was a subject upon which we had received virtually no guidance or training. By the time the Pensacola arrived at Beirut eight days later, and dropped the hook, she was at a higher state of readiness to counter terrorism than any other ship in the task force. That readiness increased steadily during the next five months as we refined and modified our overall plan and as the crew’s training improved.
This intensive plan proceeded from the belief that amphibious ships face a higher than normal risk of terrorist attack based on their missions, which primarily involve the transportation, landing, and support of U. S. Marines and their equipment. These ships, however, also get involved in disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations, and delivery of military hardware/people to foreign nations. One thing common to these missions is the likelihood that the ships involved will be required to move close to the shore, usually into static positions at anchor. Coupled with this, amphibious ships are usually the most, and sometimes the only, visible U. S. presence in the area. This combination of proximity and visibility presents a tempting target for terrorists seeking a means to dramatize their cause and/or their opposition to U. S. involvement in their regional situation. Unfortunately, until recently, little more than lip service has been paid to this problem, or its solution.
Prevention: Early in our study of the problem, we concluded that an attack might be prevented by ensuring that the ship presented an unappealing target to those who might be in the “shopping” stages of their attack planning. We therefore focused on means of “advertising” the Pensacola's readiness. While the suggestion was rejected that a large Arabic sign be displayed proclaiming, “INSIGNIFICANT LANDING SHIP . . . PRESS ON TO GLORIOUS HELICOPTER CARRIER,” we adopted the following measures to discourage potential terrorists from selecting the Pensacola as a target:
- Distancing from the Shore. A major deterrent would be to anchor the ship as far from the shore as possible consistent with the requirement to support boating and shore support missions. Off Beirut this proved infeasible—the steep inshore gradient required ships to anchor much too close to the shore. (Sea echelon was not employed.)
- Boating Exclusion Zone around the Ship. This measure was intended to preclude a sudden dash into the ship by a small boat loaded with explosives, and was particularly pertinent in the Beirut area, where numerous fishing boats and high-speed pleasure craft abounded. Without a zone, reaction time would be reduced to near zero. An exclusion zone was never approved by higher authority during MARG 2-83’s deployment. However, such a zone was implemented subsequent to the truck-bomb attack on the
Marine battalion landing team headquarters at the Beirut International Airport in October 1983.
- High-visibility Sentries. The Pensacola's, deck sentries, armed with M-14 rifles, were intentionally stationed in high-visibility locations. Six sentries were posted around the clock and frequently conducted lock and load drills that were visible from the shore. Sentries were also instructed to wave off approaching small craft with their weapons, displaying both the sentries’ alertness and the fact that they were armed.
- Frequent Small Arms Live-fire Practices. These drills were conducted on a safe firing bearing at the anchorage whenever possible, in order to be observable from ashore.
- Machine Guns. Six .50-caliber machine gun positions were manned during daylight hours, and frequent quick- reaction drills were conducted. Live fire exercises were held immediately after getting under way to be visible and audible from the shore.
- Visitor Control. Whenever visitors were on board, they were closely escorted, accesses to the interior of the ship were conspicuously guarded, and quick reaction drills were held, sometimes when guests were on board. Additionally, the visitors were permitted to operate one of the (unloaded) 3-inch/50-caliber twin gunmounts from the pointer and trainer seats. This demonstrated that both the Pensacola's equipment and crew were ready to meet any eventuality.
- Helicopter Deck Blocking. Whenever it was not being used for scheduled flights, the helo deck was fouled with portable equipment to prevent a hostile helicopter from landing. Under these conditions, rapid rapelling techniques would have to be used to deliver an attacking force. (Local intelligence sources did not then credit potential area adversaries with this capability.) When normal flight quarters were set, the fouling equipment was kept close at hand, ready for immediate use should an intruder helo be detected inbound.
► Special Lighting Measures. At night, the water area around the ship was lighted. The normal task force’s
method of lighting the water around the ship with standard ship floodlights was tried but produced areas of bright light with shadows between them, providing excellent cover for a swimmer. The problem was solved by hanging the Pensacola's “Med lights” over the side in a continuous belt around the entire ship. Although illumination was much less intense than that provided by floodlights, it was even. A simple series of support lines provided the means of lowering the lights to a height eight to ten feet above the Water. A position about five feet above the water would probably have been optimum, but choppy sea conditions in the Beirut anchorage made a higher position necessary. During servicing or when under way, the lights were simply pulled up and secured along the deck’s edge.
This arrangement worked and also added two unexpected benefits. First, because the bulbs were not shielded, the Med lights also lit up the sides of the ship from the waterline to deck level, which meant that our picket boats circling the ship would easily detect anyone attempting to climb up the sides. Second, tests with SEAL swimmers proved that the deck sentries were impossible to see from the water because of the glare from the lights, thus precluding the need to conceal the sentries, who then were free to patrol without feeling as though they were •nviting targets. The inherent danger of this arrangement Was the beacon it presented to a potential mortar or rocket attack from shore. A little creative jury-rigging by the
When operations permitted, the Pensacola's flight deck would be fouled to prevent hostile helicopter landings and the stern gate would be closed and secured. Within months, the U. S. Marines’ headquarters at the Beirut Airport, visible behind the Pensacola (left), would be bombed.
Pensacola's electricians, however, ensured that all topside and waterline lighting could be secured in under 30 seconds entirely from inside the ship, and, with minor exception, directly from the main switchboards in the engine rooms.
All topside areas, including the ladders that led from deck to deck on the rear of the superstructure, were lighted with both floodlights and normal standing deck lights. This eliminated shadow areas and demonstrated that no advantage would be gained by attacking after dark.
► Picket Boats. Picket boats were deployed each night. At times, coverage was extended to 24 hours a day. The picket boat weapons mix recommended in the task force operations order was modified to rely less on individual marksmanship weapons (such as M-14s), and more on area fire weapons (such as M-79 grenade launchers with high-explosive rounds and M-60 machine guns). Concussion grenades were also provided for use against suspected swimmers. The goal was to provide the inexperienced picket boat teams a means to be effective without having to be particularly accurate with their fire. Illumination rounds for the M-79s were later provided so that the picket boat teams might expose any unidentified small craft proceeding in the direction of the ship. Experiments indicated that two picket boats were optimum: one boat was simply too easy for swimmers to avoid; more than two made boat- to-boat identification too complicated. Two boats, operating in random patterns and directions, provided nearly 360° surveillance and made it difficult for a hostile swimmer to avoid detection.
The selection of the type of boat to use for picket was a related problem. Vehicle and personnel landing crafts (LCVPs) were selected. Although slower, less maneuverable, and noisier than large personnel landing crafts, the LCVP provided ample ready access stowage for picket boat team equipment as well as some protection from small arms fire by virtue of its armored side plating. During both daytime and nighttime hours, the picket boats intercepted and warned away small craft approaching within 500 yards of the ship. Longer range investigations and interceptions were provided by the SEAL’S 36-foot Seafox, a high-speed, heavily-armed craft ideally suited for this “pouncer mission. Individual ships could request the Seafox by contacting the task force’s sneak attack defense coordinator, who controlled this boat. The only shortcoming with this approach was the limited number of available SEALs. Any other special warfare tasking degraded the capability of covering the pouncer mission because of personnel fatigue. An attempt to deploy the Seafox pouncer from a ready-alert status at the ship’s boat boom proved impractical both because of slow reaction time and the Pensacola's “bright lights” condition, which continuously exposed the position and status of this craft.
Preemption: How to keep an attacking force from reaching the ship probably received more protracted thought and discussion than any other part of the terrorist problem. Yet, the response options developed to preempt an attack were the least satisfactory portions of our overall plan. The reasons for this are fairly apparent. The uncertainties of recognizing hostile intent were numerous, and the ability to project the Pensacola’s defense any significant distance from the ship was limited, a condition exacerbated by quite restrictive rules of engagement based on our role as part of a peacekeeping force. The attitude of the Beirut population contributed to the difficulty: despite an ongoing war, the city’s people were resigned to the daily uncertainties with which they lived. Therefore, they generally worked and relaxed in a normal fashion, that is, a nice day meant that the coastal area would be full of speedboats, water skiers, and windsurfers, any one of which might intend us harm. With the caveat that this area is still badly in need of expert research, the Pensacola implemented the following preemptive measures:
- Picket andPouncer Boats. With only one Seafox for the entire anchorage area, boat intercept capability was woefully inadequate. This was countered by altering tactics for day and night operations. During the day, concerned less about sneak swimmer attack, picket boats were stationed further away from the ship (500-1,000 yards), with both boats oriented in the direction of the highest threat, that is, on the shoreward side. But this tactic sometimes left the pickets hopelessly out of position when speedboats decided to make course to seaward of the anchorage. At night, the concentration was oriented primarily on an antiswimmer defense. We pulled the boats in closer (200-300 yards) and operated them in random patterns.
- Night Observation Devices (NODs). One large NOD was placed on each of the bridge wing docking platforms and aft on the signal bridge. This provided near 360° surveillance coverage, allowing for the normal swing of the ship at anchor. These devices proved effective in detecting both boats and swimmers. In retrospect, the signal bridge NOD might have been more useful mounted at the ship’s stern, where there would have been less interference from standing deck lighting.
The picket boats were also equipped with hand-held NODs. (In using any of the NODs, the observer’s effectiveness decreases significantly after 15-20 minutes. It is therefore important to consider a relief rotation to maximize the effectiveness of this device.)
- Limited Access to the Ship. Anytime that operations permitted, the accommodation ladder was raised and the stem gate closed. At night, the boat boom ladder was rigged in as well. The only remaining easy means of scaling the hull was the structural web of beams that made up the exterior surface of the stem gate. This area received extra bright illumination from two high-intensity rectangular floodlights of the shipyard variety. These non-standard lights were far superior to normal ship floodlights in providing wide-area, high-intensity coverage.
- Underway Readiness. As a defense against mortar or rocket fire from ashore, near immediate capability to get under way was maintained at all times. Steering control
was maintained on the bridge, both engines were randomly operated ahead and astern for a total of 15 minutes ( each hour (an anti-swimmer measure), and the anchor was made ready to be slipped. The normal underway watch team was reduced somewhat, but sufficient personnel were retained on the bridge to get the ship under way and headed outbound with no augmentation should time become critical.
The numerous watches associated with maintaining this strong defensive posture, coupled with the heavy tempo of daily cargo, helo, and boating operations, placed a severe strain on the Pensacola’s watchbill. For this reason, each department was required to submit a list of non-watch- standers. Following a period of training, about half of the added security requirements were satisfied from this list.
- ,50-cal. Machine Guns. The ship had recently been issued six ,50-cal. machine guns, but no employment or manning guidance accompanied their receipt. SEALs and Marines were recruited to study the ship and to recommend mounting locations. Marines conducted the associated training. Live-fire training was held on an average of every four days over the five months at Beirut, and proficiency reached a high level. In addition to the regular .50cal. teams, each boatswain’s mate of the watch and his quartermaster were trained as a two-man team. Since 24- hour manning of all six machine guns was simply not feasible because of manpower constraints, these duos were designated the machine gun quick reaction teams for night hours. Upon detection of a threat, the team on watch proceeded on the double to the bridge-level machine gun on the alerted side, picking up their ammunition en route— usually in less than 90 seconds.
- 3-In./50-Cal. Twin Gunmounts. Another quick reaction team, consisting primarily of gunner’s mates, was designed to man whichever 3-in./50-cal. gunmount was on the threatened side. This team was normally ready to fire in under two minutes.
Early on, however, the question of restricted fields of fire arose. With task force ships anchored 2,000-3,000 yards apart on a variety of bearings from the Pensacola, large sectors of bearing were “foul,” seriously degrading the capability to engage incoming small craft. Through experimentation, we discovered that at an elevation of zero to minus five degrees, using variable time fuse ammunition, surface bursts were consistently triggered at a
range that varied from 800 to 1,200 yards (the elevation angle will vary from ship to ship depending on the height °f the mount). The tactic derived from this consisted of setting the required elevation, training on the threat bearing, firing, and allowing the attacking craft simply to drive itself into the bursts. Thus, the only adjustment to be made Was for the trainer to keep the gun pointed toward the target as the bearing changed. Although this tactic obviously requires further testing, the Pensacola's consistent test results suggest the feasibility of using it in an urgent attack scenario, regardless of the presence of another ship °n the gun-target line at greater range. (This procedure echoes the anti-high speed boat tactics developed following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964. Unfortunately, this tactical memorandum could not be located on board •he Pensacola.)
^ Quick Reaction Force. A quick reaction team of approximately 15 men, consisting of gunners mates and others with small arms skills, was organized and trained. When this force was called, all others “hit the bulkhead” to permit rapid movement of the team. Weapons were maintained in the ship’s armory on the third deck. Nevertheless, this force was capable of arriving anywhere in the ship in under five minutes.
^ Weapons Readiness. All weapons (including all gun- mounts) were exercised on an average of every four to five days during the deployment. As a result, the Pensacola uever experienced a single weapons malfunction during the entire period. This frequent exercise of the weapons, along with the training of their operators, is essential in Preparing for a hostile situation. Any effort short of this relies heavily on wishful thinking that everything will Work properly when it is really needed. Although the Pensacola expended her training allowance many times over m this effort, ammunition resupply was never a problem, thanks to strong support up the chain of command.
^ General Quarters. The decision to set general quarters upon detection of an incoming raid was scenario dependent, not automatic. Most sequences envisioned were the "minimum response time” variety that dictated using the quick reaction teams, rather than delaying the Pensacola's ability to respond while transitioning to general quarters stations.
^ Air Defense. The Pensacola had no air defense against helos or light planes, except .50-cal. machine guns—a token antiair warfare capability at best. Subsequent to the Attack on Marine Headquarters, Stinger shoulder-fired, Antiaircraft missiles were provided to the task force.
^ Armed Sentries. Because the sentries were lightly armed, and with the probability that only one or two Would be situated to respond to an attack, sentries merely Acted as “trip wires” to alert the rest of the ship, rather than as defending forces. Once the alarm was raised, sentries were to withdraw within the ship.
Resolution: The Pensacola's capability to prevent an Attack from reaching the ship was limited. Although all that could be done would be done, realistically, we concluded that a determined force would be able to get onboard the ship. Therefore, planning commenced to devise
methods of defeating such a force. Defeat, in this context, includes both denying the terrorists their objectives and/or defeating them militarily.
First, we analyzed possible terrorist goals in boarding the ship, concluding that the four most probable were to: disable or damage the ship with an explosive device; take control of the ship, at least temporarily; kill as many people on board as possible; and/or kidnap or kill the commanding officer.
Since setting off an explosive device could be accomplished without boarding the ship, we concluded that blowing up something (perhaps themselves) would be a last resort for a boarding force. Therefore, we concentrated on defeating the other three main goals. For such a raid to be successfully conducted by a small elite force, speed and precise timing would be essential. One of our principal efforts was therefore directed at spoiling that timing and gaining precious reaction time for the Pensacola’s defense effort in the process.
► Skin Security. Measures were taken to deny access to the interior of the ship. If the aggressor could be limited to topside areas only, the attack would be more manageable. To this end, three-quarter-inch square steel locking bars were fabricated and installed on the inside of weather deck hatches and doors. These bars prevented the doors from being opened from the outside, but provided only a momentary delay in opening them from the inside. Each night
Beirut’s coastal waters were spotted with speedboats, water skiers, and windsurfers—any of which might portend harm—and the Pensacola used two picket boats for close-in surveillance. A SEAL-manned, high-speed Seafox, right, provided Ionger-range investigation and intercept capability.
at sunset, doors were barred except for the two leading from the bridge wings into the pilothouse (on the 03 level) and one additional door randomly selected each night and announced to the crew. In order to get to or from topside spaces, one of these three doors had to be used. In the event of an attack, the random door was to be secured immediately, thus leaving the pilothouse as the only access through the skin of the ship. This made the route that the attackers would have to take predictable, and therefore defensible. The purpose was not only to deny access, but to foul the attackers’ time schedule by disrupting their coordination. Locking bars were also fitted on the pilothouse doors to be used in a worst-case scenario.
- Deck Route Blockers. All horizontal through-deck hatches between the wingwall level and the helo deck above were locked each night. The only accesses to the helo deck level that remained opened were two ladders leading from the extreme aft end of the wingwalls up to the aft corners of the helo deck. This tactic not only would slow down the attackers by fouling their timing, but also would funnel them into a predictable route, namely, up over the helo deck at the stem of the ship, forward along the two narrow catwalks (the boat deck), then up the stair- type ladders which led from deck to deck on the terraced rear of the superstructure. (The all-around lighting scheme would probably discourage directly scaling the sides to higher decks.)
- Secret Quick Reaction Force. In the event an attack was in progress, the ship’s company quick reaction force was to proceed to the pilothouse (the access into the skin of the ship). However, if the attackers had been somehow able to gain access to the interior of the ship (such as through a weatherdeck door inadvertently left open), one of their principal objectives would be to block the route to the armory, denying our reaction force the weapons stored there. Therefore a second reaction force was created, the existence of which was known only to myself, the exec, the SEAL officer-in-charge, and the SEALs involved. This second force had a separate arms/ammunition cache under the SEAL platoon leader’s control. Their task was to wait until the terrorists had cleared forward from the helo deck, then attack from the rear. If the ship’s company reaction force had been able to get to their weapons, the terrorists would now be caught between two major defending forces.
A potential attack over the forecastle at the bow of the ship was also considered. But an attack from this direction would have been easily repelled, since the forecastle ends at the four-decks-high vertical face of the Pensacola’s superstructure.
- Other Weapons. Weapons were issued to the bridge team (initial pilothouse defense) and to all ship’s officers.
This kept our options open should someone attempt to capitalize on well-known standard Navy weapons ac- j countability and control procedures.
- Material Condition. At sunset, a unique material condition was set, locally dubbed ‘ ‘ Modified Zebra. ’’This condition consisted of closing all the Zebra hatches on the damage control deck, opening the X-ray scuttles through those hatches, and setting a strict Yoke condition throughout the ship. These procedures would reduce the time required to achieve maximum watertight integrity, and would slow down the attackers should they be making their way through the interior of the ship.
- Topside Restrictions. After taps, no one but sentries and other members of the watch teams were permitted on deck below superstructure level. Deck sentries detecting an attack were to sound the alarm, then quickly withdraw inside, reducing the target discrimination problem for the SEAL and ship’s reaction forces.
- Executive Defense. A counter-terrorist advisor, who was on board the Pensacola during our deployment purely
by chance, provided extensive training in what generally ' can be called executive defense. The exec also participated in some sessions. As a result of the training, I knew what to expect and how to counter it, but a more orderly approach to this problem is clearly needed.
Recommendations: The Pensacola was but one of five ships in the amphibious task force off Beirut. Over the life of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force, perhaps 25 other amphibious ships faced the same problems. These 25 ships probably approached the terrorist issue in 25 different ways. In any case, we were all merely “shooting in the dark.” The Pensacola was more fortunate than most because of the embarked SEALs and the chance presence of a counter-terrorist advisor. The problem is, too little corporate memory has accumulated. The foregoing summation of the steps taken on board the Pensacola and the following 15 recommendations constitute one ship’s contribution to that corporate memory.
- Seek Expert Guidance. As commanding officers, we are counter-terrorism amateurs trying to pit ourselves against professional terrorists. At the amphibious group level, ship counter-terrorist methods need to be examined by those who are professionals in that discipline. Their conclusions need to be codified and promulgated to every amphibious warfare ship’s commanding officer and amphibious squadron commander.
- Improve Intelligence Fusion. Lack of intelligence was not a problem—in fact the reverse was true. The ships
of the amphibious task force at Beirut received so much raw intelligence concerning terrorist activity that it was impossible to sort out the real threats from the rumors. (This problem was confirmed by the Long Commission Report, which investigated the subsequent terrorist bomb- >ng of the Marine headquarters building.) What is needed is an intelligence fusion center, manned by trained analysts, providing tailored intelligence evaluation on a near real-time basis.
- Determine Best Use of 3-In.l50-Cal. Guns. Optimum use against close-in surface targets needs to be established. Experimental results, including depression angles versus range, fragment dispersal optimums, and percentage probability of non-detonation (that is, the danger posed to ships at greater range on gun-target line) need to be promulgated. Commanders need to be able to do something more than guess at our options.
- Improve Night Observation Devices. The problem of background light interference needs to be resolved, perhaps by the development of a variable sensitivity NOD. Loss of night vision while using these devices is also a Problem that needs a solution.
- Standardize Weapon Placement. Weapon advisors need to be made available to individual ships to optimize machine gun placement.
- Invent Effective Booby Traps. Simple booby traps, capable of being installed by ship’s company personnel, need to be developed for locations such as anchor chains and the sides of ships at anchor.
- Obtain More Seafox Craft. Two Seafoxes should be assigned to each deploying squadron to conduct cordon operations similar to the methods used by two-boat, river Patrol teams during Operation Market Time in Vietnam. SEAL detachments need to be augmented to assume this additional mission.
- Use the sea echelon. The sea echelon concept seems a natural for direct application to a terrorist threat situation and should be employed.
- Eliminate Visitor Access. As astonishing as it might seem, a heavy ship’s visitor program was conducted in Beirut under the auspices of the U. S. Embassy. Visitors to the Pensacola included Lebanese Army officers and their families, embassy employees of unknown nationalities, American University of Beirut students, and others. Control was virtually nonexistent; these groups would often arrive at the beach site ashore unaccompanied. In a terrorist threat environment, this was—in the kindest terms—foolish. No visitors should be permitted on board ships under these conditions, and regulations should be Written to shield ships from this sort of State Department Pressure.
- Develop More Imaginative Anti-swimmer Measures. The SEALs made the observation that large numbers of fish hooks in the water gave them serious problems. Is a floating fish hook barrier, similar to an oil boom, feasible? Better anti-swimmer methods than cycling rudders and spinning screws need to be developed.
- Vary Anchorages. Where the area permits, various individual anchorages need to be designated, then at frequent intervals, ships need to be reassigned anchorages in order to complicate the planning process for a terrorist attack.
- Improve Picket Boat Tactics and Equipment. Expert analysis of the picket boat problem needs to be conducted to determine optimum tactics, weapons, and battle doctrine.
- Accelerate Weapons Development!Application. Once serious concern arose regarding the threat of kamikaze attack by light planes, the tactic of using Stinger missiles was applied. The same kind of analysis needs to be conducted concerning the small boat kamikaze threat.
- Analyze Shipboard Lighting. Expert analysis of the best methods to illuminate ships at night needs to be undertaken and the results promulgated. New standard floodlights need to be selected and procured.
- Establish Executive Defense Training. Major corporations have invested in this training for their executives, at significant expense. Within the Navy, the knowledge and the capability exist to conduct similar training for all ship commanding officers. Can the Navy afford not to provide it?
Conclusion: There is probably no one “best way” to counter terrorism. In the absence of expert guidance on the subject, however, no commanding officer can afford to ignore the problem and simply hope for the best. In developing the plan implemented on board the Pensacola, we solicited suggestions from every level of the command. Every suggestion, no matter how wild, received serious consideration. The overriding principles of the final plan boiled down to two points: first, it had to be simple in order to be flexible; and second, it could not produce manpower overkill (we had to be able to carry out the plan and the rest of the jobs tasked to the ship as well, without running the crew into the ground).
Obviously, for every weapon, a counter weapon is developed; for every plan, a plan to counter it is devised. The lesson here is that in constructing a scheme to be used against terrorists, deciding which parts are to be “advertised” and which parts are to be kept “close hold” is something that must be done with extreme care. In the Pensacola’s plan, the high-visibility portions were those intended to discourage an attack. In contrast, those portions designed to defeat an attack were handled on a strict need-to-know basis. In developing any ship’s plan, it is imperative to ask into which of these two baskets each particular portion is to fall.
Captain Palen enlisted in the Navy in 1957, received a fleet appointment to the U. S. Naval Academy in 1959, and graduated in 1963. He has served principally in amphibious ships and has extensive experience in the Mediterranean. He served as commanding officer of the Pensacola Irom 1982-84. A subspecialist in command and control, he received his Master’s Degree in International Relations from Salve Regina College in Newport and holds a Master Oceans (unlimited tonnage) license from the U. S. Coast Guard. Prior to his graduation from the Naval War College in 1985, he was selected for his current post as an instructor in the Strategy Department at the Naval War College. This article has been used in the anti-terrorist portion of the Prospective Commanding Officer's Course at the Surface Warfare Officers School in Newport.