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Philosophy and Strategy: North of the Arctic Circle, rugged and weatherbeaten by the continuous battle against snow, frost, and the furious waves of the Barents and Norwegian seas, lies NATO’s northeastern sentinel, North Norway. North Norway is, however, no longer only a lonely outpost. It has virtually become the strategic key to naval superiority in the Atlantic, and thereby a frontier fort of utmost importance to the freedom of action of the Western Alliance.
The reason why this scarcely populated area has become so crucial is the strange behavior of its nearest neighbor, the capriciously murmuring Soviet Brown Bear. Through the last two decades, this neighbor has made enormous efforts in learning how to swim. And a Brown Bear who takes interest in swimming gives Norway a thousand reasons for raised eyebrows and suspicion.
To observe a swimming polar bear is not at all sensational—not to anybody. Swimming is part of its special environment and imperative to its struggle for life. But when a Brown Bear, with its roots deep in the heart of the mainland, tries to get seaborne, the only logical explanation must be a desire to extend its hunting grounds.
There are, however, some practical problems attached to the maritime activities of this special bear. The first is its dependence on supplies and support from the homeland. The second is the geographical location and the limited space of its winter lair. The third is the fact that the entrances and exits of its lair are narrow and vulnerable. As long as these problems remain, the Soviet Brown Bear will likely abandon its longing for maritime adventures and probably abandon plans of aggression against its neighbors.
This somewhat laconic analogy provides, in a nutshell, the main ideas and philosophy behind Norwegian defense strategy and the composition of Norwegian forces developed after World War II. Since Norway signed the NATO treaty as one of the founding members in 1949, there generally has been bipartisan support for the following basic principles of Norwegian defense policy:
- Security and Detente: In plain language, this means adequate deterrence without unnecessary provocations.
- Continued Membership in NATO: Even if the Norwegian defense effort is substantial, a country with a large geographical area and a population equal to the State of Maryland’s cannot solve its security problems alone.
- Foreign Presence: No foreign troops will be stationed in Norway as long as the country is not under attack or exposed to threats of attack.
- Nuclear Weapons: No nuclear weapons will be stockpiled on Norwegian territory in peacetime.
- Military Assistance: Norway’s base policy does not prevent agreements with NATO countries on military assistance, prestocking of heavy equipment for allied forces, and joint allied exercises in Norway to raise deterrence.
Mission: From the basic principles of Norwegian defense policy, guidelines for the mission of the Norwegian forces employed in maritime operations include resisting any form of amphibious attack; maintaining national sovereignty and freedom of action in coastal waters and territory; carrying out adequate maritime surveillance and control in the sea territory and adjacent waters to deter surprise attack and illegal activities; protecting allied reinforcements against surface, subsurface, and air attacks in Norwegian waters; and enforcing authority in the economic zone and on the continental shelf. Because of limited resources, Norway is not able to allocate adequate maritime forces to all of its areas of responsibility during peacetime and therefore has to settle for geographical priorities. In the present situation, North Norway is given first priority, which means that the major part of Norway’s standing operational forces are stationed in, or earmarked for, that part of the country.
Total Defense Concept: To maximize the efficiency of available national resources, Norway has adopted a “tota defense concept,” whereby civilian as well as military capacity is combined an coordinated. The principal goal is to produce maximum resistance against an aggressor in time of crisis or war. Operational control of the combat forces is assigned to unified commands, in whic all three services are represented. As ta as maritime operations are concerne . both the navy and the air force are em ployed, and common procedures an close cooperation between the two has been established.
Resources: The composition of forces allocated for maritime operations is base on the mission, thorough analysis 0 selected scenarios, naval experience, economic resources, and personnel re sources. In peacetime, operational c°n trol is exercised from two joint maritime headquarters, in Bodo, where the Com mander Allied Forces North Norway ** based, and in Stavanger, home of 1 Commander Allied Forces South Nor way. The order of battle follows:
Navy: The Royal Norwegian NaA consists of three major elements: navy, with surface forces and subma rines, the coastal artillery, and the coa guard. Ships of the Norwegian Nav> include:
- 14 Kobben-d&ss (Type 207) subs
- 5 Oslo-class frigates
- 2 Sleipner-class corvettes .
- 46 fast attack craft (FAC) of Tje ' Storm-, Smogg-, and Hauk-classes
- 10 Sauda-class minesweeper/mme
hunters
- 2 Vidar-class minelayers ^
- 1 Horten-dd&s depot ship for FAC an
submarine support e
- 7 LCUs (utility landing crafts)
Reinoysund- and Kvalsund-dasses According to Norway’s total e£S_
concept, hundreds of ferries, fishing v ^ sels, and other civilian ships are PrePar for various naval missions such as m laying, minesweeping, survey, and na control.
144
Proceedings / March
Novaja
Semija
(Soviet)
Bjornoya
(Norway)
FISHERY \ PROTECTION' ZONE
Svalbard'
V (Norway)
The coastal artillery is located at the ^trances to Norway’s most important arbors and vital inshore areas. In order stop, delay, or divert an enemy amphibious assault, it is organized on the asis of gun batteries, torpedo batteries, and controlled minefields. The coastal atteries, guns, and torpedoes are genera ly located in well-protected rock instal- ahons. They are considered to be resis- ant targets and hard for an enemy to knock out.
The coast guard is equipped with:
3 Nordkapp-class long-range endurance cutters
3 NornenlFarm-c\ass medium-range cutters
^ T chartered patrol ships . ePending on the fishing season, a vary- 'ng number of civilian vessels are char- ered for law enforcement and control in connection with the coastal fisheries. The °ast guard is also supported in the sur- ■ 61 lance mission by the P-3B Orion mar- lrne patrol aircraft.
^‘r Force: The following units of the
Royal Norwegian Air Force are involved in maritime operations:
- One P-3B Orion squadron (seven aircraft) stationed at Andoya (ocean surveillance and antisubmarine warfare [ASW])
- One Sea Lynx helicopter squadron (six aircraft) operating from Norwegian Coast Guard cutters (surveillance and control)
- One Sea King helicopter squadron (ten aircraft, search and rescue)
- Four F-16 squadrons (69 aircraft) with antiship and/or antiaircraft defense capabilities. (The aircraft will be operational with the Penguin Mark III antiship missile in 1988-89.)
Readiness: On 20 May 1985, Norway’s Chief of Defence executed an extensive unscheduled alert exercise for the Royal Norwegian Navy, comprising all commissioned and also three noncommissioned naval ships. The aims of the exercise were:
- To test and exercise the readiness and capability of naval bases to ready a large number of surface ships and submarines for battle deployment without warning
- To test and exercise the readiness and capability of surface ships and submarines to make a rapid deployment without prior warning
- To exercise the headquarters of Commander Allied Forces North Norway and Commander Allied Forces South Norway in ad hoc operations
All participating ships were ordered to sail as soon as possible to an exercise area in the Vestfjorden in North Norway, to arrive no later than 24 May.
At the start of the exercise, 35 of the participating units, including the three noncommissioned ships, were in—or in the vicinity of—Haakonsvem Naval Base in South Norway. This base is the main naval base of the Royal Norwegian Navy and is situated just outside the city of Bergen, within the Naval District Vestlandet on the west coast of Norway. It was therefore the responsibility of this base, under the direction of Rear Admiral Arne Utne, Commander Naval District Vestlandet, to make those 35 ships ready for battle deployment.
Most of the ships were made ready for combat and departed Haakonsvem on 20 May, heading for the deployment area some 600 nautical miles from the main naval base, and more than 100 miles north of the Arctic Circle. The three noncommissioned ships (fast attack craft) were manned, stored with ammunition, provisions, and fuel, and subsequently went through a quick work-up, before they sailed for their deployment area on 22 May.
/ Jan Mayen
lorway
\ FISHERY \ ZONE
Tromso.
Finland
A polar bear swimming in the Royal Norwegian Navy’s area of operations, left, is no big deal; but a swimming Brown Bear—as reflected in this Soviet underway replenishment in the Norwegian Sea—is a foreboding and unwelcome sight.
Faeroes
Trondheim
Shetland
England
Stavanger,
Knsand
Denmai
Germany
in«s / March 1986
145