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aPpr°Xjm "|ateast night’s attack, which began at Seven terif e. ^0 p.m. local time, involved at least U,lnatned f^1Sts' ^he attackers approached the as yet NiCe |a, r,^ate in a small boat disguised as an Italian
offi One man rlroccori ae an Italian nnlioo
jj ^owied°Ur'nto two 8rouPs °f two. Displaying a>ry?f the ship, one pair ran to the ship’s
^ K rl_ . r*VlI1P DC if 11 'll hilinn imlnnlrjirl I. . ■ llm f'.i 11
acked a i] ^ne —Late Friday night, terrorists at- "0U|idin« frigate in Naples Harbor, killing 45 and rcP°rts j h* *CaSt others. With details still sketchy,
P^Rcer, stnc”* One man, dressed as an Italian police 't11p0|'tantarted UP lhe ship’s brow, claiming to have an ?l°p, themessa8e for the duty officer. When told to Nket, shniaa Puhed a silenced pistol from under his *'Unning °ot‘n8 the armed petty officer on watch.
an Wat^h^6 *>row’ terrorist then shot the offi- i e pist0| f aS watch officer attempted to retrieve >us,vr0ni t*le dead petty officer’s holster. Simul- ern sent-311 accomPl'ce on the nearby mole shot the i ? °ur m ^ a high-powered rifle, th^'hal h°rC terr°rists quickly boarded the ship. The ^eotk„. ?arder remained on the quarterdeck while ons, the pair killed the surprised sailors. Before leaving, the terrorists prevented further entry by setting off a thermite grenade. Moving through nearby compartments, the pair methodically killed all the ship’s personnel they encountered.
The second pair ran toward the officers’ wardroom, killing the command duty officer as he emerged. Several officers made a desperate, unsuccessful attempt to bar the door—they were machine gunned by the terrorists. Descending to the crew eating area, where the nightly movie had been in progress, the pair opened fire with automatic weapons and hand grenades, causing heavy casualties.
After only four terror-filled minutes on board, the two pairs returned to the quarterdeck. Their departure was covered by sniper fire from the mole. Two minutes later, a delayed action bomb they had left behind exploded, inflicting more casualties and covering their retreat.
The frigate had arrived in Naples only three days before, after extended Sixth Fleet operations supporting U. S. policy in the Mediterranean. . .
Hen thelv Stor^ N°, not yeL but frighteningly possi- °f U. $ C. avy’s increasingly prominent role as a sym-
•S t J *“'-Icasingiy prominent roie as a sym- icti et?rrn'nation is combined with the disturbing
tii Irecti ; ",,,uulun is commnea wun tne aisturmnj in N news°nS 'nterr>ational terrorism is taking. This fic tlcCOUnt represent*; n *irpnnrin thnt rmilH ivv’11
in .1 wWs aer ......... ............. ...... o*
>r'e near <- °unt reP''esents a scenario that could occur N MC|0 future.
avy is jn!?lat'c'> f*erhaps—but not improbable as the
usingly seen as the representative of U. S.
military resolve worldwide. Most recently, interception of the Achille Laura's hijackers was a dramatic instance of this role. During the international peace-keeping mission in Lebanon, U. S. Navy ships were off the coast daily. The most prominent symbols of the United States in Lebanon—the Marines—were victims of terrorism. Naval gunfire struck Lebanese targets with impunity, a fact well remembered by the factions involved. In fact, the hijack-
Arleigh Burke Essay Contest—Second Honorable Mention
into a de facto state of war between the U. S. Navy an _ international forces of terror. Seen in this context, much more likely that the battles the Navy will fign
ing the next decade will be in the shadowy arena
litai uttauc wm uc in me snauuw^ a**'**- nf)ftS> because of the vulnerability of unsecured seaf' rather than against Soviet battle groups. While the primary focus must remain on the Soviet threat, efforts are now required to fight the war against teI*°aseS, Terrorism is a threat to the entire Navy. Nava ^ aircraft, submarines, ships, and personnel are a" and However, one segment of the Navy’s high visibi * unique characteristics make it a prime target- the s force. offefl'
Surface force units are frequently present in areas
ers of TWA Flight-847 were quoted as being “especially critical of the battleship New Jersey.”
Elsewhere, Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi chafes over his inability to deter or counter U. S. attacks on his installations or enforce a self-declared sovereignty over the Gulf of Sidra—because of the presence and demonstrated capabilities of the U. S. Navy. Farther east, another patron of terrorism, Iran, is partially restrained from disrupting oil routes and adjacent countries by the presence of U. S. battle groups. Closer to home, U. S. warships patrol Central American waters to deter communist expansion and aid in the interception of drugs. Throughout the world, port visits by our ships support governments friendly to the United States. While justly proud of its role as a symbol of the United States, this high visibility transforms the Navy into a veritable “red flag” for those opposed to the United States and its interests.
Concurrently, significant changes have occurred in the way terrorists operate. Brian Jenkins, a leading authority on international terrorism, recently described this trend, “Terrorists can no longer achieve the same shock effect or obtain the same publicity with the same tactics they used ten years ago.” He continues: “Staying in the headlines requires acts of greater violence. Government sponsored terrorists have greater resources and capabilities. It [government sponsorship] puts more resources in the hands of
the terrorists; money, sophisticated munitions, in[e gence, and technical expertise.”1 f.
Further compounding the terrorist threat is the ern^ gence of the “suicide” terrorists. Fanatics, willing even eager to lose their lives for their cause, have sho they will undertake difficult and risky missions if the tential results are spectacular enough. Many targets o thought secure must now be considered vulnerable- ^ These developments, combined with the almost declared intentions of any number of groups to “reta1 against the United States, add up to a dangerous equa 1 Though no formal declaration of war exists, this trans
it is dur- of terr°r' ism
ble targets. In fact, the “compactness
them similar to airliners in that terrorists can in a’L deal of damage on a large concentration of Per^u|11t>ef0 equipment located in a small area. The large
Established rules warship may be approached in
g0vieat area is closely monitored
thesernhhow dose a U. S. warship ma, _ „,T_____________
battle ^.threat areas. If necessary, the ship can man . Nations in two minutes or less. Frequently, accom
beJj*S absent. A liberty port is considered a relatively
-------------------------------------- * ‘ • poll 1J VU1101UV10U U IVIUIUOI
to enn env’r°nment. While in port, the prevailing desire is hervvfn, 3 WeH-deserved rest without the pressures of un-
subtl sect'on spends its time asleep. It is
-a natural human relaxation occurs when an
current threats. It was designed to counter a
cace s^jPs ar*d their greater frequency of port calls in- Shi Se l^e'r exposure. For terrorists seeking attention, a Flakes an excellent target.
shin 6n dePloyed’ a ship is either under way or in port. A to cUnder way> while still vulnerable, is better prepared careifoi a terrorist threat. A fully alert watch team
high th trac^s ad contacts. Any approaching contact in a fire at area is Hncplv mnnitnrpH Rst^hlishprl mips
‘ng ships are available for support.
PorT dl^erent situation exists on board when the ship is . • The habitual “alertness” permeating a ship under
pan3y °Perations. Up to two-thirds of the ship’s com- “ he ashore. (This does not mean the in-port rou-
l;°as’sts only of “hitting” the beach, nor does this his b Ua* stands down from an environment demanding hours1 PetT°rmance in his area of professionalism 24 pjnc,a day for weeks or months at a time.) perim / CUrrent doctrine, a ship’s security is essentially a ti°ns ? defense with a point defense around key loca- en an alarm is raised. The underlying concept
theskf ln® conventional military objectives—to disable struct^ °r Stea* weaPons- Unfortunately, such a defensive tive is 6 ls P°orly suited to handle an enemy whose objec- devei0SlrnPly t0 kdl or a sophisticated threat with a well- bo^ fe<: Plan for executing a coordinated attack. Ship- depth -r!enses do not have the necessary coverage or forces H f ta^e t0° l°nS t0 respond. While security ProteCf C end key locations, the rest of the crew has little ^fensc'f1 Should the perimeter be “cracked” before the catastr ^.rce reaclles stowed weapons, the results can be center)rilC’ as 'n the fictional news account. Defenses lion is0n a ^ew key locations. (On small ships, the situa- resourc0rse-) For a terrorist with adequate funds and lhe i0s’ Staining details of a ship’s general layout and Thisa 10n °f the key areas would not be difficult. to the taitlCle advocates a comprehensive, total approach °gniti0rror*st Problem. Strategically, this requires a rec- lagness*1.0^ gravity of the threat combined with a wiling fro ° Cornrnit the resources to find a solution. Flow- bans]^ 111. this initial decision, the tactical response ship c[ej. lr,to an in-depth, thorough program of individual ateas. ense- Tactical responses are envisioned in three . the f | aniZation, physical security, and training. l'0ns owing proposals present only a few of the direc- ^alf'he-C 3 Pro8ram could take. One constant prevails: ®d solutions are unacceptable. Defenses must be ed with wartime vigor.
^°ctr^if2<M'ow-' Formulate an overall counter-terrorist SPcciflc ,0r shipboard defense. Such a doctrine must be ’and tailored to defending against terrorist attack—
not just a supplement to current security procedures. Under the guidance of this doctrine, each ship develops her own antiterrorist doctrine, tailored to fit her unique characteristics. Changes to the defensive structure, detailed in the physical security section, will come from this doctrine. Together, these two doctrines become the vehicle to implement the remainder of this program.
The following proposal uses a frigate-size ship as the example. (Physical size is also a factor. Small ships have fewer resources and personnel for security. Thus the danger increases as the ship’s size decreases. Small crew size provides little defensive depth.)
Physical Security: The first and primary defense under normal circumstances is the ship’s perimeter defense. Key to the perimeter is the quarterdeck. The quarterdeck controls access and coordinates all security functions, including the vital activation of the secondary defensive teams. At present, the quarterdeck is very vulnerable. Ceremonial concerns now carry more weight than security. We must recognize the quarterdeck’s most important function— security—and plan accordingly.
These recommendations should be implemented:
- Arm the watch appropriately. Provide the petty officer of the watch (POOW) an effective weapon, something along the lines of a Heckler & Koch MP5—slung at the neck, ready for instant use.
- Arm the officer of the deck (OOD) with more than a long glass. A small automatic pistol is appropriate in view of the OOD’s other duties. It is less effective than an MP5, but at least the OOD is not trying to share a single weapon with the POOW.
Overreaction? Ridiculous? Consider how effective a lone .45-caliber pistol is against a submachine gun—even assuming that the pistol can be drawn from the holster in time. The quarterdeck looks like an armed camp. Right! If you noticed it, so will potential attackers. Maybe they will be deterred, at least temporarily.
- Provide other security improvements to the quarterdeck. Many ships have a quarterdeck enclosure of some kind. Standardize these with a lightweight, removable (for under way) enclosure made of Kevlar panels to provide protection.
- Improve the OOD’s ability to observe his environment. Install closed-circuit television cameras on opposing bridge wings (low-light television would be even better). Place a monitor on the quarterdeck for the OOD. He should be able to control the camera through its full arc.
- Continue to post bow and stem sentries, but arm them with weapons more effective than cumbersome, obsolescent semiautomatic M-14s. Small automatic weapons are more useful. In addition, as they are removed from the “formal” quarterdeck, the sentries should wear Kevlar bullet-proof vests. While in dangerous ports or during other periods of high threat, have the quarterdeck watch also wear Kevlar vests. Equip the roving watch similarly.
- Add one additional watch station—the bridge. A darkened bridge, manned by an armed petty officer, provides an excellent view of the area around the ship, especially those portions out of the OOD’s sight. The bridge watch
their duties, small automatic pistols are appropr*^te'efS’ ► Link the television screens in the wardroom and c ^ mess into the bridge-mounted surveillance cameras-^ ^ channel tied into each camera allows key personne .p, serve and immediately be aware of any situation de
can monitor the approach of boat traffic, both visually and by radar. Alongside a pier, the bridge watch can observe approaching vehicles and personnel. The bridge watch also has the advantage of covering the forward segment of the ship which is invisible from the quarterdeck. Communications can be maintained from the bridge with nearby ships and law and military forces ashore. Most important, the bridge watch station is a backup control facility, to activate the ship’s security forces. Neutralizing two such control sites would be a much more difficult task for potential attackers.
- Supply the quarterdeck, bridge, rover, boats, and command duty officers (CDOs) with a two-way communication capability. Relying on telephones to transmit critical wamings/orders is time consuming, awkward, and an invitation to disaster. Lightweight radio communication sets provide an easy and effective link between key members of the duty section.
- Increase the number of internal weapons storage locations. At a minimum, there must be two well-separated defense team weapons lockers. To further strengthen defensive depth, place small weapons lockers in the wardroom, chiefs’ mess, and chiefs’ berthing, as well. These lockers, each holding three to four MP5-type weapons, would complicate the attackers’ attempt to neutralize a ship’s defense, while increasing the defenders’ response time. (Lockers should be built to acceptable specifications
for weapons security.) All officers and chief petty °* in the duty section should carry keys to these lockers- ^ duty section turnover will include an inventory 0 ^ weapons, ammunition, and keys. (Ammunition c ^e. kept in sealed, but easy-to-open, transparent bags.
stepping the need to count each bullet.)
► Arm the key members of the duty section tant CDO, and duty department heads. Again, becau
ing in the ship’s vicinity. ? gafety
Are these proposals responsible and necessary- stj|| is an obvious concern. Even if increased, access w* 0ffj- only be among the “khaki”—officers and chief PettJready cers who, in the normal course of their duties, a j0„s exercise considerable responsibility. They make dec ^ daily which potentially affect the life or death of s° ^ all of their shipmates. Few could not be worthy asg increased trust. For the remainder of the ship s forces, access remains essentially unchanged. cesSjty Both concerns merge when considering the n<^evVof for such measures. Perhaps a better question is: In v^reS? the threat, can we afford not to implement these
Countering a terrorist assault requires aforcefu ’ n for diate response. The axiom, “There is only one re 3 ^
military failure—too late,” is never truer. Terrori^^y successful because they strike quickly and sasec- against an unsuspecting foe. For the defenders, ev ^stS ond of the initial few minutes is crucial. Until the tj0tiS gain control, they are vulnerable. Delays and _ ^ at-
during the transition period, when the terrorists tempting to establish control, permit the defender
haJ ^*,S ^0rces t° defeat the attack. All of these proposals ha^'h's as their goal.
ber ?rov'n8 the quality of arms and increasing the num- jn„ ° armed personnel would both work toward disrupt- initiaj e*eat'n8 the terrorists’ initial assault. Even if these help | a,rnie^ defenders do not defeat the attack, they can asse f ay the terrorists until the defense teams are able to re( Qe- Vulnerability is reduced. This defense does not teamT °n^ a ^ew individuals for access to weapons. Both In teaders and khaki can quickly lay hands on weapons. atterp111’ & terror‘st faces a much more difficult job— hons ^tln® t0 neutralize multiple weapons storage loca- caseant* many more armed defenders. Even in a worst teairisSCenar'°> with the perimeter breached and some aCcesarnhushed, there are still defenders with arms or run them. The possibility of terrorists gaining free and c tae *s reduced. Any attempt to hold the ship rew hostage also becomes less likely.
Tr • ■
e°niD^m!n8:^ None of this can be accomplished without a quiri 6 ensive training program. It will be painful, re- PeopiJ5 SU^slantial commitments of money, resources, and C°nsre- (Women must receive the same training. While c°m^ss does not allow women to be “full-fledged” An antS’ /ew terrorists respect such niceties.)
If onlvSSent'a^ ^rst steP's adequate small-arms training, tinted °ne measure proposed in this article is imple- tfajnj ’ 11 should be the institution of a “real” weapons 'nsuffj .pro§rarn. Current small-arms training is woefully the feejlent- At best, a watchstander is familiarized with fecenti UtK' no*se °f his weapon. All Hands magazine trainjn, pu^hshed a “glowing” article on the small-arms after °f 3 surface force unit. Watchstanders qualified Sccuri(lrin^ ^ rounds from their .45-caliber pistol.2 Few healjjjg exPerts would consider this adequate training for expertyuh terrorists who likely have extensive weapons The M
Srdall_a3V^ needs to develop a realistic and thorough eyes isrms training program. Shooting at paper bull’s- neither realistic nor thorough. Blend variety and
realism into intermediate and advanced training. Use a range with “pop-up” targets similar to those employed by police departments. Construct the range so it resembles a ship. Instructors can teach the tricks of shipboard fighting, such as the problem of ricochets in a narrow passageway. Such a program will require monumental effort. An entire fleet of sailors must be trained. But consider the alternative: continued deployments of crews barely able to defend themselves and their ships against attack.
The training program should be implemented following these guidelines:
- Introduce personnel to small arms in boot camp or initial officer training
- Improve small arms proficiency training through advanced individual weapons training during overhaul
- Use refresher training (RefTra) to begin basic team training and to further mold the teams into an effective defensive organization
- Use preparation for overseas movement time for final refinement and skill building
In the interim, implementation must be on a crash basis. All ships scheduled to deploy must receive a period of intense weapons and antiterrorist training before leaving home port. Fly special teams to the ships stationed overseas. Require ships to complete antiterrorist training before making any further port calls. If available, use the facilities of U. S. bases or friendly countries. If none is available, “drop the hook” and conduct training at anchor. Draconian? Yes, but the gravity of the danger is such that these interruptions to gain additional security are worth the disruptions to the ship’s operating schedule.
Ships further down the deployment pipeline will train during RefTra, which will become the core training period. The entire ship’s company is exercised. Defensive teams pit their skills against RefTra instructors, trained to simulate terrorists. Equally important, the remainder of the crew learns how to react. Crew members not involved are taught to retreat quickly to selected compartments which can be secured against attack. All those on board are exposed to the “no rules” environment of the terrorist.
Once the ship completes RefTra, make counter-terrorism drills a regular part of the cycle of in-port fire and emergency drills. Include a counter-terrorist scenario as a part of all fleet exercises. Similarly, incorporate these drills into weekly squadron in-port training.
Concurrently, implement a rigorous force-wide information security program. Preventing a potential attacker from obtaining any information about his target must be a high priority.
On deployments, as a part of the “in-chop” process, provide current security briefs on visited areas. Include all hands, with modifications to conform to security requirements. Commanding officers, executive officers, opera-
Current small arms training does not measure up well. The Navy needs to develop a realistic, comprehensive training program to reduce ships’ vulnerability to attacks by terrorists, who are likely to have weapons expertise. Sentries need to be armed with something better than the cumbersome obsolescent M-14, shown here.
tions officers, and the security coordinator should receive a top-secret brief. Officers and chiefs should receive a secret brief. An unclassified brief, prepared from available open-source material, should be given to the remainder of the crew. Such briefings serve to increase awareness of the threat and develop the needed sense of urgency. Most importantly, these briefings provide understandable explanations of why this security program is necessary.
Throughout the deployment, continue to provide updated information and briefs. Exercise the security forces frequently. Arrange additional training ashore using the facilities of U. S. allies. Joint exercises with local forces can introduce valuable, different perspectives. Have inspection teams visit the ship to provide periodic audits of
By no means should these proposals be considered tn definitive solution. They merely present some directions enhanced antiterrorism defense can take on board surtace force ships. But the common thread must be a sincere commitment to these defenses.
Some of these suggestions may appear radical. They a ^ intended to be. The Navy faces a very real threat in a unconventional arena. Traditional responses will no Ion? suffice. So far, the Navy has been lucky—but how l°n® will that luck last? The forces of terrorism have ma abundantly clear that they are engaged in a war against United States. Our surface forces must be prepared to >g in this war.
Be Aware and Beware
By Chief Master-at-Arms Larry W. Latina, U. S. Navy, and Chief Master-at-Arms Bradford C. Pratt, U. S. Navy
From 1970 through 1984. there were approximately 22.171 terrorist- related incidents, with 3,032 of these aimed at U. S. targets. Of the 3,032 attacks. 535 of the targets were military. The number of terrorist operations continues to increase. The United States and its military find themselves increasingly the targets of hostage taking, assassination, bombing, kidnapping, hijacking, skyjacking, and other forms of violent assaults by terrorist groups.
This dramatic increase in terrorist activities directed at U. S. military facilities prompted the Chief of Naval Operations to take actions to increase security for naval installations and personnel. The Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC), formerly the Naval Investigative Service, was tasked with the project and proposed the establishment of a well-trained, professional naval security force. The Navy Security Guard Course located at Lakehurst. New Jersey, is a result of the NSIC proposal.
During the first half of 1985, construction of facilities for the school began, and the first school stall selection process was completed. Military members of the staff are selected from experienced specialists within their respective ratings. Civilian staff members are selected from the most professional applicants in the law enforcement community. This strict selection process affords the highest quality of training the Navy law enforcement and security profession can provide.
On 7 October 1985, the Navy Security Guard School, headed by Lieutenant (junior grade) Thomas W. Clement, opened its doors. The four-week course trains Navy and Department of Defense civilian personnel assigned to security duties at various naval installations throughout the world in the fundamentals of physical security. A combination of hard work, dedication, superb managerial skills, and top-notch professionalism enabled this school to be on line within 18 months, instead of the normal three to four years allowed for a new school development phase.
The immense task of instructing the topic of terrorism is assigned to the security matters section. Each instructor is responsible for teaching a weekly six-hour block on terrorism. as well as other law enforce- ment/security related topics. The instructors provide their students with the most up-to-date training in the field of countering terrorism, relating real world scenarios and countermeasures. The course offers the definition of terrorism as "the calculated use of violence to attain
political, religious, or tucuiyp- jn- goals by instilling fear or us"- timidation or coercion. .
Learning to recognize eci ' nt| signs of danger and being c° ^ ^ aware of your environment c ^ the most effective tools for s ing terrorism. American clV' rV and, to a greater extent, 1111|i£)Ugh; personnel are conspicuous cuC(; however, there are wuys ,0ib|c- your profile. When at all P^ .^nil
attempt to blend into your seria
ings and avoid showing 0efji- wealth. (In many countries. ,,r hers of the U. S. armed se ry considered wealthy.) Avo' ^
cars with special/persona |Zof
cense plates, or country. ra special qualifications dcea s ^ insignias. Use unmarked Pa ^ p spaces and vary where y011^ n v(,ui not place your family namc home. (On many military
the ^6Se ProPosa's are tailored for the surface forces. But underlying concepts can be applied to many other ()j. s whhin the Navy. Considerable resources and sums for!'10tlCy are rccluire^ to implement these proposals. Unsafely, undeclared war is as expensive as “formal” Pe must change. The easygoing, “It can’t hap-
and ,re” uttitude can easily prove fatal. During the 1960s soi *^e Israelis were forced to make similar re
in fCe cornrn'tments and attitude changes. Today, as an Sta;ca-gly favorite target of extremist groups, the United eit, es an(l its Navy must adjust. The adjustment can come for r as a reaction to a series of painful attacks or in the thr Preventive defensive measures. Either way, the eat must be countered.
'Brian Michael Jenkins, “The U. S. Response to Terrorism: A Policy Dilemma,” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1985, p. 39.
"Kenneth Klein, “Small Arms Training,” All Hands, March 1985, p. 33.
Lieutenant Commander Staszak graduated from Boston University in 1976 and received his commission in 1977. His first assignment after attending Surface Warfare Officers School was in the USS Glover fFF- 1098) as the combat information center/electronic warfare officer. In January 1983, he assumed duties as the executive officer of the USS Constitution (ex-IX-21). He left active duty in September 1984. In 1986, he received an MBA from Boston University. Currently, he works for M/A-COM Microwave Associates. Still in the Naval Reserve, he drills with the Fleet Intelligence Rapid Support Team 0291 at NAS South Weymouth. He has had two professional notes published in the Proceedings: “A New Role (Soviet Stand-in) for the Naval Reserve” (October 1984) and “. . . And Never the Twain Shall Meet” (September 1985).
1 ls common to see the com- ,sln8 officer’s name on his 'e or Peking space.) Avoid pub- ie:u'd establishing daily routines |)(jC ,ls more than one way to go from work, vary your routes I,0nally. Also, vary the time Cave from and return to your k°r h°me. Studies have shown I ^ simPly avoiding routines,
8 Just about everything you c uces your chances of being jhed by 65%.
® likelihood of actually being )\v °sta8e is slim; however, the lng suggestions will minimize ^lunatic effects:
sdrU'ni’ ant' *1ave faith in lVy ’ y°ur’country, and God.
- Stay alert for the possibility of escape. Ensure that the odds are greatly in your favor, otherwise do not attempt it.
- Attempt to establish a rapport with your abductors.
- Attempt to make note of everything that goes on around you.
- Anticipate isolation or other meth ods to break you down.
- Set up a schedule of physical and mental exercise, then follow it.
- Comply with all instructions as well as you can.
- Eat whatever you are given.
- Maintain your self-respect and dignity.
- Daydream as much as possible during your waking hours.
- Sleep as much as possible.
- Be courteous at all times; it spreads quickly.
- Do not volunteer to do anything.
- Do not worry about the members of your family; they will be taken care of by the government.
- Do not refuse to have your picture taken by your captors.
- Do not develop false expectations. (Do not start thinking that you will be rescued by a particular time.)
- Do not demand, but do not be afraid to ask for, anything (i.e., more food, books, paper, medical attention, etc.).
- Do not antagonize or criticize your abductors.
- Do not display either cowardice or bravado.
- Do not refuse any favors.
Studies have shown that the
longer you are held captive, the greater your chances are of surviving. During 1985, however, some terrorist groups killed their hos- tage(s) up to 16 hours into the hostage situation. If the terrorists' goals are to kill Americans, they may well kill.
Even though terrorism has become an increasing problem throughout the world, many of us believe we are immune. But, the threat is there, so be aware and beware!
Small arms training and hand-to- hand combat are parts of the Navy Security Guard Course, designed to train personnel in the fundamentals of physical security. This course is a form of positive action to counter the recent increase in terrorist attacks.
S ^fens*^'11*’ 3S was bring unlocked by the frige team. Opening fire with automatic weap-
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