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Comment and Discussion
Contents:
START & the Navy
Should We Rid the Navy of the “Family Separation” Excuse?
Terrorism & Friends
Telling It Like It Isn’t
Televising War
And I Was There
What is the “Drug War” Threat?
Who Needs Arms Control?
The Inevitable Attack on Libya
We Had Fun
The Far Eastern Navies
Does NFO Mean Non-Flying Organization?
The Maritime Strategy
“START & the Navy”
(See J.L. George, pp. 30-38, April 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Robert F. Urso, U. S. Navy— As a strategic weapons system specialist and former launcher officer on board the USS Sam Rayburn (SSBN-635), the first of our Poseidon subs being dismantled to comply with SALT II, I found Lieutenant George’s prize-winning essay to be well thought out and objective.
It is a tragedy that this nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarine must be dismantled to comply with SALT II. Before the beginning of her dismantling overhaul in late 1985, the Sam Rayburn’s material condition was excellent, and there were almost ten years left on her 30-year hull life.
It seems that in this era of attempting to attain a 600-ship Navy, we should not be so hasty in dismantling ships that have not yet outlived their usefulness.
. lives
seem to forget the many Amenc j, sacrificed in both World Wars on ofy soil to bring peace to Europe. Is taught in French schools?
“Telling It Like It Isn’t ^
0See W. V. Kennedy, pp. 44-53, Apng qay T. M. Daly and C. D. Howell. PP-14' ’
1986 Proceedings)
J. Christopher Ramsay, Londo 0f Northern Ireland—The press cov® Rattle U. S.-Libyan conflict has e for- otic and confused here, and I 0s jn ward to reading more accurate rep future issues of the Proceedings- ,[ary
The U. S. Government
and the *0'
,rld-
Will WW III Catch Us Unaware?
Death of a Captain
April Supplement
The Langley Legacy
Leadership Essay Contest
Collision—A Nightmare
Equal Rights, Equal Risks
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Should We Rid the Navy of the ‘Family Separation’ Excuse?”
(See R.A. Stratton, pp. 86-89, April 1986 Proceedings)
Captain J.D. Sharpe, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Emory S. Land (AS-39)—With respect to Captain Stratton’s comments in the “Nobody asked me, but...” section—Hear! Hear!
The problems cited certainly are not limited to the aviation community.
Terrorism & Friends
Midshipman Fourth Class Neal R. Fenton, U. S. Navy, U. S. Naval Academy— In light of the recent terrorist activities throughout the world, one thing upsets me almost more than the actual acts of terrorism—France’s denial of the U. S. request to fly our F-lll bombers over French air space.
Let us remember the Battle of Belleau Wood in 1918, when the American troops, who had only recently entered World War I, along with British and French troops, turned back the attacking German Army just 56 miles from Paris. Let us also recall World War II and the great Normandy invasion which allowed the Allied forces to free Paris from German occupation. How soon the French
should pay more attention to "aCtjons. wide media coverage of their £[n. While they are able to brief other ^ ments and allied forces on how ^ $ particular moves are made, jjsre- Govemment and military seernsented 10 gard how these actions are PreaslIpport the people who actually elect an these other governments. . pCo-
media are the means by whic 1 ^ or
pie are ‘ ‘ infdrmed ” of events. sensa-
nationalistic bias, ignorance, jeep tionalism have contributed ,-nen1"
misunderstanding of how N 0per- bers, particularly the United 6 a-cted in
ate. This misunderstanding is fpolitician! the pronouncements of certai P .^jang seeking popular acclaim by ,‘gutter the emotive rantings of 1 e press.” . ns of ^
There are other manifests 1 ^eSe media’s inability to cope wi eI1t
fairs, rooted in the U. S. DeP ublic Defense’s failure to appreci ^ d*at
opinion. Many of the media a and P%
the Sixth Fleet claims of^hittipatrol era*
sumably sinking four Libyan Pa in the Gulf of Sidra fonfro“2,ces Secretary Weinberger s assu taken
every possible precaution was ^^binS prevent civilian casualties m jn apy of Tripoli, are not to be belie conflict, there are claims ai eliiH|'
claims; the U. S. military s ^ evi nate all doubts by producing . exp|r
dence of its effectiveness an
nations for conflicting reports-
~............. y^ilson
Peter Braestrup, Editor, storts Quarterly—William Kenne y s0irleon record in his portrayal of me
mented the role of a “two-step A°w
They
ety of sources, including the nevfS. we’ve Before we form an opinion of w a
act as
ence groups. These people r( opinion leaders” for us. *ha
now is more properly regarded “multi-step flow.” NgW y0rk
To assert that CBS news, th pfe- Times, or any other source a
involved in the 1963 argument over Saigon coverage by the New York Times’ David Halberstam and the later misgivings of the Times’ military editor, Hanson Baldwin. In 1963,1 was the Times correspondent in Algiers.
Kennedy reports that I wrote to Hanson Baldwin, in July 1963, “warning that something was amiss with the newspaper’s reporting from Vietnam .... The warning, however, was too late.” In fact, my 1963 letter to Baldwin was hardly a warning, as you can read for yourself:
“As you know, David Halberstam, a friend of mine from Washington days, is immersed in the Saigon affair. He has had little experience with things military, yet his reporting has been good, even brilliant at times. But I think he could use a friendly letter- critique now and then (as we all can) on how he’s doing. I suggest that if you find time, you might drop him a line. He’d really appreciate it.”
My letter was a passing attempt to be helpful, a request to Baldwin to let a junior colleague know how his military stuff looked to a military affairs specialist. Baldwin had given me helpful guidance when I was a junior Timesman (with Halberstam) in the Washington bureau, and I thought he should do the same for Halberstam.
In 1963, I had no quarrel with Halber- stam’s reporting (I was 10,000 miles away) and no sympathy for Marguerite Higgins or Ngo Dinh Diem! If I later differed with Halberstam on Vietnam, it was over other issues. .
“Televising War”
(See M. C. Mitchell, pp. 52-56, April 1986;
T. M. Daly, pp. 14-17, May 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel James S. O’Rourke, IV, U. S. Air Force; Professor of Public Affairs, Chief, Policy and Information Division, Defense Information School— My congratulations to Major Mitchell on several counts: His article is cogent and well-expressed, and his argument is tightly woven. In general, I agree with his assessment of the ways in which television distorts the process of policy formation and the images we hold of the U. S. armed forces.
On one count, though, I find Major
Mitchell’s research to be flawed. IS sertion that “The opinions of t^ose,i(e brought us the news—Walter Cron Chet Huntley, Morley Safer, et^se
became our opinions. . • •’ *Snr\tpub- Walter Lippmann wrote in 19- lie Opinion, The Free Press) ‘hat the tures we form in our heads ot u ^ outside are shaped not only by wre_ see, hear, and experience, but are ^ suits of interaction with others.
Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld in Perf'\QC[i- fluence (The Free Press, 195^--jn
the process of opinion formation- acknowledged that we receive in ^ tion and bits of data—many of t ^ ^ curate, many of them not fron’ meC|ia
rc wc lumi an upiu>v«— .
seen, heard, and experienced, t ° olir check with “significant others gr. lives, including parents, siblings^ visors, role models, teachers, an^
■ocess as a
to HF Pryducls
mawuai rwi
MAI * II*! HUM
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rectiv8ed’. Processed opinion to us di- °f ■ fls s’mply mistaken. Those sources an(j ormation are powerful, important, dia] C aS a§enda-setters in the national indivirie’i,°P'n'on is the product of
me«aeeaanHariableS “ *e receiver’ the
others6 • ttle source interacting with rareiv tde environment. Opinion is All fr^ed 'n an intellectual vacuum. I’d s *s comforting to me because how c>C ratder ^orm my own opinions of tluctoH^u nadon * s defense policy is Conor oth than let Mr- Safer, Mr. Cronkite, rs f°nn them for me.
‘^nd I Was There”
voee T. R D
Proc«*igS)Ue11, p'l24, February 1986
{^tiredU^ard L' Beach’ U- S' Nayy
tcndinn ,l n tde storm of reviews at- There, bv r Publication of And / Was With can^ ^ear Admiral Edwin T. Layton tello, I t3ln ^°®er Pineau and John Cos- Worth t?,0’ Want t0 Put in my two cents ■Bence f..|C *300*c deals with the intelli- Peari t[ ' Ure Preceding the debacle of hare six* °r and recovery within a months that resulted in our dramatic victory at Midway, and I fear Commander Buell’s review may have somewhat missed the boat. Admiral Layton’s account is a passionate statement by a dedicated naval officer who, just before he died, tried to set the record straight concerning events and actions about which he had special knowledge. As Commander Buell says, it merits serious consideration by all scholars of the origins of World War II—but the author deserves better than characterization as “bitter.”
A major participant in two of the most important events of our history, witness to appalling injustice concerning both, Admiral Layton nevertheless felt bound to protect the intelligence function of which he was a member. He consequently kept silent for 45 years while the truth as he knew it was shredded and lies were converted into history. By any criterion he had ample cause for bitterness, but his version of events, described at painstaking length, should not be dismissed on that ground.
In the end, Admiral Layton lived long enough—just barely—to be released from his vow of secrecy by official declassification of the documents pertaining to Pearl Harbor and Midway. No one can read his resulting account of those two battles, and plow through the monumental compilation of notes and references at the end of his book, without being strongly affected. In addition to the visible battles, a secret bureaucratic war was also fought, and as usual in such cases, mediocrity won. Captain Joe Rochefort, with his special genius for calculating enemy intentions, lost partly because he had no time to protect his own rear. Instead, he concentrated on making the assessment that resulted in our victory at Midway, now reckoned the most important naval battle of our history. The bureaucracy already disliked Captain Rochefort because he did not conform. When he proved it terribly wrong, it destroyed him. For 45 years now, the Navy has quietly acquiesced.
Admiral Chester Nimitz’s forces were less than one-third of Admiral Yamamoto’s. There is no way the United States could have won that battle had its Pacific Fleet Commander not possessed special, accurate intelligence. For years the Navy has known that Captain Rochefort was its source and has felt uneasy that he somehow was not treated fairly when the cred-
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ral Nimit u ““6“l nave gone ir AQmi- intellioenZ on|y Washington’s faulty '°n though? t0 ®u'c*e bim? As a compan- tl°'v look ’ *S t^lere any°ne who does not cess°r ■ UP°n Admiral Nimitz’s prede- at least a ?0Iaarnand on 7 December, with No 0tlellt . compassion?
Can affordfading Admiral Layton’s book aPPends Tt° !gnore the documentation he Whether ,k u'S aPProPriate now to ask 'u% or 6 history °f that time has been authorita,COrrect|y told- Until someone at a" Dossu? y re.futes Admiral Layton, if subject ' 6’ h's is the last word on the
Ni
Ca
ate
trui
!>i
” ^
Harh ° e for that debacle. Would t‘ n(lmirai°rJlaVe heen less of a disaster ?ence? /?lmmel had better intelli- o Midway have been less of
vailable’t ^en a defeat, if intelligence ■ 8reat deal k dmiral Nimitz had not been ./lsWers etfer? To a large degree both at b6yeS’ and the quesi
P°n':biiit,, ,1Cal|y rises is where the
rave h — ’ u' 1UIU
. -v thPeen far better prepared Thedeeattack.
cjial, be]attlj8'Ve ^aPta*n Rochefori
tse
i recognition is a gooc mere medal is far froir
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Chich he hadCkSame regiment in fro'
"'as meti . been officially disgrace culousIy restored—the sair
Ndinss/,„............
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the stoglVen- Now we have his side of has a v' '* *S devastating. Seldom 'ide of w"186 'nd’vidual so changed the He w„ ar’ nor been so poorly rewarded. way . SUmmarily relieved over Mid-
^dmira^CwUSe ^ad dared t0 Pass t0 agree w- ‘mitz intelligence that did not his \ya ' . Washington’s, even though Clepartm ngat and that from the Navy
silenced , LaPtain Rochefort had been shortly af, e^ore Midway, instead of Predict h 6rWard: Does anyone care to rai m- 0w it might have gone if Admi : othing can „
Irniral H T* even UP the account for 7 DeC(US|.an^ Rimmel, commanding 'Plain knu at Pearl Harbor, or for 'Vas his du C \^0rt’ denicd the credit that aP to a]| ?' Neither can anyone make it d'ed on 7 i-,6 others who need not have jadgmp ?ccm'5er 1941. No appropri- ” resnn n -,Can he visited upon those ^Pons.ble for that debacle. Would
1 victi
mUSt k ---------- “UfikUkg kVUUU
aUtonw De yes, and the question T?nsibiiitv .1Cally rises is where the re- .drniral | *es f°r the initial deficiency, h 'h'ral kilyt°n makes the case that aVe been u me' could have and should i,as’ and if??1 better informed than he
r!°Uld haJl ke had been, U. S. forces rePUl; 6
Sfc\* ............................................................. _
Under anything lift the oblc
Ow ' '^68 w!?*1 Admiral Kimmel live if it Caat We do now is importai Verythin„ rest°re our Navy’s honoi >the7;ng- theref°re, hinges on th tk close asls made. We should com Cai.CaSe of ACan t0 what France did i alledbef;rAel red Dreyfus. (Dreyfus
officer who had broken his sword handed him a new one; the entire assemblage of troops passed in review to salute him, and all France knew of it.) In analogous action, Rochefort’s posthumous recognition should take place with full ceremony, on the anniversary of the Battle of Midway, preferably at Pearl Harbor where it all happened. Admiral Kimmel, who was never allowed to defend himself, should simultaneously be restored to the rank he held when the sneak attack was made. All of this should be done with the highest possible ceremony, and the whole nation should be made aware of the reason for it.
What we do as a consequence of Admiral Layton’s revelations we do only for ourselves. We can never wipe this slate perfectly clean, but we can regain some of our self-respect.
Editor’s Note: Captain Beach made this same appeal in his acceptance speech for his induction as a Naval Institute Golden Life Member (50 consecutive years as a member) at the Awards Banquet during the Naval Institute’s two-day Annual Meeting held on 10-11 April in Annapolis.
“What is the ‘Drug War’ Threat?”
(.See N. C. Venzke, pp. 114-115, December 1985; D. L. Brannon, pp. 29-30, February 1986 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)—Lieutenant Brannon’s point that, “We have a system that jogs; we need a system that sprints,” is very sound. Some of his other points require that I clarify my positions. Whether or not one calls it a “drug war” is purely semantic in nature, but the elements of war, short of combat, are present. The term “drug czar,” as it has been used in recent legislative proposals, means that one individual would be responsible across agency lines for executing all five elements of the National Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. This contrasts with my proposal of placing all maritime antidrug operations, sea and air, under one operational commander in both the Atlantic and Pacific—the Atlantic Area Commander and the Pacific Area Commander. They would simply be maritime operational commanders, not supra- agency “czars.”
The drug smuggling threat exists along the entire maritime region off the U. S.
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coastline with no respect for Coast Guard Districts or National Narcotics and Border Interdiction (NNBIS) regional boundaries. Of course, it is concentrated in the Southeast. Whenever pressure is applied on them, the druggers scatter, rather like a bubble of mercury being squeezed. A similar situation prevailed off the coast of South Vietnam, except there was only one smuggling adversary and the use of force was less restricted. This antismuggling effort was called Operation Market Time.
The Commander Coastal Surveillance Force (CTF-115) based in Cam Ranh Bay had operational control of all Market Time Forces from the Demilitarized Zone to Cambodia, including U. S. Navy P-3 Orion aircraft, U.S. Navy or U. S. Coast Guard offshore patrol ships, and U. S. Navy, U. S. Coast Guard, and Royal Thai Navy inshore patrol boats and radar stations. These forces operated under four task group commanders—a command and control setup that was quite successful, providing great flexibility and initiative for the task group commanders. Commander Coastal Surveillance Force supervised overall strategy and other matters such as coordinating operations that crossed lines of responsibility between task groups. This happened whenever smuggling “trawlers” transited lengthy coastal areas before attempting a delivery. The responsibility for maintenance, training, and other support of units remained with the parent service and was never infringed upon by CTF-115. This was the case during my tour as Commander, Gulf of Thailand Surveillance Group (CTG-115.4). Both administrative and operational chains of command were functioning smoothly, contributing to the success of Operation Market Time.
The analogy of operational relationships between CTF-115 and his task group commanders, and Coast Guard Area Commanders and District Commanders, is close. The maritime defense responsibilities of the Coast Guard Area Commanders, double-hatted as Commander Maritime Defense Zone (Atlantic or Pacific) strengthen the analogy. So why wasn’t the same task force/task group concept adopted in drug interdiction efforts? A good question. Perhaps it was preempted during the creation of NNBIS when the area commanders were kept out of the loop. Improved short-term coordination, among the many agencies and the related turf problems, was emphasized, instead of an operational control scheme. Also, nobody with Market Time experience was involved in the planning.
Yes, creating a “drug czar” would introduce some sticky political conse
quences. I did not recommend a c ’ j but there would still be some P° reaction from my concept. My
mendation would affect Customs -
;sibly
operating over the high seas and ^ the Customs surface craft opera i Customs waters. Neither of these
tw®
nount-
consequences should present insurm able political problems. £oaSt
Assigning sole jurisdiction to t e Guard from shore to seaward is no ical—after all, it is the federal ma A rr
i joint <
law enforcement agency. A more 1 ble solution might be to retain join ^
toms/Coast Guard jurisdiction in
^fd
toms waters, but have the Coast ^ ^ operate with operational c0”^n 0f the
patrol boats. The present
buildup
units is oopera'
Customs maritime surface and air
not logical, despite the excellentc ^ ^ „
tion between the two services^ ^efaj costly development of a secon ^
maritime law enforcement -eCj_-a
which a need has not been jus1(er 1986 version of the 1790 Revenu Service. -ce with
The Coast Guard is the sea ser sffUC- an existing command and cor\r .f expe' ture, considerable seagoing an ^ rience, and the overall ability' range
job. If more patrol boats and o ^ aircraft are needed (and they l-
them to the Coast Guard. Th® nSidet' Rudman-Hollings Act may add able incentive for such a move-
■ *
“Who Needs Arms Control- .
(See G. E. Miller, pp. 39-42,
R. I. Widder, pp. 91-92, Apnl Proceedings) ^
William R. Hawkins—Adm™ why
did an excellent job of explalUoUe no1
have
recent arms control negotiation enhanced security nor reduce pot
of international tension. Th,sfarmsc°n” be surprising, for the history 0 ,ind at' trol is anything but encourag1 arrOs
lev
-el
gues against placing any control talks.
faith
weap1
ions>
at
Before the advent of nucleat nls naval fleets were the strategic 'f|i£ the center of arms control ®J.sj1jngt‘h’ United States initiated the “ 1922-
Conference, signed 6 Ee. ^ 0 the cap1 which produced a treaty limiti tal ships of the five world na japaf’ The United States, Enghu\espeCt‘V
France, and Italy agreed - li»- battleship ratios of 5:5:3. L^ sCj1edo^
on number and tonnage for new construction
until 1942
wer6
set-
eta
ior new consuuuuui* ......... caland ^ „
Both the United States and Eng existiHg required to scrap some ot aircfa warships. Limits were also se 6(j sc carriers, but these were cons
/ J»ne
L'ava] ** 1 even attend.
1930. erence opened in January
cruisers and submarines. Ja-
Pan
st c°ntrast aitowea mn<
i ction ni ’ 3n fnlimited naval 1 s °f sunan centered around a new "Pan jn , j,1;1'battleships was adopted by
in a new arms Ah MJ the t Japanese building had r 3lT|iral M.,rCa'y limits. In January 1936, Pdon 8ano walked out of thp new
Passed the,
11 Ni ________ __
?dtttini„. ^s- In response, the Roosevelt
the
In
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Q MINIATURE ‘V
> chid Mnnn cf t
S
i i
• Are you looking ior me ire-Dreadnoughts, the Heets of • j WW I or WW II, or the present warships, ours or theirs? ] - Are you also interested in the magnificent ocean liners ^
s
finest31 tlle tlme' Cruisers and subma- s'on r>ferei.n0t restr*cted and the expan- c°nstm .• ese’ the later German the inah'!°n Poc^et battleships, shows
‘invent * 311118 contr°l to prevent
The t*n8 around” restrictions. gi°na] ,reat.y limitations gave Japan re- c°ncent °rainance because it was able to Was nr/31,? lts ^ect- The United States Hawajj 3 /0Wec*to fortify bases west of the Phi)’- . ch made it impossible to hold ^ngapo^IneS' ®rlta'n halted work on its rapid bi/hr**^3' base' Japan pursued a categori' Pro8ram in the unrestricted SubrnarinL° ncr"*sers- destroyers, and ittcreasi • ^Sland met this threat by United sf *tS cruiser program, but the ho] ^ .ates opted to rely on arms con-
C°nstructio™aC^ lnstead °f increasing
■ 1926 m .
>n arms ’ he United States participated League Cf°ny°'. ta^s sponsored by the ^r°Sress°M ^atlons> but there was no United c, ew talks were initiated by the 'hands d ^ 'n hut Japanese de- f°r cruiSf°°meU an agreement on limits and Itajvrs and destroyers, and France race- riial.fnga^ed *n their own arms The London
in j anuai y
*936 f0rlmits were established until
s Posit' — suomarmes. ja-
°f the (j ‘°n Was strengthened to 70% and destm and British levels in cruisers r*l'es- Caivf*iS’ Wldl “Parity” in subma- a!'°ther in'„a* ship limits were reduced a'n Were °n United States and Brit- U°Wn fr3 'owed 15 battleships each uildin„ u'T1 the 33 and 43 possessed or ®2l)t J he two respective powers in in Crin, JaPan was allowed nine.
con- a new j in loo a lw;51I1pc» was aaopiea oy years> '• bokyo gave the required kc arms notlce that it was abandoning (.."tiding .c°ntrol treaties, but started ftaVyhoDeHm,mediately' The Japanese 0rr> the r t ° Stea* a five-year head start
V p , V„mted States i
**! 'I Was*!011 increased shipbuilding In l9g‘no late. * S
Im.hgp-Brian?) n3'01 P°wers signed u I- Jaoan ^act> outlawing war. *
Wirin',r,dg"h*na Were f,8htinS in
f. bdrew fr *933, Germany and Japan Ifji^cneva'r'v tbe league of Nations.
,34 c lsarmament Conference of JUnVersaiuesed-' In 1935’ Hitler rejected e °f the lsarmament clause, and in **ed the vame year- England aban- ersailles ban on German
in^/Jun
naval rearmament by signing the Anglo- German Naval Agreement allowing Germany to build a fleet with 35% of the tonnage of the Royal Navy. The Kriegsmarine was permitted to have submarines again. But June 1935 was also the month that the results of the British Peace Ballot were released, showing that a ten to one margin out of 11 million registered voters favored “overall disarmament by international agreement.”
Today, as in earlier times, the most important components of national security are deterrence and an active defense should deterrence fail. Arms limitation agreements have done more to diminish security than enhance it. Clearly, arms limitations which are not linked to wider political settlements prove to be mere illusions, especially when major powers such as Germany and Japan in the interworld war years and the Soviet Union today are committed to radical changes in the international order.
It makes even less sense today to dismantle nuclear missile submarines to comply with an unratified SALT II treaty than it did to scrap dreadnought battleships to comply with the Washington Treaty. Today’s threat is better defined, and the long record of arms control failures is more apparent. The United States cannot afford to follow the arms control path of the inter-world war years, which paved the way for two world wars.
The Inevitable Attack on Libya
Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U. S. Marine Corps—In the shadowy war against terrorism, the United States has been taking it on the chin for years: embassy bombings in Kuwait and Lebanon (twice), the leveling of the Marine Corps headquarters, the murder of an invalid American tourist, and the recent bombing of a West Berlin disco frequented by G.I.s, killing one and wounding dozens more.
The grim exchange ratio is not something the Pentagon likes to talk about— more than 300 American dead, in contrast to three or four “martyrs” sponsored in various guises by Libya, Syria, and Iran.
The attack on Libya was probably inevitable. After all, there was the precedent of an Israeli air raid on Tunisia. Surely, the mighty United States, with forces aplenty in the region, could match Israeli boldness, and even exceed it in terms of sheer numbers. Nor were the Libyans paying much attention to the increasingly strident warnings coming out of Washington. According to intercepted
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of reverse leverage, it would seernj£St return. The Vietnam bombing campa -
plication, which should yield the a lot of damage for marginal e o
become
umbefS
Instead, tactical air power
hedge
technological arrogance. p0tent
There is a vast gap betwee t_lbi
ial
this attack, rarely
pe-
,eace'
accuracies, as in under actual combat con
ditions- in P1
keep the
leaf
results, is one way to
worst p1
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effect through
. We have achieved the
stin
plC
racy, we nave aw..------- jets arc -
necessarily the other. Attacx J v0iu, best suited for delivering a "/acCuracT
of area fire with reasonable . a.
Ever since the B-17 Fly1”^, twjjj
power has been to war drum is to a symphony; it cr; - ._fs
transmissions, Libyan strongman Muam- mar Qaddafi and his lieutenants were busily plotting about three dozen attacks on American diplomats, airlines, and businesses worldwide. “You just can’t sit by and let somebody else declare war on you and pretend that you’re still at peace,” argued President Reagan.
Accordingly, the United States mounted its biggest air raid since the Vietnam War—more than 100 aircraft, 11 different types in all, launched in a coordinated effort reminiscent of the strikes launched against North Vietnam in the 1960s. By all accounts, the 14 April attack was a considerable feat of airmanship. The Libyans were caught by surprise because of a vigorous U. S. deception effort and perhaps more importantly, the simple measure of coming in low. In varying degrees, all five of the assigned targets were hit.
As the hot afterglow subsides, the event assumes more subtle colorings and implications. The denial of French airspace notwithstanding, U. S. options were severely limited from the outset. Air power is not nearly as flexible and freewheeling a tool as its proponents would have us believe. Bombing Syria or Iran would have imposed far greater risks. Unlike Syria, Libya presented few Russian “advisors” in the line of fire. Unlike Iran, the Libyan military has shown little stomach for dying for Qaddafi. Libya, moreover, features a long and accessible flank.
Nor does the attack validate the tremendous U. S. investment in high-technology weaponry, despite Pentagon claims. At least four variables affected the outcome: pilot skill, the cover of darkness, low-altitude high-speed tactics, and technology. Most of the latter was old hat. Fully 60% of the ordnance dropped consisted of “dumb” bombs we had used in Vietnam more than a decade ago. The Paveway II laser-guided bombs we also used are follow-ons to the Viet- nam-era Paveway I. The tens of billions of dollars poured into defense research and development this past decade have not yielded dramatically more capable weapons in this field. Technology, it appears, was the least dominant factor, and, as always, the sheer guts and bravado of the pilots made the difference.
Despite the attempt at precision bombing, tactical air power remains a blunt instrument—one built with the tolerances of a micrometer, to be sure, but still a weapon that hits with the precision of a mallet. Infrared pictures of buildings look fuzzy in the scopes, maybe not quite like the snapshots in the briefing folders. Who can pinpoint a single building among 50 for sure? The laser designators, suspended beneath 20 tons of wrenching, twisting airframe, are hard to hold on target—The beams jiggle on their aiming points. The bombs aren’t always released right in “the basket”—the circle in space necessary for accurate delivery. Perhaps at sea greater precision is possible; a ship at sea presents an infrared signature like a candle on an ice tray. On land, the dis- tractors are as numerous as coeds at a toga party.
In the face of considerable evidence to the contrary, the surgical-strike myth persists. Yet when the Israelis bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunis last year, they did not kill Yasir Arafat, and the collateral damage was considerable. The 14 April results were similar. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger thought it was “virtually impossible” that U. S. bombs could have blown down part of the French embassy. Whether one F-111F (likely damaged by ground fire) had hung bombs are not—half the bombs went wild in tests with the Pave Tack system two years ago. As one Pentagon analyst remarked, “When precision weapons don’t guide, they go everywhere.” One stick of bombs reportedly missed the Tripoli airport by at least two miles.
For the sending of foreign policy messages of fine distinction, tactical air power clearly is not the best vehicle. The Israelis have engaged in punitive bombing strikes for years, and their terrorist problem shows no sign of abating. If the intent was to frighten the bejeazus out of Quaddafi, fine. But if our leaders thought that they could drop 500 pounds right down Quaddafi’s latrine, they were badly mislead.
The raid also points out the fallacy of “deep strike” and “follow-on force attack” envisioned in a NATO war. Twenty percent of the strike force was unable to fix and drop bombs on large, fixed, high-visibility targets. Attacking small, mobile, camouflaged targets deep in the Soviets’ rear will be far tougher. The tremendous cost and complexity associated with deep strikes, usually at the expense of an effective close-air support capability on the front lines, may not be proportional to the marginal results.
The raid does show that there is no such thing as a “force multiplier.” One weapon cannot do two, three, or six things at the same time. The F/A-18 was advertised as a “strike fighter” during development; during this raid it did not perform both roles. From a larger perspective, it took the concerted efforts of two carrier battle groups and nearly a wing of F-llls to put two squadrons worth of aircraft over the targets. A case
; with a
great deal of effort to yield a modest cost the United States about ten for every dollar’s worth of darnag^ dieted; the results here are in a s vein. Hardly an example °//°rC®everse:
has
• x- niin
too expensive to generate me
required for sustained operations' ^ time. Apply the 3% loss rate o (#0. to daily sorties for a month. an |aCe- thirds of the force’s virtually irrjter a able aircraft will have been lost- ^ ^teS month’s sustained fighting, at ° ajtal- considered miniscule for infantry ^ ions, tactical air power will liter ^ |n- appear as a factor on the batt e • ^,'ar
deed, the legacy of the Iran- supports this scenario. escort’
Piling up more specialize ajr. more airborne command and cseein craft, more tankers, etc., does ,n(ellSe to be the answer. Given a rca js it and practiced air defense sys |o2(Jed realistic to expect more esco ^eap0ns with sensors and single-purpos® It will reduce loss rates to virtua y does not seem so. jjes in 3
The answer, it appears to n> ^attjefield more realistic appreciation o n£S are realities. Numbers count. Airp fjSh. inherently fragile; like sc l°°. crj. The their real strength is in nU,T1 jts force multiplier hype deceive^ rpecti' presumption that technology nredicta^l ble and war is ultimately P „ains
Numbers, at least, are a
mere is a vasi -- . , bon'b||lr
and real capability. Theoretic oCcut
manding operational testing ,:on of time, with independent eva^ jjstinc1'0 between theory and P’;ac|j^>rst place focus. The battlefield is the “ discover the difference.
Perhaps we expect too m^‘7,0wai Tactical air power has evol ^ to reduced volume of tire‘ ' - greater racy
thr°u
UlUlli is IUU ........ j .
but has less influence than
in the violin section—whici
holds the tune. „age
(Continued on /
/June1
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 32)
oi mem aic natr0J v i
primarily the LSTs and fas’ . abys”ff (PCFs). The causes for h‘;>g ** readiness are: historic un c0ndinj\ maintenance and repair pa ; ’ -sjS in' ‘ exacerbated by the econorm _standar
Philippines; acquisition ° _
such blue-water activity in ,-j seas cade, and was favored wit the
few mechanical breakdown ^ j gu shipyard in Cuvile. a tl,e
boat was completed in 19°^ fias '[1]
“We Had Fun”
(See F. Foley, pp. 44-53, April 1986
Proceedings Supplement)
Captain Otis C. Gregg, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Foley flatters me in his interesting and informative story by referring to me as an excellent instructor at the start of his training in primary landplanes. In that particular training stage, I considered him to be one of my best students ever. On the morning of our accident, while walking to the plane for his last required hour of instruction before his “solo” check, I told him that because he had done so well, we would only go out for a short warm-up flight before I brought him in for his check flight. His account of the events immediately following our take off differ completely from those which I clearly recall.
When we reached an altitude of about 200 feet while climbing after take off, I throttled back all the way to simulate a power failure. He was supposed to demonstrate the proper reaction to such an event by nosing the plane down to a gliding speed and continuing the course into the wind until I put the power back on. To the contrary, he pulled the nose upward sharply while applying hard left rudder in a radical attempt to turn back toward the landing field. I immediately applied full throttle with the nose pushed downward and the rudder fully right in order to counteract the tailspin that the plane was entering. As we continued straight down, I managed to control the spin and began to level off, but not until we had reached a point just below the tops of the tallest scrub pines bordering the field. The plane continued through the tree tops until it finally lost altitude and turned over gently. While we were hanging upside down, I asked Francis, “Now, will you remember what to do if you should ever lose your power at a low altitude during take off?”
When the Trouble Board met, I recommended leniency for my student because of his excellent record. Consequently, he was assigned to another instructor and flew successfully until he was able to pin on his “Wings of Gold.” The board concluded that I did the best thing given the circumstances, whereupon I was reas-
signed as the Aide to the Commandant, under orders which I already had.
j j-guiain
have reestablished contact an gtje!
good friends. Fly ’em high and ta , “The Far Eastern Navies”
(See J. V. P. Goldrick and P. O- JoneS’
69, March 1986 Proceedings) {
Captain P. E. Prindle, U- and Guard—As current Chief ° pivi-
former Chief of the Naval . sjstance sion at the Joint U. S. Military* Group to the Philippines * fiie r®'
would like to correct and up offered
port on the Philippine Navy by Lieutenants Goldrick an . j-ornierly The four PN patrol frlgate* rs) hav® Barnegat-class seaplane ten ^ fiaVe been laid up since June 1 return 10 deteriorated to the point t a Ration- active status, much less mo ^j^ougJ[2] 1 [3] would be cost prohibitive. R lan<J- modernization of the PN s - . ^ none
ing ships (LSTs) is sorely n f0r [4]
has been accomplished or p _ least a year. The four ,ey are n°
patrol craft are in service, uconStruC ready for sea and none is un^ not,n tion. Missiles and missile cr ^ the PN’s plans for at least t ^ an<> Of the approximately & n0#0$ small craft in the PN inven ’ -
than 100 are serviceable, an rout^
mainv... - ,i/-0U
weapon systems without f° ^ pr-l ro'e port; no development of a v . surgenw’ in countering the Commum s 1
which would bring the PN of the defense pie. , a cleP*°v
Although the PN comp ealld b3
ent of seven LSTs to Okmawa _ first
the summer of 1985, j
the
Nation?
R. AvB,j Sherm; VrA. Ua’
PP- 21-25, April 1986
ee“ings)
u,
Avi
SP0]
Use to S me an injustice in his re-
.fhe r„l”i my article when he states that: se
,|y Elected i
nieat of the issue [is that] . . . neWIy s*.r iieutenant commanders and arp .eLcted commanders [realize] that
0m
of
Wrote th' •
erve Dnis article because my own
riaval fl r°il sclUadron (VP) is so short lief . 8nt officers tNFDsl with nn
crews, we only have
CehNF0'
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the MaS apparcntly a political project for the watC°S re®*me' ^'s presently dead in compie"’ and may prove too costly to
aMtolp;ebrUary ^86 revolution brought at thecast op characters to the staff NaVy Quarters °f the Philippine WrW)-Althoueh it is too soon to Pine N * certainty that the new Philip- Maq ^3S scdved 'ts problems, JUS- burnin(tas noted that the midnight oil is aiming, HPN- Apparently, HPN is ntix of w, ®stahlish a manageable force Which S’ P^Fs, and service vessels and jnC.an Un<Jertake the coastal patrol again$t J~rd'ct*on/troop insertion role curtgnti 6 <~0rTUTIUn'st insurgency. Con- tory Qj- y’ they are purging their inven- that sCaeXCess*ve’ unserviceable craft so this soia^6 operating funds can sustain Lieut W’ m'ss*on'°riented fleet, the mart-nantS ^oldrick and Jones are on philjppi W^en lLey point out that the "tottevNavy requires much more and to k° ready their fleet for the seas, new arm20”16 an eppective player in the strategy p forces of the Philippines’ firne an ,°r countering the insurgency, tel] lnternational generosity will
^Sjean Non-Fiyin§ °rian> P- 104, February 1986;
n}on, y11 <''°mrnander Kenneth B. Sher- relia j* '<1, Naval Reserve—Captain w d°es me an us. ™
the real
Senioi
fWroLab^Ut tolose Si °0+ per drill.’ r°m bej ’ L-aptain Avella. I am years C?rrtrnand ^ COnsidered for promotion to v'ce by aer' You do me a great disser- Preet|Sln^ me wr'ting my article res,
re|,ef'in ‘“f* officers (NFOs), with no 'tllthori^e.| t- Although my squadron is
%u„l\a 16 ■ • in tbe ."S f°r11. My squadron is not the iuq °°ndocks; it is located in one °untry T,hcavily populated areas in the >ing'fr"ere are Just not enough NFOs A*r Leserv 01 l^C f^ect into the Selected f|l’d with 6 to fuHy man the squadrons. if61, We h-° rnore P-3A/B Orions in the shitless 3Ve dle makings of a true-blue '^ted NFnb*em' Yes, we have tran- Us from A-3 Skywarriors and
F-4 Phantoms, and now we are even talking to an Air Force navigator who might, with considerable training, be taught the difference between a submarine and an oiler. Are these characteristics of a unit “fat” with commanders who are greedily hanging on to NFO waivers?
I respectfully submit that Captain Avella’s response is an injustice to the Naval Reserve NFO VP community.
The Maritime Strategy
(See Supplement, January 1986; G. M. Harned, pp. 26-28, February 1986; J. M. Collins, pp. 18-22, March 1986; R. N. Griffin, p. 25, May 1986 Proceedings)
Russell S. Hibbs—I was instructed and gratified by The Maritime Strategy, until the discussion turned nuclear. I understand the point that the correlation of forces would be altered in our favor should we destroy Soviet ballistic missile submarines (p. 14), just as the correlation would be altered in the Soviets’ favor should they destroy our ballistic missile submarines. The real question is whether either side would tolerate such destruction—without escalating to nuclear strikes to prevent piecemeal degrading of its nuclear capabilities.
I fail to comprehend the logic of Admiral Watkins’s statement (p. 14),“Escalation in response to maritime pressure serves no useful purpose for the Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the United States’ retaliatory position would be enhanced.” Does this mean that forces should not be committed because it would degrade the reserves? Is it not then preferable to hold U. S. naval forces in reserve rather than deploy them forward?
Is the real question how maritime strategy can alter the nuclear equation, and not how maritime strategy is influenced by nuclear weapons? Does the same logic apply to aircraft? Is the question how maritime strategy can alter the capabilities of aircraft, and not how maritime strategy should be built around the aircraft’s capabilities?
Just as we must predicate that deterrence could fail and we must be prepared to fight, we also must predicate that war at sea can escalate to use of nuclear weapons. The “wild card” is not terrorism (p. 22); it is nuclear weapons.
The Maritime Strategy appears to maneuver around the question of a strategy that includes nuclear war at sea. I understand that much of the nuclear question is classified; however, it would be useful to include nuclear considerations in The Maritime Strategy to whatever degree possible.
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in scope than anticipated. A sh°r^ many-only war is not envisione •
What' timely rein-
io uiw„, and, tf :^ quired, through the direct Pr0JeC
envision the Navy winning a "'c|earin self. As Secretary Lehman ma ® ai0ne his article, “Maritime super'0 ^ 0f it may not assure victory, but ^ e will certainly assure defeat.
decisive points is precisely maritime strategy,
^theai"!‘ concentration
Should the United States ;ede Soviet “home” water
icta-
san
as
larly
,bm3'
large
\0C
ines
ines
irtio
iff our allies and friends as
Rear Admiral William Pendley, U. S. Navy, Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations—John Collins raises a number of interesting and important questions in his comment on the January 1986 Maritime Strategy Supplement. One reason why Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley prepared the supplement was to promote discussion inside and outside of the naval profession. Therefore, I would like to respond to Mr. Collins’s questions.
Some general observations first: The maritime strategy is not an inflexible blueprint or a detailed war plan. Such plans are properly the province of the unified commanders, who must fight future wars. The strategy seeks to provide these commanders with the best collective professional judgment of the senior uniformed and civilian naval leadership of how to employ maritime forces to deter war or—should war come—to meet U. S. objectives, given our best understanding of Soviet strategy. Thus the strategy, like any such broad document, ignores many possible alternatives which are properly the subject of contingency planning. Many of Mr. Collins’s comments raise questions about such alternatives; it is important for us to consider them, but we must first set forth a baseline strategy. Such a baseline is what the supplement presented.
Because of space limitations, my answers must be less complete than I would desire. I have attempted to address the main theme of every question. Many of the questions did not lend themselves to the “short simple answers” Mr. Collins requested since we do not anticipate a global war with the Soviets being either short or simple.
The maritime strategy ' 'nearly ignores” nuclear war at sea.” How is this consistent with prudent planning and what alternatives are available if nuclear war comes? The strategy does not ignore the possibility of nuclear war. Instead, by altering the military balance— specifically, the nuclear balance (in Soviet terms, the nuclear correlation of forces)—it seeks to make escalation unattractive to the Soviets. By doing this, we seek to deter nuclear war. Should deterrence fail, the basic outlines of the strategy will still be relevant, although there is obviously no strategy less difficult to implement once nuclear escalation takes place.
‘‘What prevents the superpowers from fighting regional wars elsewhere? What interests, for example, would militarily involve our European allies, if regional combat between the United States and the
Soviet Union erupted in East Asia? How would such conflict affect U. S. maritime strategy?” It is in large part the deterrent effect of our national military strategy, of which our maritime strategy is a key component, that prevents the superpowers from fighting wars anywhere. Should deterrence fail, regional wars between the superpowers are possible, but it is unlikely that—given the focus of Soviet military forces—they would remain regionally confined for very long. Globalization is not automatic, and the strategy does not consider it such. Indeed, the strategy recognizes that the flexibility of maritime forces to contain and resolve regional crises is among our most important contributions to maintaining peace.
The strategy assumes that naval operations in the Pacific can directly contribute to a European conflict. This needs to be elaborated since ‘‘implied linkages are most unclear.” Pacific operations are important for several reasons. First, as both Secretary Lehman and Admiral Watkins make clear, many of our most important allies and much of our important trade are in the Pacific. One need not accept any particular assumptions about the conduct of Pacific nations in a future war to recognize that U. S. interests demand that we not abandon the region in time of conflict. Pacific operations are directly relevant to a European war. The threat of U. S. combat operations in the Pacific serves to tie down Soviet forces, particularly air forces that could otherwise be committed to a European conflict. Our understanding of Soviet strategy is that the Soviets would prefer a single-front war—which would be to their advantage, by all analyses. Just as our World War II experience indicated that secondary fronts were required to defeat Germany, it is essential to any successful strategy that the Soviets be faced with a multi-theater challenge—as opposed to their preferred situation. Thus, the prospect of a war occurring in Europe is, in part, deterred by our actions in the Pacific.
“Would authoritative spokesmen define the longest short war, and explain how naval power could favorably affect the outcome of such brief combat between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Federal Republic of Germany?” Defining “the longest short war” is not the function of a baseline strategy that has been designed to provide overall guidance to national and naval planning and programming efforts, and to catalyze strategic operational thinking in the Navy and elsewhere. History, however, tells us that wars are likely to be longer and broader
ever the length of the war, forcement and resupply of ly”" (,rjef in Europe would be vitd. Even war reconflict would exhaust NAty s assist serve stocks. Thus, maritime °rcurjng in the Central Front campaign S reinforcement and resupply- our alliances worldwide, tyinfjverting Soviet forces on the flanks or ^ other Soviet forces to them, an .nn 0f quncu, uuuugii
amphibious and/or tactical air p° ^ maritime strategy does not, 0 jt.
• ’ - T ' .
How would the practice of° early, fairly evenly distribute ^ ^ vyflr
ployments during the translt’° cnread “permit the U. S. Navy, alr^fJK,er^ thin, to concentrate its coin n(s are decisive points?” Such dep °j ^redesigned—in conjunction w ,jjes—^to
ments of our sister services an de-
cede no vital area to the S°v ^ortjieast fault. Consequently, the vlta, jy{edi'er'
Atlantic, Northwest Pacific, a rapid
ranean must certainly Con-
buildups of significant nava power"1 centrationof U. S. Navy 00111
ren-
dered more potent by its 00 forces- with other joint and combi e ^ one Again, the maritime strategy ^fat- component of our national mi g naVal egy, and requires more than forces to achieve its goals. :nterfere
nuw LUUIU 0 a 1
seriously with U. S. objec > fract‘° ventional war, if only a sn, coM1' deployed forward? Under defe',st,
dons, why wouldn’t a P& line across the Greenland- sea-lar>eS' Kingdom Gap protect 0U „iSts c0"'
Why are U. S. maritime strateg ,fthe
cerned about a Soviet first > ^ o Soviet Navy stays home. SoVie
course, there is no guaran ,s“stfl Navy will, in Mr. Collins sreferfe home” forever and the ters old1
extends thousands of kd°^ uniiatera11- , Soviet forces, Part,cUrtie m nes, could be expected to so ^ ^ ^ lumbers. It is far more Pru e -veiy. SeC hese forces early and aggr - nd m , ind, some of our allies live ^ at1^ Zollins’s proposed defensi vVrjtUV vithin Soviet “home water
dbed would provoke^ no av ^atuie i? On what basis? forces
war
Secretary Weinoeig- n0u
"inS,h'>nfieofor>S
soviet knowledge oi
suvia miuxi'-o- them
lis area helps discourage t h 0p
g to war. The Navy belief (jf by
ons will not draw retaL „s aliation” Mr. Collins
because such „,ir0oSe'
.ble
of our own forces on the Northern and Southern flanks (and in the Pacific)—as many of the advocates of static defensive strategies imply—would destroy allied cohesion and cripple both deterrence and allied warfighting capability. A passive defense line across the Greenland-Iceland -United Kingdom Gap could protect some transatlantic sea-lanes, but would condemn Norway to Soviet occupation and Iceland and the United Kingdom to a massive Soviet air offensive.
The maritime strategy seeks to do far more than simply protect sea lines. It also seeks to apply leverage on the Soviet Union and its strategic forces—in order to end the war or, even better, to ensure that war does not occur. All of these goals require our forces to move forward. This forward movement, coupled with the fact that some Soviet forces will be deployed out of area, results in the need to be concerned with the battle of the first salvo.
Why does “exposing additional U. S. ships to Soviet missiles” in time of crisis deter aggression? What deterrent do we propose if time does not permit additional forward deployments during a crisis? Early forward deployments serve two deterrent purposes. First, they ensure no one can mistake our determination to meet our obligations to all of our allies (not just those nations where troops are stationed). In addition to this political deterrent, early forward movement makes it clear that the Soviets will not be able to accomplish their primary naval missions—defense of the homeland and protection of their SSBN force—by default. It also forecloses any single front advantage. There is no substitute for such a deterrent movement of forces; that is why both Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman stressed the importance of recognizing and reacting to crisis.
Admiral Watkins says we must “wear down the enemy.’’ “Is a naval strategy of attrition best suited for the United States, considering ... the imperative need to reinforce and resupply forward deployed elements of the U. S. Army and Air Force soon after hostilities commence?” What alternatives have been considered? In calling for maritime forces to wear down the enemy, Admiral Watkins is recognizing that the Soviet fleet will not sortie en masse for a single climactic battle. But this fleet must still be destroyed as quickly as possible. If we cannot accomplish this, the residual Soviet naval force- in-being could interdict our resupply efforts and deny us the leverage of holding the Soviet homeland and Soviet strategic forces at risk. While many alternatives in the maritime strategy have been debated, few have been “discarded” irrevocably. As noted earlier, the strategy is flexible enough to deal with the key uncertainties of warfare. Nevertheless, a strategy requires making choices, and we have consciously chosen the approach we consider to be the most likely to achieve success.
“What irreducible decisions [to prevent losses offorces early in the conflict] must be made, and how would they prevent losses?” A host of decisions will have to be made, as events unfold, to prevent losses of forces early in the conflict. Among these are decisions regarding rules of engagement, alliance solidarity, timing of forward movement and reserve mobilization, budgetary authority, industrial mobilization, commitments to friendly states which are not formal allies, positions vis-a-vis unfriendly states besides the Soviets, and resource allocation priorities, especially airlift. To the extent such decisions are made so as to bring the whole variety of U. S., allied, and friendly forces to bear quickly and appropriately against the enemy, losses will be prevented. If we were not confident of our ability to make such decisions, we would need to build a much larger navy to accommodate the strategy that would then be necessary. Predicting all these decisions in advance is neither possible nor prudent; history clearly teaches that wars do not lend themselves to pre-scripting. Wars are won by the side with a coherent strategy and the capability for implementation of flexible options as events unfold.
‘ ‘Do the President, Secretary of Defense, and NATO leaders approve a frontal assault on Soviet naval strength at the onset of war in waters where risks are greatest? What alternatives did they reject that were designed to produce combat on terms more favorable to the United States and its allies or leave the Soviet Navy in isolation?” As Admiral Watkins carefully pointed out, the maritime strategy provides a foundation for naval advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA), i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense. The maritime strategy clearly recognizes that the unified and specified commanders (the commanders-in-chief) fight the wars, under the direction of the NCA.
The maritime strategy flows from explicit NCA guidance and is in concert with that guidance. As President Reagan has stated publicly: “Freedom to use the seas is our Nation’s life blood. For that reason, our Navy is designed to keep the sea lanes open worldwide, a far greater task than closing those sea lanes at strategic choke points. Maritime superiority is for us a necessity. We must be able in time of emergency to venture in
"^Secretary of Defense Weinberg testified that the maritime stra c vital part of our overall strategy’ ^ dally with regard to eliminating p0ssi- viet means of warfare as quic y (otauy ble. NATO policy and strategy ai_ y
congruent with the -tq Strati'
This is by design, sincetheOf gic Concept and Concept ot The
erations are key bases of the srtional NATO policy of “sustained con ^ defense in forward areas aga^ puily
scale conventional aggression -pj,e
reflected in the maritime sr na- United States and the other i ap.
tions have consistently re',. sacri-
proaches that would automa i Nayy
fice key allies or leave the s haS untouched, once Soviet agg occurred. „ iet SSB^s
“How could threats to scOpe
and the homeland help coti/in ^ ^jec- and intensity of conflict, a p ,rategy-
tive of U.S. national mjhtavJrofDe.
Do the President and Sec ^tions defense believe that U. S- °P . (retaHa' ibed would provoke no feature 0 n? On what basis?” A K y to
strategy is to use man J , itain crises and prevent S ^fcl- m occurring in the first P ’ r0ie o ing the traditional mant shoUld liting the scope of con aggreS'
>bal war nonetheless o jnCludm?
e use of maritime power SoV1e
eats to the Soviet home a the W BNs—could hasten an en° nstratmS J limit Soviet options by dejet inter- it escalation is not in t e testi^
. Secretary Weinberger ^ notmg
from
cause sue»
d serve no useful Sovi ^ theV it writings are quite ,ear-capal indertake attacks oni "us wg
s with conventional .fficUit f
have the capability- » ‘ t docta" j understand why a flUcl
:onventional attacks years''
s—which has existe g. stratej\
;n while a comparable u • nehow too dangerous ^ (0 low long would it a sCa«e
le amphibious s llphen rtto^u id the world, [and] /[.deft" u on-sized assault on ?u0\v][°l. ■s? Ten years fromnow ^et; action affect all 0i ped ofa h would have to be
available
type of U. S. and allied ships
emeiucu—r , ing, greater use of foreign-flags |P ^ ^ nomic tightening of the L and/or use of ships currently P carry military cargo. cecretary °f
“How many Office of the l>e ^ ^ Defense, Joint Chiefs of Stajj, [J 5.. war games have centere 0 gssUffp- Soviet nuclear war at sea. „ yjhat dons controlled their ct011 t0ies
were the outcomes? g aircr°^
have umpires ruled that a ,. „ con^e,v carrier was sunk or disabled ^ si tional war scenario? When tjnue to
- - We have played-and co s .
V-
part
Soviet nuclear war at sea’ a*
how-
time strategy and of Soviet s* a future understand it, we do(not„c0CnVjet nuc'ea
cenario; -
th«
to
lave been used, anu, u. e
if outcomes emerged, w 1neec variety of insights we aramS. improve our tactics and P saI1
us
;ded
be among the least'
LIC/ UU1V/1*^
Fleet, with an inherent than makes them less vuln®ranfUct Cer ,ases. The Falklands J^ons^
" ,eriy
lan° •ertainly
heir low vulnerability ^ d-^as' iquippcd, operated, an P J. S. Navy practice. ... crit,c '
“How does the Navy rfr theSe vho, being unable to ans'.,’c ,naf’u
phibious capabilities?” Assembly of amphibious shipping would obviously take weeks, simply because of the transit times involved. This is entirely consistent with the strategy’s rejection of the notion that only the first few days of the war matter. The flexibility to concentrate amphibious forces for one large assault or to leave them dispersed for smaller assaults in differing theaters is one of the inherent advantages maritime forces offer the United States.
‘‘How could 15 carrier battle groups . . . accomplish all wartime tasks prescribed by the maritime strategy?” How would they avoid attrition and how would we replace lost or damaged carriers? Our carriers will accomplish the tasks set forth for them by operating in multicarrier battle forces for mutual support and protection, and by operating in conjunction with allied forces and the forces of our sister services. They will undertake tasks sequentially within a given theater since, as Mr. Collins correctly points out, there will never be enough ships to do everything we would want to do simultaneously. We do not expect to avoid attrition and we recognize there are no replacements. Unfortunately, it is the nature of war that ships are sunk and men are killed. But we believe that, properly operated, our carrier battle forces will be able to fulfill their many missions.
“What threat to which U. S.INATO objectives” could justify three carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean, “a closed body of water?” U. S. forces will be in the Mediterranean because that is where our allies are. Five NATO nations have Mediterranean coastlines; three of them lie entirely within the region. A coalition strategy requires that we depend on our allies and, in turn, that they be able to depend on us. Carrier battle forces in the Mediterranean will provide air support for the land battle and will destroy Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. The fact that the Mediterranean is “a closed body” of water means that mutual support between land-based and sea- based forces—which is a key element of current U. S. naval thought—is particularly important.
‘ ‘How can the Second Fleet, even with allied assistance, handle its huge wartime responsibilities with roughly the same size U. S. force planned for use in Mediterranean operations?” While the area of potential action for NATO Striking Fleet, Atlantic, is very large, the area of probable action is not. The capabilities of allies in each area also differ. In line with the strategy’s tenets to use sea power aggressively in forward areas, the NATO Striking Fleet (which is composed mostly of the U. S. Second Fleet) will primarily be concerned with the battle for the Norwegian Sea. By winning that battle, we win the battle of the Atlantic. Thus the apparent disparity between forces and geography that Mr. Collins suggests does not exist.
Secretary Lehman’s article suggests that two carrier battle groups from the Pacific Fleet may be required in the Indian Ocean. “What threats underpin U. S. wartime force requirements” in the Indian Ocean if “the Soviet Navy remains in home waters?” The Navy does not exist simply to destroy the Soviet Navy. Indeed, in a strategic sense, destruction of the Soviet Navy is only a means to the end of controlling the sea, projecting power ashore, and bringing pressure on the Soviet Union. No one can predict the course of a future war or the areas in which U. S. forces will be involved. Secretary Lehman was simply recognizing the possibility that carrier battle groups might be required to support U. S. military operations in the Indian Ocean. One advantage of sea power is that naval forces have the flexibility to go or not go, depending on the military situation. Obviously, if in an actual war there was no military purpose served by carrier battle forces in the Indian Ocean, those forces would be used elsewhere by the unified commanders.
“What area [of the 56,000 square miles over which a carrier battle group is dispersed] contains the ships, as opposed to aircraft on the wing? What would happen to the offensive striking power of each battle group if one ship—the aircraft carrier—were sunk?” The 56,000 square nautical miles Admiral Watkins cited was for ships; aircraft increase that combat area significantly. One reason for Navy interest in Tomahawk cruise missiles is to disperse offensive power so that some offensive capability remains even if a carrier is put out of action. Nevertheless, the carriers remain the heart of our combat capability; that is why the Navy does not propose single carrier battle groups, but rather multi-carrier battle forces where the loss of a single ship is less likely and the consequences of such a loss less severe.
“Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate to support what forces, where, under what circumstances? How can it be adequate, if unable to move all imperative loads, including strategic raw materials, even in the absence of heavy attrition?” Sealift by the end of this decade will be adequate for the movement of military forces in a global war with the Soviets, under demanding assumptions governing the national military planning
■ hies
process. Should a number 0f/Vj0jns change—such as the geograp > - j
of the global conflict, the number ^
id jfl
attrition rates, tempo of ts will
each theater, etc.—our require gnt
be altered. Consequently,the ,Llv re- of Defense and the Navy constant^ ^ evaluate their sealift needs, a reflected in refinements to t eenlent strategy and to the sealift pr „ijft to
program. U. S.-controlled se ^ ^
transport strategic raw mat • ^ Re
jected to be available, but wi ence ot lihood, be inadequate. InA emerChant the desired rebuilding of oU have
marine, alternative policies jncludin§ to be implemented—Possl, v,n;nlr eco- _ - ugn-flagsh.pP^home,
nomic tightening of the e n]anned to
time? we nave > a u-
play, war games centered 0f oU
overall gaming activity. <• Re rna11 ever, of the deterrentaspec^^y aS wc
u_nsidem
--------- , tr c .Soviet 11 y
war centered on a U. o. nar)o. o-
war at sea as the most like y y^ptio11 with all games a varid^^ a varied have been used, and, th
or
nprove uui lavnw — - •
Likewise, carrier attrltl°,s0 “gives a_ exercises (it does happen ,
valuable and useful insig » the re then can and do act UP° ' prove11 world, however, carriers . ipSin®
,3
roved many of our assu carriers :erning the utility of our „roF
being unable to w , /ritf''1 , ions, conclude that America $ ca
trategy is based on the ^ stOrtj in which we control event* f ,ail » .
inish), and that it does no arrned s vith the total needs of o
1#
_ / Tufle *
V,ces or ,1
select; ■ nat‘on? Why wouldn’t more n'<ssiJe a‘ms accomphsh essential U. S.
above"* M less risk and cost?" The any Cf. exP*anations should help refute able to1CS W*1° dad been heretofore un- than . ,answer these questions. Rather ^fitim"1'’ ^ased on the best case, the tlle best^ Strategy is designed to create events *'e”t0 enahle us to control starts- a°H 21 War W't*1 tde Soviets never Place't sucd 3 war were to take that we ° ena^e us to control events so is jnCould terminate it favorably. This ral j q C^e agrcement with Rear Admi- t'°n that <<^'e s w'dely quoted admoni- sure of ’ a’m war *s some mea- The ^°ntro1 over the enemy.” to d0Vetandtne strategy is also designed lhe other riWe" w'td tlle requirements of of 0(lr „r • S. armed services and those t° its devT^ and ad‘es- All contributed sary to ■ e °Pment; all have forces neces- Hicf) ^ftplement it; and all have forces to he eff*Ulre 'tS tmplementation in order l>ve aimeCtlVe*y ernpl°yed. More selec- hl. S. rr,iS ■ITI’ght well accomplish some "'fold S'°ns at less initial cost; but they Crease th"1 ouhtedly thereby greatly in- °Ur allies6 °Vera*l r'sk to ourselves and No *
dsk. ^ tategy js perfect; none js wjthout P°vvers j1S ~Pree war between the super- rrtaritjj^ s a contradiction in terms. The ttle navalS fategy has given those of us in rUr think;Profession a way to organize 0rts, ancJng’ to better structure our effects fQ thereby to increase our pros- 'etTenCer ®teiTing war—or, should de- |itVorable ?* ’ ending the war on terms les- It ;s0 tde United States and its al- ‘"'d debat °!^ continued discussion *egic Un .e that we can increase our stra- ness, so erstanding and our prepared- essential to deterrence.
“W;
fee Hi Catch Us Unaware?
I
Pr°Ceed?ng^thus’ PP- 168-170, March 1986
^fder cw^e,grift’ ^r-—Frankly, Coi ,Ut °f tne-l e*'US s Piece scares the h .CctrOma„ esPecially that part about t “felect^tc puiSe effect neutralizi]
^an
USjn
rl^at iu I'trunates the nuclear
h "" no N JC suPertority. No compui .Usihess P?.' Also, that neutron bo
1 the,
%e
du
As
:°ry of
crowd.
the “Peace-At-Ai
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ment. Congratulations
involved
who
Of course, there may be qm
that was
not
■cedings
“Death of a Captain”
(See H. L. Buell, pp. 92-96, February 1986; F. G. Sanford, p. 16, April 1986 Proceedings)
April Supplement
(See April 1986 Proceedings Supplement)
Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I don’t believe that the Proceedings is a proper place to belittle former members of the naval profession, especially when those put down are no longer alive to defend themselves. I believe that this practice is small, unfair, and of absolutely no value 99% of the time, and it can also deeply scar the sensibilities of relatives still living.
I have in mind two recent instances of this practice. First is the February article about the late Captain Miles Browning. All this article demonstrates is that a holder of the Distinguished Service Medal and a man with an exceptional combat staff performance record was, like all humans, fallible. More than anything else, though, it clearly demonstrates that mistakes do occur in the process of selection for higher responsibilities. But that is nothing new!
The second case involves the inside cover page of the April Supplement where reference is made to a conversation between Admiral Ernest King and Admiral Jack Towers. There is no way of really knowing whether or not Admiral Towers failed to receive a combat command solely because of a personal dislike on the part of Admiral King. But it really proves nothing either way, for who can say with any assurance which course of action was better anyway?
I am not saying everyone doesn’t have the right to express his or her feelings. But I believe strongly that the Proceedings has the right, the duty, and the wisdom to differentiate between a close call and a strikeout.
Another item which I must strongly object to is the reference in the concluding paragraph of the inside cover page of the April Supplement to a soon-to-be- published Naval Institute Press book by John B. Nichols and Barrett Tillman. This reference suggests that naval aviators should be permitted to be simply aviators, nothing more, or, as sometimes derisively described, “rudder pushers” or “aerial chauffeurs.” Anyone with even a cursory knowledge of naval history knows that one of the keystones most responsible for the fact that U. S. naval aviation rose to a position of recognized preeminence in the world, rather than being swallowed up by an independent air force, was because of a philosophy
sgd to
diametrically and absolutely °PP the thinking propounded m t(,e
ence. Very few would arSue, - „ prestatement that had such thin vailed in the period from 1“ jn all naval aviation, as such, wou out-
probability be nonexistent, an been
come of World War II would have tragically different.
Commander William D. j^ntB®'
Navy (Retired)—l speakfor u ^ ,he bers of naval aviators when ^ very supplement is a great su^ces*' care that much appreciate the skill an . n 0fthe obviously went into the PrePaf . :s supple" articles and their assembly were
ibblers
will write and say that this or ^ lS told quite correctly, or that s butalso off a bit. I say let them be hea - overail know that most of us feel t a much thrust of the supplement is . an correct. Those tales neede . ^ wi" you let them be told. Future sUpple' be aided by what is in print i ha
ment, and those like myse oVer th|S many pleasant hours porl
P“n,U. S. Naval .»stitut'
have done this fine job.
“The Langley Legacy”
(See L. Hickerson, pp- 66-14, Apn Proceedings Supplement) ^ ^
JohnL. Whitmeyer,
Canberra (CA-70)-U^ cVf-27| son’s account of the Lang ^oSe°P
legacy proved most interes i . ejr cteW eratiOns honed the ships a ^ l°aj to the task quickly d“nnferVed °n * months. Those of us w o ,ue fast r-1 Canberra were also a Part .ueLalg^- rier operations—often wi • t0LieUtev However, a gremlin creP {he hea'? ant Hickerson’s account. t|lCSh”
cruiser Wichita (CA-4 ). ing W> Fe (CL-60), that passed*® Friday tn to the Canberra that bla
13th night. maiatched,
Admiral Bull Halsey R^minS^ Same Fe, Mobile (CL-63).]oIlg with (CL-62), and the Wichita,
“small boys”—the Bel Burns (DD-588), Caperton( (pP
Cogswell (DD-651), A gy ,
652), and Knapp (D^ (C^ break, the light carriers jge gr°
and Cowpens (CVL-25) j° to provide air cover.
/ }«°e
Leadership
Essay Contest
thilit,
Hec^ ^eahers-
Navai*)111^'’ * noticed a poster for the test " jnstltute “Leadership Essay Con- not hy .,Was drawn to the advertisement Portnnit e award money, but by the op- 2°0(i ie^.|l° Wr'te about my beliefs on °n mya ership and management, based tude of 0nstant observation of the multi- How„SUPer*ors above and around me.
to
sh
ht)n
Coin,
L'e«r,
ision-
bluJe*ant
^ Third Class Scott R. traffi/’ S' Navy—I have been an air seven C°ntro"er >n the Navy for almost
l°t0ff ^*lat may not seem t0 he a
have plme t0 some' but during this time I exarTlD]X^er'encec* ar>d learned from the have s 6S 'eadership under which I 0r<jer (q'T6^' h's an old saying that, “In first h° ecome a 80°d leader you must bein„ eCo™e a good follower.” Well, Navy j 71’rt^ c'ass Petty officer in the than a’i |lave been more of a follower s*ona] 6aC er‘ * have had, however, occa- f>roups °PPortunities to lead sizable takes k° ,men' * made my share of mis- heligy ^ have learned from them, and I ilitarv i 31 *S what helps to build good
_ _ . - wmvoi 10 111 in iv^vj
tfainees JVlCe Jun'or officers and officer •tty year .mean no disrespect, but during that theS ln the service, I have observed oftheiiey°Unger ensigns and even some at ^ader U/enants are not yet experienced hrnit theS I believe that it is unfair to does nofCOntest t0 these ranks because it Baders ®IVe some of the really good Pttblicly3 chance to prove themselves "Hie c0nt
?e in all k!!* Should be open to every- „ ranches of the armed forces,
» anH c 4ucuiiy ui me
not on the rank of the author. DlT°R’s m
aJ}nkal y- °TE; The ground rules of the ^°ntest ‘jtenl Astor Memorial Essay ?rs Qnd Jrk ‘S restricted to junior offi- i°n^or j lcer trainees, are set by the ^QVqJ/nst' tfl€ contest’ not the U. S. Attain on'Ute' The pages of Proceedings ? kadersir ,0 a^’ and those interested Tr>Url.e l0P‘cs are invited to write prd der>a‘ ership Forum which is a stan- ^0ceedina^^me,I, ‘n a reSuiar issue of
~A Nightmare u10y t)l‘ Commander
biy i o
the tactical action officer called to the wardroom to inform the commanding officer and myself that two members of the task group had collided. We were some 20 miles away, a safe distance from the accident. We were, however, called on to close the distance between ourselves and the damaged ships, and stand by with our LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) helicopter for medical evaluation, if required.
As we moved in, we saw the bright glow on the night horizon and knew that the two ships were burning. Reports on the radio confirmed at least one fatality. A bevy of Coast Guard helicopters and one C-130 search and rescue aircraft were made available. All units were instructed to assist. Hours later, one ship made it into port under her own power, while the other disabled ship required assistance.
Joining the curiosity seekers on the pier later that week, I was awed by the crushed bow on one ship and the huge, open wound several decks deep on the other. The tom, mangled, and fire- scorched steel reminded me of combat photos from World War II.
Those of us who saw the fires that night were reminded of the importance of instilling the basic Navy qualities of vigilance and forehandedness in our bridge watchstanders. Entrusting the safety of the crew and the ship to the officer-of- the-deck is one of the unique responsibilities involved in the making of a surface warrior. The Navy cannot afford to learn by nightmares.
The results of the Jason (AR-8)— Williamette (AO-180) collision: grim reminders to all Navy professionals.
“Equal Rights, Equal Risks”
(See R. M. Hixson, pp. 37-44, September
1985; R. J. Keevers, R. A. Fielding, L.
Masters, pp. 106-109, November 1985; K. C.
Mathews, p. 110, December 1985; R. F. Covey,
pp. 16-19, January 1986; H. F. Van Der
Grinten, p. 30, February 1986 Proceedings)
Captain D. B. Streich, U. S. Marine Corps—We in the Marine Corps are in an absolute paroxysm of self-congratulatory euphoria over the “enlightened” decision to train women Marines in defensive tactics and rifle marksmanship. The members of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services have been virtually canonized by the highest leadership of the Marine Corps, while enjoying nearly a policymaking role. Commander Hixson’s article pretends to present objectively the argument in a rational perspective, but it actually advocates—by implication—full integration of women in all military units, including offensive combat units. The inexorable march toward that unfortunate situation seems inevitable. Once again, in this era of heightened civil libertarian consciousness, the strident demands of a special interest group are seriously undercutting the standards of successful, traditional organizations.
Since the political handwriting seems to be rather clearly written on the wall, it may be a perilous career decision to offer a dissenting view. Nevertheless, before we strike our colors before current political fads and highly educated civilian human relation specialists, and before we make decisions that later might be sadly regretted but not easily undone, the matter should be examined from an opposing viewpoint. As far as career impact is concerned, I will have to rely on the civility, education, and intellect of the Marine Corps leadership.
On the surface, Commander Hixson’s article presents a placid, objective, and intellectual inquiry into the issue of complete integration and utilization of women in all military units, including units dedicated to offensive combat. Rhetorical questions are posed to the reader, apparently leading him or her by Socratic method to the not quite neutral conclusion that the author proposes. If a logical person looks beneath the calm, unexcitable prose, however, there swirls an argument of advocacy characterized by illogical inconsistency, faulty reasoning, and suspect qualifications. Rather than unemotional objectivity, the article offers an ill-disguised, one-sided view of an extremely complex issue.
Of all the verbiage surrounding the issue of female personnel resources in the military, there exist a few constants and
myths that first must be addressed. The presence of monthly hormonal imbalances does not constitute a valid or credible argument against utilization of women in appropriate, technologically assisted billets, nor does their relative lack of upper body strength. That is one reason why women are successfully integrated into operating police forces around the nation. Those two physical characteristics do become disqualifying in nontechnological military occupational specialties directly related to combat such as infantry, armor, artillery, and perhaps, combat engineers. Although Commander Hixson stated that Army artillery persons performed well when in charge of artillery batteries, and an artillery lanyard does not know the difference between a female or male hand, he conveniently overlooked such banalities as positioning the gun, camouflaging the position, and getting the rounds into the tubes. Such oversight was commonplace in Commander Hixson’s presentation.
If anyone bothered to ask, the personal experiences of male Marine officers who attended The Basic School with female Marine officers would offer convincing empirical evidence that women are unequivocally incapable of carrying the physical load required in non-technological combat billets. However much the feminists dislike that situation, it is the reality. To their claim that some women could handle the physical load, there are women in the United States who undoubtedly could, but their numbers are so small that they are statistically insignificant. The simple fact is that the average “Mary Ann” cannot keep up with the average “Joe” in physical tasks directly related to combat specialties. The suggestion that a three-week training program would alleviate this genetic difference is ludicrous and indicated a total lack of experience in these specialties. Others may use Controlled studies, conducted in pursuit of desired objectives, as their authority—but 1 cite experience.
I willingly concede that a woman can push a button or manipulate a control stick as effectively as a man, but there are other compelling reasons for women not to be employed in combat capacities. One may believe that the M-l Abrams tank, for example, is a high-tech piece of equipment and therefore suitable for female operation: but the tank will need its roadwheels changed, tracks adjusted, and gun cleaned—physical tasks related to the specialty of operating a tank that are beyond the physical capabilities of most females.
Even the method of argumentation in Commander Hixson’s article is flawed.
The remainder of his article analyz tain undesirable ramifications an ^ ^ acteristics uniquely female 1SUjrnbal- pregnancy, monthly hormona ances, and maternal duties t a
retromifwome"^
combat units-^
be brought to the forefront fully integrated into comba ^
argument, Commander Hixson^^^^ these characteristics to current P uaiity in the military, such as homoss the
and illegal drug use. He comp_____ josS
similar effects of both phenomen since of personnel—and concludes
:ts are the same, there is no^
son to exclude women tr°m js units. The logic in this argurne is
UI pulMJllll&l dll'-* v . jjq
the effects are the same, them 1
is
most incomprehensible: The mil j taking extraordinary measures
is al tar;
ry measures - ^ j,
and eliminate both homosexuahty^^g legal drug use from ,its ra^Sbat effi' such aberrations impair the t0]er-
ciency of a unit, and thus canno an<jer ated. To be consistent with 0
to mduce
COfl'
alcohol ahu*®
* \x/p cati *
Hixson’s line of argument, ^
elude that since there is an a co .nlpairs problem in the military w, lClUa inSs of
- , h the loss
combat effectiveness throug^^ service
those
individuals from effect! jtting
we should promote equality Y assUme
drug abusers also. Curious. wjt[1 fe- additional problems associate when
male integration into coniba 0(
we are spending enormous current
money and time to elimjn saine
problems that have exact y
effect?
in-
*fti simile The article is replete wi ^ contra 0ne'
-ob-
me auicic — . ■
consistencies, blithe dismissa • lictory evidence, and mcomp m
U1WIU1J1 V 1UCI1VV, —— .-jal pF
sided examinations of su s (bat th*-
lems. For example, the asse ^ ]arge
gender-free assignment po ic en-
police forces are tremendou clirrent lightened and progressive £jjsparate military policies compares acCUratW entities. The two cannot 0 (live t0
compared. Police °fficerSly engage ,0 gether 24 hours a day, « J orendur tasks requiring notable strength anything ance; very rarely exP®"esituation; :omparable to a comb 0f
:hey enjoy the creature comr°i ^
cm civilized society. fomm30^
An important subject that ^ sOct0'
Hixon barely mentions is .^rating logical-behavioral impact envir011
B imoth. ground £$&£>!» ciological study on bot^
A)men
lent
nt. I eagerly await a psych0>^of fe-
aciological study on the mV bonduV rnle presence on the mascare ]oa ffect. Although many fcmi ar0un , concede the fact, men who ^ are omen act differently than h differ nong men, and the be alf,c0nsci°u ices run far deeper ^anCrtr eXamP^’ rareness
of profanity. For exai
/June
inges p- , suirmng personality ^tertipt ,n :‘ther the men or the women 0 manipulate, control, or intimi-
'ngful in.en’ not heard,” avoiding mean- This (1e^C,rUCt'on whh the larger group.
'v°itiene,uV*0r usual,y earns the few
Product;^3 s'tuation that dampens group hd tn n'. combat, it could be harm-
p » mhvi j ^ v/i tuiiiv put
- amics°mbat ,in the field- The group
missions, and environments
l “-ner uuilui mmgaici
**• her ,.n . an admirable head of state,
< .LVir
onrnent is much more mature
heC P'ays
__ a significant role in the
f. Ganges discussed earlier. Uai . ,femii
vr0fda,jy hfe, the importance and fdtrcation i *c^ decline as maturity and °rce. «. evel rise. But our military
is
lately
cate
co,
the
a -°at f0r6‘all°n ot women into the rjpdPild cCe e 3Ve e'ther never served in anq o,,0rnbat unit or have more matu
[ 7' nave muie maiu-
E>r,UCation than are characteristic
Of
lrable i comT,at units is sexist and t° the racist policy of more
"'0men . other gender. Sometimes the discomf, ^ t0 mduce the psychological either being in the minority by
heing one °f the boys” or by
“men thp u c
%rity_C bemused contempt of the
The fISSl0n effectiveness, h'r it intJi'fln'StS ^'nd reality distasteful, So,heyr.eres with the feminist agenda. r°°m, th °lnt t0 new corPorate board- male hC;^| lnte8rated police force, or fe- fPples i>S'd state as contradictory ex- °rce js °Wever, a boardroom or police P'atoon n0t. comparable to an infantry l0°n at’caitlllery battery, or tank pla ^teher^, different. Granted, Margaret j4ry forcePurP0Sely youthful mili- '^do nij ^et’s be practical—youthful
A,avioral
f.' attrac'p'n'Sts W'H refute that, but sex- ac’s "f ,/°,n and its ramifications are
c> dui our mimar;
h0rt)Poseci eC'al*y the combat units, i ' th0 ° young people. Unfortu- > • Se who most zealously advo- 'Ptbat pwePration of women into the 'nd
°Ur arm 1114111 are cnarac
. ^t'other nt combat personnel. c°men j- argument is that excluding
°ttlparr ■ " ^ COmhat unite ,0 ravirt o r, 0 than 30 years ago which excluded black men from segregated combat units. There are considerable differences between the two policies. Racial discrimination was a learned bias which was overcome by an intensive reeducation effort. Biological attraction between the sexes, and its impact on group dynamics, would take a staggering amount of “enlightened” reeducation to eliminate. The integration of black males into combat organizations retained the masculine integrity of those organizations without requiring a denial or reversal of biological drives. Also, racial integration of the military did not degrade the individual combat unit’s physical capability to accomplish its assigned mission as the integration of women would—when men would be required to make up for the women’s lack of physical strength and endurance. A feminist will deny that a female (or females) has an inevitable impact on the behavior of a group of men. I understand this frustration at the human inability to overcome natural sexual attraction, but if one is unhappy with the sun’s passage across the sky, stamping one’s foot and declaring “unfair” will not make the sun rise in the west. The current prohibition against women in combat units is not an unenlightened and discriminatory policy, but it is rather a reasonable acknowledgement of the natural, yet counterproductive, impact of gender integration in combat environments.
If sexual attraction and relationships between members of a unit are not injurious to the morale and effectiveness of that unit, then why is there a ban on fraternization? And on homosexuality? Integration of women into the combat force will necessitate a reversal of those policies to achieve legal consistency. Will that improve the capability of the U. S. military to accomplish its mission?
I think not. The level of sexual activity in current gender-integrated units, even in such regimented and highly visible environments as the service academies and sexually integrated Navy ships, is persuasive evidence that such activity is not responsive to command authority or human relations education. Strenuous physical demands and non-sexual interpersonal relationships are less characteristic of a garrison environment or support function, where they can be sacrificed for the sake of appearing progressive. But these two qualities are vital in a combat unit, where lives and victory in battle are at stake.
Finally, those reading my arguments might ask me if I think there is any place at all for women in the military. If the presence of women impacts so negatively on the ability of men to perform their jobs, why employ women at all? I respond that the impact of gender integration is manageable in a non-combat, garrison environment. In our current military bureaucracy, where the majority of units are support units, there is an important role for women. Perhaps if we employ more women in support units, we can increase the quality and quantity of our manpower in combat units, thereby enhancing our ability to achieve victory on the battlefield. I do not advocate consigning women solely to secretarial duties and clerical chores. Women can serve our country significantly in a variety of roles.
But what is gained by integrating our combat units? Certainly no physical improvement in mission effectiveness or emotional cohesiveness is gained, no matter how much reeducation or enlightened thinking is achieved.
Commander Hixson’s article illustrates the unfortunate paradox that those who advocate integration of women into combat units and those involved in the decision-making process have no experience in ground combat specialties. A decision in favor of integration will be one of political expediency to avoid appearing unprogressive or unenlightened. Since the decision will be political, those who will decide in favor of women in combat roles will be the farthest removed from the baneful results. To quote the luminous George Will, “Change does not necessarily denote progress.” A noted philosopher at the turn of the century inquired, “Who knows what ill-advised decisions and harmful effects have resulted from a cowardly desire to appear progressive?” Is our “progressive” consciousness so enlightened that we lack the political courage to declare that the Emperor is naked? An opinion advocating the integration of women into combat forces ignores compelling arguments and real-life experience to the contrary. Such a proposal has no merit in practicality.
[1] certainly did not intend to demean Otie’s assignment as Aide to the Commandant after our accident. Such a billet was a distinct compliment to him. After all, Captain Zogbaum first had Ben Custer as his aide, and he wanted another top-notch officer as his replacement. I did not know until recently that Otie had already been selected for the job. But the commandant could have had anyone he chose, and he chose Otie.
Rear Admiral Francis Foley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Otie is probably correct. I was anxious and excited, and might have confused this incident with a prior emergency downwind in which I resorted to a split-S to extricate myself as quickly as possible. I have told this story so many times during the past 51 years that perhaps I convinced myself that it happened that way. However, Otie really knew what he was doing. I sure hated to lose him as an instructor.
Otie Gregg, left, and Francis Foley in Pensacola, 1935.
If Otie had not stuck up for me when
the chips were down, I would never have been a naval aviator in the first place. Now, after a half-century, Otie and I