Ideology: The Bear’s Carrot

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Year after year, the Communist Party dangles various carrots—such as the illu­sion of perpetual peace—before the Soviet populace. The people’s acceptance of Party dictatorship—which just concluded its 27th Congress in February, here—gives the Politburo virtually free rein in the conduct of international relations.

For many years the West assumed that communist ideology was a major influence on Soviet political- military behavior. During much of this period, the Soviet Union had qualitatively inferior military forces but could successfully manipulate the world communist movement for its own purposes. By the 1950s, Soviet leaders’ public statements seemed to confirm our worst fears about the menace of communism.¹ When super­power tensions appeared to subside in the late 1960s and early 1970s, we were troubled by Soviet statements that were at odds with our own expectations of detente but dismissed their strident words as window dressing for in­ternal Soviet consumption.²

Recently, we have heard a series of Soviet party leaders stress other factors and a “peaceful coexistence” between capitalism and socialism. Yet in Soviet documents, writ­ten for the Soviet people, the trappings of ideology remain with a fervor that resembles the worst days of U. S.-Soviet relations.³ What’s the story? Would Soviet foreign and military policy be the same without ideology? If the Sovi­ets cannot achieve their ideological objectives, will they lash out on their deathbed and embroil the world in a holo­

caust? Do the Soviets fear that the forces of ^caP^lta^. |j_StTi'⁵

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strike out from their deathbed in the face or

“inevitable” victory?

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ical-economic beliefs, has not attracted many

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sidering the influence ideology has on the S°^vl^j_ng.

ior some of communism’s problems need revie

Marxism as a Basis for Predicting Social D^{eV c} Karl Marx predicted that the worker uprising⁵

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^S°^c'^aIismh ^soc‘^a^^{sm was} the wave of the future. Yet, "'eli^ _an has not taken over, and nationalism is alive, United to. ®^row'ⁿ§- For example, in adopting the recent ⁿ>ty ^ ^atl°ns Law of the Sea Treaty, the world commu- ^ITl!lr'kind'^Un °PP^ortun'ty to adopt a “common heritage of ^e.^xPand . ^aPP^roach to oceans. Instead, it chose to further ^ited _n^na!'^onal'^sm into the “high seas.” Apparently, ^l‘Ve niea ^atlona* jurisdiction was trusted as a more effec- ^So,Pethi_n^{nS l}° ^rnana8^e the oceans than treating the sea as 8 that all mankind owns “in common.”

^Ut'der_StQ^iV||^{i Qn<}^ ^t^^le ^^uss‘^an Revolution: Vladimir Lenin _Se° ^^at classic Marxism in its original form had ^*^rst_; h_e^ri°L^S P^r°hlems, and, therefore, he “fixed” it. "^ld co ^Caan§^ecl Marx’s prediction that the revolution ^tions i”^{112 a}^^out *ⁿ the world’s most advanced industrial ^Capitaiij ^e"*^{n Sa}'^ ^wou*^cl occur in the weakest links of h'al are_asj ackward agrarian Russia and imperialist colo-

?P^ected^t ^^en'^{n rec}ognized that the worker could not be ^a'^S °Wn • °_|^t*^evel°P a proletarian’s self-consciousness on van­guard party would provide that assistance. This party would lead and force the workers into a dictatorship (in their name) in order to enable humanity to make the transi­tion from capitalism, through socialism, to communism. That transition has yet to occur; even the Soviets acknowl­edge that no true communist nations exist today.

Third, Lenin stood Marx on his head by explaining that politics would determine the economic conditions of the state and not vice-versa. This reversal is still found in the Soviet literature today.⁴ Hence, we use the phrase “Marxism-Leninism” to describe a joining of these two philosophies into a mixture that the latter dominates in practice.

The Russian Revolution promised land to the peasants, but instead provided a system in which the state confis­cated most of the land from its owners. The revolution promised national self-determination, including the right of secession, but delivered an internal empire dominated by Russians and an ever-expanding external empire that has grown well beyond the original borders of 1917.

The revolution promised production that would meet the demands of consumption, but instead, in the Soviet

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Soviet political-military doctrine. The objective war are determined within this framework. D°^c

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sentatives cannot? The Soviet peace campaign deployment of NATO intermediate-range nuclea ^ ^ in Europe clearly demonstrated this capability p^y in

Union production is either for its own sake or geared pri­marily to military expansionism. It promised plenty, but delivered scarcity. The revolution dangled a carrot of per­petual peace with the eventual elimination of a standing army, but delivered a perpetual war economy with a mili­tary always preparing for war.

The Specific Influence of Ideology: Most statements of Soviet state policy are cast in terms of the ideology, and the leading roles of that ideology and the party are en­shrined within the Soviet Constitution. Ideology is used to rationalize virtually every major decision made in the So­viet Union. If all of this ideology means nothing, then why do the Soviets go to such trouble? Because the ideology matters to the Russians who rule the Soviet empire. The ideology matters to the West because it underlies impor­tant Soviet political-military behavior in the following ways.

First, ideology teaches that the world is inevitably mov­ing in favor of the forces of socialism and that in time capitalism will be eliminated. Soviet literature still carries comments that have appeared over the years alluding to this inevitable shift.⁵ This view answers the question of why there is long-term competition with the West and helps inspire the armed forces and the population’s dedica­tion. With control of the whole world as the objective, virtually no price is too high to pay and there is no limit to the demands to be met en route to achieving victory.

Since time is on socialism’s side, long-term goals seem more feasible and any tactical reverses are easier to ac­cept. It also defines the Soviet Union as a non-status quo power, except in those areas that it already controls. The Soviet perception of the world of international relations is decidedly a zero-sum game.

Second, ideology teaches the Soviet citizen that the exis­tence of capitalism is all that obstructs the attainment of the workers’ paradise. Only after the world has accom­plished the transformation from capitalism to socialism can the Soviet Union advance to the higher stage of com­munism.⁶ Therefore, the Soviet citizen must work con­stantly to eliminate “predatory capitalism.” Rather than promise a better world in the life after death, as some religions do, Marxism-Leninism promises a better life in this world if only the citizen can do a little more. The incentive does not appear to be enough, and the Commu­nist Party of the Soviet Union has had to redefine its target completion date for eventual triumph.

Third, war and politics are not mutually exclusive. Lenin read and borrowed liberally from Karl von Clausewitz and accepted the premise that war is a continu­ation of politics with an admixture of other more violent means. Lenin agreed that politics sets the tone and deter­mines the purposes of war. Ideology also teaches that poli­tics is a continuation of war by less violent means. The absence of an armed conflict does not preclude the exis­tence of war. The Soviets attempt to reach political objec­tives while not risking nuclear war.

The Soviets view “peace”—as it is used in the West— as an opportunity to achieve goals through nonmilitary means. The Soviets call this “peaceful coexistence” and

consider it the natural state of international relation ^ ^ a nonviolent but relentless struggle continues agaifl_aS talism. Mir, which is usually translated into ng ^ ^ “peace,” is a higher state of the world that cann^ ^ until capitalism has been eliminated and worldwi munism has triumphed.  . _{f se}ven

Article 28 of the 1977 Soviet Constitutionhsi . foreign policy goals. Five of these goals are i ^e _sQCjal- including the consolidation of the position of ^w?l_erefore- ism and support for wars of national liberation- j_nVOlve the official policy of the Soviet Government is ° itself in the internal affairs of other sovereign s . ^ Ideology forms the basis for party doctrine, ^ ^ to comes official state doctrine, which, in turn, g^lV of

overall military strategy, which includes the ^eil‘^Fjjffere°t of the Soviet Navy in both war and peace. On a ^_tto level, doctrine explains to the soldier that he nan .^^a- defend the homeland and to support the cause ⁰

tional socialism.                                     ofin^terna

Fourth, the ideology creates alternate means ^ Ra­tional relations other than traditional state-to- ^ _nght tions. The world communist movement reserve. ^ that to conduct inter-party or party-to-people re a _s[i- cross borders and are not subject to state contro ’ _ntage- ing the Soviet Government with a unilateral ® ₀fti- Where is the Western equivalent to the Soviet _a(j cials’ “right” to interact directly with citizens a ^_vern- foment dissent, to organize opposition to elec e ele­

weaP⁰"⁵ 0^b'

uted to a shift to the left of the Social Democra th^e the Federal Republic of Germany and a destruc _OIl£ ot internal political consensus on security matters NATO’s key members.⁷          j_se '•^vltl

Fifth, ideology allows for tactical c°mpr⁽’ _corR^r even mortal enemies. If the time is not right, i   ^1,1

tion of forces is not favorable enough to give ^c°ⁿ^_eceSsa^r>, the control of a successful outcome, retreats ^are _ver, a" Compromise is an admission of weakness, ho eventually ideology demands success.

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General and Indirect Influences of /deolog)’" _epreS^£l1 _ represents a framework for perceiving reality-¹ ^ fh^eft

a tint to the glasses through which the world is s^ _even^tU are general and indirect influences of ideology                                                           -

ally result in concrete political-military *^3e*^ljV!_uCatioⁿ °f First and most important, the basic early ^e^_sia(icc " Soviet citizens includes ideology, and that education is influenced by ideology. Va imp⁰¹" q) grammar school children are some of the mo^s ^j,o '^vl components of the political behavior of adu ^ts’                                                                          j

decide government behavior.             _on(jiti^OIll\,

The education process is reinforced by ^ ^ f₀PjV emotional responses acquired from society- v0^c learned body of beliefs that set the bounds an ^ lary for thought, discussion, and debate. We

s_0cj ^ea* ^wdh, and predict, the possible behavior of a i(j_eoi ^ ^{ln w}hich freedom is not as important as a failed DupJ® which employs selective deduction and cherishes _simpi^Vea Propositions and assumptions. The Soviet Union Unin, ^ ^{aas a} unique civic culture and, therefore, has a 5 ^s'rategic culture.

^coiice^{1VldUalS are soc}*^afl^zed >^nt0 habitual behavior and ?Uard^^{tS       t}*^10u§ht that are largely determined by the

^ch '^{an    societ}y and values—the Communist Party,

and i_s^{& CU}'^tUre*^s passed on from generation to generation issue_s Th ^readi|y ^shaken by current events and transient is _sj_m', ^{ae res}idual impact of education and socialization the \y ^{ar t0 tbe} influence of early religious upbringing in the ad⁶]* ³ h’°wcrful force that must be dealt with even if ide₀[₀^{U 1 n}° '^on8^er practices the faith. In both religion and S_e ’ eertain truths are accepted as articles of faith. enc_{e 0} ”5’ ^certain aspects of ideology have a direct influ- on f_0r • u°rnestic affairs with a significant indirect impact Uii_ne th^^{n a}^^a*^rs- F°^r example, since party politics deter- is _not ^e Soviet state’s economic policies, the marketplace the_re • ^{a 0w}ed to determine unemployment; therefore, institu_t- ^^r°^{ss ec}°nomic inefficiency compounded by an e_c° <^)na'^ized bureaucracy which undermines sound a _state ^lc Planning. Thus, the Soviet state is constantly in ^C0,upens t °ⁿ°^{miC Cr}*^S^^{S and} '^{s searc}hing for ways to

stat_e of"^{8 t0 an ideol}°gy il¹³¹ promotes this backward ^trausacLf ^fa!^rs supports' certain international strategic Am_on; r ^based on unsound economic reasoning. ^artificiali ^{£Se are tbe sa}'^e Soviet oil ^ar|d natural gas at tftarij,e ^ow prices to allies, and the use of the merchant Costs n ° ^Carry foreign cargoes at prices below actual basj_c j_n ^{06 tbe} central dilemmas in the Soviet state is the and th_e .^0rnP^atit>ility between the need for modernization 'ⁿhiative^ldeCdo^^caby driven authoritarianism that stifles {hem j»,^e' ^exPlains, in part, why the Soviet Govem- its eco_nQ^{St Stea}l foreign technologies in order to modernize A th' ^my-

°Ve_r ’ indirect influence is the result of party control &o_nap ^mili^tary, stemming from a constant fear of lions of IQ⁰¹' ^he party will never forget that the revolu- Ihe . ¹' succeeded largely because of the inaction of 'he mij f^1Un H^iiilary at crucial times. Party domination of lion inst^ary-^bas '^ts P^ri^ce> however. The Soviet Constitu- ^CVerythi ^Utlona''^zes lire government giving the military nev_JU "S if needs—a tenet reaffirmed by Leonid Brezh- ^rcsuii is ,L^Cb)re l'^c died and by each new party leader. The ^b0i°_n ^at Ihe military cannot be too strong in the Soviet ^ilitarv ^ereas in the West, many citizens demand that Th_e ^e*P^endilures be kept to a minimum. ^e*^acerb t*^ltai^ ^bas ^'^rst priority on the economy, further [he jp ^ln8 the economic inefficiencies and providing °^0rde_rs ¹⁰ find solutions outside the Soviet Union’s f°reig_n' ^be resulting strong military means that Soviet ^a°\v b_acK° *^cy’ including its ideological component, is ^Seif~defo ^Ct* ^by credible forces that well exceed any logical Th_{e S}^{nSe re}quirements.

^averali °^V'^{et de}f^ense buildup has resulted in a shift in the ^^0yiet ^°^rre'ation of forces and means in favor of the ⁿ'°n. Thus, the West can no longer dominate any

escalation decision. This naturally impacts on the West’s plans for using its conventional naval forces for crisis re­sponse. Will we back our conventional forces with the nuclear threat as we did in the Cuban Missile Crisis or will we place our ships and men in harm’s way and expect them to go it alone?

The Soviet war economy is the ultimate military-indus­trial complex and could not shift overnight from its em­phasis on guns to butter. We should neither expect any near-term reduction in Soviet military force production

With the motto of the Soviet Congress adorning their classroom walls, these children are learning values designed to color their adult political beliefs in order to perpetuate the system.

nor a Soviet foreign policy conducted from a position other than strength.

Former long-time commander of the Soviet Navy Ad­miral Sergei Gorshkov understood the benefits of diplo­macy conducted from a position of strength. He frequently argued that a nation such as the Soviet Union cannot be a truly great power unless it is also a great sea power. He said that navies have direct usefulness in supporting over­seas foreign policy, which by the Soviets’ constitutional definition includes ideological objectives. In addition to

demonstrating power beyond the borders of a state, navies demonstrate that state’s economic potential, intimidate adversaries, and can provide direct aid to friends and al­lies. Gorshkov learned from Western examples that a gov­ernment most frequently calls upon its navy to respond to a crisis or to make an overseas political-military state­ment. President Ronald Reagan stated that “the core of our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union” is its belief that it has a “historic right to use force to export its ideology.”⁸

A fourth indirect influence of ideology is that it pro­vides the historical setting for a regime that seized power in the Soviet Union, and the only real source of legitimacy for the regime that maintains control over an empire and

the leadership which used every cutthroat method mi nable to seize and maintain that power. By their own tions, the Russians who consolidated the gains ^^rorn^ revolutions of 1917 have tied this ideology to a party then tied that party to their government.

Legitimacy depends upon the fulfillment of * ^e ^ scriptive predictions contained in the ideology. ¹ ‘^1C P jy and the government must be seen as working continu⁰ toward the eventual fulfillment of those ideologic^ P.^ dictions. Those efforts must, by definition, resultⁱⁿ ^ tory. The Politburo cannot openly accept the interna ^ ^ status quo without undermining the very legitimacy regime itself.

The Soviet Constitution provides no guidance or n

weapon systems.

In Soviet military doctrine, ideology fosters the concept of a “nation-in-arms” as a basic tenet of Soviet life (i.e., the en­tire population must assist in the defense of the state). This means

After years of studying the design and operation of the So­viet military and its weapon sys­tems, it is my opinion that com­munist ideology strongly influences the Soviets’ military doctrine and the design of their

anothe °^{F trans}^^er °f power from one state leader to cj_a]_s L°^r ^^or the length of service for its major state offi- p_0Wer ^{1S result}s directly from the party’s prevailing than )_a^^Ver 8^0vernment and the use of ideology, rather som_e i ’ ^{as a sou}rce of legitimacy. This system raises funist¹?⁶¹^¹'¹¹^ questions for the West. Since the Com- iti ti^g ^arty has yet to explain how it picks its leadership during ^0t P^eace> would the resulting scramble for power le^a(i_eKu-^{War   a} P'^{us or m}*^nus for the West if the Soviet

Sovigj rP-*^{S tar}8^eted? If the West goes to war with the o_Vert ⁿ*^on> should one of its fundamental goals be to War_Saw p ^current Soviet leadership or merely to defeat Postwar ^{aCt miIitar}y f°^rces? What should the preferred World look like, and how can we use military

forces to achieve those objectives?

A fifth indirect influence of ideology is that by accept­ing party dictatorship, the Soviet populace has given the Politburo virtually complete freedom in the conduct of in­ternational relations. The Politburo is neither subject to oversight by an equally powerful legislature nor to the scrutiny of a domestic free press. The man on the street does not openly question the government’s political-mili­tary policies. Where are the Soviet people’s outcries against genocide in Afghanistan and the inhuman use of chemical warfare? The Politburo simply does not have to contend with either the number or the quality of critics which Western governments face when attempting to im­plement or formulate policy.

war must be started suddenly, to take the enemy by surprise and impair his ability to forestall the disintegration of his social and military system.

In light of this military doc­trine, it follows that Soviet prin-

'^ieuk °^{f his} society. Thus ctnne teaches that a

quic^i

Sid ^def^eating the enemy b V_{ts d} ^ncentrated military Ser _t ^eeP *ⁿto his territory fk'^SruPt kj^Jn<L'^crni'^ne his defense S ^faSic^S₀f^C°^nomy: ^{and shat}

A

Before retiring from the Navy in 1982, Captain Kehoe served in three destroyers and three aircraft carriers, including command of the USS John R. Pierce (DD-753). Currently a partner in Spec­trum Associates, Inc., of Arlington, Vir­ginia, Captain Kehoe has written many features for the Proceedings, examining Soviet weapon system design practices and military capabilities.

(Retired)

Ideology is the driving force behind the Soviets’ military doctrine, which stresses offensive mobility. This is reflected, for example, in the Soviets’ invest­ment in surface effect ship and hovercraft capabilities, far be­yond U. S. efforts in these areas.

ciples of warfare would stress the primacy of the offensive in waging war. At the operational and tactical level, this view is reflected in the emphasis on mobility, maintaining a high tempo of combat operations— and in the design of vehicles (including submarines, ships, aircraft, tanks, and missiles) often able to achieve higher speeds than comparable U. S. systems. It is also reflected in the Soviets’ emphasis on mili­tary engagements that concen­trate forces to attain local battle­field superiority at decisive times and places, and in weapon system designs that emphasize firepower and mass producibility.

salt—we are often at a loss in the social sciences ^l0^_nV tify all of the variables, let alone measure them

with any

...                                                                                                                                                                                                          _                                                         .l, fpotal

havior into a different category since it serves as u ^ justification for any behavior that advances the cau socialism.

the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division of the OpNav

of^{the S}! au‘^h°^r

Conclusion: A complete analysis of Soviet state and military behavior must include, above all, power politics, the residual influence of traditional Soviet foreign policy goals and domestic political practices, the legitimate needs of self-defense economics, and many other factors. But any analysis that does not account for ideology is fatally flawed. Ideology, mixed with these other factors and the increased military capabilities, provides a credible politi­cal force and is a danger to the Free World. Ideology is a device used to advance non-ideological goals and a con­straint that makes achieving other goals more difficult.

The Soviets are prepared to manage a long-term compe­tition with capitalism, emphasizing incremental gains. Ideology demands that the Soviets manage that competi­tion with a spirit of elan and with the goal of victory. Ideology has transformed what could be peaceful interna­tional relations into a confrontational relationship that the West needs to manage properly in order to avoid setbacks and crises that could escalate to war. The United States has taken the lead in the West in recognizing the long-term competitive nature of this relationship with the Soviet Union and has made the necessary steps to formulate a true multidimensional national strategy. It is idealistic to think that military solutions alone will suffice.

Ideology supports the traditional Soviet goal of achiev­ing security by ever-expanding borders. To the Politburo, security is not the ability to defend against only one enemy but must be attained in its absolute and ideological terms. Security must be strong enough to protect socialism from all enemies and will remain incomplete until all enemies are defeated.

Ideology demands that the party controls the Soviet state and that the state safeguards the party and its control over the empire. We must understand the significance of this need for security and control over the military when we ascertain our intelligence collection requirements and assess Soviet political-military options. We must look for Soviet capabilities that reduce perceived vulnerabilities. We must not expect the party to embrace Western concepts of deterrence that require institutional vulnerability.

Soviet military forces used in a war will attempt to achieve strategic goals which, if attained, will result in victory. Ideology demands no substitute. The use of mili­tary force to punish an aggressor has no foundation in party logic. We should not expect Soviet military plans to include essentially status quo postwar settlements. The new program the Communist Party adopted at its 27th Congress in February 1986 outlined the party’s fundamen­tal goals and major beliefs, and established the framework for military doctrine.⁹

The Soviets are different in both the way they think and the way they interact with the West. This becomes a prob­lem for the West when it attempts to contemplate Soviet options, learn about their capabilities, or attempt to predict their future behavior. Even if we identify the correct pieces of the puzzle and analyze them properly, we have the problem of our decision makers accepting the results of such analysis without themselves “mirror-imaging.”

Unlike the hard sciences—in which we know that the combination of sodium and chloride will always produce my dii ui me vdiiduico, ici aiunc mtaouiv degree of confidence. We cannot know how .^mUC_wor|(j variable influences the behavior of one nation in ^a ₍₀ system in which all the variables and their relations 'P ^ each other are far from known. Ideology sets Sovi

'Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston, MA: Little, Brown Inc., 1970), p. 512:                 ^ _b„t

“Peaceful coexistence among different systems of government is V°^s^ ^^yal peaceful coexistence among different ideologies is not. It woul _coeXj_Stenc« of our Party’s first principles to believe that there can be peace u .j_e0j₀gy oⁿ between Marxist-Leninist ideology on the one hand and bourgeois the other.”            _P/lrfy'5

i pa'¹} .

²Leonid Brezhnev, The Report of the CPSU Central Committee an ^_ongress Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy > 2 t p_ebrua0' the CPSU, 24 February 1976, reported in Pravda and Izvestiya on

1976, pp. 2-9:                                                                                                                           the

F h or altei

‘‘Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot abo is _ee detentea^s laws of class struggle. . . . We make no secret of the fact that we^s _s0cial>^st a path leading to the creation of more favorable conditions for pea and communist construction.”                                                          fgadf

³A. S. Milovidov, ‘‘War and Social Progress,” Ch.V of Marxist-L^en^^_at, 19^‘ ings on War and the Army, D. A. Volkogonov, Ed. (Moscow: Voyen

between . u

‘‘Peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states, _oneWh)^c two systems is not a class peace but a specific form of class strugg » ^ f_0feigⁿ has the objective of excluding war from the arsenal of the ^res°^^r_capitali^slT1 ^ policy. In the conditions of peaceful coexistence, socialism an waging an acute struggle which does not escalate into war.               ^_ceful

Yu. Pankov, ‘‘In the Interests of Peoples: The Leninist Conception

Coexistence in Action,”          Pravda, 5 November 1984, p. 6:                                     ._oliard

• nt a sates. •#

‘‘Peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems ^{1S n} ^ _nor »^{s 1} for regimes that are rotten through in their social and politica P a commitment to maintain the social ‘status quo.’ ” Hon/*

• • Constr^uCU

⁴See S. A. Bartenev, ‘‘The Economic Factor in War and Military Ch.XIII of Volkogonov, op. cit.                      , pevel°P

⁵V. Zagladin in ‘‘The Correlation of Forces in the World Arena ^anw_ethodol°^ ment of International Relations (Some Problems of Theory and ^ th^ Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 2, February 1985, pp. 68-79 ^oUt ^ _soCiaU^SII1‘j_n stages of this shift in the long-term correlation of forces in favor o syst^-ra stage one, imperialism ceased to be the only all-encompassing w _current tn stage two, imperialism ceased being the only world system. In _c0ntin^ue‘_A stage, military-strategic parity has been achieved and the shift wi ^ _th^e A ⁶See V. S. Gorbunov, ‘‘Wars in Defense of the Socialist Father an complishments of Socialism—A Special Form of Just War >                                                                            ^

Volkogonov, op. cit.                                                                                              <p_actics» ^an

⁷Alex R. Alexiev, ‘‘The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy*

Means,” Orbis, Vol. 29, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 348-350. _seInbly ^{at 1} President Ronald Reagan’s address before the U. N. General ^s    .

commemoration of the 40th Anniversary, 24 October 1985.                                   28

⁹Pravda, 26 February 1986. Available in English in a supplement to                          0

1986 FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-86-O6O, V° •

Supp. 066).

the Sch°° _nt

Commander Tritten received a bachelor of arts degree frorn ^_{ge ft⁰¹ ^ International Service at the American University, a master s ^ p fr° Florida State University, and another master’s degree and a_uthern ^ the School of International Relations at the University of fomia. He is a naval aviator with primary experience w _aSS;gnm^eI1._ej antisubmarine warfare. In addition to his operational duty du⁽¹ Commander Tritten has been selected three times for ^ec*^uca_ratj₀n ^ana

at civilian universities. He has also served at the Rand Corpo j_s c^a

-               -• • •       -■   ~ stafL ,,_etaO

rently Assistant Director, Net Assessment in the Office ~ ■ ., t,_an of Defense. He is the recipient of this year’s Alfred Thayer of the year award sponsored by the Navy League.