This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the Department of the Navy. It includes criticisms of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating "The Maritime Strategy" to the overall national military strategy, and to historical precedents. It is organized topically and—within each topic—chronologically in order of publication or historical period treated to show the development of the strategy as well as its alternatives.
The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that strategy. Absent are discussions which do not have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.
The Maritime Strategy Debates: 1979–1985
American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns centered around antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and the Navy’s role in nuclear strike warfare. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt’s formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy"—strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate discussions.
In 1979, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward’s focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U. S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That era’s focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, especially conventional.
Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he sparked continue to this day, fueled by the statements and policies of the Reagan administration, especially Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., who took office in February 1981.
Under Lehman and Admiral Hayward’s successor, Admiral James D. Watkins, the Navy organized its strategic thought into one coherent official declaratory statement, a classified briefing and publication, tested in games and exercises, and updated routinely, styled "The Maritime Strategy." General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and his staff participated in its creation, and—with the Navy—developed a component Amphibious Warfare Strategy.
The U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus Navy program-development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released the initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public.
Contrary to much uninformed external criticism up to that point, it was presented by the Navy as only one—albeit a vital—component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also, contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice, to each other and to the nation and its allies.
Hayward. ADM Thomas B., "The Future of U. S. Sea Power," Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1979, pp. 66–71; Also Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R., Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103–106; and "Comment and Discussion:" July 1979, pp. 23–24; August 1979, pp. 87–89; September 1979, pp. 89–91; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p. 88; January 1980, pp. 82–86. (Public debate on the new direction in U. S. Navy strategy begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Lind, Friedman, et al. See also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1979–1982.)
Turner, ADM Stansfield, "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," Proceedings, August 1980, pp. 66–69. Also "Comment and Discussion:" October 1980, p. 101; November 1980, pp. 124–127; January 1981, p. 77. (ADM Turner questions role of power projection in general war strategy.)
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U. S. Naval Strategy," Strategic Review, Summer 1981, pp. 9–15. (SecNav’s view's upon taking office. For more than two years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. See also Lehman "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981–1985, especially regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.)
Wemyss, RADM M. LaT., RN, "Submarines and Anti-submarine Operations for the Uninitiated," RUSI Journal, September 1981, pp. 22–27. (Restatement of classic Royal Navy arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts around expected afloat targets, instead of forward operations.)
Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo—Strategic ASW," Naval War College Review, September–October 1981, pp. 4–14. (Call for anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.)
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate, April 1982, pp. 18–20, (SecNav’s charge to the officer corps.)
Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, RADM Robert J., U. S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982 (Two different arguments for shift to national maritime strategy.)
Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, pp. 1,124–1,144. Also, Turner, ADM Stansfield, and Thibault, CAPT George, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp. 123–135; "Comment and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Winter 1982/3, pp. 453–457. (The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs Turner vs Lehman.)
Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 583–589. (Argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.)
Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?: Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 28–54. (Claims forward U. S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere are a bad thing.)
Zakheim, Dov, "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on Strategy," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1982, pp. 158–166. (Reagan administration maritime strategy in overall military context.)
U. S. House Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization For FY84: Part 4, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 47–51. (COMO Dudley Carlson publicly unveils U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, Feb. 1983. Published later that year.)
Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981–1982," in Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency, An Early Assessment, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 82–116. (Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the context of the Maritime Strategy.)
Wilkerson, LTCOL Thomas, "Two if By Sea," Proceedings, November 1983, pp. 34–39. (On important role of the Air Force in Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps contributor to the strategy’s development.)
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, William O., "Strategy for Survival," Foreign Policy, Fall 1983, pp. 22–41, Also Komer and Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983–84, pp. 176–178. (Seeks to synthesize all points in the maritime-continental debate.)
Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan’s Military Strategy," International Security, Winter 1983/84, pp. 3–18. Also "Correspondence," Summer 1984, pp. 217–221. (Echoes Komer’s and Turner’s stated positions.)
Dunn, Keith A. and Staudenmaier, William O., Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Paper #107), Washington: CSIS, 1984. (Expands arguments made in their Foreign Policy article.)
Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of American Maritime Power." Proceedings, February 1984, pp. 47–51. (Refinement of Lehman’s thought after three years in office.)
Zakheim, Dov S., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1984, pp. 35–39. (An Assistant Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions and programs in context of overall administration strategy.)
Toyka, CDR Viktor, FGN, "A Submerged Forward Defense," Proceedings, March 1984, pp. 145–147. (Complementary German Maritime Strategy for the Baltic.)
Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY85: Part 8, Washington: GPO, 1985, pp. 3851–3900. (SecNav and CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as component of national military strategy, March 1984, but not published until the following year. Further development of the Strategy presented by COMO Carlson a year earlier.)*
Rivkin, D. B., "No Bastions for the Bear," Proceedings, April 1984, pp. 36–43. Also "Comment and Discussion:" June 1984, pp. 14–15; July 1984, pp. 14–20; August 1974, p. 101; September 1984, p. 164; October 1984, pp. 97–100; January 1985, p. 129. (The anti-SSBN mission debate.)
Turner, ADM Stansfield, "A Strategy for the 90s," New York Times Magazine, 6 May 1984, pp. 30–40, etc. (Argues for USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and more/smaler ships.)
Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the North-East Atlantic?" International Defense Review, 12/1984, pp. 1803–4. (USN and NATO naval strategy.)
Watkins, ADM James D., "Current Strategy of U. S. Navy," Los Angeles Times, 21 June 1984, p. 22. (USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert, "Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," Los Angeles Times, 16 May 1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs. Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1983–1985.)*
Komer. Robert, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense, Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also book review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1984–85, pp. 721–722. (Komer’s last salvo before November 1984 elections, with administration retort.)
Brooks, CAPT Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy," Proceedings, August 1984, pp. 33–37. Also "Comment and Discussion:" October 1984, pp. 28–29; November 1984, pp. 18, 24; December 1984, p. 174. (Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by a contributor to development of the Maritime Strategy. Focus of debate begins to shift to the strategy as it actually is, rather than the strategy as it is alleged to be.) **
"Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on Offensive," Navy Times, August 20, 1984, pp. 25–26. (COMO William Fogarty outlines Maritime Strategy.)*
Stewart, MAJ Richard A., "Ships That Can Deliver," Proceedings, November 1984, pp. 37–43. (Amphibious versus prepositioning issues.)
George, James L. (ed.), The U. S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. (Papers delivered at a Center for Naval Analysis Conference, Fall 1984. See chapters by Dov Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare," Robert Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired Admirals Robert Long and Harry Train. Admiral Long’s Pacific Command "Concept of Operations" and his Pacific Command Campaign Plan were important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.)**
Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review, November–December 1984, pp. 4–12. Also "In My View:" March–April 1985, pp. 96–97; July–August 1985, p. 83. (Mainstream U. S. Navy thinking.)
Zimm, LCDR Alan D., "The First Salvo," Proceedings, February 1985, pp. 55–60. Also "Comment and Discussion:" April 1985, p. 16; June 1985, p. 132; July 1985, p. 106. (See especially for timing of forward carrier battle group moves and for Soviet strategy issues.)
Breemer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy’s SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," RUSl Journal, March 1985, pp. 18–26. (Includes useful review of literature.)
Ackley, R. T., "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2," Proceedings, April 1985, pp. 42–47. Also "Comment and Discussion:" May 1985, pp. 14–17; July 1985, p. 112. (More on the anti-SSBN mission.)
Stavridis, CDR James, "The Global Maritime Coalition," Proceedings, April 1985, pp. 58–74. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, p. 177. (On role of allies in Maritime Strategy.)
Watkins, ADM James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," Baltimore Sun, 16 April 1985, p. 15. (USN rejoinder to a variety of critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore Sun, 26 March 1985. p. 7.)*
Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H., Future Imperative: National Security and the U. S. Navy in the Late 1980s. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985. (See especially Ullman’s critique of Maritime Strategy, pp. 20–21, & 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner. Proceedings, January 1981, p. 77.)**
Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, William O., "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," Survival, May–June 1985, pp. 108–118. (Shows Maritime Strategy similarities to Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offensive strategy on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both.)
House Armed Services Committee Seapowcr and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the 600 Ship Navy, Washington: GPO (Forthcoming.) (SecNav, CNO, Commandant, VADM Lyons. ADM McKee. VADM Thunman explain strategy-program interface, June–September 1985. ADM Kidd, ADM Turner, RADM Carroll, CBO, GAO comment. Thorough airing of the issues, especially relationship to "600-Ship Navy.")**
Holloway, ADM James L. III, "The U. S. Navy—A Functional Appraisal," Oceanus, Summer 1985, pp. 3–11. (Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by former CNO. Focus on sea control and on Soviet Navy as anti-SLOC force.)
Friedman, Norman, "U. S. Maritime Strategy," International Defense Review, 7/1985, pp. 1,071–1,075. (Analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy.)**
Foley, ADM Sylvester R., Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," Proceedings, August 1985, pp. 34–38. (Retiring PACFLT commander discusses his task in context of overall Maritime Strategy. Shows one fleet commander’s view of the strategy.)*
Turner, ADM Stansfield, "U. S. Naval Policy," Naval Forces, No. III/1985, pp. 15–25. (Update of Turner's thoughts, emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC protection.)
Grove, E. J., "The Convoy Debate." Naval Forces, No. 111/1985, pp. 38–46. (Update of classic post-war Royal Navy pro-convoy/anti-forward ops arguments.)
O’Donnell, Maj. Hugh K., USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive," Proceedings, September 1985, pp. 42–57. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, pp. 16, 20, December 1985, pp. 20–23, and subsequent issues. (USN/USMC global Maritime Strategy as applied to one region; comprehensive commentary on the Maritime Strategy debate.)**
Collins, John M., U. S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985. (Compares strategy and policy as well as force levels. See especially Chapter 11. Also Chapters 9, 12, and 16.)
Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman’s Navy Riding High, But Critics Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," National Journal, 21 September 1985, pp. 2120+. (Wide-ranging review of many aspects of the debate.)
"NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea." Virginian-Pilot, 9 September 1985, pp. 1+. (Another fleet view of the strategy, VADM Henry C. Mustin, Second Fleet Commander, on exercising and implementing Maritime Strategy in NATO Atlantic theater.) See also "Protection of Convoy Routes a Key Objective for Ocean Safari 85," Jane's Defense Weekly, 5 October 1985, pp. 749–753.*
Lehman, John F., Jr.. "Talking Surface With SECNAV," Surface Warfare, September–October 1985, pp. 2–10. (SecNav ties the strategy, surface warfare, and procurement issues together.)*
West, F. J. "Bing" Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," Naval War College Review, September–October 1985, pp. 5–19. (By a former Reagan administration official, naval strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the strategy.)**
McDonald, ADM Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 46–53. (Actually on relationship of Maritime Strategy to NATO fleet strategy in the Atlantic, with emphasis on mine warfare.)*
Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 32–37. (Surface combatants and the Maritime Strategy.)**
Powers, CAPT Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," Proceedings, October 1985, especially pp. 62–63. (Central strike warfare theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.)**
Watkins, ADM James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our National Willpower," Sea Power, October 1985. p. 71. (CNO describes utility and process of the Maritime Strategy.)**
Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," International Defense Review, 10/1985, pp. 1587–97. (Maritime Strategy and North Atlantic ASW strategy: Open ocean vs close-in vs convoy strategies.) Wood, Robert S., and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," Naval War College Review, November–December 1985, pp. 5–18.**
Heginbotham, Stanley, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe," Naval War College Review, November–December 1985. pp. 19–27.**
Bowling, CAPT R. A., "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes," Proceedings, December 1985, pp. 92–98. (Argues for a return to SLOC protection focus for U. S. Navy.)
Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy;" Watkins, ADM James D., "The Maritime Strategy;" and Kelley, GEN P. X., and O’Donnell, MAJ Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" in Proceedings, January 1986 Maritime Strategy Supplement.*
Soviet Views and Strategy
U. S. Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat—along with U. S. national interests and geo-political realities—is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. The focus in the works listed below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their navy and for ours, and whether these priorities will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this bibliography.
Sturua, G. M., "The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy," USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, November 1982. (A prominent Soviet civilian defense analyst’s views on the U. S. Navy's Maritime Strategy. He sees it as primarily a nuclear counterforce strategy, employing submarine and carrier-launched nuclear weapons.)
Stalbo, VADM K., "U. S. Ocean Strategy," in Morskoy Sbornik, No. 10, 1983, pp. 29–36. (The Soviet Navy’s leading theoretician writes in its official journal. Reaction to the Proceedings October 1982 issue on the Soviet Navy, and to statements by the Secretary of the Navy. Criticizes the "new U-S. Naval Strategy" for its geopolitical roots, its global scope, and for its aims of "isolating countries of the Socialist community from the rest of the world.")
U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY84: Part 6, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 2935 and 2939. (RADM John Butts, new Director of Naval Intelligence, gives authoritative U. S. Navy view of Soviet navy strategy, April 1983. See also updates in Butts testimony of 1984 and 1985.)
McConnell. James M., "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional:" Vols. I and II, Alexandria VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CRC 490, June 1983. (Includes alternative views of Soviet naval strategy.)
Stuma, G., "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare," USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, February 1985. (Strategic ASW viewed as a primary USN mission.)
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition), Washington DC: GPO, 1985. (Latest in a series of official U. S. Navy handbooks on the Soviet fleet. See also critique by Norman Friedman in Proceedings, November 1985, pp. 88–89.)
Fitzgerald, CAPT T. A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 12–16. (Argues Soviets may use their navy as a risk fleet for a "Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial.)
Antecedents and Background
The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is presented here are only two kinds of materials: a few books that show how strategy is made, was made, or should be made; and books that describe earlier strategies—planned or implemented—which are analogous to key aspects of the U. S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered.
Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1984, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. Chapter I. (On how military strategy really gets made, and why. Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. Views military as predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies.)
Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (Second Edition), New York: St. Martin’s, 1914. (Basic one-volume historical and topical survey.)
Barker, A. J., The War Against Russia, 1854–1856. New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 1970; and Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979. (Maritime global forward coalition strategy against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas, and off Kuriles and Kamchatka.)
Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913–1919," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1954. ("Maritime Strategy" of the 1980s was not first time this century U. S. Navy developed a coherent preferred strategy.)
Palmer, Alan, The Gardeners of Salonika, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. See especially pp. 226–247. (Southern Flank Maritime Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube from beachhead in Greece in 1918, knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated.)
Roskill, Stephen W., Naval Policy Between the Wars, Volume I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929, New York: Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920." (Multinational maritime global forward intervention in Russia’s Civil War.)
Dyer, VADM George C., On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Retired), Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973. Chapter XIV: "War Plans." (Discusses development of Navy preferred strategy of the interwar period.)
Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to Berlin (Vol. II) Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1983. See especially Vol. 1: pp. 14, 55–57, 218, 237–240, 271–272, 295; Vol. II: pp. 43, 132, 156. (Effect of Far East operations—or lack thereof—on Central/East Europe Front in World War II.) Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. (Basic geopolitical reference. See especially maps, pp. 50–54.)
Love, Robert B., Jr. (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations, Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. (See sections on post-World War II CNOs’ views on strategy, especially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh Burke. While certain Secretaries of the Navy, the Naval War College, the U. S. Naval Institute, the Center of Naval Analyses, theater commanders, and civilian thinkers have had roles to play in the development of overall naval strategy, the CNOs and their staffs have normally been the most important global strategists in the post-war U. S. Navy.)
Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience," in A. F. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart, et al. Air Power and Warfare, Washington, GPO, 1970. (Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies; by the premier historian of U. S. Navy postwar strategy.)
Nimitz, FADM Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces," Vital Speeches, Jan. 15, 1948, pp. 214–217. Also, in Brassey’s Naval Annual: 1948, and Shipmate, February 1948, pp. 5–6+, as "Our Navy. Its Future." (Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy capable of land attack early in a war.)
Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957, New York: Dial Press, 1978. (1949 JCS study: good example of early postwar strategic thinking. See especially pp. 161–165, 206–211, 225–235.) (Not to be read without examination of review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III, Naval War College Review, Fall 1978, pp. 103–106.)
Wylie, RADM J. C., Military Strategy, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967. (Codification of views of USN’s most prominent post-war strategic theorist.)
Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution, New York: Crane Russak, 1977. (Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory. Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature of Western security problems.)
Ryan, CAPT Paul, First Line of Defense, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. (Mainstream USN perspective on post-war defense policies through Carter Administration.)
Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College, Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1984. (Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U. S. Navy strategic thought. See especially pp. 201–202, 237, 312–319.)
Fleet Balance: Atlantic vs. Pacific vs. Mediterranean
Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet the U. S. Navy’s global posture since World War II has often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. These articles and letters illustrate the current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.
Booth, Ken, "U. S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, Usability, and Credibility," Naval War College Review, Summer 1978, pp. 11–28. (Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet.)
Cole, CDR Bernard, "Atlantic First," Proceedings, August 1982, pp. 103–106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp. 86–87.
Deutermann, CAPT Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, September 1982, pp, 46–49. Also "Comment and Discussion:" November 1982, p. 14; January 1983, pp. 17–20; February 1983, pp. 80–81; March 1983, pp. 12–17; July 1983, p. 89.
Breemer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," Naval War College Review, Nov.–Dec. 1982, pp. 27–32.
Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom," Proceedings, July 1983, pp. 22–28. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1983, p. 26.
Ortlieb, CDR E. V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation." Proceedings, December 1983, pp. 36–40. Also "Comment and Discussion:" February 1984, p. 22.
Maiorano, LT Alan, "A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, February 1984, pp. 52–58. Also "Comment and Discussion:" July 1984, pp. 28–33.
Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G., "Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater," in James L, George (ed.). The U. S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985.
Sestak, LCDR Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 64–71.
Naval Operations: Peacetime and Crises
Most of the above works deal with use of the Navy in general war. What follows, in chronological order by publication date, are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U. S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and "small wars" (the "Violent Peace"). Many of these derive from the increased visibility of peacetime presence as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. They build on the earlier literature of the 1960s on the role of the U. S. Navy in limited war.
Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session, Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier. Washington: GPO, 1970, pp. 162–165. (Listing of uses of USN in wars/near-wars 1946–1969; takes negative view of same.)
Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, New York: Praeger, 1970. (First of a spate of useful books seeking to list, classify, and describe peacetime uses of navies. Surveys twentieth century activities of all major navies. Updated in 1981.)
McGruther, LCDR Kenneth, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," Naval War College Review, September–October 1974. (Part of the 1970s Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN "Naval Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and a "cookbook.")
McNulty, CDR James, "Naval Presence—The Misunderstood Mission." Naval War College Review, September–October 1974. (Another reflection of Zumwalt-Turner focus on presence. See also Turner, VADM Stansfield, "Challenge," in same issue.)
Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. (Short treatment sponsored by VADM Turner. Typology and analysis based on concept of "suasion." Focus on the U. S. Navy in the Mediterranean.)
Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," Survival, November/December 1974, pp. 262–267. (Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy.)
Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy, London: Croon Helm, 1977. (Magisterial treatment.)
Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U. S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975," Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977. (Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries of incidents and responses.)
Blechman, Barry M., and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. (Utility of USN vs other U. S. armed forces.)
Congressional Budget Office, "U. S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime Presence Mission," Washington: 1978. (How it could allegedly be done with fewer CVs.)
Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. (Comprehensive surveys and analyses.)
Allen, Charles D., Jr., The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Excellent short analysis, with typology. (Focus on postwar U. S. Navy, and on escalation.)
Kaplan, Stephen S., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. (Does for the Soviets what Blechman and Kaplan did for the U. S.)
Cohen, Raymond, International Politics: The Rules of the Game, London: Longman, 1981, pp. 41–48. (One of the few general works on international relations by an academic political scientist to deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy force movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of international politics.")
Taylor, William J., Jr., and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Stability, Political Decay, and Navies," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 579-522. (Limitations of naval interventions.)
Wright, Christopher C., Ill, "U. S. Naval Operations in 1982." Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1983. (Includes general introduction to USN concepts of operations, deployment patterns, tempo of operations, as well as review of actual operations.) See also updates for 1983 and 1984 in Naval Review, May 1984 and May 1985.
Hickman, LCDR William J., "Did it Really Matter?" Naval War College Review, March–April 1983, pp. 17–30. (On limitations and misuses of USN naval presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to McGruther article a decade earlier, above.)
Zelikow, Philip D., "Force Without War, 1975–82," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1984, pp. 29–54. (Brings Blechman and Kaplan book up to date. Also provides listing of incidents when USN was used.)
Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag," Proceedings, April 1984, pp. 59–63. (The utility of ship visits.)
Luttwak, Edward N., The Pentagon and the Art of War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984 pp. 222, 247–248. (Sees diminishing value of peacetime deployments.)
U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY86. Statement by VADM James A. Lyons. Jr., "The U. S. Navy’s Global Commitments," February 28, 1985. Washington: GPO (Forthcoming.) (Most recent official USN position.)
Lehman, John F., Jr., "An Absolute Requirement for Every American." Sea Power, April 1985, p. 13. (Argues high USN peacetime operating tempo is partly self-generated. See also Washington Post, October 6, 1985, p. A12, and Virginia Pilot0Ledger Star, October 27, 1985, p. AI.)
Daniel, Donald C., and Tarleton, Gael D., "The Soviet Navy in 1984," Proceedings! Naval Review, May 1985, pp. 90–92, 361–364. (Snapshot of one year's Soviet global peacetime activity.)
Etzold, Thomas H., "Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and Low-intensity Conflict." in Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H., Future Imperative: National Security and the U. S. Navy in the Late 1980s, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985. (Argues low-intensity USN contingencies and peacetime operations are on the increase.)
Harris, CDR R. Robinson, and Benkert, LCDR Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" Proceedings, October 1985, pp. 32–37. (Contrasts peacetime and global war strategy requirements, with focus on surface combatants.)
Booth, Ken, Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. (Peacetime naval strategy and the Law of the Sea, and much more. Rebuts Elizabeth Young, p. 66–68.)