Addendum to Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography

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"Addendum to Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography

January 1986 Proceedings The Maritime Strategy Supplement

By Captain Peter M. Swartz, U. S. Navy April 1987

INTRODUCTION

This is an addendum to "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography" (P. Swartz, pp 41-47, January 1986 Proceedings Supplement). It includes a few subsequently published comments on items listed in that article, many items published at the same time or later, and several earlier items that had been omitted. A few 1987 (and draft 1988) publications are also covered.

In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items are listed chronologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statements of the Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double asterisk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various issues or aspects of the Maritime Strategy or with its immediate antecedents.

Unlike its predecessor, this addendum lists publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the Maritime Strategy separately, to aid the reader/researcher. It also separates items dealing with the Strategy's antecedents from those discussing how strategy is made, and the role of the naval officer corps in making it. And it adds a section on Maritime Strategy Wargaming. (Admittedly, this and other artificial typological devices run against a central theme of the Maritime Strategy: its global,

"seamless web" character). Like its predecessor, however, it pays only cursory attention to pre-1981 Navy strategic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.

A highly abridged version of this addendum, plus additional commentary, was published as part of "The Maritime Strategy in Review" in the February 1987 Proceedings, pp. 113-116.

I.. MARITIME STRATEGY: ADDITIONAL MATERIALS THROUGH 1985

Moorer, ADM Thomas H. USN (Ret.) and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Sea Power and NATO Strategy", in Myers, Kenneth A., NATO: The Next Thirty Years, Boulder CO: Westview, 1980 , pp 223-236.

("Detailed arguments on the necessarily global nature of any major future war with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off the Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval Operations. Arguments against a "swing" strategy from the Pacific are also echoed in "For Want of a Nail: the Logistics of the Alliance" by ADM Isaac Kidd USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO commander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same volume, pp 189-205).

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be Secretary of the Navy, '(January' '2 8, 1981 , Washington: U'S'G'pQ,

1981'. ( "I' think' the major need of the Navy today is the

establishment by the President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval strategy, first and foremost").

Prina, L. Edgar, "Budget Increases Reflect 'A Major Change in Naval Strategy'", Sea Power, April 1981, pp 13-22. (Best coverage of Secretary Lehman's press conference of 3 March 1981, when he unveiled his "major change". See also page 1 of the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, and v Baltimore Sun, March V, T9 SI"," 'ancT George, James L., "US

Carriers--bold New Strategy", Navy International, June 1981, pp 330-335 . Compare with Admiral Hayward'¹ s 1979' article and with Moorer and Cottrell piece above).

Hart, Senator Gary, "Can Congress Come to Order?", in Franck, Thomas, (ed.), The Tethered Presidency, New York: New York

University Press! 1981',' pp 2 4 2-3 . fA~call for a national maritime-only strategy and "obvious and indisputable naval superiority". The U.S. Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first).

Betts, Richard K., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy,

Politics, Washington! Br'o'o'k'i'n'gs , 1981, pp 587-540 . ("Sees 'discussion of carrier penetration of Soviet waters as "peacetime deterrent rhetoric" about risky "missions that could turn into a naval Charge of the Light Brigade").

Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance:

befense Spending'¹ ahd~(3onventional Forces: A'Preliminary RepoFt,

Fart 11,' Washington': Carnegl e" Endowment for International

Peace, 1981. (Chapter 3 pp 99-148, assesses the naval balance and identifies key issues. No policy recommendations. Comprehensive and even-handed. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, purely budget-oriented).

Etzold., Thomas, "From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in American Strategy Since World War II" Proceedings/Naval Review 1981, May 1981, pp 66-77. (On the neecf to make hard strategic choices, especially between the Pacific and Indian Oceans).

Zumwalt, ADM Elmo R., Jr., USM (Ret.) "Naval Battles We Could Lose", International Security Review, Summer 1981, pp 139-155. (By the' '1'97'0-T97'4 tl.'S'. Navy CNO'. Argues for more stress on the U.S. Navy as "geopolitical cavalry" for low-to-middle-leve1 conflict, and for a "distributed force" building program as optimum for the full spectrum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear war at sea).

Stockman, David, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan

Revolution Failed. New York: Harper and Row, 1'9H'6", pp

280-381. (Anonymous "experts" ridicule "the theory of 'getting

in harm's way'" in mid-1981 to President Reagan's gullible budget director).

Koburger, CAPT C. W., USCGR, "Pitts' Choice: An Alternative

NATO Strategy for the USA", Navy International, December 1981, pp 730-731. (Like Sen. Hart7'one of' the very few real examples of a call for a "pure" national maritime strategy, a position often falsely attributed to proponents of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy) .

Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the

Strategic Imperatives", Strategic Review, Spring 1982, pp 11-18. (By the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Especially good on administration requirements for naval forces to provide options to fight on a variety of fronts).

Kennedy, COL William V. , USAR (Ret.), "Tailor Military Strategy to the Economy", Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 May 1982, p 25.

(Sees the Reagan Administration as building a new maritime strategy on top of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far East as the key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit).

Vlahos, Michael, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Geopolitical Needs and

the Soviet Maritime Challenge", in Taylor, William J., Jr., et al. (eds.), Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s, Lexington MAi D.C. Heath, 1 '9 S 4 , pp 427^L432 . (1982 views of a

former Naval War College faculty member. Especially good on late 1970s internal Naval strategy debates, and as critique of tying U.S. naval strategy too closely to the Soviet naval threat. Cf approach taken by McGruther, cited in Section X below. tHTs volume also contains some of Ambassador Komer's early—and most lucid—arguments, at pp 196-199).

Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong", Washington Post, December 16, 1982, p 23. ("The Navy is working to do its part in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval power. Navy strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of deterrence, not a substitute for it").

Cohen, Eliot A., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/3, pp 325-343. (A Naval War College faculty member argues for strengthening the U.S. Navy, creation of a "Fifth Fleet", global U.S. military focus and increased European military responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the "Atlanticist vs navalist" debate).

Staudenmaier, COL William, USA, "One if by Land - Two if by Sea: The Continental - Maritime Debate", Army, January 1983, do

30-37 . (Opening salvo of the "Carlisle ScKo’oT" . a leading Army War College faculty member contributes to the misperceptions that the central U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy vs Continental Strategy, and that it is driven solely by budgetary considerations).

Tritten, CDR James j., "it's Not Either Or", Wings of Gold. Spring 1983, pp 49-52. (Argues Mahanian concept of'TJ".g. seapower is necessary to support U.S. forward defense continental strategy).

Nunn, Senator Sam, The Need to Reshape Military Strategy, Washington: Georgetown University' CSI'S, March" IS, T9TT7 P 7.

(Advocates choke point defense, vice earner-based airpower, vs. the Soviet homeland).

Glenn, Senator John, Carter, Barry E., Komer, Robert w., Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces, Washington: Center

for National Policy, 198'3". (Two' e'x-Army officers, Carter, pp

33-35, and Komer, pp 46-48, attack the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy).

Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment", in Oye, Kenneth

A., Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s,' Boston:

Little' Brown, 198 3 , pp 6 7-104 . (Critical of all' aspects of Reagan defense policy and strategy, including offensive conventional warfighting, especially with naval forces.

"Overall, a counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding missions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all ... a counteroffensive strategy defeats the basic purpose of American conventional forces--the control of escalation." Advocates a 10-carrier force).

Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense and

Foreign Policy in' a' 'Dangerous Wor ld,' 'BbuTder' 'GO": We's't'view

Press, 198 3 . ("By' the 197 7-1981 Secretary of Defense. Mildly critical of forward carrier operations; more strongly critical of the 600-ship Navy build-up. See especially pp 100-101, 121-123, 171-187).

Miller, Steven, "The Northern Seas in Soviet and U.S. Strategy", in Lodgaard, Sverre and Thee, Marek, (eds.), Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, London: Taylor and Francis, 1983, pp

117-137". (Comprehensive analysis, especially of tie-in between U.S. naval strategy and Reagan administration policy).

Caldwell, Hamlin, "Arctic Submarine Warfare", Submarine Review, July 1983, pp 4-13. (Develops the arguments in his 1981 article on Arctic Strategic ASW).

Arkin, William M., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1983, pp 6-7. (Sees U.S. Navy theater nuclear weapons under development as destabilizing, despite Soviet theater nuclear naval programs).

** Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective", Proceedings,

October 1983, pp 66-81. (By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime strategy and the role of the Naval War College. "You have to discard the term 'naval strategy', and even the slightly more modern variant, 'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy... Newport is not, of course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers get together and try to produce better ideas" ) .

Epstein, Joshua M., "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a

Recurrent Theme", International Security, Winter 1983/84, pp 19-31, especially pp 33-55. Also reprinted in Art, Raymond and Waltz, Kenneth (eds.), The Use of Force (second edition), 1983, and updated as Chapter "3" of"Epste^,ih^Ys" Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf",¹' Washington': FFookings,

19877' (Critique'of 'horizontal Escalation', not only as a

counter to a Soviet invasion of Iran, but also apparently as a function of maritime forces in a global war with the Soviets.

Sees Soviet-Chmese wartime relationship as unaffected by naval considerations, and Soviet ground force numbers as virtually limitless. No discussion of possible Soviet air force redeployment, however).

Kaufmann, William W., The 1985 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1984 , especially' pp 29-34 . fX’"snide critique of U.S. Navy strategy and force level requests. Naval power projection forces seen as only needed in Third World areas during a global war with the Soviets. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-oriented document). See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier 1982 and 1983 Brookings annuals edited by Joseph Pechman,

Setting National Priorities: 1983 and 1984.

Record, Jeffrey, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring

Means to Ends, Washington': Pergamon-B'r assey ' s , 198 4'. ( An

argument for a national maritime strategy, but without the offensive forward operations characteristic of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. See especially pp 83-86).

Ullman, CDR Harlan, USN (Ret.), Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and Nationalise cur i t'y", Washington': *~

Georgetown CSTS'7 1984. (Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the basic opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would-be analysts).

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National Maritime Strategy: The U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan,

1977-1984", in Hagan, Kenneth J., (ed.). In Peace and War, (Second Edition), Westport CT: Greenwood Press'", 1984 . ("Mostly on operations and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman's contribution as a reorientation of national strategy rather than simply an enhancement of its maritime elements).

Tritten, CDR James J., "Strategic ASW: A Good Idea?", Proceedings, January 1984, pp 90, 92. (Argues for procuring anti-SSBN systems without declaring an anti-SSBN policy. See also his "Strategic ASW", Submarine Review, January 1984, pp 52-55, and "The Concept of" strategic aSW^v', Navy International, June 1984, pp 348-350).

Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern Europe", Back grounder (The Heritage Foundation), No. 1356, May 30, 1984. (Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat).

Perry, Robert, Lorell, Mark A., and Lewis, Kevin, Second-Area Operations: A Strategy Option (Publication R-2992-USDP j, Santa

Monica CAV'Rand Corporation, May 1084'. (Pros, cons, risks and uncertainties associated with multi-theater war and "horizontal escalation". Historical and analytical survey).

Nagler, VADM Gordon, USN (Ret.), (ed.) Naval Tactical Command and Control, Washington: AFCEA International Press, I"9 8 5. ("See the art'icl'es in Chapter III: "Tactical Space Assets" and Chapter IV: "EW: A Force Multiplier" on how the U. S. Navy uses space and electronic warfare systems to resolve a variety of operational problems inherent in implementing the Maritime Strategy).

Kaufmann, William, W., The 1986 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1985 , especially pp 32-35'. (Another sarcastic

Kaufmann budget-oriented critique, including an unduly sanguine view of allied naval capabilities).

Jenkins, Ronald Wayne, "Coalition Defense versus Maritime Strategy: A Critical Examination Illustrating a New Approach to

Geopolitical Analysis", unpublished PhD dissertation,

Pennsylvania State University, 1985. (A political geographer's take. Buys into categorizations of "Schools" popularized by Komer, Dunn and Staudenmaier. Recognizes irrelevance of much of the pre-1984 literature to "real-world" USN planning and programming problems. Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers on geography and Maritime Strategy).

Thomas, CDR Raymond E., "Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: Matching Strategy and Capability", in Essays on Strategy, Washington: National Defense University" Press, l98b, p'p 39-51,

especially p 50. (Criticizes U.S. naval strategy for not addressing theater nuclear warfare adequately; disagrees with forward carrier operations in high threat areas).

Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal, Spring 1985 , pp 229-247 . (Sees forward offensive operations of ships with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the likelihood of nuclear war).

Arkin, William M. and Chappell, David, "Forward Offensive Strategy: Raising the Stakes m the Pacific", World Policy

Journal, Summer 1985, pp 481-500. (Forward operations in the Northeast Pacific seen as "provocative and destabilizing". Similar in tone and political coloration to Posen 1982 critique of Norwegian Sea operations).

"The Defense Budget:^ A Conservative Debate", Policy Review, Summer 1985, pp 12-27, especially pp 20-21. (Prominent conservatives line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy).

* U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,

** Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee,

Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session. Hearings: The 600-Ship

Navy and the Maritime Strategy, Washington": USGTO , 19'8"6". TTITne

and' 'September 1985' graphics-laden testimony by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and several critics and commentators, notably Admirals Turner and Carroll. With the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement and related "Comment and Discussion”" Tetters, the most comprehensive statement and discussion of the Navy's official views).

Martin, Laurence, NATO and the Defense of the West, New York: Holt, Rinehart and' Winston, T'985 , especially¹ pp 30-35 ("Flanks"), 51-56 ("Warning, Mobilization and Reinforcement"), and 57-67 ("The Maritime Battle"). (Features graphics rivaling those in the official U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their explanatory power and -- often -- their complexity).

** O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh K., USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime

Offensive", Proceedings, September 1985 , pp. 42-57 . (Also "Comment and~Discussio"n", October 1985, pp 16, 20; December 1985 , pp. 20-23 . See especially January 1986, p 19 letter discussing complementary Norwegian Navy operations; and February 1986, pp 19-25 letter by Dr. Norman Friedman elaborating on and endorsing the Maritime Strategy, and placing it in historical context).

** U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners!* Conference: 17-18

September 1985 , Washington: O'ffice of the' thief o'f" Naval

Ope r a 11ons' TOT-0 0 K), 1986 . (On relationship between the Maritime Strategy and U.S. Navy long range planning, program development, and research).

** "Phoenix", "The SSN-21 and U.S. Maritime Strategy", Submarine Review, October 1985, pp 27-31. (Discusses linkages' between threat, strategy, and ship design. See also letter by Ulmer, CAPT D. M., April 1986, pp 58-60, questioning using estimated Soviet intentions, vice capabilities, to drive strategy and programs. Cf McGruther article cited in Section X below).

* Norton, CAPT Douglas M., "Responding to the Soviet Presence in Northern Waters: An American Naval View", in Archer, Clive

(ed.). The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, London: Croom,

Helm, forthcoming in’ 1987 . [X paper presented in October 1985 at Aberdeen, Scotland as part of the dialogue between U.S. Navy strategists and allied civilian and military leaders and defense specialists).

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "The Pacific and U.S. Naval Policy", Naval Forces, VI/1985, pp 36-48. (Sees U.S. Navy Pacific experience as primary driver of Maritime Strategy. Especially good as the role of ADM Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fleet Commander, originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of Naval Operations).

** U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,

Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Report of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee on the 5oO-Ship tJ'av'y, 'November 18, 19'S'5',' Washington: USClP'O, f'f'He house

Seapower Subcommittee endorses the Maritime Strategy.

Essentially the same report is m Bennett, Rep. Charles E., "The 600-Ship Fleet: Is it Necessary?", Naval Forces, 11/1986, pp

26-38).

* Watkins, ADM James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within", Defense 85, November 1985, pp 18-20. (The CNO on the role of the fTaritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristics. "We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fleet commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynamic strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington").

Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War At Sea", International Security, Winter 1985-86, pp 3-31. (Argues against anti-SSBN operations and for more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory dangers of theater nuclear war at sea. Not particularly accurate).

Owens, LTCOL MacKubm Thomas, USMCR, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform", International Security, Winter 1985-86, pp 98-111, especially pp'l06-109. (Links' the strategy debate to the

contemporaneous debate on JCS "reform": "The JCS reorganization

debate is really a debate about strategic doctrine." Cf Richard Best Feb 1987 article, cited below).

7 Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revolution in Defense Policy?", World Affairs, Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182 (especially 175-6). (Sees maritime strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget rationales. "The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine").

THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1936

Watkins, ADM James D., "The Maritime Strategy"; Kelley, GEN P. X., and O'Donnell, MAJ Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy"; and Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy"; Proceedings, January 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" Supplement. Also' "Comment and Discussion": February 1986, pp 26-28; March 1986, pp 18-21 by

COL John Collins USA (Ret.) (raises 20 questions); May 1986, p 25; June 1986, p 83 (questions nuclear aspects of the Strategy); and pp 84-89, by RADM William Pendley (answers Collins's questions and elaborates on the Strategy); July 1986, pp 24-27, (posits significant Soviet forward submarine operations); August 1986, p 10 (still more questions from the insatiable COL Collins); January 1987, pp 25-30 (argues for new role for PHMs in the Maritime Strategy; and April 1987, pp 22-27 (another response to COL Collins by the indefatigable RADM Pendley)).

Gordon, Michael R., "Officials say Navy Might Attack Soviet A-Arms in Nonnuclear War", New York Times, January 7, 1986, p 1. See also (New York) DaiTy News, Jan 8, 1986, p C-10; The Oregonian, January" "9", 198 6', p ClO; Los Angeles Times, JanuaFy ITT, 1986',' p 4; Boston Globe, January' 11, 1986'; New York Times, January 12, 198 6, p E-'l; and The Times (London)^ February" 2'6'V 1986 . (Initial press commentin' publication of "The Maritime Strategy" by the Naval Institute. Ignores all strategy issues except the anti-SSBN operations debate).

Jervell, Sverre and Nyblom, Rare (eds.), The Military Buildup in the High North: American and Nordic Perspectives, L'anHam' i'Tb: University Fresh of 'America', 1'9"8 6'. ('1985 Harvard conference.

Eliot Cohen, Robert Wemland, Barry Posen, VADM Henry Mustm and a number of distinguished British and Nordic officials, military officers, and thinkers debate the Maritime Strategy and much else) .

Train, ADM Harry, USN (Ret.), "Seapower and Projection Forces", in American Defense Annual, 1986-1987, Lexington MA: Lexington

Boo1<s^ I^lT7*ipi^irFrT9^ (This former Sixth Fleet and Atlantic Theater Commander updates his views on the Maritime Strategy.

Book also contains routine arguments by Ambassador Komer. More detailed —and controversial— views by ADM Train can be found in George, James L. (ed), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the' Mi'd-l98 0s, A'nnapol i s : Nava 1

Institute' Press7 1986",' pp 1 S'3'-2'87") .

Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory

and Practice, Annapolis: Naval Institute' tress, 1986 . (By¹ a

Naval" 'Postgraduate School faculty member. Shot through with important insights on naval strategy and its relationship to tactics. See especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war ashore, and Chapter 9 on the relationship between peacetime and wartime naval missions).

Connell, John, The New Maginot Line, New York: Arbor House,

1986, pp 71-81. (Another journalist—this time British—for whom the strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations. Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have been news four years earlier).

Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David (eds.), Northern Waters: Security and Resource issues, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble','

198 6 . (X"series' of survey" papers focusing on the Norwegian Sea. See especially Geoffrey Till on Strategy, David Hobbs on Military Technology, and Steven Miller on Reagan Administration Strategy. The Miller piece is essentially an update of his 1983 paper, cited in Section I above).

Oliver, James K., and Nathan, James A., "Concepts, Continuity, and Change", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington'DX: Scholarly

Resource's, 1986 ,' pp“ 1 '-'T2\ ( Sees Reagan Administration naval

strategy and force planning as derived essentially from concepts and goals developed by the Navy in the late 1970s).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan: The Geostrategic Framework for

the Conduct of the U.ST - Soviet Co'n'tes't', kb'ston: ' Atlantic Monthly' 'tress', 1986 . (Views role of the Navy as one of "Sea Control" and projecting American power into "distant local conflicts", rather than carrier strikes on "Soviet home ports" or "strategic nuclear warfare". See pp 183-4, 191-2).

Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising, New York: Putnam, 1986.

* *

Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake: in the Pacific, New York: Penguin ,^—l 98'6‘.

(Fiction. Wartime' 'Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to pre-emptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully, but with heavy losses). In this vein, see reviews by CAPT David G. Clark in Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 139-141, and ADM Thomas' Bi 'Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings, March 1987, p 164. Cf Hackett and McGeoch et aT~ (The third World War: The UntolcPStory, cited in Section V below'; an'd Hayes'" et al".',' American 'Lake'; Below, chapter 19, which addresses the ’ Pacific' 'in' a' hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which CAPT Clark or ADM Hayward would agree).

Hayes, Peter, Nuclear Peril

'('thorough" and' extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and much else, but in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See especially Chapters 8 and 16, and Chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that "What appeared a mere budget battle was in fact a conflict over military strategy").

Daniel, Donald C., Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic StabilityChampagne XL: University ot Illinois

FTessT 1985’. (An' excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member. Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S. could so reduce the number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using the remainder". See especially pp 151-157) .

** West, Francis J., Jr. et al., Naval Forces and Western Security, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey' s"^ 19'8"6'. (Contains' two essays:

"U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, RADM Robert J. Hanks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53. West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion that there is a profound divergence between U.S. and West European perspective, on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about. The other essay' offers an overview of current issues regarding the role of naval forces in NATO strategy).

Kaufmann, William W., A Reasonable Defense, Washington: Brookings, 1986 , especially pp 7 2-92’. (Kaufmann ' s annual attack on his own highly personal interpretation of the Maritime Strategy, ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous allied naval forces but sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely aimed at influencing legislative budgetary decisions).

Cohen, Eliot A., "Do We Still Need Europe?", Commentary, January 1986, pp 28-35. (A Naval War College faculty~member" 'views NATO flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent").

** "Ocean Safari '85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic",

All Hands, January 1986, pp 20-29. (Publicizes close-m convoy defense, coastal defense, and mine countermeasures aspects of the strategy, as well as strike warfare and tactical innovations).

** Gray, Colin, "Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, February 1986, pp 34-42. (Supportive commentary by a top-ranked civilian geopolitician and strategist. Especially helpful in untangling arguments regarding "horizontal escalation").

* "Message to Moscow: 'Be My Guest': The Navy", Newsweek,

February 3 , 1986 , pp 16-17. (VADM Henry C. Must ini on U.S.

Second Fleet implementation of the Maritime Strategy).

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress,

Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for" Appropriations'for fiscal Year 1987 : Part 1,

February' 5, 198'6'Washington: tJSiSPO, 1986", pp 82-83 . fTh e

Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify on the budget and, in response to questioning from Senator Nunn, on anti-SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy element enunciated by the highest Defense Department officials. See also Wilson, George C. and Weisskopf, Michael, "Pentagon Plan Coldly Received", Washington Post, February 6, 1986, p A14; Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. betense Strategy", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986 , p 695; and Andrews, Walter, "Weinberger' Warris^r"o'f 'Hollow Strategy'", Washington Times, July 30, 1986, p 4).

* Lehman, John F., "The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the

600-Ship Fleet", Naval Forces, No. 1/1986, pp 14-23. (Update of Lehman's thought)T

* Watkins, ADM James D., "Power Projection—Maritime Forces Making

a Strategic Difference", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 102-106. (CNO dTscusses Maritime strategy within a

NATO context. N.B.: this annual special issue contains

articles signed by most of NATO's naval chiefs).

** Lapham, Lewis H., "Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition",

Harper's, March 1986, pp 8-9. (A bizarre, overwritten expo'siblon on the Maritime Strategy as propaganda and the U.S. Navy as incompetent).

** Ausland, John, "The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Be

Broken", International Herald Tribune, March 12, 1986, p 25. (A critical Took at 'naval' 'theater' nuclear weapons and warfare and the Maritime Strategy).

** Reed, Fred, "Soldiering: Navy's Sensitivity Works Against It",

Washington Times, March 27, 1986, p 2. (Criticizes U.S. Navy explanations' of the Strategy as lacking in "strategic substance", a rather ironic criticism given the author's own arguments).

* Mustin, VADM Henry C., "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea", Naval War College Review, March-Apnl 1986, pp 2-6. (The NATO S’t'rikihg' Fleet Atlantic' Commander on U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea). See also "in My View...", Autumn 1986, pp 101-2).

Landersman, CAPT S. D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review, March-April

1986 , pp 23-34 . (By a member' "of the' "initial' 'U.S. Navy Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) as well as Naval Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential but too-little-discussed aspects of the Maritime Strategy which are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward operations. See also his "I am a...Convoy Commodore", Proceedings, June 1986, pp 56-63).

Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "New NE Asian Geography?", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 91-92. (An extreme view of the role of Pacific operations. Calls for a North Pacific Maritime Strategy to split the Soviet Far East from the rest of the country at the Urals).

** Doerr, CAPT P. J., "CWC Revisited", Proceedings, April 1986, pp 39-43. (Organizing the Battle Force to implement the Maritime Strategy. Contrast with CAPT Powers's October 1985 Proceedings views).

** Watkins, ADM James D., "Laurels, Accomplishments, and Violent Peace", Sea Power, April 1986, pp 6-20. (See especially pp 9-10, on the rat Tonale for publishing the Maritime Strategy).

* Kelley, GEN P. X., "The United States Marine Corps Today", Sea Power, April 1986, pp 82-97. (See especially pp 83-86 for an" overview of the Maritime Strategy from the Commandant of the Marine Corps perspective).

Bagley, ADM Worth H., USN (Ret.), "U.S. Military Power in the Pacific: Problems and Prospects", in International Security

Council, National Security in Northeast Asia, New York: CAUSA Publications',' April' T5-15', 198 6'. (Reverses' the usual argument by treating NATO as a "second front threat" diverting the Soviets from the Far East).

Liska, George, "From Containment to Concert", Foreign Policy, Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression",

Summer 1986, pp 108-129. (U.S.-Soviet rivalry seen as "fed

primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asymmetry between land and sea powers". Argues, however, for a "land-sea power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea- over land-based power has diminished as the principal maritime power finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval superiority").

** "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The

Economist, April 19, 1986, pp 49-65. (Strategy and programs).

** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The

Case for Military Reform, Bethesda MD: Adler' & Adler’, T93'"6', pp 77-81. (Cfit"!ci'z'es' 'tKe"Maritime Strategy for its linkages to

the land war in Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship to current force structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of the term "Maritime Strategy"). •

** Ausland, John, C., Nordic Security and the Great Powers, Boulder CO: Westview, 19861 '(The most comprehensive and' detailed

treatment of the Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall context of Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20, "The Battle for the Norwegian Sea", the author's "climax").

Kolodziej, Edward A., "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected Front", AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. 6 No. 2 1986 , pp”45-56^ especially pp" 48-50. (A' leading political

scientist endorses CAPT Peter Deutermann's views on reorienting U.S. naval concentrations from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic).

* Hughes, VADM Thomas J., Jr., "Logistics Became Legitimate", Sea Power, May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. (By the Deputy tfh'ief of Naval Operations for Logistics. "The logistics of the Navy are matched to our maritime strategy").

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A

Busy Agenda Awaits the Next CNO", Sea Power, May 1986, pp 48-51. (Sees a need for the New cKief" of 'Naval Operations to examine the future maritime environment as well as the reactions of U.S. and foreign political and military leaders to the Maritime Strategy).

** Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay", Navy

International, May 1986, pp 304-308. (Endorsement of the Maritime' Strategy by a prominent British naval affairs writer. Questions, however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a Soviet priority under ADM Chernavin as it did under ADM Gorshkov).

"Sailing the Cold Seas", Surface Warfare, May-June 1986, pp 6-8. (On the steps being examined and' Faken to increase U.S. Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as required by the Maritime Strategy).

Williams, CDR E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 35-42 . (An argument tor convoying". Sees the SLOC protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes". Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these options and forward defense, the more topical issue.)

Pendley, RADM William, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime

Strategy", Proceedings, June 1986, pp 84-89. (This ostensible response to~an' earlier "Comment and Discussion" item is actually an important official amplification of the Maritime Strategy by the 1985-86 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist).

* *

Mather, Ian, "NATO Row Over Boundary Shift", Sunday London Observer, June 16, 1986. (Sees Secretary of Defense Weinberger's call for an expanded NATO reach beyond Europe as derived from the Maritime Strategy).

Samuel, Peter, "State Dept., Navy Agree on Opening Pacific Front in Case of War in Europe", New York City Tribune, 23 June 1986, p 1. (State Department's Director of Policy Planning espouses views congruent with the Maritime Strategy, especially regarding global nature of war with the Soviet Union and early anti-submarine operations). For an updated version of these views, see Solomon 1987 article cited below. See also Bedard, Paul, "Pacific Waters Boil With American and Soviet Warships", Defense Week, June 23, 1986, p 1; and Elliott, Frank, "U.S.

Cooks t"o" "Pacific Fleet to Help Europe" and "Soviet Power Grows", Navy Times, July 7, 1986, pp 29 & 32.

** Epstein, Joshua M., The 1987 Defense Budget, Washington:

Brookings, 1986 . (Brookings''s' annual attack on the Maritime

Strategy. Pp 13, 41-45, and 55-58 reject the Maritime Strategy as "inefficient and potentially escalatory" and recommend U.S. Navy force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as not requiring significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived from Kaufmann, Komer, Posen, and the Congressional Budget Office. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document).

** Gray, Colin S., "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy

for a Maritime America", The National Interest, Summer 1986, pp 24-36 . (Masterful discussion' of the' relationships between geopolitics and the Maritime Strategy).

** Wood, Robert and Hanley, John, "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic", Atlantic Community Quarterly, Summer 1986, pp 133-144. (Latest incarnation of this oft-reprinted article by two Naval War College faculty members).

** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea",

Proceedings, July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and biscussion", Proceedings, September 1986, p 90. ("The Maritime Strategy must' be challenged for its lack of definition in how we are to deter nuclear war at sea").

** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars,

Washington : Committee f o r N a t i on a 1 Security", 1986 . ( The

Committee's annual attack on the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy. "There is no need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk missions close to Soviet shores". Advocates a "return to a more sensible naval strategy". Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy).

** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea BAsed Deterrent:

Clever Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest Report, June-July 1986 , pp 1-10. (The^auth'br’'seems to lean more

* *

Truver, Navy?", 74-81. carrier

to the "foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce the current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article, below).

Scott C., "Can We Afford The 15-Carrier Battle Group Armed Forces Journal International, July 1986, pp (Gn the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and force levels).

O'Rourke, Ronald, "Tomahawk: The U.S. Navy's New Option", Navy

International, July 1986, pp 394-398. (Good coverage of the bene 'fit's and' problems associated with integrating sea-launched cruise missiles into the Maritime Strategy) .

Ryan, CAPT T. D., "SUBDEVRON TWELVE: In the Global War Games",

of" Naval' Strategy tactical

solutions)

Submarine Review, July 1986, pp 39-40. (Good examples of uses War’ College Global War Games to test the Maritime and to identify problems needing new technological and

** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy", Oakland Tribune, 7 July 1986. (Decries the Navy's "forward offensive strategy" for going "beyond legitimate defense purposes").

Canby, Steven L., "South Korea's Defense Reguires U.S. Air Power, Not Troops", Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1986, p 24. (Sees limited utility'of Ba'cifi'c Fleet" carriers in a war with the Soviets. Advocates naval force level cuts).

** O'Shea, James, "U.S. to Sink Billions into New Attack Sub".

Chicago Tribune, July 20, 1986, p 1. (On the role of the SSN-21 Seawbl'f 'in 'the' future Maritime Strategy).

Smith, Lee, "How the Pentagon Can Live On Less", Fortune, 21 July 1986, pp 78-85. (See especially p 87. Fortune" and ex-Reagan Administration official Richard DeLauer" oppose as misguided the "Lehman developed" "forward strategy", construed as carrier strikes on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk). For more on DeLauer's negative views, see "Interview: Richard DeLauer on Defense", Technology Review,

July 1986, pp 58-67).

* "Maritime Strategy Seminar", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 8-10.

** (Former SACLANT/CINCLANT ADM Wesley McDonald, former

Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West, and then-U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander VADM Henry Mustin debate the Maritime Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime Strategy Seminar Transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute,

unnrn

Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 107-108. The author's views on the relationship between the Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy force level goals. "While some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan...one that Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other services").

* *

** Parry, Don, "U.S. Navy's Role in Space", Navy International, August 1986, p 477. (Quotes Deputy Assistant' Secretary of the Navy for and Space on the role of space in the Maritime Strategy).

** Hinge, LT A., RAN, "The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region: Naval Aspects", Journal of the Australian Naval

Institute, August 1986, pp~3T-50. (Poses' important questions regarding USN force posture requirements in each oceanic theater, and potential naval roles of Pacific allies, China, and ASEAN. Very sanguine regarding Western maritime superiority in the Pacific).

"Rust to Riches: The Navy is Back", U.S. News and World Report,

August 4, 1986, pp 28-37. (SECNAV John' Lehman's influence' on naval strategy seen as paramount).

Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base", Daily Telegraph, August 13, 1986. (Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive against forward battle group operations in the Norwegian Sea, "the so-called Lehman Doctrine").

"Aircraft Carriers Use Technology, Speed to Stage Vanishing Acts on High Seas", Baltimore Sun, 17 August 1986, p 16. (Discusses U.S. Navy countermeasures to Soviet intelligence and targeting at sea, a key element in carrying out the Maritime Strategy).

Bunting, Glenn F., "Navy Warms up to Idea of Presence in Cold Bering Sea", Los Angeles Times, 31 August 1986, p 3. (Maritime Strategy as reflected¹ in' increased U.S. Navy peacetime North Pacific presence).

* Demars, VADM Bruce, "The U.S. Submarine Force", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 18-30 and "Speech at the Submarine Symposium, TTTma, Peru", Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 5-12. (By the Deputy Chief of'Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare. See especially pp 20-21 of the former and 8-11 of the latter on the role of U.S. and allied submarines in the Maritime Strategy: "We dare not go it alone").

** Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle",

Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 46-52. (Sees the Maritime Strategy as merging the’"two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat).

** Tellis, Ashley J., "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the

Atlantic Alliance", Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 54-60. (Endorses the Maritime Strategy' "for'‘it’s" geopolitical logic, especially regarding forward operations).

* Cropsey, Seth, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime Strategy and its Alternatives", Policy Review, Fall 1986, pp 40-46. (An excellent restatement of the Navy's arguments by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly useful on the historical background of the Maritime Strategy).

* Mustin, VADM Henry C., "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates",

Proceedings, September 1986, pp 33-37. (U.S. Navy Second

Fle'et/NA'TO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander's positive views on the utility of the Maritime Strategy to an operational commander. See also "Comment and Discussion", November 1986, p 14) .

Hampton, LCDR J. P., "Integrated Air Defense for NATO", Proceedings, September 1986, pp 114-116. (On integrating U.S. Navy carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied air force aircraft to counter the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern Front: an essential component of the Maritime Strategy too

often overshadowed in the public debate by discussion of the Northwest Pacific and especially the Norwegian Sea).

** Wood, Robert S., "Maritime Strategy for War in the North", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, September 1986, pp 17-20. (Development of this toaval'War' College faculty member/strategist's thought. Stress on combined arms).

** Fouquet, David, "NATO Soldiers March Into Autumn, Testing

Tactics, Eguipment, Systems", Defense News, September 15, 1986, p 14. (The Allies test the Maritime Strategy on the Northern Front).

* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of NATO, Washington: Georgetown University" 'C'STS ,' September "25',

TWF. (SECNAV's most recent views: "No maritime strategy can

be a successful strategy without an effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe". "The forward strategy, articulated by the Reagan administration, is in fact orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance doctrine".

"In summary we have a maritime strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime forces of Europe and the United States").

** Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West, New'"Yb'rk": National Strategy Information Center,

19‘8'6'. (Ari extension of his classic 1977 work on geopolitics, focusing on implications for U.S. national military strategy.

The footnotes include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments of Ambassador Komer. A new classic).

** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy

and Deterrence in Europe", international Security, Fall 1986, PP 3-57. (Despite its biases /'distortions, and misleading discussions of the development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most important piece of writing critical of the Strategy to date. Faults the Maritime Strategy for its "elastic quality", actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom line: "the key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces should be given first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets").

** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "Naval Power and National Security: The

Case for the Maritime Strategy", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 58-87. (One of the Strategy's contributors definitively expands on its basic elements and on its rationale. Especially useful in discussing the rationale for anti-SSBN operations and the Strategy's inherent uncertainties, integral aspects of the Maritime Strategy often slighted in public official U.S. Navy discussions).

Schoultz, VADM Robert F., "Strikefleet: Cost-Effective Power",

Armed Forces, October 1986, pp 446-448. (Deputy Oommander'-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare on the role of the Carrier Battle Group in the Maritime Strategy).

** Winnefeld, LT James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right",

Proceedings, October 1986, pp 141-146. (The Navy Fighter Weapons' School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution, by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of his profession).

* Weinberger, Caspar, "The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore Roosevelt", Defense Issues, Vol 1 No 76, November 24, 1986.

(The Maritime" S't'rat^Legy'"as' 'a component of national military strategy, by the Secretary of Defense. "The greatest value of President Reagan's maritime strategy is that it focuses on the crucial issue of how we can best use our maritime forces and those of our allies to achieve the basic goal of deterrence -- and deny the adversary his preferred warfighting strategy"). Summarized in Wilson, George, "USS Theodore Roosevelt Joins Active Service as 15th Carrier", Washington Post, October 26,

1986, p A21; and Matthews, William! ''Carrier (Theodore Roosevelt 'Charges' to Life", Navy Times, November 10, 1986, pp 33 & 37.

** "U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s", Security Digest, (The

Wilson Center), November 1986. (CAPT Linton Brooks and Prof.

John Mearsheimer debate the Maritime Strategy).

** Morring, Frank, Jr., "Navy Chief: 'Forward Defense' Doesn't

Mean Kamakazi Missions", Nashua (NH) Telegraph, 26 November 1986. (First reported public" discussion of the Maritime Strategy by the new CNO, ADM Carlisle Trost, with a critique by Brookings Institution researcher Joshua Epstein).

** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Strategy and ASW", Jane's Defense Weekly, 29 November 1986 , pp 1269-1277 . (An update of Dr . Friedman's thought on the Maritime Strategy, ASW, and the SSN-21).

* "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy", Proceedings, December

** 1986, pp 11-12. (The Director of U.S. Wavy Attack' Submarine

Programs, The Naval War College Professor of Submarine Warfare and two noted civilian naval analysts debate the role of the U.S. submarine force in the Maritime Strategy. For more than this brief summary, see Transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval

Institute, forthcoming).

** O'Neil, Captain W. D., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy", Proceedings, December 1986, pp 39-41. (Recommends measures that the U.S. Wavy must take to ensure the continued executablity of the Maritime Strategy, by keeping the Soviets on the defensive and improving defense penetration and strike effectiveness).

** Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy — The Arms Control Implications", Arms Control Today, December 1986, pp 10-17. (Appears to favor the' Maritime Strategy more than he did in July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea... The likelihood of widespread escalation of the use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low.")

** "Dossier: U.S. Report", Naval Forces, VI/1986, p 132. (Alleges

there is current "indecisibh^,""abou't what a U.S. maritime strategy should comprise". A remarkable piece of reportage for October 1986. There's always 10% who don't get the word).

* Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO Attacked", Navy Times, December 1, 1986. (Despite the misleading Headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering of the views of the principal USMC global strategist, BGEN Michael Sheridan, on the role of the Marines in North Norway, as part of the Maritime Strategy).

** Halloran, Richard, "A Silent Battle Surfaces", New York Times Magazine, December 7 , 1986 , pp 60, 94-97 . (On TTFe anti-submarine warfare component of the Maritime Strategy).

** Elliott, Frank, "Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War",

Defense Week, December 8, 1986, p 16. (Senator Exon opposes the anti-SSBN "aspects of the Maritime Strategy. "There are good elements in that strategy, but much of it concerns me").

Greeley, Brendan M., Jr., "Third Fleet Increases North Pacific Operations to Counter Soviet Activity", Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 22 , 1986 , pp 28-29 ."' (On' VADM Diego Wernandez and the Third Fleet North Pacific build-up, especially joint and allied coordination).

U.S. Navy Appears to Expand Operations in Pacific Ocean", Jane's Defense Weekly, 27 December 1986, pp 1474-1475. (Interview w'l'th VX"SM Hernandez on new peacetime measures to more successfully deter war or -- should deterrence fail -- conduct wartime operations in the North Pacific in accordance with the Maritime Strategy).

III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1987 AND BEYOND

* Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the

United States, Washingtonthe" White House, January 1987 . (The f r am'e'wor !< with in which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially p 19: "U.S. military forces must

possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary"; and pp 27-30: "maritime superiority is vital. (It) enables us to

capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet

homeland...").

* Weinberger, Caspar W., Report of the Secretary of Defense to the

Congress on the FY 19887FY"l989 Budget and FY l98'8-92~ Defense Fro gram's, Washington: tJ'S'C'F'O", I'9'8 T, p 16b. ("Reconfirms the

Maritime Strategy as a component of declared U.S. national military strategy).

Crowe, ADM William J., "Statement on National Security Strategy", U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy, January 21 , 1987 , Washington: USG&O, 1'9'8 7 TTor't'h'cbmihg) . ("Solid concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we have benefited from some excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy—how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping, and use our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece, and Turkey. it is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are doing").

vital components of our

important —

warfare in particular).

Trost, ADM Carlisle, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy",. Proceedings, January 1987, pp 13-16. (Admiral Watkins's successoTas CNO briefly reaffirms the Maritime Strategy's fundamentals: deterrence, forward defense, alliance solidarity,

the global view, coexistence with other national military strategy, and -- most flexibility. Highlights anti-submarine

22 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 19'88 and 1989, Washington DC: US'GPO' '(forthcoming m 198 7/8 )'. (Prepared annual "posture" statements by SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, CNO, and other officials. Also hearings repartee, and responses to questions for the record. Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy budget legislative process. In addition to those just cited see especially statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn Paisley, CINCLANTFLT ADM Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Surface and Air Warfare, VADMs Joseph Metcalf and Robert Dunn).

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth ** Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy, January-Apr il 1987, Washington : U'SGE’O ( forthcoming' i n 1987/8 ). (Testimony by administration civilian and military officials, and by government and non-government defense specialists. Includes much discussion of the Maritime Strategy. See especially testimony by ADM Lee Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command).

Hendrickson, David C., The Future of American Strategy, New York: Holmes and Meier , 19 8 /. (A' new and' different

perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental and maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in Third World contingencies, especially carriers, but would cut back on naval—and air and ground--forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes Aegis cruisers and destroyers).

** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "Conflict Termination Through Maritime

Leverage", in Cimbala, Steven and Dunn, Keith (eds.) , Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion^ ari'd War',' Boulde r' CO": Westview, 19 8 7 . (Actually written a year

Before his 1986 International Security article).

** West, F. J. ("Bing"), Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next

Step", Proceedings, January 1987, pp 40-49. (By a former Assistant' Secretary of Defense, Naval War College faculty member, lead author of Seaplan 2000 and U.S. Marine Corps officer. One of the most importanf analyses of the Maritime Strategy by an outside observer to date. Develops further his 1985 and 1986 views, cited in "Contemporary Naval Strategy" and Section II above, on the relationships between the Strategy and U.S./NATO doctrine. Cf, however, actual statements by allied military leaders in Section V below). See also "Comment and Discussion", Proceedings, March 1987, pp 14-15.

23 Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The

Implications for NATO", Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 8-19. (A thoughtful, wide-ranging, and 'often provocative article examining linkages, especially between continental and maritime power, between the European and Pacific theaters, and between strategic and conventional deterrence. The article is notable also for the contributions of CAPT Roger W. Barnett, USN (Ret.), one of the foremost original architects of the Maritime Strategy) .

** Solomon, Richard H., "The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices

for American Security", Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 36-43, especially pp 78^L39. (The Director ot the State Department Policy Planning Staff updates his June 1986 Naval War College Current Strategy Forum lecture: "We must be prepared to

open a second front in Asia").

"From the Editor", Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 3-5. (Challenges some of 'the basic'"strategic concepts of the Maritime Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs).

* Connors, LCDR Tracy, "Northern Wedding '86", All Hands, January 1987, pp 18-26. See also "Cape Wrath Feels Iowa's Fury",

"Nimitz and Northern Wedding", and "Alaska", in same issue.

(VADM Charles R. Larson, Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic: "We

went north to test tactics designed to support NATO's maritime strategy of forward defense. I am proud to report those tactics worked").

** Thomas, CAPT Walter 'R', USN (Ret.), "Deterrence, Defense, Two Different Animals", Navy Times, January 26, 1987, p 23.

(Critigue of John Mea'r' sheimer ' s International Security article).

** Keller, LT Kenneth C., "The Surface Ship in ASW", Surface

Warfare, Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. ("Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be fought in accordance with the maritime strategy". Another of the new generation of naval officers gets—and passes—the word).

** Doerr, CAPT Peter J., USN (Ret.), "Comment and Discussion:

Large Carriers: A Matter of Time", Proceedings, February 1987,

p 78. (On the "defense within an offense within a defense" nature of the putative Battle of the Norwegian Sea and, by implication, other potential wartime operations implementing the Maritime Strategy globally).

Tritten, CDR James J., "(Non) Nuclear Warfare", Proceedings, February 1987, pp 64-70. (By the Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.

On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, and war fighting).

24 ** Best, Richard, "Will JCS Reform Endanger The Maritime

Strategy?", National Defense: February 1987, pp 26-30. ("The

passage of JCS reform will provide a future administration with a handle on defense policy that will allow it to override previous strategic conceptions, including the Navy's maritime strategy, (which) will come under heavy criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach of the systems analysts." Best decries this since "only the Navy has thought through the implications of the continuum of operations in a way which will not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror").

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy", Navy

International, February 1987, pp 118-122. (Especially'good on

'the' ''complex, interactive relationship" between the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy, and on "the issues". Less useful—because occasionally inaccurate—in tracing the prehistory and history of the Strategy, probably because of deficiencies in the public record).

** Donatelli, Thomas, "Go Navy", The American Spectator, February 1987, pp 31-33. (On the linkages^- between defense¹ reorganization and the maritime elements of the national military strategy supports the Maritime Strategy, and fears for its future under the new Defense Department set-up).

Matthews, William, "U.S. Navy's Exercises in Aleutians Underscore Pacific Interest Concern", Defense News, February 9, 1987, p 25. (Reprinted as "Marines, Navy Test Amphibious Skills in Aleutians", Navy Times, February 16, p 27). (The Navy and Marine Corps practice cold-weather operations to implement the Maritime Strategy in the North Pacific).

** Lynch, David J., "Maritime Plan A 'Prescription For Disaster' Educator Says", Defense Week, February 23, 1987, p 12.

(Professor Mearsh'ei'me'r" 'again, this time at the American Association for the Advancement of Science).

Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic Development at the Naval War College", Naval War College Review, Spring 1987 , pp 4-16. (Further development 'of 'the' views' 'o'f' 'this Naval War College strategist/facuity member. His focus is now on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming).

Piotti, RADM Walter T., Jr., "Interview", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, Vol 5 #2 , 1987, pp 14-16. (The Commander of Ehe" U'.S*. FTTTTFar"y~'Sealif t Command on global wartime planning for sealift).

** Pocalyko, LCDR Michael, "Neutral Sweden Toughens NATO's Northern Tier", Proceedings, March 1987, pp 128-130. (By a 1985-86 member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). On the interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strategies and the Maritime Strategy).

25 ** Daskal, Steven E., "Added Sealift Protection in Time of War", National Defense, March 1987, pp 38-41. (Recommends a variety of merchant ship self protection measures for wartime, given the realities of the Maritime Strategy and U.S./allied force levels).

** "Analysis: U.S. Carriers", RUSI, March 1987, pp 1+. (Drags out yet again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime Strategy as an issue. Claims West Germany "would object strongly if moves were made to convert the Maritime Strategy into the U.S.'s general war strategy". It is, in part, and they haven't, at all. Cf Bonn's actual White Paper 1985, cited in Section V below).

* Dunn, VADM Robert F,. , "NANiews Interview", Naval Aviation News, March-April 1987, p 4. (The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of its effects on Naval Aviation": "Tactical commanders must deal with the strategy on a day to day basis. From that derives a new tactical awareness").

Taylor, RADM R.A.K., "BBBG Power: Validated.'", Surface Warfare, March/April 1987, pp 2-5, (Testing Battleship Battle' Group warfighting concepts at sea, an important element of the Maritime Strategy). See also Matthews, William, "Navy Leans to Battleships With More Cruise Missiles", Navy Times, April 13, 1987, pp 37-38 , and Defense News, April 13, 198 /, p 35; and Halloran, Richard, "Warship Cleared for Duty off Iran," New York Times, April 12, 1987, p 32.

** "Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged", Defense Week, March 2, 1987, p 5. (RADM J.S. Tichelman, RNLN, argues" that' emphasis on minesweeping "should go hand in hand with the forward strategy" at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare).

** Daggett, Stephen and Husbands, Jo L., Achieving an Affordable Defense: A Military Strategy to Guide Military Spending, Washington": ’ 'Commit tee"’For" National Security, March I'D", 19 8 7 .

(The annual CNS attack, using the usual W.W. Kaufmann "data" and arguments. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely designed to influence the U.S. legislative budget process). A summary is in Korb, Lawrence J. and Daggett, Stephen, "A 15-Carrier Navy: Is it Really Necessary?", Defense News, March 30, 1987, p 27, reprinted as "15 Carrier Navy Leaves Forces out of Balance",

Navy Times, April 6, 1987, p 32.

** Wilson, George C., "600-Ship Navy is Sailing Toward Rough Fiscal Seas", Washington Post, March 16, 1987, pp Al & A5. (Sees forward’ ant'i-SsbN operations as a "Watkins" "scenario" and forward carrier battle group operations as a "Lehman"

"scenario", with little backing in the officer corps. Cites a "number of (nameless) Navy officers" as predicting that the latter "aspect of the forward strategy will start fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department". This seems doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the Maritime Strategy, but we shall see).

26 Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Warfare", New York Times, March 19, 1987, p 19. (Outgoing Assistant 5’ecret'ary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research: "We are faced with a crisis in our anti-submarine warfare capability which undermines our ability to execute maritime strategy". For context, however, see actual Paisley statements before congressional committees, 1987).

** Trainor, LTGEN Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "Lehman's Sea-War

Strategy is Alive, But for How Long?", New York Times, March 23, 1987, p 16. (Another article in the

"Will-the-Strategy-survive-John-Lehman?" vein. General Trainor's understanding of the uniformed navy, joint and allied aspects of the strategy do not appear to be on a par with his understanding of the Marine Corps aspects).

* *

* Dorsey, Jack, "NATO Navy Called 'A Constant Source of Pride'", Virginian Pilot, March 28, 1987, p 133. (Deputy Secretary of betense William H. Taft IV: It is "naive and dangerous" to believe that strong naval forces are merely expensive competitors to ground forces in Europe, an argument that has become fashionable in recent years for critics of naval programs and maritime strategy).

Trainor, LTGEN Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "NATO Nations Conducting Winter Maneuvers in Northern Norway", New York Times, March 29, 1987, p 14. (Practicing the reinforcement of North Norway.

BGEN Matthew Caulfield USMC: "Marine reinforcement is part of our maritime strategy". GEN Fredrik Bull-Hansen RNA: With or without American carriers, northern Norway will be defended).

** Lessner, Richard, "Quick Strike: Navy Secretary's Wartime

Strategy Is Contested Legacy", Arizona Republic, March 29,1987 pp C1+. (Comprehensive discussion of the issues, including a lengthy interview with Secretary Lehman on the eve of his departure from office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to the erroneous view—running throughout America journalism--that the Strategy was solely his creation).

* Goodman, Glenn W. Jr. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 76-84, especially p 79. ('The Chief of ‘Naval" 'Operations discusses his views on the Maritime Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and relations with the NATO allies. "Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime forces at risk in the event of war.

That includes anything that is out there").

Liebman, Marc, "Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific: 1942 Revisited?", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 58-64 . (On Pacific' maritime' operations during a global war with the Soviets).

Truver, Scott C. and Thompson, Jonathan S., "Navy Mine Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?", Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 70-74. (Ah adequate survey of the

problems" and prospects. No discussion, however, of the primary U.S. mine countermeasures concept of operations embedded in the Maritime Strategy: killing minelayers far forward, in transit, and offshore, before they sow their mines. Illustrative of the dangers of discussing any one warfare area in isolation from the total Strategy).

** Brooks, CAPT Linton, "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy",

Proceedings, April 1987 pp 33-39. (A major contributor to the Maritime Strategy thinks it through under the highly unlikely conditions of nuclear war at sea. An important and prize-winning essay).

** Cross, LTCOL Michael J., USMC, "No More Carrier Debates,

Please", Proceedings, April 1987, pp 79-81. (Relates the Maritime Strategy's requirements to the CVN-CVV debate).

* "Individual Human Beings and the Responsibilities of

Leadership", Sea Power, April 1987, pp 81-96. (Valedictory interview with Secretary Lehman. See p 85 for his parting views on the Maritime Strategy).

Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat", All Hands, April 1987, pp 30-31. (On USN efforts to "harden" "its ships, aircraft, and equipment against nuclear attack) .

** "Naval Strategy: America Rules the Waves?", Science, April 3,

1987. (Another journalistic attempt to summarize the debate. A little better than most).

Sea-War Plan All Wet?", Columbus Dispatch, April 7, 1987, p 10A. (A call for a "vigorous review" 5y“the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan", including "aircraft carrier battle groups ... sent to the... Barents , (a plan) never ... formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy reflects longstanding JCS, SECDEF, or NATO policy and strategy,“or of its roots in the naval officer corps).

** Beatty, Jack, "In Harm's Way", The Atlantic, May 1987, pp 37-53 (forthcoming).

** Kaufmann, William W., A Thoroughly Efficient Navy, Washington: Brookings, (forthcoming in 198('The"'annual Taufmann attack, designed to influence the U.S. defense budget, not the Soviets).

** Barnett, CAPT Roger, USN (Ret.), "Rocks in the Scuppers:

Another Round in the Maritime/Continental Debate", Proceedings (forthcoming in 1987). (By a primary former architect ot the Maritime Strategy).

28 ★ *

* *

k k

Peppe, LT P. Kevin, "Acoustic Parity, SSNs, and the Maritime Strategy", Proceedings (forthcoming in 1987).

Kalb, CDR Richard, "The Maritime Strategy and our European Allies: Cold Feet on the Northern Flank?", Proceedings (forthcoming). (By a former member of the CPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy).

Stefanick, Tom A., Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, Lexington’'M'A: Lexington' k'o'oks (Torthcoming 'in 198 /) .

Cimbala, Stephen J., Extended Deterrence: The U.S. and NATO

Europe, Lexington MA: Lexington' H'oo'ks ( forthcoming' in 1987).

(has a thoughtful chapter on the Maritime Strategy and the Defense of Europe).

Gray, Colin, The Wartime Influence of Seapower on Landpower: An

Historical An'ai'y's'i's', (forthcoming m l'987).

Friedman, Norman, The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy: Concepts and Operations', London': Janet's' Publishing Co.

(forthcoming in 198/).

Daniel, Donald and Wood, Robert, Presuppositions of the Maritime Strategy, Elmsford NY: Pergamon-Bra'ssey '"s (forthcoming in ’

1987)". (By two Naval War College faculty members).

Barnett, CAPT Roger, USN (Ret.), Bernstein, Alvin, and Gray, Colin (eds.). Maritime Strategy: A Textbook (forthcoming in 1987). (Collaboration by a former pre-eminent U.S.Navy strategist, a Naval War College Strategy Department head and a distinguished civilian strategic thinker).

Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press (forthcoming in' 198777 (Cursory discussion of the Maritime Strategy as "nonstrategy").

Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), The Navy, the Maritime Strategy, and Nuclear War (forthcoming in 1988). '(Examines whether the' strategy might cause escalation and the results if it did).

Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), U.S. Military Strategy for an Uncertain Future (forthcoming in 198871 —

Hartmann, Frederick, A Force for Peace: The U.S. Navy,

1 982-1986, (forthcoming in 1988)". (by a Naval' War College

faculty member).

Baer, George W., Manila Bay to the Norwegian Sea: Dimensions of

U.S. Naval Strategy Since T890 ('forth coming’ "in' T'9'8 8')'. (TTy“a

Mavaf War' 'College faculty' member ) .

IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME

Strategy

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Pub. 2), Washington: The Joint Chiefs of

'ting the National Security Act of 1947,

(See also article by Wilkerson cited in "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography"/ p 42).

Armed Forces (JCS Staff¹, December IT 8 6.

as amended. The

U.S. Army,

Army, 20 August and therefore a

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of the U.S. armed forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each Military Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces ... for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war". This responsibility (and not —as some critics charge—a desire to somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy and Marine Corps development, promulgation, and discussion of the Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department's framework for discharging its responsibilities to "organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea").

Operations (FM 100-5), Washington: Department of the

'1982'. CTh'e" ‘Army ' s "keystone warfighting manual" building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no discussion of Army-Navy mutual support, however, e.g.: air defence and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May 1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies).

U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (AFM l'-T)’,' Washin'gton : Department' of the Air' Force,

discussion of USAF AAW contributions to maritime warfare, element of the Maritime Strategy).

16 March 198 4". TWe "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and therefore a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g. strike or amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace " operations, and the lack of

a key

Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare: Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand'Paper j6999 )~, Santa Monica CA: $and Corporation, A'p'r£ 1 1'98’4'. CSee

especially for arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning Style", many of which are belied by the Maritime Strategy).

Killebrew, LTC Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options, Wilmington"BE:

Scholarly' Resources, 198'6 . (Unique among studies of NATO defense in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and allied land, sea, and air forces. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible. Advocates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier "guarding" force. Sees a potential role for carrier air on the Central Front in a protracted war).

Atkeson, MG Edward, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could Be a Hot Spot in Future Conflicts", Army, January 1986, pp 13-14. (Fanciful proposal for expanded"' tJ. S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime Strategy: "An Army air cavalry force, properly

tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as well as, if not better than, another submarine").

Alberts, COL D. J., USAF, "U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike",

Naval Forces, No 1/1986, pp 62-75. (The strike warfare elements of 'the 'ffari'time Strategy from an Air Force officer's point of view).

** Harned, MAJ Glenn, USA, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime

Strategy", Proceedings, February 1986, pp 26-28. (Argues U.S. Army suffers from' lack of a Maritime Strategy equivalent and from Navy reticence in explaining its operational and tactical doctrines).

* Pendley, RADM William, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and the Air-Land Battle", in Pfaltzgraff, Robert, Jr. et al. (eds.), Emerging Doctrines and Technologies, Lexington^—MA: Lexington

Books ,’ f or t'h coming" "in" '19 tn~. ('Official views of the Navy's Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60) as of April 1986. Argues that Maritime Strategy and Air-Land Battle doctrine are similar and complementary. Sees both as essential parts -- along with nuclear deterrence -- of an "essential triad" of U.S. defense strategy. A short summary is on pp 15-16 of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: implications for Global

and' Regional Political-Military¹ Balance': A" Conference Report:

ftpriT T6-T8", 1986 , Cambridge" MA': Institute tor Foreign l^olicy

Analysis', IW1TI Cf March-April 1986 views of VADM Mustin on linkage between tKe Maritime Strategy and "Deep Strike", cited above, West German views on lack of linkage, cited below, and Dunn and Staudenmaier May-June 1985 Survival article, cited in Swartz, January 1986 Proceedings Supplement).

** Kennedy, COL William V., USAR (Ret.), "There Goes the U.S.

Navy—Steaming the Wrong Way", Christian Science Monitor, 23 June 1986, p 14. Calls for the“Nav'y to refocus "on' Asia", crediting a U.S. Army "counterattack" with having turned the Maritime Strategy from an alleged early Pacific orientation to a current European one. Attempts to drive a wedge between the Navy and Marine Corps, and alleges "only nominal mention of the Army and the Air Force" in the Proceedings "Maritime Strategy" Supplement, charges belied by actually" reading the Supplement).

Grace, LCDR James A., "JTC³A and the Maritime Strategy",

★ *

Surface Warfare, July/August 1986, pp 22-24. (On the role of 'the ' JoTnt“Ta c t'Tc a 1 C³ Agency in fielding joint and allied programs and procedures to ensure implementation of the Maritime Strategy).

Yost, ADM Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's

Coast Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed", Sea Power, August 1986, pp

8-24. (See especially pp 11-12 and 21-22,' "on the Maritime Defense Zones, an important Navy-Coast Guard element of the Maritime Strategy, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard).

** Builder, Carl H., The Army in the Strategic Planning Process:

Who Shall Bell the Cat?, Eet'hes'da MD: U'.'S'.' Army concepts

An a 'lysis Agency, October 1986 . (A study done for the U.S. Army to "try to find out why the Army doesn't seem to do very well in the strategic planning process". Analyzes Army, Navy, and Air Force strategic planning, especially the Maritime Strategy.

Looks for -- and therefore "finds" -- differences rather than similarities. To be revised and reissued as a Rand Corporation publication in 1987).

Prina, L. Edgar, "The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast

Guard Give the Navy a Helping Hand", Sea Power, October 1986, pp 32-45. (Good update on tri-service contributions to implementing the Maritime Strategy).

** Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role", Navy Times, October 20, 1986, p 27. (On the role of the Maritime Defense Zones).

** Breemer, Jan S. and Hoover, SSG Todd, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea with Harpoon", National Defence, February 1987, pp 41-45. (A history and an update')". Cf thipman and Lay article cited in Section X below.

32 The Maritime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was reflected in the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement, "The Maritime Strategy". The 'postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist". Allied contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then had been continually updated in the drafting of allied war plans. Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held between the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates.

Thus most of the hard bargaining and tradeoffs had already been done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and planning staffs and to NATO commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today.

Allied naval strategy -- and its relationship to the Maritime Strategy — is well enough documented. The NATO Information Service is prolific, and NATO commanders author relevant articles frequently. Most allied defense ministries publish occasional or annual "Defense Reports" and/or "White Papers" which sometimes touch on naval strategy as well as policy and procurement issues. As is evident from these and other writings, U.S. Navy and allied military thought is generally congruent.

(See also articles by Wemyss, Toyka, Stavridis, Grove, and Heginbotham cited in "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A

Bibliography").

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th

and subsequent editions), Brussels': NATO Information Se'rvi ce,

1981 and subsequently. (The basic official public document on NATO policy and strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR." "NATO's forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines, and in general preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic").

Train, ADM Harry, "U.S. Maritime Power", in Coker, Christopher, U.S. Military Power in the 1980s, London: MacMillan Press, 1983

FP' 107-l'l4 . CSA‘Ct;A'NT provides details on the 1981 NATO Maritime Concept of Operations (CONMAROPS), one of the building blocks of t'hV'Maritime Strategy) .

33 Wemyss, RADM Martin La T., RN, "Naval Exercises 1980-81",

Jane-' s

Naval Annual, 1981, pp 151-158. (Highlights problems in interallied naval cooperation resulting from U.S. Navy communication and intelligence systems advances).

The North Atlantic Assembly, NATO Anti Submarine Warfare: Strategy, Requirements and the Need tor Cooperation, Brussels:

1 98 2 . (Good survey of the issues,' wi't'h a call' for resolution of

the debate over mission priorities).

Hackett, GEN Sir John, BA (Ret.), McGeoch, VADM Sir Ian, RN, (Ret.), et al. The Third World War: The Untold Story, New York: MacMillan^ T9"827 ("Fiction.' Sequel to'The Third World War:

August 1985 (1978). A British vision, stressing the War at sea and on the northern front, and all but ignoring the Mediterranean and Pacific. "Swing" and carrier strikes on the Kola understood--as in 1978—as normal NATO modus operand!. Cf Clancy's 1986 Red Storm Rising, and Hayes et all's American Lake, Chapter T9"] cited''in Section II aboveTl

Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders", Financial Times, October 27, 1982, p 3. (Reports NATO Northern kegion ground' commanders ' concerns that carrier battle groups may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough).

Eberle, ADM Sir James, RN, "Defending the Atlantic Connection", in Till, Geoffrey, (ed.). The Future of British Sea Power, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, l98'4,' "pp 14 6-ibU . ("See

especially for frank overview of four Royal Navy tasks in the Atlantic) .

British Atlantic Committee, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat: NATO's Defense and New Technology, London: February T9'84'] (A

group of ret ire'd" Br'i'tTsh'"generals and others rail against the "practicality" and "very purpose" of the NATO reinforcement mission, given their assumptions of a short conventional war phase in Europe and overwhelming surface ship vulnerability.

See also Mitchell, LT I.G., RN., "Atlantic Reinforcement — A Re-emerging Debate", Armed Forces, September 1986, pp 399-400.

Hunter, Robert, (ed.), NATO—The Next Generation, Boulder CO: Westview, 1984. (See especialiy--and unexpectedly--for Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force role in closing off Far Eastern straits and protecting Western Pacific sea lines of communication, in chapters by Jun Tsunoda and Shunji Taoka).

Bouchard, LT Joseph, and Hess, LT Douglas, "The Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense", Proceedings, March 1984, PP 88-97. (On the concurrent Japanese FTaritime Strategy debate. See also Lehrack, LTCOL Otto, "Search for a New Consensus", same issue, pp 96-99) .

King-Harman, COL Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy--A New Look", RUSI, March 1984, pp 26-29. (By a former long-time member of the International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of political direction in the maritime sphere". "It has been largely left to SACLANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for deterrence... There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic review", one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that "reinforcements... would only need the minimum of maritime protection").

Mabesoone, CAPT W. C., RNLN, and Buis, CDR N. W. G., RNLN, "Maritime Strategic Aspects of the North Sea", RUSI, September 1984, pp 12-17. (Dutch Navy view of North Sea operations. Complements the Maritime Strategy. Stresses need for land-based air forces in air defense and possibility of SSN TLAM-C support of Central Front operations. Emphasis on barrier vice close-support Naval Protection of Shipping operations).

Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange

Revisited", Proceedings, March 1985, pp 73 & 79. (From Home Forces Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled").

Holst, Johan Jorgen, et al. (eds.). Deterrence and Defense in the North, Oslo: Norwegian University' 'Press, 1985 . (See especially authoritative chapters by high Norwegian government officials and others).

"Royal Navy Edges Closer to Kola", Defence Attache, 4/1985, 9-10. (On complementary Royal Navy North' Norwegian Sea strategy).

Federal Minister of Defence (Federal Republic of Germany), White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal

STme'cf Force's". (In eludes latest' off icial'West German defense pol'i'cy and'"strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216. Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea" in accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be effected immediately in front of their own bases". Differentiates clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and "aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's territory", which "NATO strategy rules out").

Shadwick, Martin, "Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for

Rationalization", Canadian Defense Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 22-27. (The range^-of options for'future' Canadian deployment strategies, any of which would affect the Maritime Strategy).

Crickard, RADM F. W., CN, "Three Oceans—Three Challenges: The

Future of Canada's Maritime Forces", Naval Forces, V/1985, pp 13-27. (On complementary Canadian strategy'," especially area ASW in the North Atlantic SLOC).

Dunn, Michael Collins, "Canada Rethinks Its Defense Posture", Defense and Foreign Affairs, November 1985, pp 12-19.

T*Discusses Cahadian ground and air contributions to NATO's Northern Front and naval contribution to Atlantic ASW and Arctic defense).

Sokolsky, Joel J. "Canada's Maritime Forces: Strategic

Assumptions, Commitments, Priorities", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Winter 85/86, pp 24-30. (See especially pp 28-29, regarding similarities between the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s and NATO naval strategy of the 1950s. Also see Francis, David R., "Canada Ponders Major Shift in Defense Policy", Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1987, p 9, for update of Sokolsky's views)'.

Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. (eds.), Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s, Boulder CO: tVestvieiw, 198b .

(See especially'’COL”” Jonathan Alford, BA (Ret.), "The Soviet Naval Challenge", pp 43-56, and LTGEN Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA (Ret.), "The Federal Republic of Germany's Contribution to the Defense of Northern Europe", pp 57-82. The former sees forward U.S. operations in the Norwegian Sea as unlikely, and argues that the Royal Navy should therefore concentrate on the Channel, the North Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, rather than either "unspecific flexibility" or "keeping open the sea lines of communication to the United States", options that parallel those discussed in the concurrent U.S. Maritime Strategy debates. The latter discusses the increasing West German role in Baltic,

North, and Norwegian Sea defense. Both authors base their arguments for enhanced European naval power on the premise that the U.S. Navy will not be available, at least not in strength, in the Norwegian Sea early in a war).

Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities,

Canberra: Australian Government 'Publishing Service, T986 .

(Against Australian involvement in United States contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our national interest and capabilities". An input to the March 1987 government White Paper on defense).

Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway, Oslo: Research Center" f'o'r Defense 'History,''Nationa 1

defense College Norway, 1986. (See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as providing "from the Norwegian point of view... a considerably improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept open").

36 Richey, George, Britain's Strategic Role in NATO, London: MacMillan, 1986. ("Argues tor Britain's return' to a classic Maritime Strategy, as Ambassador Robert Komer, Senator Gary Hart and William Lind -- but not the U.S. Navy — use the term).

Small, Admiral William N., "The Southern Region: The Key to

Europe's Defense", Armed Forces, January 1986, pp 12-13. (By the NATO Commander-in-Chlet', ATlied Forces Southern Europe/Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NATO's current plans for defense of its Southern Region, including allied and U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet/STRIKFORSOUTH Mediterranean operations and Turkish Black Sea operations).

Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO", NATO Review, February 1986, pp 7-12. (By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial that in any defence of sea routes between North America and Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible... the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap...is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO envisages a forward defence in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update on the defense debate in Iceland).

Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO", NATO Review, February 1986, pp 29-33. (By a U.S. Maritime A’dmTni'stration official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. On the shipping that is to use the North Atlantic SLOC).

Margolis, Eric, "Will Canadian Waters Become the Next Maginot Line?", Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1986, p 23. (A Canadian~call for increased U.S.-Canadian ASW capabilities in the Arctic) .

Schlim, VADM A. J. P., BN, "Mine Warfare in European Waters", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 20-28. (By the Belgian CtiO'. how' NXTO plans to use mines and mining against the Soviets. Excellent complementarity with the Maritime Strategy).

Leenhardt, ADM Yves, FN, "France—The Need For a Balanced Navy", NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 41-46. (Rowing fc'b' the" beat ofa' different drum. Authoritative statement by the French CNO. Heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis prevention and control, and allied cooperation. Minimal discussion relating to global or regional forward conventional operations against the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S. Maritime Strategy and other allied writers).

Young, Thomas-Durell, "Australia Bites Off More than the RAN Can Chew", Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1986, pp 15-17. See also his " ' Self-Reliance' and Eor'ce"'Development in the RAN", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 157-161, and "Don't Abandon Kadtord-C'oliins", Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1986, p 16. (On Australian' arid^- New' Zealand''ASW and Naval Control/Protection of Shipping roles in the Indian and Southwest Pacific oceans). Kampe, VADM Helmut, FGN, "Defending the Baltic Approaches", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 88-93. (By the NATO Commander, XTlied Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. Complementary German and Danish naval strategies: "in the Baltic Sea, forward

defense begins at the Warsaw Pact ports").

Grove, Eric J., "After the Falklands", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 121-129. (Questions the wisdom of the' Royal' 'Navy functioning primarily in conjunction with Striking Fleet Atlantic and USN SSNs in the Norwegian Sea. Would prefer RN focus to return to Naval Control and Protection of Shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel) .

Grimstvedt, RADM Bjarne, RNN, "Norwegian Maritime Operations", Proceedings, March 1986, pp 144-149. (By the Norwegian CNO. Stresses Norwegian Navy intent and capabilities to defend North Norway, including same Vestfjorden area that focused COMSECONDFLT/COMSTRIKFLTLANT¹s attention in 1985 and 1986).

Secretary of State for Defence (UK), Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986 : 1 , London: HMSO, 198F1 (See' especially pp 'Z9,

T$~, and' 6 0^l61. T"...enemy attack submarines are successfully to

be held at arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defence against these submarines would begin when they sailed"; "the availability of U.S. ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be assumed"; "U.S. and European navies are continuing...to ensure the preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in key ocean areas").

Defense Agency (Japan), Defense of Japan: 1986. (Includes

latest official Japanese''defense policy and sFrategy views. See especially pp 99 and 154. Outlines agreed division of labor between the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the event of an attack on Japan, as understood by the Japanese government. The Maritime Strategy was developed in full accordance with these concepts).

Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO", NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1986, pp 44-49. (Argues against a significant Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best).

Armitage, Richard, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance", Defense/86, July-August 1986, pp 20-27. (Reagan Administration defense policy vis-a-vis Japan, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The context of the Maritime Strategy in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific. See also his "Japan's Defense Program: 'No Cause for Alarm'", Washington

Post, February 18, 1987, p A18).

Eberle, ADM Sir James, RN, "Editorial", Naval Forces, IV/1986, p 7. (By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring some much needed clarity into the field of maritime strategic thinking. But it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval officers than it is by political leaders").

★ *

Tokinoya, Atsushi, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective (AdelphT'Baper #212), London: IISS, Autumn 1986 .

** Huitfeldt, LTGEN Tonne, RNA, NATO's Northern Security, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1976. (By the retired Director of the NATO International Military Staff. "United States maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed NATO strategy". Good coverage of the 1981 NATO Concept of Maritime Operations, a major building block of the Maritime Strategy).

Howlett, GEN Geoffrey, BA., "Interview", Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, September 1986, pp 13-16, (NATO Commander-in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe rejects a GIUK Gap maritime defense line. Advocates forward defense on land and sea in North Norway and the Baltic, and containment of the Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets in their home waters).

** Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy", Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control (UK), September 1986, pp 5-'6". (Regards' the Strategy as" "self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded", "yet another example of the growing difference in mood between the two sides of the Atlantic". Challenges fellow Europeans to inject amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears". The "difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean than between Americans and Europeans).

** Ausland, John C., "The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas",

International Herald Tribune, 16 September 1986. (On some effect's "of "'the Maritime' Strategy in Norway).

** Huitfeldt, LTGEN Tonne, RNA, "The Threat From the North --

Defense of Scandinavia", NATO's Sixteen Nations, October 1986, pp 26-32. (The former NATO International Military Staff Director's endorsement of the Maritime Strategy as "making a more effective contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any adventurism in the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in general", with the caution that it "not go beyond what is essential for deterrence and defense").

** Boerresen, CAPT Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime

Strategy", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 14-15. (By the military secretary to the Norwegian Minister of Defence. ("During the 1970s, NATO and the USA expressly limited their carrier operations... to the waters in and south of the GIUK gap,

Norway... found this situation rather uncomfortable... The official Norwegian reaction to (forward deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is.. .sensitive to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of tension").

"Japan, U.S. Map Out Sea Defenses", Washington Times, 1 December 1986, p 6. (On the wartime division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force).

Cremasco, Maurizio, "Italy: A New Definition of Security?", in Kelleher, Catherine M. and Mattox, Gale A. (eds.). Evolving European Defense Policies, Lexington MA: Lexington books,1987 , pp 257-27^2. (On the Italian military policy debate and Italian Navy views on strategy).

Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe, London: Groom Helm, 1987. (Surveys all the defense forces ot all the Western

European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces", pp 58-94, which examines in some detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward defence". Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by COL Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed Forces in Europe", which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in Germany").

** Nakanishi, Terumasa, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan", Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 81-97, especially pp 84-85 and p 9 0. '('The Maritime Strategy in the context of the overall military situation in Northeast Asia. "The new 'Full-Forward' strategy of the U.S. Pacific Fleet ... is certainly in the interest of Japan's conventional security". He is less sanguine regarding Japan's nuclear security, however).

Newman, Peter C., "Business Watch: About-face in Defense

Strategy", Maclean's Magazine, 12 January 1987, p 28. (Naval aspects of the defense debate in Canada on the eve of publication of the March 1987 official defense "White Paper", the first in Canada since 1971).

Ebata, Kensuke, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style", Proceedings, March 1987, pp 98-101. (On Japanese AAW concepts and' programs, essential elements of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific).

Department of Defence (Australia), The Defence of Australia; 1987, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19,1987. (The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy. "In the remote contingency of global conflict. . .our responsibilities would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then consider contributions further afield...for example, our FFGs...are capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well distant from Australia's shores").

** Mackay, CDR S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" Proceedings, April 1987, pp 82-89 . (Concludes that a peacetime' USN' Norwegian Sea CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment from Norway", and "a firm and agreed-upon line...on ROEs".

"There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a 600-ship Navy...the supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine US. policy for the future and not just a product of the current administration").

** Urban, Mark, "New Navy Plan to Attack Soviet Subs Near Bases", The Independent (London), April 14, 1987. (Commander-in-Chief of the' British''Fleet, ADM Hunt, on forward Royal Navy and NATO submarine—including anti-SSBN—operations) .

VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS

Gorshkov, RADM Serge G., The Sea Power of the State. Annannlis: Naval Institute Press, 1979'. See especially pp 29U and 329 .

("The employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...").

Yashin, RADM B., "The Navy in U.S. Military-Political Strategy", International Affairs (Moscow), #2, 1982. (Sees "new U.S. Naval Strategy^' of' Secretary Lehman as deriving from the "ocean strategy" of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner).

Rumyantsev, RADM A., "The Navy in the Plans of the Pentagon's 'New Military Strategy'", Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye,

June 1982, pp 59-64 . (Soviet public interpretation' oTKeagan Administration naval policy, including Norwegian Sea Battle Group operations and Arctic SSN anti-SSBN operations. Soviets fully expectant of a USN anti-SSBN campaign).

Strelkov, Captain First Rank V., "Naval Forces in U.S. 'Direct Confrontation' Strategy", Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1983, pp 78-82. (Highlights maritime’ roles of allies and sister services as well as USN).

Leighton, Marian, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan", Survey, Autumn-Winter 1983, pp 112-151. (Sees "striking and disquieting similarities" between recent "patterns of Soviet coercion against northern Europe and Japan").

"Soviet Naval Activities: 1977-1984", NATO Review, February

1985, pp 17-20. (A series of charts reflecting recent Soviet exercise activity in the North Atlantic).

Bystrov, RADM Yu., "U.S. Games in the World Ocean",

Literaturnaya Gazeta, September 4, 1985, p 14. (Soviet public react!ion to exercise Ocean Safari 85 and other forward exercises).

Tritten, CDR James J., Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment, and Policy’, Boulder' CO: West view, 1"9’8'6“.

'(By' the acting' Chairman of th'e" National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Examination of Soviet naval missions, including implications for U.S. naval strategy. Anticipates Soviet navy wartime bastion defense, anti-carrier warfare, strategic anti-submarine warfare, and--controversially--anti-SLOC operations. See also his "Defense Strategy and Offensive Bastion", Sea Power, November

1986, pp 64-70).

Watson, Bruce W., and Watson, Susan M., (eds.). The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities, Boulder CO: West view', T986 .

(See especially chapters by'rticFTard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction", and Keith Allen, "The Northern Fleet and North Atlantic Naval Operations", which see SLOC interdiction as more likely than most other knowledgeable experts expect, since Soviet thinking is seen as evolving toward greater consideration of protracted conventional conflict).

** George, James L., (ed.). The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, Annapolis: Naval' Institute Press,

198 8. (An outstanding collection of papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored conference of top experts in the field, including several references to the Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes' discussion of the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative judgments of RADM William Studeman, RADM Thomas Brooks, and Mr. Richard Haver, the nation's top naval intelligence professionals; and the contrasting views of ADM Sylvester Foley and ADM Harry Train, two former "operators". Wayne Wright's "Soviet Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War College and and the paper by Anthony Wells have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest,

Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National defense, February 1986 , pp 38-44 ) .

Trofimenko, Ginrikh, The U.S. Military Doctrine, Moscow:

Progress Publishers, 1986 . (See especially pp 34-36 on Mahan, geopolitics, and restraining Russia; and pp 193-201 on the alleged "Blue Water Strategy" of today).

** Falin, Valentin, "Back to the Stone Age", Izvestia, January 23/24, 1986, pp 5/5. (A top Kremlin spokesman takes the Maritime Strategy to task as being "remarkably odious": "It is

hardly possible to imagine anything worse". Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen). See also commentary by Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: The Soviet Union

Reacts", Proceedings, April 1986, p 111.

Petersen, Charles C., "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval Exercise", National Defense, February 1986, pp 32-36. (A leading strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees Soviets' strategy threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition to defending SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic homeporting, mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to "carrying the fight to the enemy").

** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation", Naval Forces.

No. 1/1986, pp 92-97. (Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps the greatest threat to NATO navies).

Balev, B., "The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on - the World Ocean", World Economics and International Relations, April 1986, pp 24-TCI (A Soviet perspective on the Maritime Strategy -- "novaya morskaya strategiya"* ^The three notional phases restyle’d' as"“"Keep^,ing'“OneseIt orPthe Verge of War", "Seizing the Initiative", and "Carrying Combat Operations into Enemy Territory").

* *

** Komenskiy, Captain First Rank V., "The NATO Strategic Command in the Atlantic" and "Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO Forces in 1985", Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozrenive, April 1986 (pp 47-53 and August 1986 pp 45-51). (Includes discussion of roles and missions of NATO naval forces in the context of the Maritime Strategy). See also Rodin, Colonel V, "The Military Doctrines of Japan", August 1986, pp 3-9.

Daniel, Donald C., and Tarleton, Gail Donelan, "The Soviet Navy in 1985", Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1986, pp 98-108. (Overview of operation's).

Ries, Tomas and Skorve, Johnny, Investigating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photos , Oslo : riorsk "

Dtenn kspolitisk I'nst'itutt, 198 6 . {"See especially pp 21-49, on the place of Fenno-Scandia and adjacent waters in the context of overall Soviet strategy).

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Soviet Military Objectives", World Policy Journal, Fall 1986, pp 667-695. (Adapted from his Ido ok', cited below". Much that goes against the grain of contemporary informed conventional wisdom regarding Soviet intentions, including the naval threat. Mediterranean seen as particularly important. See especially pp 676-680).

** Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View:

RimPac-86", Proceedings, October 1986, p 191. (The Soviets see linkages between' the Maritime Strategy and allied exercises).

van Tol, Robert, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-1985", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 18-34. (Most useful in its discussion of the' interactions between NATO and Soviet strategies and between NATO and Soviet exercises).

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), Military Objectives in Sovipf- Foreign Policy, Washington: Brookings', 1987. (Indi vidualisFTo

iconoclastic , and debatable). '

Schandler, Herbert Y., "Arms Control in Northeast Asia", The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 69-79. (Wide-ranginq~~ ar't'T'cTe which give's~the context within which the Maritime Strategy operates in the Pacific. Highlights "the ever-loonn nq nightmare of a two-front war" as gaining in credibility for the Soviet Union. "This two-front threat is enormously important to Soviet psychology and provides the United States with a major pressure point on Soviet leaders").

** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes", International Affairs (Moscow), 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. (See especially p 83, on 'the Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington today").

** Manthorpe, CAPT William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: More

Than Meets the Eye", Proceedings, February 1987, pp 117-118. (Sophisticated analysis"of "3-4 October 1986 Red Star article on potential changes in Soviet doctrine, strategic thinking and planning that, if adopted, will have important implications for Soviet response to the Maritime Strategy).

* Weinberger, Caspar, Soviet Military Power 1987, Washington: USGPO, March 1987. (More extensive analysis' of Soviet strategy and operational concepts than in previous five editions).

* U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Current Intelligence Issues", Washington: Department of the Navy Office of Information, March 1987. (See especially pp 1-4 on the anticipated employment of Soviet naval forces in wartime).

45 PEACETIME, CRISES, AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES

Howe, CDR Jonathan, Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics

in the Missile Age, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, TT7TT (The 196 7“

Mideast crisis,' the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and the effectiveness of conventional naval forces as foreign policy instruments, by a future flag officer and political-military affairs sub-specialist. Argues for a strong global naval posture, especially in the Mediterranean).

Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence", in Power at Sea: I. The New Environment, Adelphi Paper Number 122, London:

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9. ("The period we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely circumscribed").

Moore, CAPT J.E., RN, "The Business of Surveillance", Navy International , June 1974, pp 9-10. (Rationale for peacetime surveillance operations at sea).

Hill, CAPT J. R., RN, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea", Survival, Mar/Apr 1975, pp 69-72. (Takes issue with Elizabeth Young'' s Nov/Dec Survival article. Suggests that, "in the turbulent future7~niar"itime forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at home and away").

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.), "Changing Naval Operations and Military Intervention", in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of Military Intervention, Beverly Hills: Sage,~T977, pp 151-178,

and reprinted¹ in Naval War College Review, Spring 1977, pp 3-25. (Sees numerous constraints now' in 'place on the "almost casual use of force which used to be the norm" in military intervention by sea).

MccGwire, CDR Michael, RN (Ret.) and McDonnell, John (eds.), Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, New

York : Praeger", 197 7 . (See¹ especially’chapters by"MccGwire ,

Booth, Dismukes, and Kelly).

Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., "The Evolution of International Order and the Future of the American Naval Presence Mission", Naval War College Review, Fall 1977, pp 37-59. (Sees political and technological changes as necessitating revision to contemporary thinking on naval presence, just when that thinking had begun to solidify).

Eldredge, CAPT Howard S., "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence Operations", in Ra'anan, Uri et a1. (eds.), Arms Transfers to the Third World, Boulder CO: (TesFview, 1978, pp 2l-6'4. ("Argues

bhat growing' sea denial arsenals of littoral nations are complicating the risk calculations of the superpowers in using naval forces to further their interests. Focus on anti-ship missiles and submarine torpedoes).

46 Zakheim, Dov S., "Maritime Presence, Projection, and the Constraints of Parity", in Equivalence, Sufficiency and the International Balance, WashTngton: National' befense university,

August 19/8, pp' I'Ol-'118. (Argues for a combined arms apP^roac^'

vice solely naval focus, re: U.S. maritime presence).

Madison, CDR Russell L., "The War of Unengaged Forces -- Superpowers at Sea in an Era of Competitive Coexistence"/ ^Nava^- War College Review, March-April 1979, pp 82-94. (Thoughtful piece seeking¹ to "integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions into one framework: the "Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare").

Smith, Edward Allen, Jr., "Naval Confrontation: The

Intersuperpower Use of Naval Suasion in Times of Crisis"/ Ph.D. Dissertation, American University, 1979. (Examination of U.S. and Soviet use of their navies in six postwar crises. Heavily influenced by Luttwak's concept of "naval suasion").

Truver, Scott C., "New international Constraints on Military Power: Navies in the Political Role", Naval War College Review,

July-August 1981, pp 99-104. (Sees regular employment ot manor naval combatants and large-deck carriers as becoming less tenable in Third World areas for the remainder of the century, for a variety of reasons).

Neutze, CDR Dennis R., JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical

Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy", JAG Journal, Summer 1982, pp 81-158.

(By the legal advisor to' the beputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the lawfulness of the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and international law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political uses as expanding in the future).

Barnett, CAPT Roger W., "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism", Terrorism, Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480.

(A primary architect ot the Maritime Strategy argues that while the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested to be a large one").

Howe, RADM Jonathan T. "Multicrisis Management: Meeting an

Expanding Challenge", in Uri Ra'anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.), Security Commitments and Capabilities: Elements of

An American Global Strategy, Hamden TTT Arch on Books, 1985'ppp”

12 5-13 7'. (Reflections on America's ability to manage "multicrises", through naval as well as other means, by the U.S. naval officer who popularized the term 15 years earlier).

Martin, Laurence, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime", Naval War College Review, January-February 1985, pp 4-14. (A lecthYe summarizing many contemporary themes on the subject).

47 U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for" Appropriations' 'f or Fiscal'Year 1'9I16, Part 8, Washington: 0 S'G PO, 1986, pp" '4 40'9-4448'. (VA'DM' ’James A. Lyons on "Global Naval Commitments", February 28, 1985.

The official policy enunciated by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06)).

Arnott, CDR Ralph E. and Gaffney, CDR William A., "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force", Naval War College Review, March-April 1985 , pp 18-30. (Seeks 'to'"develop a rational structured approach to choosing a force tailored to respond to a particular crisis, so as to achieve the desired outcome with minimum effect on scheduled fleet operations).

Levine, Daniel B., Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval Forces in Peacetime"! CRM 85-77), Alexandria VX'": Center for

Naval Analyses, September 1983 . (Much more than underway replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis response and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean area, frequency, and number/types of combatants used).

Hill, RADM J.R., RN, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Annapolis: Naval Institute' Press, 1936 . (Chapter 6, "Normal

Conditions", pp 88-110, describes the various roles of navies, especially those of medium sized countries, in peacetime.

Chapter 7, "Low Intensity Operations", pp 88-131, covers operations somewhat higher up on the scale of violence).

Parritt, Brigadier Brian, Violence at Sea: A Review of

Terrorism, Acts of War and~Piracy,' and Countermeasures' to Prevent¹ Terrorism, Pa'r is : IOC Publishing , 1'9 8'6 . ('S'e e especially (Paul Wilkinson's "Terrorism and the Maritime Environment", pp 35-40, on the role of navies in combating terrorism and the kinds of naval force required).

Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy", International Studies Quarterly, March 1986, pp 59-76. ("The most"' effective" gunboat' diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim").

** Elliot, Frank, "Battleships Assume Some Carrier Duties", Navy Times, March 31, 1986, pp 25, 28. (Role of battleships vis-a-vis carriers in the presence mission).

** Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning", Orbis, Spring 1986, pp 133-148. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign against the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different Third World contingencies).

Wright, Christopher, "U.S. Naval Operations in 1985", Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1986, pp 34-40, 283-297. (The Fourth 'in' this excellent annual series. Note especially the observations regarding exercises and the Maritime Strategy on pp 34 and 38). See also "Comment and Discussion", Proceedings, August 1986, p 89.

* *

Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future", Proceedings, August 1986, pp 36-41. (Forcefully argues that Fhe days' of gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who have said otherwise).

Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign Policy", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 36-43. (By probably the most important“contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples).

"Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas", Washington Times, 24 November 1986, p 4-D. (On adjustments to UTS'. Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy flexibility and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO) .

James, Lawrence, "Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat Diplomacy Today", Defense Analysis, December 1986, pp 324-327.

(On its limitations, past and present).

Bush, Ted, "Sailors Spending More Time at Home Under PersTempo", Navy Times, February 9, 1987, p 3. (On naval presence and morale. The U.S. Navy tries to balance conflicting requirements).

49 As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies, other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training , and "real world" peacetime and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board and computer games now available that can provide players with insights into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players' understanding of the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out). Thus they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to "prove" validities or demonstrate "outcomes". Nevertheless, playing them is the nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can ever come to actually "being there", and therefore is an activity that can only be encouraged.

A. Commentary

** Perla, Peter C., "Wargaming and the U.S. Navy", National

Defense, February 1987 , pp 49-53 . (By a 1 eading'"'dent"e"r‘'for FTavaT Analyses war gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues for which they are best suited... a classic example of this process can be seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues raised by the game.

Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major exercise, as the process continues"). See also his "What Wargaming is and is Not", co-authored by LCDR Raymond T.

Barrett, Naval War College Review, September-October 1985, pp 70-78 ; and "War Games',' 'Analyses, and Exercises", Naval War College Review, Spring 1987 (forthcoming).

Connors, LCDR Tracy D., USNR, "Gaming for the World",

Proceedings, January 1984, pp 106-108. (On the Naval War College's Global War Game series, a principal research tool for identifying critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy issues). See also Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective" Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81; and Eulis, CDR James, "War Gaming at E!7e U.S. Naval War College", Naval Forces, 1985/V, pp 96-103.

50 B. Games

Grigsby, Gary, North Atlantic *86, Mountain View, CA: Strategic Simulations IncTT 1983 (Apple' Computer Game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings, July 1984, pp 116-117. (Entering premise in E"he initial' failure of NATO,

U.S., and the Maritime Strategy: "The great war in Europe is over. As expected, Russia won; it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next plan: complete domination of the North Atlantic through the isolation of Great Britain").

Nichols, W.J., Grey Seas, Grey Skies, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada", 1981 (second 'edition forthcoming in 1987)(Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings, July 1984, pp 116-117. (Seven "pre-built" scenarios", including Japanese destroyers versus Soviet submarines in the Kuril Islands, a Soviet amphibious group versus West German forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus Soviet carrier battle groups off the North Cape, and similar clashes in the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean. Focus is more tactical than the other games listed here).

Nichols, W.J., Fifth Escadra, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada", 1984 (Apple Computer Game). (Soviets vs NATO in the Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict ranging from rising tensions to global nuclear war).

Nichols, W.J., Seventh Fleet, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada", 1985 ("Apple Computer Game). (Soviets vs U.S. and Japan. Includes Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, and South China Sea operations).

Balkoski, Joseph, Sixth Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Revi^le’wed"b'y" U7S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, Strategy and Tactics, January-February 1986, pp 51-52. ("The inclusion' of 'random eTements into the system, the addition of logistic rules, and the key role of Soviet naval aviation made the Sixth Fleet game an excellent operational level naval war game”")".

** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed' by tJ.S.' Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, Proceedings, March 1987, pp 160-162. ("Those of us without access t'o 't'h'e' War College's computers can test the waters north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the application of the Maritime Strategy". Can be played simultaneously with Sixth Fleet, with forces shifted from one set of maps to the o’E’h'e'r', in' a" "simulation of war in both Northern and Southern European waters and adjacent areas).

Herman, Mark, Aegean Strike, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by"D".S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Palmer, Strategy and Tactics, (forthcoming in 1987). (The eastern Mediterranean . ^,rFew, if any , games .. .better integrate the strengths and weaknesses of land, air, and naval assets").

51 Callwell, Major C.E., BA, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo, Edinburgh: William Blackwood' and

Sons', 18T7V ('Seeks’Vo“^Trupdate" Mahan. See especially pp 178-182 and 196-197 on the Crimea, a case of successful application of a maritime strategy as a component of a larger allied military strategy vs Russia. "The dread of enterprises never attempted, and never indeed contemplated, by the Allied Powers forbade the concentration of the Russian legions in the real theatre of war"). Also, Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale, Hanover NH: University" Press of'New' England,¹! 985". (See

especially pp 124-126, 136-137, 158-159, 178, 201-202, 206-209. Looks at the global coalition aspects of the war—which blocked Russian expansion for over 20 years—from a present-day perspective).

** Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian",

in Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From

Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, bfinceton NJ": Princeton

University Press, 1986, pp 444-477, especially p 477. (By a Naval War College professor emeritus. The Maritime Strategy approvingly seen as antithetical to Mahan's teaching, especially as regards the role of other services, in a book which otherwise—and to its detriment—pays scant attention to makers of modern maritime strategy).

Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John, The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow: The Allied War in Russia7 1918-I92U, New York:

Atheneum , 198 6 , pp 4 2^L 4 77 7 2- / 3 , 247^:-'26"6, and" 274-776 . (Latest retelling of poorly devised global, allied, forward maritime operations against the Soviets 70 years ago, which, however, did achieve independence for the Baltic states).

** Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange, 1897-1945: The Naval

Campaign Through the Central Pacific, Annapolis: Naval

Institute Press, forthcoming in '198ir. (History's most successful pre-war plan, with lessons for the complex problems of naval strategic planning of the 1980s). Also, Shelton, CDR Michael W., CEC, "Plan Orange Revisited", Proceedings, December 1984, pp 50-56; and "Comment and Discussion", March 1985, pp 73 and 79. (Draws false parallels between the Western Pacific in 1941 and the Norwegian Sea today, i.e. between a purely naval, unilateral, theater problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem. Advocates ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the Soviets. Bad history and worse strategy).

** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 7—22. (By a former" Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again today, including linkage between gaming and planning).

52 Reynolds, Clark G., "The Maritime Strategy of World War II:

* *

Some Implications?", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 43-50. (By a former Naval Academy faculty member. Gleans lessons and implications for today's Maritime Strategy from that of World War II).

** Turner, ADM Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "Victory at Sea: Bull

Halsey at Leyte Gulf". Washington Post Book World, Dec 15,

1986, pp 1 & 13. (Review“of E.B. Potter's Bull Halsey. Draws

analogies to today's military problems, especially regarding "the offense and the defense". Of a piece with Turner's other writings).

** Palmer, Michael A., Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade',"'Washington : Naval Historical Center (''fortheoming in 19'88 ) . (An important discussion of the similarities and differences in U.S. naval strategic thought between the first and fifth postwar decades, the two postwar eras most characterized by concern with problems of naval warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself).

** Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution, London: Conway

Maritime Press, 19FF7 See especially Chapter 10, "Epilogue", pp 212-218. (On allied naval developments in the first post-World War II decade, including relationships to the Maritime Strategy developed three decades later).

Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navy, Vol I: War and Cold WaFT Annapolis': Uaval Institute l?ress',

Tforthcoming in 19F8). (By a Naval War College faculty member. "Maybe it would help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a presentation on how the Navy could function in the first 90 days of a war, and keep that presentation up to date "—RADM Burke in 1952 after relieving as OP-30, now OP-60).

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy", Proceedings, May 1954, pp 483-93. (Clearly foreshadows the basTc” outline 'of the Maritime Strategy. A analysis generally as relevant today as then).

Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War", Proceedings, August 1981, pp 36-41. (By a prominent Navy Department' historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy").

Wylie, CAPT J.C., "Why A Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor", Proceedings, August 1957, pp 811-817. (By the Navy's leading public' strategist of the 1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to the views expressed in the Maritime Strategy a generation later).

** Rosenberg, David, U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical Perspective, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1988).

Comptroller General of the United States, Implications of the National Security Council Study "U.S. Maritime Strategy arid ftaval' Force feequ'irements^h On the'Future "Naval Ship Force ( "pSaD-7,Washington": UYS". General' Accounting Office, March ~T, 19 7 8". [Uiscusses in detail—and in highly unsympathetic terms—the classified 1976 NSC study often cited by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman as triggering his thinking on U.S. naval strategy and force levels. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, "Which Five-Year Shipbuilding Program?", Proceedings, February 1977, pp 18-25).

Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978 . (Codification’of' Lehman's thought on naval strategy before becoming SECNAV. Much more than carriers, especially Chapter II). See also his March 1980 testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on National Defense: Alternative Approaches to the U.S. Defense Program, Washington": USG^O, 1980, pp 208-255.

U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study

(Unclassified Executive Summary), 2'8 March 1978. TS” progenitor of the'Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses of naval power).

MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES

Snyder, Jack L., "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914", in Robert Jervis, et al. (eds.). Psychology and Deterrence, Baltimore: John HopVins University Press, 198'5, pp 162-154 .

(Summarizes the literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive") .

Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and

Instability", International Security, Fall 1986, pp 151-175.

(An excellent piece'. 'Takes' issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive". "Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states with expansionist war aims, but also by states that have a strong interest in protecting an exposed ally". See also Snyder, Jack and Sagan, Scott D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the

Consequences of Counterforce", Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198).

Bartlett, Henry C., "Approaches to Force Planning", Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, pp 37-48. (By a Naval liar College faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but each such "approach" can—and does—apply to the drafting of Strategy as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often simultaneous, to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches: "top-down",

"bottom-up", "scenario", "threat", "mission", "hedging", "technology", and "fiscal". The first four were probably the most important influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s-early 1950s and the 1980's; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences tended to be driven more by perceived capabilities in the 1940s through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on "technology" and "budget" influences. There is actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with the organizational and psychological influences on war planning identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates).

Johnson, CAPT W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion" "Strategy: Ours vs Theirs'", Proceedings, September 1984, p 107. (One of the initial drafters of fch'e 'Maritime Strategy elaborates on the necessity, utility and existence of a national military strategy from which the Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down" view of strategy-building written in response to McGruther's "threat-based" approach, cited below. See also "Comment and Discussion", Proceedings, April 1984, p 31).

Hughes, CAPT Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strategy", Naval War College Review, January-February 1986 , pp¹ 2-17(the' strategy-tactics interface. The "bottom-up" view of strategy-building. See also his Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, cited in Section II above; and hill, kADM C. A'.' "Mark''', Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress and the Carriers", Wings of Gold Spring 1987, pp 6-8. But cf "In My View...: Tactical Skills", Naval War College Review”

May-June 1986, p 91: "The best plan's are' not' those developed

through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists and tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare").

Jampoler, CAPT Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to Support the Land Battle", Naval War College Review, November-December 1984 . (By a member of the'1983-84 Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Argument is distilled from a "scenario" approach).

McGruther, CDR Kenneth R., "Strategy: Ours vs Theirs".

Proceedings, February 1984, pp 344-39. (By a former member of Fh'e Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603 ). Calls for a strategy based on defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach. Unlike Bartlett, however, McGruther's approach is rooted in intentions as well as capabilities. Cf Vlahos chapter, cited in Section I above).

Holloway, ADM James L., Ill, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—A Functional Appraisal:, Oceanus, Summer 1985, pp 3-11. (Focus on "mission" by the 1974-7B"'CNO: "The organization of fleet battle

strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deployment of the U.S. Navy"). See also Williams, CDR John A. "Jay", USNR, "U.S. Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical

Reappraisal", Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1981, pp 499-528; and Byron, CDR''John', "Sea Power: TEe'‘Global Navy", Proceedings,

January 1984, pp 30-33. (Alternative views of the Navy's "missions" by two officers who later contributed to the Maritime Strategy's development. Also see "Commentary", Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1982, pp 682-684 for official Navy response to Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy development, and Williams's rejoinder. Williams's updated views are in "The U.S. and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces", Armed Forces and

Society, Summer 1984, pp 507-528).

Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime Power, Beverly Hills: Sage, 198T7 (A' good' example of

a^Hedging" Focus. Regards Lehman's "major change" as not enough. Also wants greater naval activity in the Caribbean, periodic visits to the South Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific, and continuing large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000, cited in Section IX above).

Froggett, CDR S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role",

* *

Proceedings, February 1987, PP 51-54; Williams, RADM J.W., Jr., "in My view ... Cross Training", Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 96-97; and Ch'ipma'n, Dr'. "Donald D ."', and Lay, MAJ David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress", Air University Review, January-February 1986, pp 45-50. (Good examples' of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on one system—in these cases the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the land-based heavy bomber— and arguments on strategy are built around it. But cf Taylor, Philip A., "Technologies and Strategies: Trends in Naval Strategies and

Tactics", Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 44-55. ("The consensus among senior military officers is that ... technology ... has not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy").

** Ullman, CDR Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Gramm-Rudman: A Fiscal

Pearl Harbour", Naval Forces, 11/1986, pp 10-11. (Congressional budget actions seen as potentially disastrous for both the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy. Shows the pitfalls of a solely "fiscal" approach). See also Ullman, Harlan, U. S. Conventional Force Structure at a Crossroads, Washington: Georgetown University¹ "CSTS", 1985 ; and the annual volumes issued by the Brookings Institution and the Committee for National Security, cited in Sections I-III above.

Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The

Uses of History for Decision-Makers, New York": The 'Free 'Press,

T986'. ("Seeks to tocu's decision-makers/users of the "historical" approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of "decision- makers". For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor -- The Crimea, Salonika, the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc. --can all be profitably examined using the Neustadt-May methodology).

XI. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS

The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily--although certainly not exclusively--by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks", but great importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.

Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would be recognizable to naval officers who developed the U.S.

Navy's warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s—e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers, and the Navy's 1978 Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts ol: the' U.S. Navy (NWP 1 (Rev.A)T-'-'are also^-evident in' the' Maritime Strategy'of the 1980s.

Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent discussiori of (a) global warfare—rather than separate service and theater operations; (b) warfare tasks--e.g. anti-submarine , anti-air, anti-surface, strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare--rather than traditional "platforms" or "unions"; and (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the Navy of the 1980s. This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the Strategy to satisfy current global fleet operational requirements, over the requirements for the future of competing bureaucracies in Washington. its effect in fostering common reference points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior officers, is already being felt.

While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from its roots throughout the Navy and Marine Corps, both over space

and over time, T't" owes a" high degree of its current utility to its

approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV).

These include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), Directors of the Strategy, Plans and Policy Division (OP-60), Heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one U.S. naval organization tasked to view maritime strategy not only in a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current national military planning parameters.

OPNAV's capabilities in this endeavor are due in part to the existence of the Navy Politico-Military/strategic Planning subspecialty education, screening, and utilization system. This system, while admittedly imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a network of strategists—in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere—for over a decade and a half.

58 Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs community today, a number of publications have appeared in the last decade decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.

(See cited in

also April 1982 "Contemporary U

article by Lehman and entry by Hattendorf, S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography").

The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos

Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in their Professional Journal", Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb 1980, pp 46-56. (A future pr imar'y' "cd'ritr 'fbutor to the development and articulation of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view of the navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of RADM J. C. Wylie's Military Strategy, RADM Henry Eccles's Military Concepts and Philosophy', and ADM Joseph J. Clark's coautfiored Sea Forces and i fs' Meaning) .

Buell, CDR Thomas B., USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior", Proceedings, January 1981, pp 40-45. Also "Comment and Kiscussion"': February 1981, p 21; March 1981, p 15; April 1981,

pp 21-23; June 1981, pp 77-79; July 1981, pp 78-80; August 1981, pp 71-75; November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20. (Posed the question: "Where will

we get our future strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no real answer to the question, a view shared by most of the eight "commenters and discussants" chosen for publication by the Proceedings, only one of whom was familiar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before 1981-82).

Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping 'U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980's'", International Security, Fall 1981, pp 202-207. (By the 1977-198U' Under Secretary' of the Navy. "The other side of the coin". A call to bring the "American academic intellectual establishment" and the military establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology"). For similar disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs. Practice", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1987 , pp 20+. ("Theorists and consultant's nave had "Tittle impact on the development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, stategic planning should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by military officers and civilian bureaucrats").

Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?", Proceedings, January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and PTscussTon^7r: March 1982 , p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982 , p

17. (The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-stra'tegist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plans staffs, the Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer and nine line officers--six with PhDs--assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic thinkers before 1982-83 . ) .

Hanks, RADM Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval Strategy?", Strategic Review, Summer 1982, pp 16-22. (An outstanding t>P-60 of the’ 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was published).

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century: Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval Thought", National Defense, April 1983, pp 27-30. (Covers the resurgence or the Uavai War College, although without describing the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually translated into Maritime Strategy elements). Also see 1983 Murray article cited in Section I above.

Milsted, LCDR Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategists", Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. Based on the skewed open literature available during this period. As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range planning" not well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of specifically educated and trained naval strategists responsible for long-range planning. Following his own model, Milsted was subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985, where he became a key contributor to the codification of the Maritime Strategy Cf U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference cited in Section" I above')".

Crackel, LTCOL Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels", Public Interest, Summer 1984, pp 18-30. ("The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War College: "None of the war college faculties is in

the forefront of development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually, no group has been more in the "forefront of development" in the "discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this bibliography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little apparent experience in actual strategy- or policy-making, and with an almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategists, he has apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial environment").

61 "413 Named as Proven Subspecialists", Navy Times, September 9, 1985 , p 58. (The Navy system for identifying ETfe "pool" of naval strategists. Results of the seventh biennial U.S. Navy selection board that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid- and high-level assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic Planning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. Includes many of the builders' of the’'liaritime Strategy. Note that these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists", but also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts).

** Stavridis, LCDR Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval

Marryott, RADM Ronald F., "President's Review, Nov-Dec 1985, pp 2-4. (By the

toaval' War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On development of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War College's vital supporting contribution).

Notes", 1985-86 of Strategy,

Naval War President

College oT the"

War College", Shipmate, November 1985, p 8. (On the role of the Naval War College m contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime Strategy, and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member).

** CNA Annual Report: 1985, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval

Analyses , 198 6 ,' 'especially pp 7-12 and 29-30 . (On CNA ' s contribution to the development of the Maritime Strategy and on its use of that strategy in planning its research programs. Also, CNA analysts' views on Soviet maritime strategy).

Davis, CAPT Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results", in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.). The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington

PEI Sc'hoTarly Resources, 1986 , pp 23-62 . CA" somewhat anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few thinkers", riven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions'—the carrier, submarine, and surface-warfare admirals". Thus the seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic politics of the 40s, 50s, and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-80s, -- despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy.

Cf articles by VADMs Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn--leaders of the submarine and air warfare communities--and by LTs Winnefeld and Keller—the rising generation—cited in Sections II and III above).

** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy", Navy Times, February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. (OPNAV strategists iIluminate a variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however, that they are somehow less important). Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report", Naval Forces, 11/1986, p 94. Alleges "an unusually large number oi'naval'officers do not recognize fully the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command believes is necessary". But cjE "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave", The Economist, April

* *

19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What is certain is that an entire

generation of junior and middle-grade naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the navy would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases".

** Burdick, CAPT Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval

War College Faculty", Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 81-89. (On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the Maritime Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War College).

** Wirt, Robert T., "Strategic ASW", Submarine Review, July 1986, pp 50-56. (Calls for a comprehensive ASW plan, driven by submariners, to support the Maritime Strategy. Unionism is not quite dead yet).

** Metcalf, VADM Joseph, "Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy's New

Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes", Navy News and Undersea Technology, July 18, 1986, p 2. (The Deputy' Chief of toaval Operations for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of little concern to Navy junior officers. A minority view).

Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges", National Interest, Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. (Antidote to~Cracket. "The best''of' the war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by which the other war colleges should be measured." "The strategy and policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a number of the best young military historians and political scientists in national security affairs to Newport.").

** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a

Course for the Navy's Debates", National Journal, February 21, 1987, p 435. (On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated forensics over the Navy's trumpeted maritime strategy (while) similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of official restraints". The Institute has come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at' the cutting edge of maritime strategy debate' today).

B. The Public Record: OP-603

From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by VADM William J. Crowe (then OP-06) and RADM Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 has evolved into an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional operator-strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence Agency officers.

Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs academic publics—especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College—these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. naval vision.

As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output is largely classified. Nevertheless, they—and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B— have often also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically, their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work on the Maritime Strategy. (For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this bibliography by RADMs Hanks and Marryott; CAPTs Barnett, Brooks, Johnson, McGruther, and Swartz; CDRs Hickman, Kalb, and Milsted; and LCDRs Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy",' generally the Ol>-b03 "Branch Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breadth of experience and depth of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty).

Weeks, LCDR Stanley B., "United States Defense Policy Toward Spain, 1950-1976, unpublished PhD dissertation, American University, 1977; and Johnson, LCDR William S., "Naval Diplomacy and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East -- 1921-1935, and "Defense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the Carrier in the Royal Navy", Navy War College Review, February 1972 , pp 67-88 and May-June 197 3 , pp '12-30. (Operators and international relations specialists as future strategists. By the OP-60 co-drafters of the initial 1982-1983 U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy briefings and testimony).

Barnett, CAPT Roger W., "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy", in Currie, MAJ Kenneth M. and Varhall, MAJ Gregory, The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political

Affairs in the' l98us, Washington: IISGPO, 1985, pp' 581-605.

(the operator' and Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980 paper by the 1983-84 OP-603 Branch Head). See also his "Their Professional Journal" (with Dr. Edward J. Lacey), Proceedings, October 1982, pp 95-101.

Seaquist, CDR Larry, "Memorandum for the Commander. Subject: Tactical Proficiency", and "Tactics to Improve Tactical Proficiency", Proceedings, July 1981, pp 58-61 and February 1983, pp 37-42T (The operator and tactician as future strategist. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group and 1984-85 OP-603 Branch Head).

Parker, LCDR T. Wood, "Thinking Offensively", Proceedings, April 1981, pp 26-31; "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Wavy",

Naval War College Review, Jan-Feb 1982, pp 3-16; and "Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom', ancf Naval Warfare", Proceedings, April 1983, pp 29-35. (The operator and War CoTlege student as future strategist. Three prize-winning essays by the 1984-85 principal OP-603 Maritime Strategy Action Officer).

Daly, CAPT Thomas M. and Myers, CDR Albert C., "The Art of ASW", Proceedings, October 1985, pp 164-165. (Operators and warfare specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and his primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their primary warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq War, July 1984 and May and' 'J’uly 1985, and on the Bikini A-Bomb tests, July 1986).).

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Addendum to Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography

Captain Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy

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Addendum to Contemporary U. S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography

Captain Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy

Quicklinks

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