Leadership Forum: The Critical Link

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made to reach such a condition.^ ₀pfj-

A division officer can strengthen a ship’s chain of command if he can forge a strong link with his LPOs. A true two-way exchange of informa­tion is the key, which means a lot of comparing notes.

Perhaps one of the most rewarding and critical relationships in the U. S. Navy exists between the junior division officer and the leading petty officer (LPO). The degree that this relationship is developed by the members of the wardroom and chiefs’ quarters is a direct indication of the unit’s effectiveness in all measurable areas. Like the perfect marriage, the rela­tionship between a division officer and LPO involves a common and well- expressed vision, mutual respect, useful

Of all the traits an aspiring na ^ cer has acquired, the ability to .^gciy senior enlisted personnel, P^artl_e|-j_ned- chief petty officers, is the least re ^ However, many different princip _ be used to develop a sound work^|n=^ ^ port between the division officer a LPO.

and other division members. Process separates the effective divi- ₍⁰ hcers from the ineffective ones. ^,s must know that their division offi- a_C(i ^{S com}mitted to the right course of ^c°unte ^fegar^*^ess °f the hardships en- of _a ^ered; There are times when a course _Cer ^ ^loa *^s presented to the division offi- ‘bv ^{C as ex}P^e(hent but not quite sir?” r '⁵⁰⁰'^c''' rather, as “How ’bout it, enerally, the LPO hopes the divi­de nl° ^{IC6r w}'^{d not} carry through with W_ant ^{an anywa}y- At these times the LPO _divi-^be “stood up to.” He wants his

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^chiefs’ d°^{b tbat} greatly dissatisfies the W ^{qUarters ls tbe ret}luction of re- by ₍j^S|oility. This can be done, of course, o_ne ^ect|y and formally relieving some- e_Ver ,^a Primary or collateral duty. How- s_Uc.’ ¹¹ seems that relieving someone tp_u ^as the LPO of responsibility happens by . ^rriore subtly but no less corrosively, the i° ^at'ⁿS the chain of command. For than ^^lsi0n officer to ask anyone other v_arj ^tae division LPO for the status of sj₀ ^as Projects, information, or profes- LpQ ^lnput is a form of relieving the

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that ^{6 m}°^{St lm}P^ortant asset—the one _rest_^^{lves s}hape and cohesion to all the

trust th '^ntegrity’ ^{tbe a}hihty to develop _mu , ^hrou8^h one’s actions. Integrity with ⁶ ^°^unc* ^ln h°th members, because _not h^{Ut U}' ^{an e}^^ect'^ve relationship can­to,^ .? ^built- Throughout an overseas ^tested ^{6 integrity a} division officer is th_e I p“^nSC,0USly ^or unconsciously, by

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^s'°n officer to show that he has

b|y _a‘”°^ne and that he is able to forci- rn_an(j, convincingly represent the com- n_ee(j ^S Policies, as well as the division’s know ^asPirations. LPOs need to Up ,₀ ^tbat their division officer will stand lj_ev„ , h°ss on matters which they be- w_ant ° ^{be r}*ght, fair, and practical. LPOs backb*¹⁶'¹ division officer to have the W_ltho^{0ne w}hich is bom of integrity. fn_an ^Ut this, standards erode, perfor- w_ar ^Wanes, and, on the larger scale, Readiness decreases, pen ^{e Sense} °f ownership is another im- L_Po^{nt tra}h that division officers and s_Cns^{s s}hould both possess. That is, the (li_v;,^{e tbat a}h matters that pertain to the si_0r) ¹⁰ⁿ Pertain, also, to the LPO. Divi- ^lfin_c°f^1Cers might use the underlying

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ch_ec^^at’ ^as LPOs, they have a blank

i_er .°f some degree of ownership and, a_re °^re, responsibility. Certainly there the ^{lmes w}hen the LPO does not know status of a particular job or task as

well as the Leading First in the division who has actually got the wrench in his hand. However, the division will suffer a certain loss if the division officer “re­lieves” the LPO of his responsibility for knowing by asking the First. A tricky tightrope for the junior officer to walk lies between the simultaneous need for conveying job status to the department head in a timely fashion and ensuring that LPOs meet their responsibilities for knowing the status. By requiring such reports exclusively of the LPO, division officers can train their LPOs to know about and aggressively pursue all matters that pertain to the operation of their par­ticular division.

Another vital concept that should be used by division officers and LPOs to build strength within their divisions is ‘‘out-and-aboutness”—called managing by wandering around (MBWA) in mod­em business literature. This practice in­volves the division officer and LPO showing an interest in divisional affairs by walking through the spaces and seeing how things are getting along. For the di­vision officer, the key is to see and not to intervene—unless ship’s or personnel safety is endangered. To intervene in a job or administrative task without the LPO’s knowledge or input would weaken the link between the division officer and LPO. Ideally, with the exception of a casualty situation, division officers need to exchange very few words about job status with anyone but their LPOs. Feasi­bly, the only words they might need to say to the troops are general questions, such as, “How’s liberty?” “How are the folks, the wife, the kids?” or "How’s studying going?” These are important questions for sincere division officers to ask, but they really do not need to ask much more than this. Through MBWA, an officer can improve morale in his divi­sion as well as build up his LPO’s critical role. Often, members of a division will make informal reports to their division officer while one of these “inspections” is taking place. The division officer can use these opportunities to bolster the strength and meaning of the chain of command by ensuring that the member informs the LPO as well, thereby reaf­firming the LPO of his link in the chain of command.

“Team sense” is what makes a whole greater than the sum of its parts. Division officers and members of a division feel­ing they are all part of the same team and committed to the same goals is an essen­tial factor that distinguishes effective di­visions on board ship from mediocre ones. Frequent and meaningful goal­setting is a key element. From what to train on, to when to accomplish major job items, to deployment objectives, to how to prepare a sailor for the next ad­vancement-in-rate exam are all topics which must be jointly discussed by the division officer and LPO.

Frequently, a junior officer acts as a wardroom “ambassador” to the chiefs’ quarters. He is in a position to present a plan or policy to the LPO in a favorable and meaningful light so that the LPO feels he is part of the policy—he “buys into” the new plan and then turns around and “sells” it to the troops. A policy will be effective only if an LPO supports it because the enlisted ranks look instinc­tively to their LPO for direction and as a role-model. Division officers can also enhance team sense (and ownership) by soliciting LPOs for long- and short-term goals. In modem corporate language, this process, called “contracting,” is used by executives who attribute its success to the resultant worth and ownership felt by the employee or, in this case, the LPO. The process also involves an agreement over what type of monitoring and tracking the supervisor will use. By the time the divi­sion officer and LPO are finished with their discussion, they have a list of goals that is challenging and realistic and has been jointly decided. Now it becomes the division officer’s job to “facilitate”—to do everything possible for the LPO to achieve the objectives discussed. One analyst says that “except when giving orders or directions, you [the division officer] are the servant, not the master, regardless of your authority. Your job is that of a midwife, helping the receiver to give birth to the same ideas, . . . feel­ings, or motivations that you have.”^[1] Christ used this principle when he washed the feet of his Apostles.

An essential tool in any relationship is feedback. Whether it is between division officer/LPO, husband/wife, parent/child, or commanding officer/executive officer, feedback must occur frequently, con­structively, and honestly. In I’m OK, You're OK, Dr. Thomas A. Harris dis­cusses “strokes” and “stroking”— positive feedback which enforces good behavior by encouragement and praise and negative feedback which involves disciplining and targeted counseling to correct improper behavior.² Feedback of both types is an important show of care and concern and will be perceived as such by LPOs and their division. To “stroke” positively enhances one’s self-esteem which “leads to feelings of self-confi­dence, worth, strength, capability, and adequacy, of being useful and neces­sary. . . .”^[2] All of these are very essen­tial feelings. Similarly, a LPO can have a heavy impact on his division officer. It means a great deal to the junior officer’s self-esteem to be accepted by the division and its LPO. To be told by the LPO that a particular problem was handled well or that a job was done well can be very con­structive, real-time reinforcement. The pitfall of such an idea is that the junior officer tries to please the LPO and the division instead of representing and pur­suing the goals of the command. But if the encouragement and feedback are hon­estly and maturely conveyed and re­ceived, they can be very important to the welfare of the relationship.

The young junior officer receives al­most no formal training for dealing with the tenuous relationship that exists be­tween the division officer and LPO. NROTC, Officer Candidate School, and the U. S. Naval Academy concentrate on providing the candidate with many op­portunities to work with peers and se­niors. Sports, academics, and extracur­ricular activities constitute a sort of leadership laboratory in which the candi­date consciously or unconsciously exper­iments with various leadership styles. However, they do not afford the aspiring officer the chance to practice leadership skills with subordinates. While it is true that first class midshipmen are, by rite, placed in positions of responsibility over

groups of subordinates, these subordi­nates are, almost without exception, as­piring officers themselves who are by nature idealistic, naive in the ways of the Navy, and. generally, easily influenced.

A newly commissioned officer goes to the fleet with excellent training on how to deal with seniors and peers, but very little training in dealing with the subordinates with whom he or she will come in contact within the first hour of reporting on board ship. Fortunately, however, these leader­ship fundamentals that the officer has gathered by the time of his or her com­missioning are indeed the necessary be­ginnings. These must be expanded and then built upon. It is a sink-or-swim chal­lenge which, like all challenges of this nature, is exciting and potentially very rewarding. So where does the junior offi­cer learn? Important coaching of the ju­nior officer on how to deal with enlisted men comes, certainly, from the other of­ficers on board, just through watching. But like any learning process, true knowledge comes from doing. American author Herman Melville wrote: “The sea has been my Harvard, the sea has been my Yale.” Only with time and diligence will the junior officer be plugging away on all leadership cylinders.

The relationship between division offi­cers and leading petty officers is the most

critical one on board U. S. Navy

Through them word is transforme action, policies are carried out, mo ^ ^ shaped, and energy gains direcuom^^ weak link exists between these imp people, the division will not °P^era _w;n a clear sense of purpose; productive ' ^ be sporadic at best and tend to ^resa ^ad crises only. Together they form t ^ ₍₀ whose collective responsibility ¹ ^ ^ inspire, lead, encourage, discip m > prune and to “sell” goals, P° thoughts, and ways of thinking- _g(j There is a great variety of we ^ concepts available that division ⁰ can use to build an effective re a ¹ with their LPOs. The division o ^ _re_ let is extremely rewarding—^r"^e _mands sponsibility and challenging ^e _e|_se. which are not likely to be ^^0UIVj-fj_Cult where. The process of learning^1S ₍i_ng yet rewarding. The rewards of cu the competence, enthusiasm, aj¹ |pjjjj_ng mitment of subordinates are as u as they are bounteous. ^{* [3] 3}