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Contents:
Death of a Captain
A Titular Nuke CO
The Achilles’ Heel
Does NFO Mean Non-flying Organization?
January Ad
Naval Surface Fire Support and the Iowas The Admirals’ Revolt October 1985 Issue What’s Going on Here?
Who Needs Arms Control?
Blue-out and Nuclear Sea States Sealab: A Postscript The General Unrestricted Line Surface Warfare and Surface Warriors The LHD and Sea Control
“Death of a Captain”
(See H. L. Buell, pp. 92-96, February 1986
Proceedings)
Major F. G. Sanford, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps—Having recently completed a review of Professor E. B. Potter’s splendid biography, Bull Halsey (Naval Institute Press, 1985), and having spent more than two years in the Marine contingent on board the carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65), I was doubly impressed by Commander Buell’s expose of Captain Miles R. Browning’s less-than-distin- guished wartime command of the USS Hornet (CV-12). His article is a provocative commentary offering many valuable moral leadership perspectives.
For past, present, or future readers of Bull Halsey—and I recommend it—a few minutes invested in “Death of a Captain” will add a complementary perspective to some of Admiral Halsey’s problems, which were caused or exacerbated by Browning’s caustic personality. There is no doubt that Halsey was fully appreciative of his chief of staff’s limitations, but he was willing to endure the pernicious side effects in order to exploit fully what he perceived to be Browning’s brainpower, an asset that—I believe— Halsey sought in others because he underestimated it in himself.
For past, present, or future commanders—or anyone aspiring to a leadership position—a few minutes invested in Commander Buell’s article will yield a vivid image of the potential “dark side” of command—a side we should acknowledge and conscientiously avoid. It is incumbent upon leaders to understand completely the potential outbreak of the perfidious malady, capable of striking even the most accomplished commander: obsession with perfection and success at the cost of the human element. In just a few pages, Commander Buell does an exceptional job of clearly portraying the tyrannical and temperamental captain of a carrier who lets his frenzied approach to fanatical obsessions destroy the cohesion and teamwork essential to the accomplishment of his own goals. Such a captain eventually destroys himself.
“Death of a Captain” is much more than an expertly researched and composed situation narrative. It is an analytical piece of masterful quality and insight. Commander Buell not only expertly and
succinctly summarizes the obvious teac ing points into less than three columns a the conclusion, but he also transcends t explicit and lays the foundation for en ^ less implicit exploration. The story is * bizarre, yet so real, that we are driven ^ ponder. We are not reading about a w° fictional character wreaking havoc on Caine; we are reading of a World V/ar reality on board the Hornet.
The most significant aspect of Co mander Buell’s vignette is the refreshing candor. It is real life. It happens every day, and like it or not, it could happen any of us. The article is brief enoug ensure the reader’s attention, but subs tive and stimulating enough to guara° thoughtful study and reflection. H . one, applaud Commander Buell’s exp tory accomplishment and beg for 111
“A Titular Nuke CO”
(See J. Rogitz, pp. 90-92, January 1986
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Sean P. Sullivan, U-S-S'^J ^ Lieutenant Rogitz missed the mark ^ advocating the split wardroom concep board U. S. nuclear submarines as a to “catapult us ahead of the Soviets ther than any single technological breg through.” I believe he overstates problems of our present submarine o cer career path, underestimates our ta ^ cal abilities, and proposes a solution serious drawbacks of its own.
Lieutenant Rogitz contends that we to produce the most competent and P^^ fessional officer corps in the world cause we train submarine officers to nuclear engineers, not tacticians. He ports that a junior officer on board first submarine “normally spends 01 of his tour ‘back aft,’ qualify*0® r and maintaining the nuclear P° ^
plant. . . . By the end of his first tour^
has no more tactical expertise than he_ after basic officer of the deck qua'1 lgte tion.” This is simply not true. A j accurate description of the typical tour goes like this: A newly reported cer will spend his first three t° ef months qualifying as engineering 0 ^ of the watch. Once qualified, he takes ^ place on the aft watchbill and beg10 f qualify forward, first as diving off'c , w the watch and then as officer of the
(OOD). Sometime between 12 and 18 months on board, he is usually assigned primarily to the forward watchbill, standing an occasional engineering watch for proficiency. By this point in the wardroom cycle, another more recently reported junior officer has taken his place on the aft watchbill. Thus, during his last two years on board, the junior officer can expect to be an OOD during several maneuvering watches, tactical exercises, and special operations.
Perhaps, on some ships, junior officers do suffer from the dilemma Lieutenant Rogitz describes. If so, it is the fault of that particular ship’s senior officers—not “the system.” A good commanding officer (CO) ensures that his junior officers (JOs) are well trained in all areas and get equal opportunity to “drive” as well as “push.”
During my initial sea tour, on the Plunger (SSN-595), I served as both reactor controls assistant and main propulsion assistant and stood engineering officer of the watch during two operational reactor safeguards examinations. However, I also served as weapons officer, stood OOD during a Western Pacific deployment, and stood as OOD during two Tactical Readiness Examinations. My collateral duties included ship’s diving officer and ship’s qualifications officer (in charge of the enlisted dolphin qualification program). When I recently detached from the Plunger after 40 months on board, I wasn’t quite ready to assume command, but I was very comfortable with my acquired tactical skills.
Other fallacies of Lieutenant Rogitz’s argument include the following:
- “We are understandably more concerned with the political ramifications of reactor safety than with tactical proficiency for a war that is not imminent. That is not what we say, but it is the way we train.” Anyone on board the Plunger during our tactical readiness examination would strongly disagree. Ironically, the squadron commodore who administered our examination used to work for Naval Reactors, and undoubtedly learned a lot from the engineers, including how to administer a tough, thorough, and fair examination.
- Lieutenant Rogitz asserts that because U. S. submarines rarely make unassisted landings as the British do, this is a tacit
admission that we are inferior ship dn ers. Using tugs for landings is like using seat belts in your car; they make the evo lution safer and they are readily aval able, so why not use them? We made se eral landings with the Plunger where tug didn’t do anything other than com alongside, but I always felt better kno ing the tug was there, just in case.
- A submarine officer will,“if ^
lucky, shoot one torpedo as approach o ficer during command qualification- This lucky officer will not qualify sl® the current instructions (Comman Submarine Forces, Atlantic, Instruct' 1552.lL/Commander Submarine Force • Pacific, Instruction 1552.1 IE) require^ least four attacks be conducted where pedoes are launched. Six additional s' ^ ulated attacks are required. The wardroom concept would do little to crease the opportunities a junior ot has to fire torpedoes since the 11IT1‘ availability of assets (retrievers, targ v helos, and exercise weapons) is m°!.ecan strictive than the amount of time a J devote to such activity. ua[
- “The approach and attack ma”ea. would become as widely read by ■
en as the reactor plant manual is by gineers.’ ” if naval warfare publicans get less attention than do reactor ant manuals in any wardroom, then the ought to take another look at his wardroom training program.
lem'?Utenam Rogitz’s solution to a prob- dra ‘uat ^oes not ex'st has its own serious of th 3C*CS most s'2n*f’cant impact to I' 6 wardroom concept would be t, !01'1 t*le flexibility of the wardroom. A Subt SUbmarine has 14 or 15 officers, sen ni?t tbe tbree PeoPle whose duties (Cn6ra ly *CeeP tbem the watchbill Ce , ’ executive officer, and supply offi- sta ^OU're *eR with about 12 watch- thj1 ers- Typically, from two to four of Cau*e ‘hfcers are not fully qualified befog h t ^ baVe 0n'y reccnt|y reported on Cer ' 4hat leaves about eight to ten offi- the r man tbe at-sea watchbill. Under be ah 11 Wardr°°m concept, there would bg out lour or five officers who could no(CaS*neering officer of the watch, but tj0 and vice versa. Such a situa-
inWould severely limit a CO’s options par|jaan'n8 his watchbill. It would be PowICUlarly detrimental on a nuclear- ered attack submarine, which typically leaves officers on shore during short underway periods to attend schools, take leave, etc.
Another problem would be to develop incentives for the split wardroom engineers. Lieutenant Rogitz recognized this problem, but I believe it is more difficult to overcome than he thinks. I, for one, am willing to accept the demanding challenges of our nuclear-power program because I look forward to the ultimate reward: command at sea. Career engineers would not be eligible for submarine command. I suspect we would end up either having to pay higher salaries and increased bonuses or accepting less talented individuals to supervise our reactor plants. Congress would likely balk at the first alternative, and naval reactors would certainly balk at the latter.
I do agree that we should never be satisfied with our current abilities, and we must continue to improve our tactical capabilities in many areas. But I do not believe that a drastic reorientation of our current system of submarine officer development is warranted. I offer Lieutenant Rogitz a bit of age-old wisdom: If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
“The Achilles’ Heel’’
(See J. P. Kelly, pp. 41-45, November 1985;
R. N. Gottshall, W. H. Doherty, p. 16, January 1986; S. T. Connaughton, pp. 102-103,
February 1986 Proceedings)
William C. Winkley—I found Captain Kelly’s article very interesting. His idea of using large tankers was well taken. However, I do not understand the relevance of picturing the Greek bulk carrier Triton C in this connection. Surely a photograph of a U. S. tanker would have been more appropriate.
“Does NFO Mean Non-flying Organization?”
(See K. B. Sherman, p. 104, February 1986 Proceedings)
Captain J. R. Avella, U. S. Naval Reserve—1 knew that it would be only a matter of time before this issue would hit the pages of Proceedings. It has been a matter of consternation in the Naval Reserve patrol squadron (VP) community for almost the entire 15 or more years that VP Reserve Force squadrons have existed. Officers wrote to the Chief of
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vVa Operations during the Zumwalt th t'1C su^ject has been addressed by ev® hJaval Reserve Policy Board; and Veni now the annual scurry to write com- tian er waiver letters has become as rou- js6 as annual fitness reports. The subject at ?mot'onaL very personal, and cloudy he,--ith many vocal proponents on
foi^s a naval flight officer (NFO) and 0j-p er reserve squadron commanding fr(.ICe(r’ ' have been exposed to the issue ma7°th sides: when selected for com- a_.n er and potentially facing the “up tun ?Ut polic'y-” and later after being form3 e enough to be selected for com- qun ’ 1 had to decide the fate of subsent commander selectees.
tion 11611 the reservists began the transi- ttla . t0 the P-3 Orion antisubmarine/ nii:r,e patrol aircraft in significant [> 3,,ers’ 25% of fleet P-3 assets were Piet h ^hen the transition was com- Doe. ’ almost 50% of the fleet was com- Ce6 ^e trained base of offi-
bcctlCorn‘nS from different aircraft has hav 'fi't^1 US *or as l°ng as the reservists ex6 down P-3A/Bs. An outstanding p0rmple's the Jacksonville VP Reserve a| Ce scluadron which draws its NFOs p_3pSt exclusively from the Jacksonville ISf0 . Community. An almost perennial aWa ri fV*S winner (the battle efficiency tha(r 'or reserve patrol wings, Atlantic), ^ squadron does not seem to suffer. regr'rCraft downgrades and the need for fac.essive training have always been hlPo°u hfe in the U. S. Naval Reserve: eat •S ”3Ve switched from the F-14 Tom- tsjaJH, ^1C deet to the F-4 Phantom in the ina Reserve. In the VP community, as the , ers’ the tactics don’t change, just the arc!'vare to execute them. Now with ti0nsactlcal navigation system modifica- p-3 a ^hnological differences between p and P-3Cs are reduced. tiCj °r -Vears, pilots and NFOs have par- ti0n . ed at the highest reserve opera- Perf lntensity with superb results. The Vldu7lance of both squadrons and indi- exCea S laas been well documented. This ***** individual performance has Parti Qij *n Very dlS*1 promotion rates, Tho u arly to the rank of commander, for resuit is someone who “strokes”
Uire^any years being “put out to pasty^ Perhaps at the point in his career cgqj he *s most valuable. Similar cir- evervatlces exist in the regular Navy. Not cl()n>|0ne achieves command—those who djff m°ve on to other things. So what’s ^ent about the reserves? caUsge real meat of the issue and the Njobr i°^ ll|c consternation is money. Pot »l ^ Wants to lose his paycheck. It is e value of trained officers; it is not the apparent lack of trained P-3A/B NFOs in the fleet—it is the senior lieutenant commanders and newly selected commanders realizing that they are about to lose the $100+ per drill.
While he was Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt answered a letter from a disappointed commander-selectee essentially by saying that it is not the Navy’s responsibility to guarantee its Selected Reserve officers a 20-year paid career. If that’s what an individual wanted, he should have remained on active duty. There is a guarantee of a 20- year career for those who reach at least the grade of lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve; only the pay is not guaranteed. Admiral Zumwalt’s answer is still appropriate in 1986.
My comments should not be construed as those of one who does not support the concept of commander waivers. There are documented cases of VP squadrons which have had manning problems because of their relatively remote geographic locations. These problems were exacerbated because a significant portion of the officer cadre would make commander. To have lost these officers would have left a squadron truly incapable of meeting both peacetime and mobilization operational requirements. In those situations, the chain of command has used waivers as the short-term solution. On the other hand, there are also documented cases where a commanding officer has exaggerated his potential losses in capability solely to take care of billet incumbents. While perhaps noble when viewed as rewarding those who have served well, such activity is questionable when viewed against the entire scope of command responsibility. As in any exception-accommodation system, there have been users and abusers.
When naval flight officer manpower shortfalls have arisen in the past, we found alternative solutions, such as transitioning F-4 radar intercept operators to P-3 navigators. I have benefited from this approach: I began my naval career as a surface officer and later earned my wings as a naval flight officer in the Selected Reserve. We need more imaginative solutions and less preoccupation with the problems.
January Ad
(See p. 1, January 1986 Proceedings)
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caliber gun systems.
Modular weapon systems seem to the wave of the very near future. 1 155-mm. VLGS appears to fit the needs of naval gunfire support and a ship’s se defense and antisurface warfare capabj1 ties. The advent of this gun system cou ^ and would, be a very useful and nee e augmentation to the big 16-inch gunS 0 the Iowas.
permissible, I do hope the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) got a hefty contribution from Marconi-Rockwell for her crew/ family welfare fund—at least $1 per head for that HFAJ gang on deck.
Editor’s Note: The Marconi-Rockwell ad is the product of high-technology gaming. The sailors of the Carl Vinson were also surprised to see all those strangers on their flight deck in the ad.
“Naval Surface Fire Support and the Iowas”
(See S. C. Truver and N. Polmar, pp. 130-133, November 1985, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Terry A. Sanner, U. S. Naval Reserve, Naval Gunfire Officer, 10th Marines—Dr. Truver and Mr. Polmar introduced an interesting alternative to conventional naval gunfire support with the use of the assault ballistic rocket system (ABRS). They also mentioned a proposed 155-mm. vertical loading gun system (VLGS). The ABRS would be best suited to replace or augment the aging 5-inch/38-caliber gun mounts on the Iowa-c\ass.
What I propose is the installation of the 155-mm. VLGS on newer class ships, such as the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)- class. The current design of this system is modular, facilitating ease of overhaul and/or replacement. Another advantage is an increase in projectile variety—the 155-mm. VLGS would be capable of firing all 155-mm. artillery rounds held by the Marine Corps and the Army. With the installation of the 155-mm. VLGS, the U. S. Navy would achieve ammunition uniformity with Marine Corps and Army artillery. This uniformity would aid interservice support of ammunition supplies. Also, the 155-mm. VLGS would have greater range than the existing 5-inch/54- caliber guns, which have a maximum range of approximately 21,000 meters. The 155-mm. guns would have a maximum range of approximately 30,000 meters with the rocket-assisted projectile. The 155-mm. VLGS is compatible with the Mk-86, Mk-92, and Mk-68 fire control systems. The existing 5-inch/54- caliber guns are compatible only with their designed fire control systems—for example, the Mk-42 gun mount is compatible only with the Mk-68 fire control system (except in the USS Tattnall [DDG-19], USS Goldsborough [DDG- 20], and USS Benjamin Stoddert [DDG- 22], which have been modified to accept the Mk-86 fire control system); the Mk-45 gun mount is compatible with the
Mk-86 systems, and the 76-mm. Mk-75 gun mount is compatible with the Mk-9- system. This system interfacing would be a significant advantage over the current gun systems.
There are some disadvantages, the most significant being the weight of the 155-mm. VLGS system. The weight Module A, including ammunition han dling and stowage equipment and con trol panels, is approximately 130,00 pounds, compared with the 5-inch/5 caliber Mk-45’s 53,000 pounds. When compared with the 5-inch/54-caliber Mk- 42’s 139,000 pounds, the VLGS has an advantage. The firing rate (maximum continuous rate) of the 155-mm. VLGS is ten rounds per minute. This is one-ha the firing rate of the current 5-inch/5
be
(Continued on poge
90)
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Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 26)
mariners and that we are not giving face warfare officers (SWOs) en
sur-
lough
i’s
LieU'
surface squadrons. Command is
4-
“The Admirals’ Revolt”
(.See P. R. Schratz, pp. 64-71, February 1986
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral David L. Martineau, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Schratz’s article presents an excellent account of that critical period for the Navy and Marine Corps. An important omission, however, is that it passes over the role of Congressman Carl Vinson (D-GA), who, more than any other individual, brought about a peaceful compromise to that bitter interservice battle over roles and missions. He accomplished this as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1949-1950, through skillfully conducted hearings at which he was one of the alltime masters. This was followed by legislation that effectively prevented the takeover or strangulation of naval aviation by the newly created Air Force and of the Marine Corps by the Army. Certainly nothing which has happened since has disproved the strategic soundness of Chairman Vinsons’s far-reaching response to the historic “Revolt of the Admirals.”
The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee met with key witnesses on the first day of unification squabble hearings. Left to right: Congressman Carl Vinson (D-GA); Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfield; Commander, Pacific Fleet, Arthur W. Radford.
In his otherwise well-documented article, Captain Schratz states that in 1947 “even House military expert Carl Vinson (D-GA), long known as the father of the modem Navy, jumped ship and climbed aboard the Air Force bandwagon.” That Congressman Vinson was the dominant single influence in preparing the way for the victorious Navy of World War II is certainly true. But it is untrue to say that he deserted the Navy for the glamorous new Air Force of the early postwar period. Perhaps he gave that impression in 1947 when he lent initial support for the creation of a 70-group Air Force. There was nothing to be gained at that time by opposing what was then being hailed as the new wave of future air warfare. Besides, it was a good issue on which Congress could look into the overall defense structure for the postwar period. And that is exactly what happened.
However, at that time, the Navy was not making a very good case for itself in the public relations battle then being waged over roles and missions, as well as the battle over unification of the services. Also, the Navy had inadvertently humiliated Congressman Vinson. It neglected to give him advance notice at the time the agreement was reached with the Army and Air Force on the unification revisions which led to the National Security Act of 1947.
At that time, I was the representative of the Chief of Naval Personnel on key personnel legislation, and I was privileged to have frequent early morning meetings with Congressman Vinson in his office from 1947-1949 and during later periods.
Congressman Vinson had been keenly interested in the unification negotiations being conducted in 1947. But when agreement was finally reached among the services in that same year, he was angered and humiliated when the Navy failed to notify him before he read about it in the daily newspaper. No one in politics enjoys surprises of that kind. When I later asked him what his reaction had been, he replied: “I put on my hat and caught the first train back to Georgia.”
He came back, of course, and continued many more years of distinguished ser vice to the armed forces and to the nation-
October 1985 Issue
“What’s Going on Here?”
(,See W. G. Carson, p. 124, October 1985,
W. J. Toti, p. 16, M. Amedick, pp. 16-1'' December 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James K. Gruetzner, V- Navy—Another battle in one of the V- ■ Navy’s internecine wars (surface vers submarine this time) has commence again on the pages of the Proceedings- The first salvo was fired by Captain Car son in the October “Surface Warfar Issue.” He believes that too many sU* face squadrons are commanded by s command opportunities. Lieutenant ° fired back with a spread directed at surface warfare community’s high'va . units: more ships. In Lieutenant i° words, “Surface ships are not legittma ASW platforms.” Conclusion: n111 more submarines.
I am a submariner, fully sharing 1 tenant Toti’s pride in our “Silent vice.” I’ve also qualified as a sur warfare officer and share Captain ^ son’s pride in that which defines the ^ ^ face warrior. Perhaps my perspective member of both communities wil ^ helpful. Both Captain Carson and Ltf tenant Toti, at times, are right; at o times, both are wrong. ^
Captain Carson points out that the mariners commanding surface ^ squadrons possess “the characterist fine leaders—intelligence, force, 7 mism, and dedication.” Their only r , -s back is that they haven’t grown up g surface warfare community. He 1 this sends a signal to junior surface fare officers, implying that they are ^ (0 ond rate. Not so. The correct signa junior SWOs is this: Fine ^ea^erS^ of eluding submariners) get comma
c , 1 Sc not .
------------------------------------ orones sarily limited to the home-grown r.ft uct. For command, work to be a '
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Th
ne surface warfare specialty is not S()mPosed of the third best. Captain Carnot IT,a'ces an error in logic. If an officer dm ^Ua'*fied for submarine or aviation Warf C3n rema'n qualified for surface ^ are duty, it does not mean that the thg1 ''b'eers are not allowed to serve in off SUrJace warfare community. And an 0rer s disqualification from submarine iCaaV,ation duty for reasons of technologic.01' Physical inability by no means qual rS t*13t 's not better than many so Pro * ICC* *n tde means, methods, and go Sfcut'on °f naval warfare. We do have Oct . SUr^ace warfare officers: read the s°nie Cr^rocee<^‘n8s for examples of look6 And can 2et b*gh commands: Pleetat tde present Commander Second 0n» another Proceedings author—as
°ne example.
forceS tll£ excel,ence of the surface brati S 3nC* ^C'r 0fftcers is worthy of cele- I_ieu?n ln an *ssue of Proceedings. But 'dight^h11' ^0t'—*ess ironically than out °ave been appropriate—pointed eXcen Slgniflcant flaw in that otherwise c0ne„entf'ssuc: the noticeable absence of rinern 'or the still unsolved antisubma- rnain^Var^are (ASW) problem. That re- c°nfro°ne °* tlle toughest propositions make mm8 the battle group today. What s Us absence even more surprising is the significant increase in surface ASW capabilities over the past four or five years and the still pressing need for improved ASW-equipped ships. There is a vital role for surface ASW platforms. Using submarines for ASW close in to the battle group is not a wise idea. The reaction time of a LAMPS-equipped (omigosh, aviators now!), towed-array ASW frigate or destroyer to the close-in threat is superior to the otherwise hands- down champs—our submarines. The quicker reaction time of the surface unit, even though saddled with an inferior weapon, the Mk-46 torpedo, could make the difference between a timely attack before the hostile submarine takes out the carrier or a belated attack after the carrier’s loss. In today’s world (contra Lieutenant Toti), surface ships are often legitimate ASW platforms.
Our submarines are needed to reduce the threat to the surface battle group to a manageable level—and to go where surface forces can’t survive. This is well recognized in public testimony on our maritime strategy: The Soviet submarine (and air) threat must be reduced prior to steaming the battle group into the bear’s gullet.
In my mind, submariners and surface warriors are natural allies—submarines are needed to reduce the threat in areas where surface forces conduct the operations that submarines are incapable of doing.
“Who Needs Arms Control?”
(S«* G. E. Miller, pp. 39-42, January 1986
Proceedings)
Robert /. Widder—Admiral Miller’s cogent remarks present us with a refreshingly different outlook on arms control. During the 20 years that I have been involved with arms control issues, I have witnessed many changes in the arms control community; by no means were they all changes for the better. In particular, one tends to find that in the past, decisions on arms procurements or reductions tended to be based on analysis, but today the analysis is often skewed to justify decisions already reached—on the basis of political expediency, facile phrases, or dogma. Both proponents and opponents of arms control increasingly resort to this practice.
Admiral Miller reminds us of the significant unilateral strategic arms reductions which we undertook in the early 1960s. Hundreds (possibly thousands) of nuclear delivery vehicles that the Soviets
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V / considered strategic and the weapons they carried were found to be of marginal value at best and were therefore phased out. The list includes B-47s and other bombers, Atlas and Titan I intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Thor and Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and cruise missiles such as Snark, Matador, Mace, and Regulus. With the exception of the IRBMs, whose dismantling helped provide a face-saving solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was no Soviet reciprocity involved in these actions. They were taken to improve the overall effectiveness of U. S. forces, since it was recognized that this improvement was not dependent on the Soviets taking any similar actions. Initially, there were some proposals advanced by the arms control community to stage a joint U. S.-Soviet “bomber bonfire;” when no interest for this was found on the Soviet side, the Department of Defense (courageously and intelligently) proceeded with unilateral arms reductions in order to streamline U. S. nuclear forces.
Some may agree that these actions took place during a period of overwhelming U. S. strategic superiority and could therefore be undertaken with little risk. Nevertheless, a half-dozen years later, by which time rough strategic parity existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was still possible for the Nixon administration to formulate a Doctrine of Strategic Sufficiency which provided guidelines for structuring U.S. strategic forces. The objectives which the strategic forces were to support were not new then and have remained essentially the same. They were stated as:
- Deterring strategic attack on the United States or our allies
- Dissuading potential adversaries from threatening or coercing the United States or our allies
- Deterring less than all-out attacks by threatening the risk of unacceptable escalation beyond the deterrent provided by U. S. and allied conventional and theater nuclear forces.
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird then formulated four criteria for designing U. S. strategic forces to meet these strategic objectives. These were:
- “Maintaining an adequate second- strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces” (i.e., a confident retaliatory capability)
- “Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis” (i.e., crisis stability)
- “Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war” (i.e., unfavorable casualty ratios)
► “Defending against damage fronJ small attacks or accidental launches (i.e., modest damage limitation)
It is noteworthy that neither the doctrine nor the criteria mention Soviet force levels nor the desire to match or excee them. Sufficiency implied that U. s- forces would be sized to accomplish certain specified objectives. The capability of Soviet forces would obviously in"u' ence U. S. force structure, but only in a secondary way. By deemphasizing direct
iiumviivui 11 j/cn i , uiw (
open for both reciprocal arms control an unilateral arms reductions or increases as the circumstances warranted. When viewed in this light (i.e., that U. S. forces met the criteria for strategic sufficiency)’ the unequal numerical levels negotiate in the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) I Interim Agreement on Offen sive Arms no longer seem so threatening- Arms control has always had a politic^ component. This became stronger during the two and a half years of SALT I neg° tiations, and especially so during *
hard-sell campaign for congressiona
approval and ratification. Part of the pr'ce paid by the Nixon administration during this process was legislation which man dated that future arms control agreemen had to be negotiated at equal numeric' levels. Whatever else it may have accom plished, this legislation, coupled wi slogans such as “essential equivalence’ “window of vulnerability,” and ba gaining chips” virtually ensured that t United States would no longer take un^ lateral steps to reduce strategic arms, matter how desirable this may be u° the standpoints of cost, military e‘*et" tiveness, or sufficiency.
“Blue-out and Nuclear Sea States”
(See Peter J. Brown, pp. 104-106, January
1986 Proceedings)
Chief Quartermaster Edward L.
U. S. Navy (Retired)—! can understan why some of the effects of underwa test “Baker” have been lost uPon.TcS Navy. However, I was on board the Benevolence (AH-13) during this te ^ only 16 miles from the explosion- Benevolence was portside to the b From my station on the port bridge W1 ’ I can testify that I neither heard nor ^ any effects from the blast. It would been amazing indeed for a 90-foot ti wave to have escaped from the l?g°°n which “Baker” was conducted.
'tselfdi; Part
Div' WaS named the Deep Submergence Shi 1S'0n ^ro8ram and was given to Nav- Co PS~~now NavSea (Naval Sea Systems ^af,mant*T This program would ulti- Veh' administer the Navy’s underwater Sat C • anc* surface support platforms. ShiUr!tion diving was taken over by Nav- Ps Supervisor of Diving and Salvage. Sp0e Pr°cess of dividing PM-ll’s re- °the N ^ Was C0rT1ple8, and, as in most tas. 1 Navy programs, it involved shifting of ? as Priorities warranted. These kinds a,?n8es still occur in NavSea. hab t • ibe Navy’s work in seafloor satu^31!011 ended with Sealab, the work in PlicafIOn ^'V'n8 ar|d salvage and its ap- mitrriIon t0 ibe Navy’s operational contents has hardly slowed. ane Sealab research has evolved into Deennati°nal system: the Mk-II Mod-I terri \y1V'n® ^alva8e and Rescue Sys- the ' ltb 'his system the Navy now has satur^bdity to keep crews continually Uietersf 31 30 equivalent depth of 350 sinr„ ,, or a month, an obvious advance 1(® the time of Sealab. the cJjSf'mP°rtant, however, to understand ’ional erences- In response to its operated fk0rarnitrnents, the Navy has devel- faCcu. 6 Mod-I system into a sur- ased system. In this system, divers
Pr,
Sealab: A Postscript”
b" D. Chamberland. pp. 72-82, January 1986 Proceedings)
Dennis Chamberland—It is improbable at Berry Cannon’s death was the single Motivating factor ending Sealab. At the oment of the aquanaut’s death, Sealab’s ^nrunation may already have been ated. At the same time Sealab was ( °r^*ng on the seafloor, the Navy had j* en on two other costly programs: the eeP submergence vehicles and large ob- savage programs. Both of these in- ved the same saturation diving pro- ref115 anC' were much more closely a ed to the Navy’s primary mission an the Sealab seafloor habitation reSearch project.
The Navy had established a major pro- Lam .management office (PM-11) to , Minister all the subsurface work, in- this ^ea*a*3, Tet many believed that and de®ree °f administrative commitment PM <j°ntro1 was unnecessary. The fate of "11 and its three expensive programs re under scrutiny and discussion long °re 18 February 1969.
,jj eSardless of the motivators, when cha‘lster befell Sealab, the effects of the co Were 'remediate as the Navy’s ah u X bureaucratic structure quickly ar>d restructured the program’s . lre administrative framework. PM-11 'isappeared. The undersea vehicles are pre-pressurized on the surface in a deck decompression chamber, then lowered to worksite depth in a personnel transfer capsule. The divers are tethered to the surface, supplied with hot water to heat their dive suits and their breathing air, which also comes from the surface.
Although the Navy’s research has dramatically changed from the early concept of living on the ocean floor, its mission of working on the seafloor through saturation diving has evolved to meet its more mobile responsibilities.
In a recent interview, Rear Admiral John B. Mooney, Jr., current Chief of Naval Research, said, “The Sealab program itself stopped, but what Sealab developed is still in use today in the Navy’s operational capabilities.”
He also pointed out that world commercial interests are benefiting by the Sealab research and current Navy endeavors in the form of Navy personnel who arrive in industry with Navy knowledge and expertise.
Admiral Mooney stated that, “Navy divers are being used as instructors and divers in nearly every major underwater oil project in the world from the North Sea to the Gulf of Mexico.”
“The General Unrestricted Line”
(See G. C. Sadler, pp. 117-120, January 1986
Proceedings)
Commander S. A. Mohsberg, III, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy—The “general unrestricted line” officer whose photograph appears in Captain Sadler’s Professional Note is, in fact, Lieutenant Deborah J. Marcotte, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy.
Lieutenant Marcotte is a typical Civil Engineer Corps junior officer in that she holds both undergraduate and graduate degrees in engineering. Based on her academic qualifications and her proven ability in a prior tour of duty to lead and manage in a shore facilities environment, she was assigned to the Naval Academy where she was serving as a mathematics instructor at the time the photograph was taken.
At present, 80 (4.86%) of the Navy’s 1,645 Civil Engineer Corps officers are women. The trend is one of steady growth constrained principally by the still relatively small number of women who elect to pursue an appropriately accredited engineering or architecture degree. For those who acquire the necessary credentials, the opportunities have never been greater. Even given the realities of present law and policy, 92% of the Civil Engineer Corps’ billets are open to women.
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“Surface Warfare and Surface Warriors”
(See J. Metcalf, pp. 65-80, October 1985; P. B. Marion, p. 16, December 1985; J. K. Pernini, p. 103, February 1986 Proceedings)
“The LHD and Sea Control”
(see G. P. Tierney, pp. 147-150, October 1985 Proceedings)
Kenneth Levin—Admiral Metcalf states that we used a roll of toilet paper and a gong to find submarines in World War 1. I’m stumped. How did that work?
Editor’s Note: Admiral Metcalf’s reference to using ‘ ‘a roll of toilet paper and a gong to find submarines’ ’ was essentially metaphorical. He was stressing the primitive nature of early antisubmarine warfare (ASW) techniques, compared to today’s highly technical approaches. One early ASW system did, in fact, record information on a paper roll that looked something like a roll of toilet paper.
Rear Admiral Robert H. Gormley, U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is refreshing to see some naval officers interested in employing the amphibious assault ship (multipurpose) (LHD) for missions other than amphibious warfare. This new ship and her LHA (amphibious assault ship [general purpose]) parent are large and expensive, and it therefore makes sense to consider their applications in other warfare areas. Who knows, the United States may be faced with multiple contingencies at the same time, and the need for sea-based
tactical air power could well exceed our carrier battle group resources.
Both Admiral Metcalf and Commander Tierney looked at the AV-8B Harrier II and judged its performance inadequate for sea control missions. The AV-8B can become a sea control weapon, Admiral Metcalf says, only if it can be made to project power at a distance; he finds the plane too “short-legged.” Commander Tierney indicates the AV-8B can deliver antiship ordnance only out to 125 miles, while its close air support radius of action is 150 miles compared to 500 miles for conventional carrier aircraft.
While I applaud both officers for shining a much needed light on the issue of using the AV-8B for naval missions, they have greatly understated the plane’s range and payload capability. This is somewhat understandable since most naval officers and, indeed many Marines, are unaware that the AV-8B is essentially a new plane and not merely a rehashed, long-of-tooth AV-8A. Compared to its 15 year-old ancestor, the new AV-8B is changed aerodynamically and is much easier to fly. It has an advanced cockpit, a modem avionics system, an increased payload, and at least twice the range of the AV-8A. But because both planes carry the Harrier name and evolved from the same embryo, the AV-8B continues to wear the “not very useful for the Navy” label. The facts indicate otherwise, however, and the accompanying charts illustrate the vastly improved range/payload capability of the AV-8B.
So the AV-8B is a new bird with twice the range/payload of the AV-8A. But how does it compare to some of the conventional takeoff and landing aircraft with which Navy operational commanders may be familiar?
It is clear, I think, that the AV-8B is definitely in the range/payload ballpark. The plane is not at all short-legged as the admiral and commander state; it can keep up with other aircraft in the naval aviation stable. What is missing for the sea control mission and related power projection operations is a multimode radar which would give the AV-8B an all-weather fighter/attack capability. The installation of such a radar has been studied in some depth and there are several suitable candidate systems which could do the job. With this multimission avionics suite, its long legs, and the inherent vertical/short takeoff and landing operational flexibility, the AV-8B could pave the way for the LHD (and LVA and LPH [amphibious assault ship (helicopter)]) to become a serious player in both sea control and all-around power projection.
Perhaps it might be well for Admiral
Attack Mission Radius.
Missions flown under
standard Navy rules
Tanks retained Weapons expended
Metcalf and the Chief of Naval Op® ^ tions’s other principal assistants to ta look at capitalizing on the new AV-o ^ a way of deploying supplemental s based tactical air power. We’re not & ing here about replacing the aircraft c rier or diluting the amphibious wa mission. No, it’s a question of putting ^ force-multiplier principle to work ® hedge against the uncertainties of wa ^ which history tells us are indeed 3■ tainty. Hasn’t the time come for the to seriously consider an AV-8B v
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louse
94
Proceedings
/ Apr'1l9!i6