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All J'a|| p.
EnCo. °Wn: 'America’s Tragic Gar, °Unter with Iran
^85 3^,' ew York: Random House, ft. . ' Pp- Notes- Ind. $19.95 ($17.95). cv,eWed K
Ge “ Ambassador Bruce Laingen
the taJ,C pCnnan °nce observed that 'nhibit rk° lnternational politics is not to change to "8e but t0 find means for l^ace 0r , proceed without upsetting the ^e?a Pah|C W,odd- In Shah Mohammad Pr°ved i||aV' S *ran’ the United States Sensing , e<lu'PPed for that challenge,
'V*’°Se tim° [ate tbe Power °f an idea whoSee had come. And the Shah,
Pr°ved „ ntr^ Was t0 topple, tragically HenthedWcak rced on which to rely b°'Vever | an2.er signals became rampant. J°rrespect ackm§ in anal°gy in some rna- iC|lt even[S’ 0ne nonetheless hopes that recited Stat m tbe Philippines suggest the SQlhe ieses may possibly have learned Gary Sj0?! Prom the Iran experience. ?^rippingC S h00^, in addition to being 3 Period jnanC* °kten elocluent narrative of ^ded j recent American history ex. 'etnam ;ltS pa'n and trauma only by ‘"'d there a 30 accounting of lessons— Jre many indeed. He subtitles dogged determination of Khomeini to put in place the radical, theocratic regime that the hostage drama made possible.
The book is advisedly the best written to date on the two crises, Sick having been in a unique position as principal White House advisor on Iran to President Jimmy Carter to recall and research the documents of that period. His title highlights his own conviction that “the story has no heroes.” Among the lessons emerging from the revolution itself, he cites how—in the critical months preceding its culmination in February 1979— top policymakers in Washington were preoccupied with SALT II, Camp David, and the normalization of relations with China. As far as Iran was concerned, the results of these negotiations demonstrated again that the United States is ill- equipped to handle more than one major crisis at a time. And certainly the task is further complicated when the President loses confidence in his ambassador in the field—as tragically appears to have happened in this instance with U. S. Ambassador to Iran William H. Sullivan.
Those were days of extreme frustration in Washington, as well as of enormous country and the Shah in the end, “not having the heart,” did not attempt an iron fist option—an option the Shah envisioned resulting in enormous bloodshed and with highly uncertain results. Certainly among the lessons from that tormented policy period are the inherent limitations that confront an outside power, however influential, in seeking to direct the destiny of another country, especially when its own leadership is as uncertain as was the Shah’s.
No one would suggest uncertain leadership, however, on the part of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The seizure of the U. S. Embassy and its personnel made possible, Sick points out, the eventual “triumph of one man’s radical, vision.” No matter that Iran became “an instant pariah” on the world scene as a consequence of an unprecedented campaign of persuasion and pressure launched by President Carter to force the hostages’ release. Iran was prepared to deal only after the new powerholders of the revolution had put in place their apparatus of government—a readiness accelerated to some extent by Iraq’s aggression in September 1980.
_ , ~ ^ kiiujumu 111
Cfhaps better put, failures—a
h’sC05‘,n tde strategic loss that the *nd represented and a failure
b t0|,d in th 6 rePresented> and a failure r?f0ra"l!:ubsequent effort to find a
*ur a r 1 . tus.iu viivjii uiiu a Utter f,r,atl0nsb’P w*th the new Iran.
^-effort
in . Was Pr°bably doomed to any event, because of the
difficulty for Sullivan in Tehran, with the Shah desperately looking for viable options and unable to find any, and American policymakers in equal desperation trying to respond to the Shah’s request for counsel. As Sick points out, in the final analysis, President Carter was not prepared to tell the Shah how to run his
Author Sick characteriz.es the Iranian hostage rescue attempt as “a failure of military execution, not of political judgment or command.” Above, crewmen ready RH-53 Sea Stallions on board the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) for the mission.
book’s credibility. For exan1P|e’r(j \V'ar counting the British-German ° eS II “battle of the beams,” the co' >■
“Bromide,” “Benito,’ and various
are used improperly in describingureS. bombing beacons and counterm ^ There are also occasional lapses ^ong nology. The Chinese communist ^ March, for example, is c*e ^,orid\Vaf than a decade and placed after
War. ^ a
--------------- HgftVQf ^
complex topic and those who ^ for
detailing U. S. electronic
........... & - ■ ---------- . War.
opments during the Vletna ^ atteti-
and- P,,
ioss1'
tion to U. S. use of “tear gas
;’sofgaS
ons
ment, which is best skipped conclusions about satellite to electronic warfare.
There is a genuine need ^ „. readable books that demysti y s|jcl. art of electronic warfare. ■ - <<$' packaged offering falls short
,but"
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Sick speculates that the Iranians wanted to end the crisis before the American presidential elections in November, thinking that a better deal was likely from President Carter than from Ronald Reagan, but that their own internal disagreements frustrated that agenda. That assessment, however, flies in the face of Iran’s disdain for Carter, which would suggest no interest on their part in helping achieve his reelection. In fact, surely one of the most far-reaching consequences of the hostage affair was the way in which it contributed to the end of a presidency: “Iran, like a rock around the President’s head, pulled him down.”
Sick refutes criticism often heard that Carter overplayed the hostage issue, enhancing its importance and thus prolonging the ordeal. He sees limits for any administration in moving such an emotion-laden issue lower on the national agenda. Rationalization? Perhaps, but as Sick points out, there is no convincing evidence that such a strategy would have resulted in the hostages being released even one day earlier. The crisis had its own course to run, responsive to the passions of Iran’s own body politic.
Arguably, only an early resort to force might have significantly affected the timetable. But, we will never know the answer to this, and Sick devotes relatively little speculation on it. As for President Carter’s one policy resort to force, the ill-fated rescue mission, Sick characterizes it as “a failure of military execution; not of political judgment or command.” Happily not too much time is spent on the “long shot that just missed”; that is, the lengthy but futile policy efforts with Abolhassan Bani Sadr and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh to broker a settlement. Washington was slow to recognize that these efforts could go nowhere because they lacked the ultimate authority of Khomeini. There is gracious tribute to the hostages themselves, symbolic of “those Americans who daily serve their country in conditions of great uncertainty and personal risk and who choose to stay rather than run.”
One finishes a book like this, written as it is with commendable objectivity by someone so closely involved in the policy process, with the wish that it had included more of an effort at projecting where all this may take Iran in the years ahead. But there is relatively little of that. Sick only observes that “the story is not over. It has just begun.” Given the puzzle that Iran is today, perhaps caution in predictions is wise—recalling counsel attributed to the Yugoslav writer Djilas: “the future is known only to God and the dogmatists.”
Ambassador Laingen was the senior embassy official held hostage in Tehran during the 444-day crisis. He is currently Vice President of the National War College in Washington, D.C.
Electronic Warfare: From the Battle of Tsushima to the Falklands and Lebanon Conflicts
RAdm. Mario de Arcangelis, Italian Navy. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1985. 306 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Commander Fred Glaeser,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
This slender volume succeeds brilliantly in conveying the dramatic tactical impact of the skillful application of electronic warfare. Unfortunately, the book’s numerous technical, historical, and editorial flaws severely diminish its value as a reference book.
The author’s most compelling depiction of electronic warfare is his detailed description of the celebrated World War II breakout by the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen from the blockaded port of Brest in occupied France. The daring plan called for the ships to run a gauntlet of British radars, aircraft, mines, and coastal guns in a dash up the English Channel.
The task of neutralizing British radar surveillance was assigned to General Wolfgang Martini, German director general of air signals. Believing that success in warfare means defeating people, not machines, General Martini crafted a plan to lull British radar operators into a sense of complacency.
From earlier observation, the general knew the frequencies of virtually all British transmitters along the coast. Beginning two months before the planned breakout, he ordered German transmitters to commence daily jamming of English radars. The jamming was begun at very low power levels and increased in strength and duration each successive day. The jamming was carried out at approximately the same time each day, in hopes the British would attribute the effects to an unexplained diurnal atmospheric phenomenon.
The plan worked. In the ensuing breakout, the German battle cruisers did not get away unscathed, but the overall success of their dash up the channel serves as an enduring lesson in the effectiveness of electronic warfare, used to confuse the men who operate sophisticated weapon systems.
Unfortunately, the remainder of this book generally lacks such quality. Historical errors abound, detracting from the
II, just prior to the Korean Electronic warfare is, by n
explain it should be held accoun ^e(j technical accuracy. The boo' 1guC[1 as
by numerous misrepresentations. sen-
the alleged use of airborne m rcjoUds sors to see “all objects” throng and to detect targets underwa e • fe American readers of this boo ^g. offended by the author’s freqnerenal digressions. For examp e’ ts by counting of technical develop^ ^ -s ac- the Axis powers in World War ^ varj- complished without mention o ous atrocities for which those n -ate to well known, an omission appt^ guUn the specialized focus of the boo j.
■ warfam, ^ author strays from his tale to
bly, other, more harmful type* jeS. root Vietcong fighters out ^.j^parab^ also comments on the , result' damage to plant and animal 1 ing from the use of defoliants; ^aIfate The final chapter, “Electron' ^ tbe in Space,” is the weakest conjeC book. Its summary of known a reali- tured capabilities badly dtsf° g Given ties of military space survema ^ fee the paucity of hard facts in the P ord, it is unfortunate that the ^tion no differentiation between 1 gleaned from highly regar i n»d Nations, such as Aviation Wefk“s of % Technology, and the specula1 . T‘|C well-informed, self-proclaim ^
analysts. The result is an aVOidfa
Commander Glaeser graduated fro g jn el^ Academy in 1965 and earned a ca^tiate . engineering at the U. S. Naval oS fleet an pjii’r in 1971. His naval career spanne^ squadf°n>vy tours, including command of a V § jn th® to retiring in 1985, he spent three y He ‘ cp Space Systems Division at the penQ\\ristl rently editor for special projects lor ence Monitor.
Gloss,
^ew York: Harcourt Brace
anovich
ft
*=er)era] jngCC0Unts> with only enough s^rPrisine]v°rmat*on t0 keep the reader . iic ev Web'oriented in the midst of Wat th,, Lnt8, "' be down-to-earth view- el>'t°|Uize,i arnmel seeks and achieves is ^ s°ntewh ^ lb£ book’s title, a typical Heirm 31 rude Marine abbreviation
evad(maner°n .)!’ the bombing of BLT aerienCes ’ ',e R°ot chronicles the
Out a ,|°£. Marines attempting to h ‘ mfficult and frustrating mis- bioh eScPtUres the many odd details ?'ch illu Ped notice in the press, but f-^ntinp ',nate the overall situation: Jrebghts fnu 6S °1 engagement; sudden :nd eXchan„ °Wed by impromptu parleys
® freelv l,CS oP insults; newsmen mov- 3sit;_ v betu/ppr, . j . ...
Poj
‘Bis f)
fo'mh anese—including medical U OStile militias—swarminp in
V0l
^•hor^P
°r’s stv|tS’- ls.not a quick read. The y e is lively, but the same ter-
AueiKf0°in The Marines >n Beirut, *“8Ust 1982-February 1984
Jovi
Il)ss- Bih i ~ PP- ii
(517.95) - *nd' MaPs- APPend. $19.95
Review,.,) k
Haynes ||Vlai"r General Fred E. g, ’ ' S- Marine Corps (Retired)
the recent*S weH-written book on strikes a h Marine experience in Beirut larly jn .,eeP emotional chord, particu- °f that r annes' ^or this reviewer, part many 0f ^P°nse comes from knowing Colonel T'6 peop^e involved (including °f the 24th Cieraghty, commander haying he ^ ar'ne Amphibious Unit) and •heir train603t *east Partly responsible for Was th'n^ aS Junior officers.
^Ught the^6!,311^'11® we could have •he diSas.m l lat might have helped avert deling . rous bombing of the battalion We have (I"11 '^bf) headquarters? Would had beenanything differently if we A'hat thej , •be Marines, knowing only ^83? Th eaders knew on 23 October CQrnma| , Se are questions that thoughtful ^•elverifWith experience ask
C°mrnand • ■no suc'h disaster befalls a linages1S *• because the commander uck? Prevent it—or is it a matter of Ham
°f that so« i?es not dwell on questions e,lPerienr.„' ”ls subject is the day-to-day !i°n’as cant V' Marines in Leba- Sed withUret* *n •be interviews he con- b'sbookj cyewitncsses of all ranks. rsthanc] .,Primari'y a synthesis of these
een Marine and hostile
a|l over°ntlle militias—swarming in h ^ at the 4 °eirut t0 help rescue survi- 6ld|lUartersern°hshed Marine battalion J' bfough it an
’• The h i ’ there runs a certain te- it °°k, despite the nitched hat- rain appears again and again: the Lebanese gunmen all begin to look alike, and one firefight comes to resemble another. Only the catastrophe of 23 October punctuates the deadly routine of “peacekeeping.”
The sameness of the Marine experience in Lebanon recalls Vietnam, where an apparent lack of progress toward any recognizable goal came to symbolize the futility of U. S. involvement. Troop morale can suffer badly under those conditions, so it is particularly heartening to read that the many Marines interviewed expressed pride in how they carried out their mission. Judging from the story itself, their pride was amply justified.
The Marines in Lebanon were all professionals, peacetime volunteers who chose not only the military, but a service known for its fighting tradition. They were not draftees forced willy-nilly into a conflict for which they had no stomach. Yet, by Hammers account, even these highly motivated young men disagree as to what, if anything, their sacrifices in Beirut accomplished.
The course of Lebanon’s civil war cut short our involvement before the apparent pointlessness of our limited efforts could seriously affect morale. Nevertheless, Hammel’s account vividly portrays the ambiguous position of U. S. servicemen asked to execute an unclear extension of American foreign policy under diplomatic constraints that preclude any clear- cut military decision. Just as there was no war-winning strategy in Vietnam, so in Lebanon there was no palpable objective beyond the negative one of protecting Americans and assisting local groups deemed—for whatever reason— friendly.
This is not to condemn American intentions in Lebanon or, for that matter, in
Vietnam. It does, however, underline the need for the United States to think carefully through both its national objectives and the practical possibility of accomplishing those objectives before it employs troops to intervene in a Third World conflict. The contrasting nature of the two separate Beirut operations covered in The Root underscores that need. In the first operation, conducted during the summer of 1982, the Marines intervened along with British, French, and Italian contingents, for the specific purpose of evacuating Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization fighters. This was a concrete objective, one that could be achieved within a reasonable length of time, and one that was within the capabilities of the forces committed. Consequently, the operation succeeded.
The second operation, also undertaken by a multilateral force, had no clearly achievable objective. Following the 18 September 1982 massacre of Palestinian civilians, the Marines received vague orders to “establish a presence” in Beirut. This soon evolved into a major American effort to reestablish the Lebanese central government and somehow bring an end to what is undoubtedly the world’s most complex civil war. The commitment was open-ended and well beyond the capabilities of the would-be peacekeepers. Not surprisingly, it failed.
The Root, a good infantryman’s view of how messy even the best-intentioned military operation can become if not properly conceived, should be read by all politicians and diplomats who must take a hand in dealing with Third World crises.
General Haynes is a combat veteran of three wars. He is currently an executive with LTV Aerospace and Defense Company and is military consultant for CBS News.
seems to ^
reach overland.’
assessment. Unfortunately, the q f the
• llSc •
facts al
those sources varies, and their u.
Mr. Polmar, author of the Naval tnst'', c f\‘e< ,o -r,.. c,.: j nf the U- J ,hllt0t .
U. S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985
John M. Collins with Patrick M. Cronin. New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985. 360 pp. Notes. Index. Maps. Append. $50.00 ($45.00) hardcover, $29.00 ($26.10) paper.
Reviewed by Norman Polmar
Americans tend to like short, clear, unqualified answers. Most people— whether asking about who won a game, how much something costs, or which is best—generally want one-word answers. The same holds true on military issues.
Who is ahead militarily, the United States or the Soviet Union? Try to answer that in one or two words or even a few sentences. Unfortunately, many persons try to do just that. Those who ask such simplistic questions—or give those one- or two-word answers—have no need for this book. But for those who wish a more comprehensive and realistic understanding of who is ahead in the U. S.-Soviet military balance, this volume is a must.
John Collins, senior specialist in national defense at the Library of Congress, and Patrick Cronin, his assistant, have sought to give perspective to this balance. Without the use of fancy photos and slick paper characteristic of many so-called military assessments, Collins and Cronin provide a detailed and unclassified analysis of the last five years of military activity by the two superpowers. The purpose of the effort—originally sponsored by a non-partisan group of congressmen— was to assess how well the Reagan administration has managed the military.
Collins and Cronin provide a mixed review. Military morale is high, maintainability and sustainability are improving, and U. S. forces are better trained and equipped, and hence more combat ready. The bad news is that:
“[0]ur military force structure is inadequate to meet our formal and informal worldwide commitments, and we are not doing well in narrowing the gaps between U. S. and Soviet capabilities that existed in 1980. In many instances we have made substantial improvements, but the Soviets have managed to maintain or increase their lead. Many of our critical deficiencies are not being properly addressed.”
These conclusions are based on a variety of criteria: U. S. and Soviet defense budgets, manpower, technologies, industries, nuclear weapons (strategic, theater, and tactical), chemical and biological capabilities, mobility, strategy, force integration, and others. In most of these categories, the authors describe the significance, explain the methods of measurement, provide a description of each side’s developments since 1980 (often in tabular form), and include a “bottom line” commentary.
Beyond these categories of military capabilities, Collins and Cronin also address relative military force potential in specific geographic areas. They believe there has been no change in the balance in Europe and that both superpowers seek “refinements” there rather than change, but that northern Norway remains vulnerable to limited-objective invasion. Neither Norwegian forces nor the small NATO mobile force—including a U. S. Marine brigade—could prevent a quick Soviet fail accompli. The authors believe that NATO’s threat to employ nuclear weapons provides the prime deterrent.
The question remains, however: Would the United States or other NATO nations allow the use of nuclear weapons in response to such a limited Soviet assault on the NATO periphery? Certainly Charles de Gaulle questioned the American will to do so, when he established an independent French strategic nuclear force. A limited Soviet assault, with definite and carefully defined objectives, and the absence of U. S. forces or major population centers in their path could—in fact—deter even the threat of nuclear response, especially if the United States has a less conservative administration than it has now.
Intensive superpower interests continue in the turbulent Middle East. There, the picture is less clear. Here, the authors do see more of a potential for the employment of theater nuclear weapons, again in response to a carefully defined Soviet assault that could be accomplished before the U. S. Central Command could deploy forces to the region.
In East Asia and the Western Pacific, the authors say the U. S. Commander in Chief, Pacific is better off than his Euro_______ Right Place, Wrong Time
pean counterparts. In the PaC1 ' ' ajr Soviet threat is primarily nava j,
with both sides unable to ga,n a fear, advantage by military f°rce' £u-
however, is that conflict in Kof ^ rope, or the Middle East will l jnCjian sources from the Pacific an Ocean areas. ent of
Naval forces are a key comp*’ gn(j U. S. strategy in virtually al » ujne: here the authors are less ~eeds
“Asymmetrical U. S. and Sovi -Q.
for naval power also have spec*®. e paid cance: the United States wou ^ vVjr pressed to prevail in any re®l0.atse3i ashore, if it was stalemated or 0vjets far defeat at sea would leave the 0can less disadvantaged in any region
The military advantage se ani with the Soviets in theater, tac chemical weapons. The strategi ^ situation, where the authors P^°P(rategic better answers are needed for t e^leSi is issues now facing the Unite
less clear. f nublislie.d
The authors used an array 0the>r sources and interviews to st.ruC„ua|jty ^
Adelphi method of deriving cot- numbers does not always reveanately>'s rect information. This, ur|forU' s[11eiits' necessary for unclassified as* j fro1” Two areas could have bene ^^nd. more extensive coverage^1* ^ and
control, and communications ^ jin
space weapons. Both are o ^ijtaO vital components of all mode
• r *hflt
operations. . bo0ku
These are small flaws in arealistlC should be useful to all who see s answers to the question 0 .. gry bn ahead” in the U. S.-Soviet m ance. But the book should he aUthorS. merely used as a reference. vjeVvsan perceptive text provides usefn ^ tabu information, beyond the mass lar data.
books The Ships and Aircraft of t1Cc0otribut Guide to the Soviet Navy, is a frequa ^ and t° £(| the Proceedings as well as to other ■ ^ car professional journals and newspap^^^ of the Naval Institute's distinguished au
for 1985.
When Captain Kevin Anderson, a Navy chaplain, served in Lebanon during 1983-84, he was able to fulfill a lifelong dream of visiting the Holy Land by means of a short liberty run to Haifa,
Israel. In leaving when he did, however, the padre missed a chance to meet Charlton Heston while the actor toured positions of the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit near Beirut International Airport.
As a staff sergeant aptly put it, upon Chaplain Anderson’s return, “You may have seen the Promised Land—but I stayed right here and shook hands with Moses!” viarine <'°l
Captain Keith Oliver, U. S. w*'
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
• e is tra h ar ln
>somace .t*lrou8h the various conflicts °nSofaircra?nSmg resuIts' Detailed descrip- i*re a|so indn /’WeaP°ns> tactics, and training nPUblisheri69, as weH as many previously combat action photographs.
Atla,
1 its tr, rea£ier to interpret tomorrow’:
tS true Perspective.”
Ca» for
JCS Reform: Crucial Issues
^n:DC2^02.)
'em j. "cise essn>,
teir.k v'ng thp r? comPares the current sy m;„0ok man, DePartment of Defense with ed th» . Sement process. Having dete
the def "wu Process- Having deter °ffers n 'Cle.nc'es> Lieutenant Colone tj0 'lard D fnciples for achievable reform
Mi
\ir \Va_f
Lo„ o vdr<! m <hc Missilc Age
p'nithsonjanrd,een: Jr; Washington, DC:
Bib Zltut!on Prcss’ >985- 265 PP- IIIus- <522.45) tes- Ind- Maps. Append. $24.95
The c
'ido-pjpj 1^>at components of the Vietnam, C,°n«icts ar„ni’ ^“^le East, and Falklands '”e <'istorinfreSentec* 'n tk’s book along with >Thealand P°litical backgrounds of !!' Suided m-, or s central theme is the impact heiae i, ,..Issiles on war in the air, and this
$22 oCat'0ns lqs's11', New York: Facts on F‘le k2'9S<520 65)' 92 pP- llIus- bib. Ind. Maps.
%ite its t-.|' .
?'kction 0r e’ tk's book is more than a mere pS° offers .. aPs’ tables, and illustrations. It . ast-\Vest ret nurnkler of articles dealing with p ge aumbi>ra f°ns s‘nce 1945 and features a “Act t0P‘Cal inserts' such as “Oil ban'" and ..,S of Terror,” “Chemical War- lsl'c misc-i ?Vlet 1CBM [intercontinental
frvSR*** Sc™ ” The
n enable u, s to present the facts that oews j„ ■ tne r~ 1
Th,
ft(ilc,nal befcnse II0ses' USAF. Washington, DC: ofD ' $l’2s- (O Vniversily Press, 1985. 61 pp. <Vao’CUments, i/ fr directly from: Superintendent ,n~ - ' ' Government Printing Office,
«5SS ..
Ca'Defenseanrence: Pres'dent of the Na Solv*°rd: “g mversity, writes in the book’ cai e,’ rather th Searckin8 f°r real problems ti tifv!krnativesar',?ereIy comParing theoreti t° l|}0se steDs' , ° onel Moses seeks to iden ter,,,? ftl the ipr?ICl1 Can realistically be takei t-b [Joint Chiefs of Staff) sys
o^hec
b ^1"' Klee? aS,CsltlC: Thc Sinki"8 of the C>ry * PaFlovv in 1919‘
^6. 240 nnaP°lis, MD: Naval Institute At^'3.56) P' Pus' lnd- Maps. Append.
’ V‘rtual|v ^ar 1’ tbe German surface act, was interned by the vie- torious Allies at Scapa Flow. Forbidden to lower a boat without permission, stripped of all ammunition, and not allowed to fly their ensigns, the German Fleet wallowed in the shame imposed by the victors for approximately seven months. Then, in a Final act of face-saving defiance, the German admiral ordered his fleet scuttled. This momentous act
sent 52 ships to the bottom; seven remain there today. The Grand Scuttle recounts the events leading up to the internment and provides a detailed account of the scuttling and the subsequent salvage efforts that continue today. It is a grand story rich in history, intrigue, and human emotion.
Great Battlefields of the World
John Macdonald. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984. 200 pp. Illus. Maps. $35.00 ($31.50).
Books that try to re-create the battles of the past often suffer from the limitations of twodimensional maps. Great Battlefields of the World overcomes this by employing computer graphics to create “three-dimensional” portrayals of 30 battles spanning the centuries from Hannibal’s victory over the Romans in 216 B.C. to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. With excellent artistic renditions of details superimposed on the graphics, these 9‘/2-by-12-inch “maps” show the reader the significance of terrain in these battles. Tactical analysis and the circumstances leading up to each battle are also provided.
The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibiography, Second Edition
History and Museums Division. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1985. 373 pp. Illus. Bib. Maps. $22.00 ($19.80) hardcover,
$7.50 ($6.75) paper.
A total of 22 articles previously appearing in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps Gazette have been compiled into this volume to recount the role of the Marine Corps in Vietnam. The first 16 articles chronologically trace the Marine participation in the war and the last six cover the topics of aviation, logistics, civil affairs, Navy medical support, amphibious warfare, and maritime support. This is an updated edition of the volume, which first appeared in 1974. Ten new articles have been added to the first edition and one of the originals has been deleted.
NATO’s Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain
Stanley R. Sloan. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985. 243 pp. Ulus. Gloss. Notes. Ind. Append. Tables. $6.50 ($5.85).
A specialist in U. S.-Alliance relations for the Congressional Research Service examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with an eye toward reassessment. Stanley Sloan contends that many current problems stem from the original 1954 agreement which established it. He points out two weaknesses centering around Europe’s failure to form a European defense community and Western Europe’s reliance on U. S. nuclear forces and suggests directions for future strategies in formulating what he calls the “Transatlantic Bargain.”
Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between the World Wars
Ronald Chalmers Hood III. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 221 pp. Illus. Bib. Notes. Ind. Append. $25.00 ($22.50).
The author has drawn extensively upon interviews with former French naval officers, French Navy archives, and numerous other sources to reconstruct the events and circumstances that led to the French Navy’s challenge to the very government it was sworn to protect. His work describes the social background, intellectual preparation, and the eventual isolation of the French Navy during the period between World Wars I and II. Royal Republicans carefully explores the factors that caused French naval officers to become antidemocratic in their outlook and explains the breakdown between civil and military factions that ultimately contributed to the fate of the Third Republic in 1940.
lnfisMun,
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U.S. Naval Institute
2062 Generals Highway Annapolis, Maryland 21401
umiu^.y i ic-aov uiiv/it *----------------------------------- jjja** .
non-Naval Institute titles. When ^cta3\
other special handling is reques tfie postage and handling cost will be rnstitute r. Rooks marked ES are_Na 111'
Shaping A Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-1861
John H. Schroeder. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985. 229 pp. Notes. Ind. Maps. $35.00 ($31.50).
In the 30 years prior to the Civil War, the American Navy played a vital role in the development of the nation’s overseas commercial empire. This book describes how the Navy of that era opened diplomatic and commercial relations with the Far East, explored parts of South America and the Pacific, and challenged British hegemony in the western hemisphere. It shows how these things came about, not as a result of governmental planning or doctrine, but rather in response to pressures from commercial and other non-govemmental sources. This treatise fills a void in scholarly research and sheds important light on the significance of sea power in world affairs.
B The U. S. Navy: The View from the Mid-1980s
James L. George, Editor. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. 385 pp. Illus. Gloss. Notes. Append. Tables. $19.85 ($15.88).
James George has compiled 22 essays and commentaries under four major themes: “The Naval Air Force,” “The Surface Force,” “The Submarine Force,” and “The Theaters of Operation.” The contributors are professional naval analysts, active and retired naval officers, and editors in naval publishing. Their topics include many important current issues such as “The Role of VSTOL [vertical short takeoff and landing] Aircraft,” “Battleships for the 1980s,” and “The Caribbean Theater of Operations.”
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I YA6F
Qty. Book Titles
Word of Honor
Nelson De Mille. New York: Warner Books, 1985. Fiction. 518 pp. $17.50.
Nelson De Mille, a former lieutenant in Vietnam and a successful writer, has written a gripping novel that reaches back to unanswered questions from the Vietnam War. His main character, Ben Tyson, finds his comfortable and secure life suddenly shattered by the revelation that he and his rifle platoon committed an atrocity 16 years before at Hue. Tyson is brought up on charges and finds himself facing a legal trial and a moral dilemma. Publishers Weekly describes Word of Honor as “a story which . . . probes the conflicting concepts of honor, duty, and loyalty as they relate to an event of the My Lai variety.”
Other Titles of Interest ______________
The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect
William Bowman, et al., Editors. New York: Pergamon: Brassey’s, 1986. 352 pp. Charts. Tables. Ind. $32.50 ($29.25) hardcover, $14.00 ($12.60) paper.
European Naval and Maritime History, 300-1500
Archibald R. Lewis and Timothy J. Rurtyon, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985. 192 pp. Photos. Illus. Bib. Ind. $22.50 ($20.25).
Focus on Flight: The Aviation Photography of Hans Groenhoff
E. T. Wooldridge. Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985. 108 pp. Photos. $19.95 ($17.95).
Green Berets at War: U. S.
Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-
r4. presw10
Shelby L. Stanton. Novato, G •
Press, 1985. 360 pp. Photos. Maps- Bib. Append. Ind. $18.95 ($17.0 )■
. 1874
A History of the Israeli Army- the Present
Ze’ev Schiff. New York: Macmillan 1P1^,. ing Company, 1985. 274 pp. Photon Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).
Space A ’86-’87: The Travel Guide f°r Military Families Connje
Karen Davis, Editor. Oakton, VA- ^986. Gibson Wehrman Connor EnteiprlS 302 pp. Maps. Ind. Charts. $7- •
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