This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
The tactical organizational doctrine known as the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept has been criticized recently—and on these pages in aPtain R. c. Powers's October 1985 article, “Commanding the Offense’’ (pages 61-64). Most disadvan- ,.agCs attributed to this doctrine, however, result from its ,au ’y application in fleet exercises, rather than flaws in he doctrine itself.
R'H'kground: The composite warfare commander con- ^Pt was the brainchild of Navy Captain Stuart D. Lan- Clsil'an, Commander Destroyer Squadron 23, first coinhanding officer of the Tactical Training Group Pacific, a,K .lhe surface antisubmarine warfare (ASW) guru of the acilic F-leet in the late 1970s. He honed to ensure that
Sc . Ic elect in the late 1970s. He hoped to ensure that "lot, experienced officers were in chance of the various
I are areas of modern battle force operations. Captain -andersnian’s innovation was to extend the decades-old
L llne °l “Alpha Whiskey" (a special functional com- ^ hinder tor antiair warfare |AAW| under the officer in < ASlU* Comniant* IOTC |) to ASW and antisurface warfare
11 post-Vietnam fleet operations, battle group com- ‘ cr shills tended to concentrate on power projection trol CS Unt* 'htormally delegate ASW and ASUW sea conin'', *Unct'ons to the carrier serving as flagship. Given the cer ' ■ Preoccupation of the carrier's commanding offi- th> sa,etY ancl efficiency of flight operations around , ,C s "h- the P-3 junior officers in the carrier’s ASW mod-
nj0|ran.ant'SLJbmarine warfare and the surface warfare ju- a ! °fficers in the carrier's surface module maintained the litti^llr*acc wai*ure picture in both cases with relatively c senior, experienced officer guidance, the vmg PeraKi- the Navy also tried to purge itself of 'ctnam-era idea that the only “offensive" actions C(^c Subniarine-launched ballistic missile attacks on Moss ' air strikes on airfields, or Marine amphibious as- n,,. S' Strategists were scekinu a better balance between
r'lWOr r\r " • c
Plish OJCC,lon an<J sea control as the means to accoin- utte *'1C NavV’s tnissions. A "war-at-sea" renaissance ThenJfed t‘i improve A-6 and A-7 antiship strike tactics, ttuiih °et S accfu's't‘on °f Harpoon missiles in significant droVeC1S re‘nv'£°rated surface antisurface warfare and Ca| ,C . c uced to coordinate the Harpoons' use with tacti- ''Matiun- This threat-oriented antisurface warfare as a
ale functional subset of naval warfare was relatively
fij...■' Unt^ Gctical innovators were still having difficulty UIStlni;uishin„ r , ... .• ' r -
guishing it from platform-oriented surface warfare.
The Na
enlvy was beginning to acknowledge that killing t^j 1 ■ skl'Ps- submarines, and aircraft—wherever they sink' e/Hund at sea—was “offensive.” Surely, the
S|nkii sea—was intensive. ouieiy, me
tho -fupunese carriers at the Battle of Midway and
"V Virtu..i ................... _ J
Mari.lrtUa> annihilation of Japanese carrier aircraft in the truestnUS Turkcy Shoot were offensive operations in the pacjfjscnsc- and were as essential to allied victory in the suult C JS carr'er ril'ds on Rabaul or the amphibious as- gian o’n *.Wo Jinia. Comparable successes in the Norwe-
i ^Ci.1 in a iii.,r ,,,;«u ih . c________ • * i i_:___ »i. ... :..n: ..i
heavv L|l 111 a War w'1^ Soviet Union, if they inflicted
n^-»v . ' vvim me owviei ui
Backf °SSes on t*lc Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet and b°mb.,rC *°rCe' wou^ be as "offensive’' as dropping °n the Kola Peninsula. And such operations would
April 1986
CWC
Revisited
By Captain P. J. Doerr, U. S. Navy
The composite warfare commander doctrine is sound, but some traditions die hard. Try telling a destroyer squadron commander that his battle station should be in a carrier’s combat information center.
*
contribute to the victory on NATO's Northern Flank and in the Atlantic. A minor but symbolic reflection of this new thinking involved dropping "air defense" from the Navy's vocabulary in favor of "antiair warfare."
All the while, command, control, and communications (C’) facilities on board most destroyers remained very limited. The ASW commander (ASWC) by seniority and experience usually was the destroyer squadron commodore. in the absence of an ASW carrier (CVS) and ASW group commander, both of which ceased to exist after the early- 1970s. Having the ASWC on the carrier made a lot of sense, although CWC doctrine did not mandate such action. On board the carrier, the ASWC had the ASW module (in the Midway |CV-411. the embryonic tactical
those seas. These battles will be multi-dimensional— over, under, and on the surface—and either simultaneously or sequentially engaging large-scale combined-arms forces, including Soviet submarines, surface action groups, and land-based air-to-surface missile-equippe° bombers. These engagements will also require close coordination with direct-support submarines, shore-based air (Navy, Air Force, and allied), shore-based sensors, an shore-controlled space systems.
Indeed, these will be campaigns more than they will e battles. The officer in tactical command will be campa[1]gn commander to an even greater degree than were Spruance and Halsey in World War II. As OTCs, the commanders o the Second and Seventh fleets will be deeply involved m coordinating support from forces outside their comman and integrating battle force and amphibious force opera tions. A subordinate battle force commander exercising combined-warfare functions will be essential to fight battle force. ...
The ranges of the modem sensors and weapons that wi be used in those campaigns will make the battle space-' within which operations will have to be coordinated an controlled by a single composite warfare commander— almost coincident with the whole Norwegian Sea or a huS chunk of the Northwest Pacific. The speeds of the moder weapons will compress the time available for making deC' sion to tens of minutes. No single brain, no matter h° well supported by staff and tactical decision aids, will capable of maintaining detailed control in these circum
flag command center), extra communication terminals for the many additional circuits needed to coordinate direct support land-based patrol aircraft (VP) and submarines, face-to-face, near-real-time access to returning S-3 Viking tactical coordinators, and face-to-face liaison with the composite warfare commander and his staff for the midrange operational planning so critical to effective ASW.
Several ASWCs in the late-1970s and early-1980s elected to stay in their destroyer flagships despite these C3 shortfalls. This reluctance to leave the destroyers often was based on a resistance to change or for reasons having to do with destroyer squadron commodore command perks in his own flagship. The result was a Seventh Fleet dictum that the ASWC would be in the carrier unless Commander Seventh Fleet granted permission for the ASWC to embark in some other ship. That permission was fairly easy to obtain, however, provided good reasons were the basis of the justification.
At the same time, the upper end of the tactical echelons institutionalized the sea control-related battle force and battle group titles and concepts, replacing the power projection-related carrier strike force concept. Unfortunately, flexible operations* and multi-carrier battle force exercises were years away and only clearly understood and appreciated by the Chief of Naval Operations and the fleet commanders in chief. Consequently, the CWC concept fleshed out on the skeleton of an individual, small battle group rather than that of a more robust and demanding battle force. Applied to small-scale problems within minigroups, the composite warfare commander concept often meant too much organization and too much delegation. After all, many fleet operators believed that any good group commander should be able to handle a carrier and five escorts with his own staff resources.
A final historical point must be mentioned. As the CWC concept developed, the fleet was awash from standing operation orders (OpOrders) and ad hoc exercise directives—inches thick from several echelons. To combat this problem, the U. S. Navy borrowed a device from the Royal Navy with its affection for one-liner OpOrders— e.g., “England expects every man to do his duty.” Called OpGens, these devices were to constrain tactical commanders to include only essential data in a message, freeing the fleet from the paperwork load. Increases in communications capacities, however, eliminated the constraints, permitting messages of almost any length. This coincidental turn of events should not be blamed on the development of the CWC doctrine. The command and control organization in effect does not drive the form of operational directives—whether written OpOrder or message OpGen.
Application of the CWC Concept: For the battles of the Norwegian Sea and the Northwest Pacific in a major war with the Soviet Union, the Navy’s maritime strategy calls for multi-carrier battle forces to establish allied control of
stances; delegation will be essential. .,|
Communications and emission control policies f change significantly during the course of the campa>gnj Transits and initial engagements will have to be we thought out, and pre-planned responses fully documen t for decentralized execution in conditions of very restrl tive control of electronic emissions. However, once e gagements commence, attrition begins to take its toll, and both sides settle into a war of maneuver, stn ’ and counterstrike—active coordination will have to ta* place. Commanders will have to communicate situat'° reports and decisions. Resources will have to be rea ^ cated among missions. Subsequent engagements will ha to be planned and then fought. Changes in coordinah arrangements with external supporting commands wi , needed. Again, the OTC and CWC will need to make an communicate big-picture decisions, and will have to m° itor selectively the execution of those decisions by de gated subordinates. .
The only real issue is whether to organize the tof functionally, by platform, spatially, or in some coirlblst tion of these options. In my view, it makes the greas sense to organize the battle force functionally. The f°r required for the various sea control functions fit into r sonably neat packages: cruisers, E-2s, F-14s, and E-3S ^ area antiair warfare; frigates, S-3s, P-3s, nuclear-p°w<T ^ attack submarines, and support processing stations as ^ for area antisubmarine warfare; destroyers, A-6s> A-7s for area antisurface warfare. Of course, most s and aircraft in the battle force and the forces supp°rt,n-^, are “multi-function.” However, most have clear
one 'a IZat'ons ^at make it possible to allocate them to hav' War*are c°mmander for primary tasking, while also ^m available for collateral tasking by other war-
LoCOmmanders'
areCa. tas^ un>t level relations (e.g., carrier and screen) conchy workable subsets of the larger command and nianj° Pr°hlem and do not really affect force-wide comas^ ^ control. For example, destroyers and frigates djffj n i to protect distant antiair picket cruisers have little Whi]CU ^ ,'n joining a local AAW net with these ships aee(je .^'ntaining the long-range ASW or ASUW nets t°Wed those warfare commanders. Outer screen ASW tcjbut array sonar ships working for the ASWC can con- mjSsjf to the surface picture or launch Harpoon antiship 'tt'ssic^n °n °rder without seriously degrading their ASW The
in 0UrCornP°sition of battle forces and groups envisioned Permit War P*ans *s not generous, but it is adequate to is f rnuch more single-mission tasking of our ships than Warn. ln Peacetime exercises. Resource allocation in able ■' not he a trivial problem, but it will be manage- ulin ’In Ways that are often concealed by peacetime sched- “SPracte. '
fare cre®ard to the flagship controversy, combined war- th0UehTand procedures and structure do not require— Cornm ma^ ^ean 'n that direction—that all warfare warfaranders he embarked in carriers. Clearly, the antiair than tlf C°mman<^er could not find a better platform to ride in adv6 cruiser, provided that he educates himself ers; an^p °n Wa^s t0 task the carriers for fighters, tank- and c .2s, and provided that organizational integrity saryntlnuity have permitted him to develop the neces- rriulti- ^^°rt w’th the operators on board the carrier. With ^‘‘g-lev'T161^ ^att'e forces, however, and the two or three strange^ ®rouP commanders they include, it would be the anf !h°se 8rouP commanders in the carriers were not 'VarfareSUbmar^ne warfare commander and the antisurface Warp,6 Commander, as well as the alternate composite
Por ,C°mmander-
battle Css'than-general-war situations involving single ***"*¥•. the officer in tactical command and the AS\yp *6 Waffare commander should decide where the formsarJd ASUWC will be located, based upon the plat- and commanders available. Indeed, in Third World
In organizing the battle force functionally, traditional attack aircraft—like the A-7—fit well with destroyers to provide area antisurface warfare.
limited war situations, the variability of the threat will demand major adaptation of the CWC doctrine. However, this neither invalidates the doctrine nor the sets of procedures that support the doctrine. There is nothing in the doctrine, for example, that prevents the CWC from retaining some functions if the situation makes it desirable to do so.
Answers to Criticisms of the CWC Concept: Carrier and cruiser-destroyer group staffs have some administrative structure and functions. However, the half dozen carrier group staffs with and on which I have served were primarily manned for tactical command and staffed with true experts in the several functional warfare areas. They are by no means “merely” writers of formatted OpGens and OpOrders.
I have never served in a battle group or battle force where ships were constrained to operate within 20 miles from the carrier so ultra-high frequency communications could be maintained to meet all needs. Every group or force I have been with has been spread out over hundreds of miles. And it is this dispersion that drives the main features of communications plans, not the composite warfare commander structure.
Building a complex multi-battle group composite warfare commander structure may be appropriate at times. In most cases, however, a fairly simple force-wide structure for a multi-carrier battle force requires only one each of the major warfare commanders. There is only a requirement for multiple screen coordinators because each carrier main body unit needs one.
Whether or not a warfare commander is somehow a “staffie” and not a commander is probably in the eye of the beholder. The issue is largely semantic and perks- related rather than substantive. But the ASWC is no less of a commander than the old screen commander was, and a return to the tradition of the destroyer squadron commodore as screen commander seems to be what many surface warfare opponents of composite warfare commander concept want to restore.
The suggestion that delegation and command by exception inhibit tactical initiative on the part of subordinates is false. Indeed, CWC procedures delegate a great deal of execution from each warfare commander to the individual units.
Conclusions: the composite warfare commander concept has proved itself as an effective doctrine under many circumstances which the Navy can expect to face in the future. And the concept continues to evolve. With renewed emphasis on power projection, a strike warfare commander recently has been added to the CWC concept.
Most of the composite warfare commander concept’s faults are attributable to the fact that we have not tried it in genuinely realistic circumstances very often. Pacific Fleet exercises in 1981, 1983, and 1985 provided good tests, and they validated the doctrine as far as can be determined by the exercise reports. There have been fewer multicarrier operations and exercises in the Atlantic Fleet. This most likely results from the difficulty in moving battle groups across Atlantic and European commands’ chop line and allied navies’ reservations about CWC.
So while every organizing scheme can and should changed or modified as situations alter, I suggest that a ; CWC course change be based upon the reality of the do trine, rather than on partial perceptions and misun standings of what it is and why it is that way.
The Quiet Revolution
Scene 1: On Board the Kidd (DDG-993)
The destroyer squadron commander destined to be the antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC) is organizing his staff for the upcoming battle group deployment. He’s spent a great deal of his career on missile ships, so it’s been a while since he’s been actively involved in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). However, he is determined to rectify the situation by studying publications that deal with ASW in order to ‘ ‘get up on the step.” His staff is dutifully returning with the required Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs). One staff member returns with a dozen NWP-65s, each one covering a different class of surface combatant in the battle group. Another brings in a half-dozen NWP-55s, each covering one of the air ASW platforms available in the battle group.
Eager staff members continue to pile more NWPs and Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) on the chart table. More ambitious staffers return with type commander tactical memos (TacMemos), fleet commander tactical notes (TacNotes), lessons-learned, operating guidelines, and more publications dredged from the bottom drawers of secret safes. As the ship takes a gentle roll, and the pile of publications crashes down on the commodore; he wails, “/ thought being ASWC was going to be fun!' ’
Scene 2: On Board the Flagship at the Battle Group Planning Conference
The battle group commander has gathered his warfare commanders together almost a year prior to their Western Pacific deployment to coordinate their efforts and assign responsibilities. Prior to the admiral’s arrival, the warfare commanders attempt to iron out some areas of contention. The prospective antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC) believes that he’d like to live on board the Kidd-c/ass DDG because of her Navy tactical data system (NTDS) suite and staff berthing. But that ship’s commanding officer believes that he may be the antiair warfare commander (AAWC) and doesn’t think that he can spare the communications nets or NTDS consoles necessary for the ASUWC. The ASWC and ASUWC enter a heated argument regarding who will “own” the Spruance (DDG-963)-class destroyers in the battle group with their significant antisubmarine and antisurface capabilities. The electronic warfare commander (EWC) adds that he had intended to put several elec ironic warfare vans on the fhg'11 deck of one of the Spruances, which will prevent her from being able to accommodate a LAMPo helo. There is total disagreement on whose messages should be chopped through whom. All of other warfare commanders are dumbfounded when the AAWC an nounces that he intends to use
. • has
Almost every naval tactician £ encountered scenes similar to
LAMPS Mk-III-equipped Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class fr‘Sa as an AAW picket ship. As the admiral enters, name-calling n started and anarchy almost re,nS\gll The admiral moans, ‘ 7 thought) all had been around the fleet an knew how to operate!”
Blast3111 ^0err receive(l a bachelor’s degree from Columbia College and a Din]61 arts *n 'aw anc* diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Sch °r[laC^' a*so graduated from the Navy’s postgraduate Intelligence ff 00 ' has commanded the Parrot (MSC-197) and the Francis Evar^°(rs ®E'1067). He served as the executive officer in the Frank E. Offi ^ “®~754). His service also includes tours as Surface Operations r tor Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Group Three and as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy for Commander Seventh Fleet. In 1981, he took command of Destroyer Squadron Fifteen, operating mainly as Antisubmarine Warfare Coordinator and Combined Warfare Commander for the Seventh Fleet’s Battle Group ALPHA embarked in the Midway (CV-41). Last April, he reported to Commander Carrier Group Eight as Chief of Staff. He is currently Chief of Staff Carrier Group Four.
(i Scr'bcd here and has wondered if SQere's going to be any relief °n. New systems enter the fleet fQConiPanied by a plethora of plat- linmanuals and operating guide- bee\ After these systems have
Nwpln t*1e ^eet Por some ftme
ss> TacMemos, TacNotes, les- do r earned’ and other sources of aiQC rine and information follow So Extremely diligent tacticians RerrrfIITIes master ad °f the details aj ane to their particular ship,
Mi u ’ 0r submarine, but those
f°rrn'laVe t0 dea^ muftftP*at‘
and °Perations in one warfare area dca] ^art'CUlarly staffs thrrt must areacr°ss several warfare areas W1aa'°« immediately overloaded URh ‘"formation.
vigorously to this
ftfeaml y
l'ons
By Commander George Galdorisi, U. S. Navy
situation, the Navy has •tied Naval Warfare Publica- Whi^k° COnfomi to the method in •n a We ^ght the fleet”—i.e., Warf C°rc^ance with the composite
trmewCOmmander fcwc) doc'
grou' the doctrine, the battle
CQmP c°mmander, serving as the SuJ-de warfare commander, has f0r gr mate warfare commanders face ntlsuf>marine warfare, antisur- electWarfare> antiair warfare, and °ther°n*CS Warfare> as well as by "ator ST^°rd'nate warfare coordi- NavaMiT6 restructuring of the vides f.VVar^arc Publications pro- creteacdcai guidance in the dis- operat^ntext °f carrier battle group
°f tb|U[e ' shows the organization Ntyp , atde SrouP commanders’ prior ser'es publications. The ClVc Af puEiicati°ns include the Ual dP . anual and a discrete man- Threea lnS with strike operations. °Per,t PUbllCations draw together atl°nal, unit, and Rainform
reports, areas that had previously been the source of considerable confusion. Supporting the four warfare commanders are a series of subordinate warfare commander manuals, all of which have a common format which is basically the same for all manuals. This common format, outlined in Table 1, helps staffs keep up with the dy-
Table 1 Standard Organization for NWP 10-1-XX Series
Chapter 1 Introduction
—Purpose —Abstract
—Executive Summary Chapter 2 Warfare Commander Organization
—Staff Organization —Watch Organization —Plots —Displays —Files
Chapter 3 Preparation
—Training —Planning —Promulgating Plan Chapter 4 Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence —Warfare Commander Communications —Intelligence
Chapter 5 Warfare Commander Tactical Employment
—Principles —Options
—Special Warfare Problems Chapter 6 Any other chapters peculiar to a particular warfare area
Appendix A Example OpGen Appendix B Any other appendices peculiar to a particular warfare area namic environment of carrier battle group operations which can have the staff or ship operating as ASWC one week and ASUWC the next. Finally, direct-support guidance for using all platforms not usually assigned to the battle group (P-3s, A-3s, SSNs, etc.) in all warfare areas is dealt with in a separate publication—NWP 10-1-30.
Far from proliferating more NWP publications, the battle group commanders’ NWP 10 series consolidates existing publications. For example, NWP 10-1-30, Battle Group Direct Support, consolidates the information in NWP 25 (The SSN in Direct Support), NWP 25-2 (The VP in Direct Support), and a number of other manuals, thereby eliminating these publications.
Platform manuals and operating guidelines for specific surface, air, and subsurface platforms still fill a necessary place in naval warfare.
The battle group commanders’
NWP 10 series of publications has streamlined the information provided to warfare commanders and molded it in a format required to fight a carrier battle group.
Time-proven tactics presented to warfare commanders in the discrete context of carrier battle group operations promise to be a surefire combination!
A 1970 Naval Academy graduate, Commander Galdorisi has served in LAMPS-I and LAMPS-III squadrons on both coasts. His most recent afloat assignment was with Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three on board the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). He received a master’s degree in oceanography from the Naval Postgraduate School and graduated from the Naval War College with highest distinction. He has been associated with the LAMPS-III weapon system since 1981: currently he is executive officer of the newest squadron, HSL-43.
43
ln8s / April 1986
[1]The concept of flexible operations implements the national forward deployment strategy while reducing the rigidity of commitments to the various theater commanders-in-chief to permit fleet commanders-in-chief to assemble forces for realistic multi-earner battle force operations and exercises.