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By Norman Polmar, Editor, Guide to the Soviet Navy
The Soviet Union is the principal supplier of arms to the Third World. In 1984 (the last year for which comprehensive data are available), the Soviet Union exported $8.6 billion in arms to the so- called developing nations, plus $800 million to other nations, primarily Warsaw Pact countries, for a total of $9.4 billion.
In comparison, U. S. arms transfers in 1984 totalled $7.7 billion, of which $4.8 billion went to developing countries. In the last five years, the ratio of disparity is even greater, with the Soviets averaging over $11 billion annually, compared to about $8 billion for the United States.
During the past five years, naval ship transfers have paralleled this trend: The Soviets transferred more surface combatants of all types to other nations than the United States. The Soviets also provided the Third World with eight submarines, a type of warship the United States no longer exports.
The current Soviet ship transfer policy has none of the constraints of Western arms policies: The Soviets provide new and used weapons to nations that are allies, neutrals, or even historically aligned with the West; the recipient countries may or may not be capable of operating the weapons; and the terms of payment are highly flexible.
The Soviets believe arms transfers:
- Earn “hard” currency for ships built in Soviet or East European shipyards for “soft” rubles
- Provide the means for establishing a training-support infrastructure in the host country
- Increase the receiving country’s dependency upon the Soviet Union for spare parts and other logistics support
- Provide a potential weapons reserve for Soviet forces
- Cause problems for the West
In many respects, the last purpose is the most significant, as evidenced by the cost to the United States of Soviet weapons supplied to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and more recent arms transfers to such nations as Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua.
Arms transfers have, however, created problems for the Soviet Union. In some cases, recipients have not been able to pay as promised or pay in hard currencies, leaving the Soviets with a financial loss. By Western standards, Soviet training and support personnel assigned to Third World countries have been of poor quality, and spare parts have been in short supply. As a result, the Soviets have created dissatisfied customers and, in some instances, strained relations with their clients.
Nevertheless, by establishing major support and even production facilities and Peru (aircraft), the Soviets have made important political-military m- roads. Such facilities and spare par*s stores could be used by Soviet forces operating in the region.
The current Soviet arms transfer policy began taking shape shortly after the death of Josef Stalin in 1953. Under Stalin, Moscow viewed the world as bi-polar-— either a nation supported the Soviet Union or was against it. Only China- North Korea, and the allied Eastern European nations received ships as part ot Soviet military assistance in the first decade after World War II.
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Table 1 Soviet Ship Transfers, 1955-1985 (Excluding China)
Warsaw Pact
time a ship was sunk by guided mis-
ss | Submarines | 14 | 54** |
CL | Cruisers | _ | 1 |
DD/DDG | Destroyers | 3 | 16 |
FF | Frigates | 7 | 10 |
FFL | Light Frigates | 11 | 28 |
PGG | Missile Corvettes | 4+ | 11 |
PTG | Missile Boats | 39 | -230 |
PT/PTH | Torpedo Boats | 91 | -250 |
PCC/PC | Patrol Craft | 48 | -110 |
LST/LSM | Landing Ships | — | 38 |
LCU/LCT | Landing Craft | 24 | 65 |
MSO/MSC | Minesweepers | 37 | 56 |
MSB/MSI | Minesweeping Craft | 26 | -60 |
‘Includes ships transferred to Finland and Yugoslavia “Includes four submarines taken over by Albania in 1961
Khrushchev, saw political and economic advantages in recognizing the “third” ^°rld of so-called non-aligned nations. n 1955, the Soviet Union made its first ^jor transfer—to Egypt with Czechoslovakia as intermediary. Until 1955, S§ypt was totally dependent upon Britain °r arms. The Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement—valued as high as $200 mil- i°n by some sources—was significant 0r breaking a Western monopoly as well as for its size.1 In a barter agreement, the Egyptian Government agreed to pay for ”e arms with cotton and rice over a 12- year period. Thus, much of Egypt’s primary crops was pledged for more than a ecade for arms that were, reportedly, of Poor quality. Moreover, most of the arms transferred’ in the first year were lost in the October 1956 conflict between Egypt ar>d Israel, and the ensuing Anglo-French jnvasion of Suez. After the 1956 war, the Egyptians continued to rely on the Soviets for weapons.
P The initial Soviet arms transfer to hgypt in 1956 included two Skoryy-class estroyers and several torpedo boats. Ver the next 15 years, the Soviets proved a large fleet: several Whiskey- and otneo-class submarines, more Skoryy estroyers, Komar- and Osa-class missile °ats, torpedo boats, and patrol craft. The Komars, each armed with two S-N-2 Styx antiship missiles, made his- 0ry on 21 October 1967. From the safety ? Egypt’s Alexandria harbor, a pair of ^oinars sank the Israeli destroyer Eliat pUh their Styx missiles. It marked the s'ies fired from another ship.
By the early 1970s, the Egyptian Navy a<f 12 submarines, plus the destroyers 'albeit outdated), and missile and torpedo °ats, providing a considerable naval CaPability—-at least on paper. The Sovi- et-S also transferred Tu-16 Badger strike aircraft armed with AS-1 Kennel mis- s'ies, Be-12 Mail and 11-38 May patrol/ antisubmarine aircraft, and An-12 Cub lectronic reconnaissance aircraft. Some ‘ these planes flew with Soviet crews. * but the Badgers were returned to the
Soviets, and Soviet military assistance to Egypt ended in 1972.
While the Egyptians now acquire arms from the West and China, the Soviets continue to make most of their arms sales to the Middle East. More than one-third of Soviet arms sales from 1979 to 1983— estimated at $20 billion worth by the U. S. Government—went to Middle East nations, primarily Iraq, Libya, and Syria. (U. S. arms transfers to the Middle East during that five-year period totalled $14 billion; those of other NATO nations totalled $18 billion.)
Other major areas receiving Soviet arms from 1979 to 1983 were Africa (almost $14 billion), Eastern Europe ($6.8 billion), East Asia ($6.5 billion), South Asia ($5.3 billion), and Latin America ($3.6 billion).
Indonesia was the only other nation to receive as large a Soviet-supplied fleet as the Egyptians. During the Sukarno regime, ship transfers to Indonesia included a Sverdlov-class cruiser, which, at 17,000 tons, was the largest warship ever transferred by the Soviet Navy, a dozen Whiskey-class submarines, several destroyers, and lesser craft. Like the Egyp-
The threat to Western naval forces operating in the Mediterranean has been created largely by Soviet transfers, including Syrian Osa-II patrol boats, opposite, with SS-N-2B Styx missiles, and Libyan Nanuchka-II corvettes, with SS-N-2c Styxes and an SA-N-4 missile system.
tian deal, the terms were simple and stretched out over a long period. Yet the Indonesian Navy’s ability to operate the equipment was questionable; reportedly, some of the ships never left port under the Indonesian flag.
Some Soviet arms agreements had significant naval implications, even if only minor naval craft were involved. For example, during 1968-1976, the Soviets provided Somalia with several torpedo boats and a Polnocny-class landing ship. More significantly, the Berbera airfield was enlarged to handle strike aircraft, and a Soviet missile assembly facility was built there. Because Somalia lies at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the Soviet presence had major strategic implications for the West. (Somalia’s war, beginning in 1977 against rebels backed by Ethiopia’s Marxist government, embarassed the Soviets. Soviet aid to Somalia ended, and the estimated 1,500 Soviet and Cuban advisors were expelled.)
Since the mid-1950s, 33 nations have received Soviet naval ships, submarines, and small craft, though some, like Somalia, no longer have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The ships transferred during those 30 years are shown in Table 1. All of the landing ships trans-
Third World*
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r°ceedings / March 1986
used
In the 1980s, very few older,
Cuba’s Soviet-supplied Koni-class frigate tags along behind three Soviet ships in a recent Caribbean exercise. India has received Foxtrot attack submarines, bottom, as have Cuba and Libya.
ferred by the Soviet Union—one Ropucha tank landing ship and 31 Pol- nocnys—were built in Poland. Shipyards in Poland and, to a lesser degree, East Germany provide most of the Soviet Navy’s amphibious, research, and survey ships, as well as certain support ships.
Foreign shipyards are among the several sources for ships the Soviets make available for transfer. Other sources include new Soviet construction undertaken specifically for foreign navies, new construction of Soviet Navy ship types, and units that have seen service under the Soviet naval ensign.
The most impressive of new construction ships built for transfer are the 4,950- ton modified Kashin-class missile destroyers going to India. (The Soviet Navy took delivery from 1963 to 1972 of 20 Kashins—the world’s first all-gas turbine warships.) The 61 Kommuna shipyard at Nikolayev on the Black Sea is building the modified Kashins for India; four have been delivered and at least two more are being built. A larger ship based on the Kresta-II cruiser is reportedly on order for delivery to India.
Another warship class being built only for foreign transfer is the 1,900-ton, Koni-class frigates or patrol ships. This class, oriented toward antisubmarine warfare, initially may have been intended for Soviet service. Only the lead ship, however, was retained by the Soviet Navy, apparently for training foreign crews. The ten additional units built have been transferred to Algeria, Cuba, East Germany, Libya, and Yugoslavia. Each of the Yugoslav ships has been fitted with four Styx antiship missiles.
Reports persist that the new Kilo-class submarine will become a major foreign sale item. This diesel-electric boat, with a submerged displacement of 3,000 tons, was introduced into the Soviet Navy in 1982. Production is under way at the Komsomol’sk shipyard in Siberia, with at least six units in Soviet service. No other diesel submarines are being built in the Soviet Union. Although older units are available for transfer, from 1967 to 1983 the Foxtrot submarine production line was kept open to build 17 units, to be transferred to Cuba, India, and Libya.
Syria received its first submarine—-tw° used Romeos—in late 1985. These nations, plus Vietnam, are expected to receive additional Soviet subs—Kil°s’ most likely. .
A number of other ship classes being built for the Soviet Navy are also being transferred. In some instances they are being modified significantly for foreign clients. For example, Nanuchka-clasS missile corvettes for export have Sty* missiles in place of the more-capable SS N-9s on Soviet units, and the Square Tie targeting radar instead of the Band Stan (although the lesser radar is housed in *he same dome).
ships have been transferred by the S°vl ets. The Soviet Government is commit16 to providing relatively modem and capa ble ships to its allies and to non-aligne nations. This policy will continue t0 cause problems for the West, while gar nering several benefits for the Sovi Union and the Soviet Navy.
'In 1955. $200 million was about the cost of a t- ■ Forrestal (CVA-59)-class aircraft carrier. ^ "The first sinking of a warship by guided missiles in September 1943: German aircraft cmp'HV guided bombs to sink the Italian battleship R°,n
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Proceedings / March