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Lieutenant Commander Siena glanced at the large screen strategic display, and then around the combat information center (CIC) of the Aegis cruiser as fulfilled the dual functions of tactical action officer VAO) and Battle Force Alfa Whiskey on a tense mid- VvQtch. Even in this highly restrictive electromagnetic radiation control (EMCON) condition in which the battle Sfoup was operating, he had confidence he could protect *he three bird farms from attack as they plowed the rough Seas of the Northern Pacific. His eyes went back to the strategic display just as the eight “hostile air” symbols aPpeared. He rang the captain’s at-sea cabin, and simul- tjtfieously reached for the red phone to call Alfa Romeo.
'l,ne to wake up the airdales and launch the E-2C and '14 alert package: “Bridge, TAO, sound general quarters!” The cruiser throbbed with the general quarters aiarm as crewmen ran to their battle stations. The most efftcient antiair warfare (AAW) system in the world pre- Pured to engage a threat which was still more than 500 miles away.
Lieutenant (junior grade) Whiskey squinted through the fftin-streaked windscreen, watching the angry green seas °reak over the missile launcher and smash against the °r'dge. Not a good day to be officer of the deck (OOD), Particularly with the LAMPS helicopter overdue and near- ,n8 fuel exhaustion. The helo had launched on a routine Mission, but radio and radar contact had been lost. The st°rm had swept in with the suddenness so typical of the ^reenland-Iceland- United Kingdom Gap this time of year. The worried voice of the antisubmarine air control- er continued to call the missing Waterbug 12, with no response. Lookouts were straining eyes and ears for some s‘8n of the wayward SH-2. Finally, the voice of the CIC ^utch officer announced “Splash Time,” and the commanding officer emerged from CIC. Then came the welCome call from CIC to steer course 278° for 50 miles to P‘ck up the missing helo drivers. A message from the
beach had provided the downed helicopter's position.
Lieutenant Oscar, navigator in a trusty Knox (FF- 1052)-class frigate, expert with the sextant since Surface Warfare Officers School, had not seen the sun or a star in ten days. Operating without the aid of any landmarks in the vast southern Indian Ocean, the whole crew was ready to lynch him if his navigating cost the ship even one day in-port time in Perth. But, he slept peacefully, knowing within 100 meters where his ship was, based on his last fix. He dreamt of liberty in Australia.
These fictitious incidents represent events which could happen any day. They demonstrate the growing dependence of fleet operations on space-based tactical capabilities and why surface warfare officers must understand their potential advantages and pitfalls.
Ever since the first seagoing captain strapped a seaman to the mast to increase his search capability, the naval commander has been attempting to extend his operating horizons. In World War I, the airplane was added to shipboard equipment to further expand the field of view in an attempt to target an “almost” over-the-horizon weapon— the 12- and 16-inch guns. In World War II, the airplane’s offensive power increased the required detection ranges of sensors to hundreds, instead of tens, of miles.
Today’s weapons require that we extend our sensor coverage to thousands of miles. As Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins said at the commissioning of the Naval Space Command in October 1983, “. . . our sensors have moved from the masthead to the edge of space.” This advance is also true of our communications, our navigation, our environmental detection capability, and even our search-and-rescue capability. The modem surface warfare officer, as well as every other warfare specialty, must take into account the unique capabilities and limitations of our space systems in order to combat effectively an enemy who is devoting great efforts to opti-
mizing his use of the same medium. Of the more than 100 active Soviet satellites on orbit, less than 10% serve no military purpose. And nearly half the military satellites are somehow involved in attempting to neutralize U. S. naval capabilities.
What do you, as a TAO, OOD, or other surface warfare officer, need to know about space? Is being able to pick up the fleet secure voice communications handset and successfully reach Alfa Bravo enough? Or should you be aware of the limitations imposed by the satellite footprint? Do you need to know your ship’s vulnerability to geo-location under certain circumstances? What does the average surface warfare officer need to know about the workings of the tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) offices of the services? Is it enough to depend on specialists to always be the only ones who deal with this magic?
Then there is the capability of potential enemies. If the modern surface warfare officer is to counter the total threat, he must look for far more than a periscope feather or low-flying aircraft. How can surveillance from space be avoided? How can it be defeated, if it cannot be avoided? Can it be fooled? What will the cost be to our own ship’s or our own force’s offensive or defensive posture?
Ask the space systems officer on board your ship for the low-down on this exciting new world of tactics and warfighting capability. What? There is no space systems officer on board your ship? Then, who does the planning for these capabilities? Who plans, not just for your ship, but for your command-and-control functions as Alfa Whiskey, Alfa Sierra, Alfa Xray, or Alfa Whatever? The navigator may have a certain amount of expertise on the Transit system, and the communicator can probably tell you what the pointing angle is to access the Fleet Satellite Communications System, but who will tell you what is out there to aid you in AAW, antisurface warfare (ASUW), or antisubmarine warfare (ASW)? Who will tell you what the problems are for interoperability with Air Force units using satellite communications? Who will tell you how to use national systems to the best advantage?
If you are on a larger combatant, with an intelligence officer assigned, he may be able to shed some light on the latter problem, but we do not speak the same language as the intel types, which is not to criticize either community. Both have a professional focus and language which are complementary, but semi-exclusive.
One major problem is that most of us are not cleared to enter that strange land where many of our space-based capabilities exist. And, unfortunately, most of the critical capabilities and limitations of these systems are shrouded
Satellites open new horizons for surface ships—from top to bottom, an aircraft’s view of the Malacca Strait at 36,000 feet, and a satellite’s view at 160 miles, at 600 miles, and at 19,000 miles. The advantages of space-based radar in surface force operations, for example, in broad area surveillance, are almost unlimited.
ln a fog. Of course, if you talk to the intel type, he will be as convinced that the mysteries surrounding a successful aPproach to a carrier to refuel in rough seas at night are beeped in fear, superstition, and pacts with the devil.
The space capabilities most familiar to the majority of naval officers are the ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite c°mmunications systems—FltSatCom (Fleet Satellite Communications), Gapfiller, and, most recently, the t-eaSat (Leased Satellite System). These satellites provide ‘*eet broadcast, tactical voice, common user digital information exchange, and a host of other circuits. Their footprints are large. For example, Commander Task Force (CTF)-70, embarked in the USS Midway (CV-41) in the yea of Japan can readily communicate with forces under ais command in the Indian Ocean.
These satellites are not without their limitations, howler, and the professional naval officer must realize these imitations in planning and operations. As a warfare commander, your ability to communicate with the forces as- Sl§ned must be a key consideration in developing your §eneral operations plan (OpGen). Losing a critical communications path at the wrong moment could cause you to mil to fulfill your responsibilities in force defense. In an exercise, it is embarrassing. In combat, it could be a disas- *er- If the loss of the communications path could have °een foreseen, it is unforgivable.
We also have a limited shipboard capability in the SuPer-high frequency (SHF) band. When the Milstar sys- ^m is operational, we will go even higher in frequency to me extremely high frequency (EHF) range. The advances of these higher frequencies with their greater band 'Vldths, and associated higher data rates, are obvious when cornpared with the limited number of channels available in me crowded UHF spectrum.
Space support is not limited to communications. The transit navigation system was placed in orbit more than 20 years ago and continues to provide two-dimensional loca- ri°n accuracy to within 100 meters to every combatant in ae Navy as well as to nearly 70,000 commercial users.
FltSatCom, left, and LeaSat—ultra-high frequency satellite communications systems—are among the satellites most naval officers recognize because they are among the most commonly used. They provide valuable services to the fleet, including fleet broadcast, tactical voice, and common user digital information exchange.
The next time you are worried about maintaining Link-11 gridlock for a large force spread over half the Mediterranean, maybe you should consider including satellites as the primary gridlock source in your OpGen Lima. But Transit is not the complete answer. It also has limitations, and to use it properly, the tactical planner or operator must know these limitations.
Weather is still a major factor in naval warfare, and space-based weather sensors provide much-needed input for daily operations. Direct downlink to carriers provides a capability for optimizing combat air patrol stationing, patrol and antisubmarine aircraft search areas, force disposition, and such major considerations as which way to turn to avoid weather conditions preclusive of offensive or defensive operations. The use of weather to avoid detection by air breathers, and even certain space sensors, must be factored into transit plans. The weather satellite data have far more tactical value than enlivening the evening news.
The Navy’s Geodetic Satellite (GeoS^t) is busily orbiting the earth at this moment, determining the earth’s geoid. Since the earth is not a perfect shape, there are differences in the local vertical at different spots on the earth. This can translate into a variance in perceived positions between a remote targeting platform and a shooter. At short ranges, this difference is probably negligible, but as the range increases it becomes a significant problem.
GeoSat will spend 18 months determining the earth’s geoid. GeoSat will be joined by the Navy Remote Ocean Sensing Satellite (NROSS), which will provide even more information about the ocean environment. The antisubmarine warfare and antisurface warfare implications of this capability are impressive.
The joint U. S., Canadian, French, and Soviet Search-
and-Rescue Satellite (SARSat) program has provided a worldwide capability to geolocate signals originating on international distress frequencies (121.5 megahertz, 243.0 megahertz, and the new experimental frequency, 406 megahertz). This system is a real-time system, which has already proven its worth in providing emergency assistance in a matter of minutes. But it poses some problems for the tactical user. When was the last time the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopter emergency locator transmitter was inadvertently activated when the pilot pranged it onto the deck too hard? Or the last time the aircrew checked out the personal survival radio?
The tactical exploitation of national capabilities offices of the services make available to the tactical user informa-, tion which is obtained through the national systems. The sources of this information are highly classified and are far too often available only to those units having intelligence officers. The tactical planners on ships without intelli' gence officers, such as the platforms hosting Alfa Whiskey and other warfare commanders, have not been able to make the best use of these sensors in accomplishing the mission. The tactical training groups have done much to alleviate this situation by including discussions of these sensors in the courses of instruction for officers destined tor major staffs. However, even more effort is needed to get the information to the working level operator. The Naval Space Command sponsors an annual TENCAP symposium which is designed to get the word out on these capabilities and their potential for tactical use. More paf' ticipation is needed from the line officer community to exploit fully these valuable assets.
While this article does not fully cover the host of space sensors and capabilities available to the tactical user, provides an idea of the tremendous capability which t5 there. But not all of the “space systems’’ are in space. The terrestrial elements of a space system are critical. Without them, the spacecraft on orbit become merely high-priced pieces of aluminum traveling around the earth.
Every satellite on orbit requires tracking, telemetry, and control from a ground station to monitor the satellite’5 health and welfare, as well as to provide orbital corrections to ensure the satellite stays where it belongs and maintains the proper orientation. Imagine the difficulties
tricity of the orbit can be used to provide special coverage °f particular areas of the earth. Knowledge of these factors can help the tactical user make better use of a friendly usset or defeat an enemy satellite.
The tactical user should be stating which orbit to put the satellite on to meet the tactical need. More operationally oriented professionals should be working side by side with
s. NAVY (BRIAN A. OEDER)
ln communicating via FltSatCom if the antennae of the satellite were pointed off toward Mars instead of down to your ship.
Ground stations are also required to monitor the data from sensing satellites, such as the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), GeoSat, and NROSS, and to provide these data to distribution centers. The ground station must be within the footprint of the satellite, which means that many must be located in remote areas where physical security is difficult to maintain and may not be under the direct control of U. S. forces. These ground stations may be the space system’s most vulnerable part.
However, all the hardware in orbit is worthless unless we have experienced people to use it. For example, or- hitology is not just a subject of interest to astronauts or those who put objects on orbit. Height above earth determines power requirements, antenna-pointing accuracy required, minimum-discemable signal, angular resolution, and a myriad of other tactically significant features. The inclination of the orbit determines coverage. The eccenthe highly technical people who design and build our spacecraft.
The two space subspecialties, XX76 (space operations) and XX77 (space technology), have been established to offer the 11XX and 13XX officers a defined career path to develop the space expertise necessary to keep the Navy at the forefront of using tactical space. Currently, there are more than 200 space subspecialists required to fill identified space subspecialty billets. As the need for space expertise on major afloat staffs is recognized, the number of identified space subspecialty billets will increase.
Both subspecialty codes are available through completion of the space operations or space technology courses of instruction at the Naval Postgraduate School. The majority of the current billets are in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at Naval Space Command, and the Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command. Future billets on afloat staffs and with the Unified Space Command should provide an even greater variety of duty. Both subspecialties need fleet-experienced officers in all pay grades to meet the service’s needs.
But, in the future, the Naval Postgraduate School is not going to help use the war-fighting capability available today in space. What is available to the fleet sailor to assist in planning and employing space assets on this cruise?
First, various space-related briefings are available from such agencies as Naval Space Surveillance System, which provides satellite vulnerability info and how to use it, or Naval Space Command, which assists in exercise planning, space capability, TENCAP, etc. Do not ignore your trusty intel officer—he is an expert in collection management. But you, as the war-fighting expert, should personally assume the responsibility to find out what is there and how to use it. You may even have to define the requirement for space-derived information on your ship, which can then be used as a justification to get the necessary clearances to gain access to the information.
The officer who attempts to fight his ship, or his battle group, or his fleet without using all of the assets available to him to the best advantage is bound not to fare as well as the officer who does. This is as true for a space-based asset as it is for the ubiquitous E-2C Hawkeye from the carrier. By the same token, the officer who depends on a space asset and expects it to perform in an environment in which it cannot function is going to be in the same fix as the commander who plans to take his older guided missile destroyers on a high-speed transit without an underway replenishment somewhere along the way. And just as surely as the operational planner must know the time-distance-fuel limitations, he must know the limitations of his space support. The knowledge, if not the detailed expertise, must reside in the operational planner, not in a support function. This is true from the fleet commander to the
Not all of the “space systems” are based in space. Without their critical ground support stations, probably the space system’s most vulnerable link to hostile action, the spacecraft would become useless pieces of aluminum, aimlessly orbiting the earth.
Space Systems and Surface Warfare
Captain Denbow has illustrated several ways in which the surface warfare community can exploit existing space assets more effectively in performing its daily tasks. To those who believe that space is for the future, he has demonstrated that the future is now.
But even a future has a future. Surface warfare and space systems must evolve synergistically in order to counter successfully tomorrow’s threat. Naval officers must pay closer attention to the capabilities that space systems—ours and theirs—provide, and they must learn to use our space assets, separately and collectively, as an integral part of the battle force.
We must focus our attention on the implications of the currently approved and conceptual space systems on future battle force strategies now.
Space systems have several significant attributes in common. They provide global coverage, furnish global connectivity, and are capable of furnishing specific local and wide-area timely information to support the local commander anywhere on the earth’s surface. Space systems can simultaneously view large portions of the earth, and yet provide high local resolution when required. As a rule, space systems do not require radiation from their surface customers to be effective; therefore, they can serve as the eyes and ears of a silent fleet.
Space assets cannot be readily hidden. Their positions are highly predictable, and the fact that they are radiating is not easy to deny.
Consequently, space systems are vulnerable, but no more so than other military assets. On the other hand, the price for any adversary of attacking these systems is relatively high, in terms of weapon cost and in tipping off intentions.
Given these characteristics, space systems can help the most in the following problem areas:
- Worldwide secure, jam proof, high-data rate, and survivable communications
- Worldwide accurate positioning data
- Worldwide timely information covering the atmospheric and oceanic environment
- Worldwide electromagnetic radia tion control (EMCON)-independent timely airplane and ship surveillance data of targeting quality, including discrimination of targets and battle-damage assessment
In all likelihood, there will not be a single solution to some of these complex problems. Rather, we will evolve a series of complementary procedures and hardware enhancements that will improve our ability to execute the surface warfare task. The space systems described here will surely be among those that endure the test of time and usefulness.
Near-term Prospects: The Global Positioning System (GPS)* will become operational in 1988. The basic 18-satellite constellation will provide nearly instantaneous, threedimensional navigation fixes anywhere on the globe, with a guaranteed precision of 16 meters or bet
ter, for all but the least expensive receivers. Imagine what this capability will do for the gridlock problem. Once GPS becomes operational, all subscribers to the Navy tactical data system nets will be able to exchange their data using a common, high-precision reference system. The Joint Tactical Information Data System (JTIDS) nets will need only one subscriber with GPS equipment in order for all to obtain absolute own-position data with GPS accuracy. Spotting teams ashore will now be able to call for supporting fire using this same common grid. All of this will be achieved with passive receivers. A useful by-product of GPS will be the capability for all subscribers to achieve unprecedented precision in time synchronization.
Milstar represents a jam-resistant, communications capability with a low probability of being intercepted that will become operational in the
individual ship or unit. It is an operations function, not that of the intelligence or communications community.
The surface warfare officer community is the single biggest user of tactical space assets, not just in the Navy, but within the entire Department of Defense. We must increase our effectiveness in using these capabilities. From accession sources, through all tactical training, to periodic refreshers prior to specific operations, space capabilities must be incorporated into all of our training until the thought of not using space assets is as foreign as the idea of not using the embarked LAMPS.
The tactical employment of space does not have to be shrouded behind the closed doors of a dark castle under the control of Darth Vader. You can bet any potential enemy you face when your ship goes in harm’s way will be using his space capabilities to the fullest.
early 1990s. This system will be deployed on board both surface ships and submarines, as well as in selected strategic aircraft. Its resistance to jamming, achieved through a highly sophisticated waveform, will allow the battle force commander to have great confidence in his ability to sustain voice and data hnks in the presence of a determined adversary. The narrow beam Permits the commander to maintain communications with little fear of detection.
, The Navy Remote Ocean Sens- 'ng System (NROSS), an environment-sensing spacecraft, will be °Perational in the early 1990s. Among other things, it will provide an accurate picture of winds, sea state, precipitation intensity, ice Margins, and surface temperatures. These data will provide a timely uPdate of the master data base which is used for global predichons. Knowledge of the winds, sea state, and precipitation has direct application to effective over-the- horizon (OTH) targeting, while knowledge of the sea surface temperatures will significantly enhance °nr antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.
Looking Ahead: Given the precise navigational data which GPS Can provide, imagine what a small receiver installed in a Harpoon, Tomahawk, or even in a longer range antisurface warfare weapon could do for the OTH problem, especially when coupled with the surveillance and command, control, and communications capability also furnished by space systems. Inexpensive future GPS equipment could also be used to locate drifting sonobuoys. A constantly supported network would no longer be required. Barriers could be established and monitored at sufficient range from the battle force to provide early warning of both surface and subsurface threats. These data could possibly even be sufficient for targeting.
Recently, the Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency demonstrated the use of an airborne laser to transmit data to a submarine at operational depths. A satellite-based global laser communication system promises the battle group commander the opportunity to communicate directly with his most effective ASW weapon, an attack submarine. LAMPS helicopters and real-time coordination of submarines will make a potent combination.
One of the most intriguing concepts currently under discussion is the use of a space-based radar for aircraft and ship detection, tracking, and targeting. Once we provide a global radar picture from space, the battle force commander will be able to establish a meaningful EMCON without having to accept the unacceptable risk of being surprised. Infrared detection from space forms a natural complement to radar by augmenting the detection of aircraft and missiles. Detecting raids at an early point in their mission will allow the optimal alignment of the antiair warfare axis and permit the most effective
use of the Aegis system.
Finally, there is another side to the role of space in naval warfare. Since no one has a corner on technology, the battle force commander must be provided with the tools to counter his adversaries’ space systems. Some of these tools already exist, and others are being considered for future introduction into the fleet.
The Opportunity: In the not-too- distant future, space systems will enable a battle force commander to maneuver with full knowledge of coming weather and oceanic conditions and own-force positions, to set a true EMCON, to detect and track his adversary, to distinguish his adversary from noncombatants, to target his weapons prior to engagement, and to obtain a battle- damage assessment afterward. Throughout this evolution, he will be able to maintain communications with his own forces, the national command authorities, other services, and our allies.
These capabilities will have a profound impact on the tactics and strategies of the future. It is not too soon for naval officers to begin thinking about the impact of the fourth warfare arena—space—in planning their missions.
*The Global Positioning System Satellite is pictured.
Commodore Mattingly was the Command Module Pilot on Apollo 16 and the Mission Commander of the first Department of Defense flight of the STS51 -C. He is currently Director, Space Program, under the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.
The next time you are standing on the fantail, watching Ihe wake stretch away to infinity on a moonlit night, pause f°r a second and look at the stars. You should remember that the nearest 5,000 objects in space were put there by rr|an, and not all of them mean you well. Learn to use the good ones and dodge the bad ones. The successful employment of your unit (or force) may well depend on how 'vell you use space.
Captain Denbow was commissioned in 1963 after graduating from Purdue University with a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering and a master’s degree in statistical communications. He has served in a variety of command-and-control billets, including AAW/C1C/NTDS officer on the staffs of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotillas Seven and Nine, and commanding officer of an E-2C Hawkeye squadron. Captain Denbow also served on the staff of Battle Force/Carrier Striking Force Seventh Fleet (CTF-70/-77) as CIC officer. Following that tour, he attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces prior to reporting to his current assignment to the Naval Space Command as the Director of Operations.