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ysis from the University of Maryland. Before re in 1969, he commanded the USS Sailfish (SS* -
and was executive officer of the USS Hunky 31), an instructor of ordnance and gunnery
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from simply surging increased levels of dedicated SLOC protection forces may combine to make it impossible to achieve the high survivability rates required for the first convoys. For example, achieving an objective of 87.6% survivability for the first convoy would require that no more than six of the 50 merships in the first convoy would be lost to a pre-deployed and dedicated force of 40 Soviet submarines. That is, the submarines would have to be reduced to an effectiveness level less than 40% of that assumed in the baseline example. This may be too great a challenge for even a surge effort of dedicated SLOC protection forces.
► Given the implied need, diversion of other ASW-capable naval forces could produce more significant gains. If they could be deployed to create another layer (offensive or defensive) in a broad defense-in-depth posture, they might achieve much higher marginal gains in overall force effectiveness. In addition, whenever and however they might be so employed, their contribution would be a clear plus without accepting much less than nominal levels of SLOC protection later in the campaign. The implied tradeoff for so allocating these forces must be considered by the higher decision levels of NATO, where the potential gains in initial delivery rates of munitions to NATO ground forces must be balanced against other NATO losses which might result from the delay or degradation of the performance of NATO naval forces in other initial naval missions.
Prime candidates for such contingencies are the versatile Atlantic Fleet carrier battle groups (CVBGs). In their normal configuration, they provide several layers of ASW protection. Given advance planning, it may be possible to initially deploy them in the western and mid-ocean shipping lanes with even greater ASW capability. For example, upon deployment, the aircraft complement could be made up of predominantly ASW aircraft (plus the necessary level of AAW interceptors). The normal aircraft complement could be restored by ferrying the attack aircraft when required. Similarly, the initial ready weapon loads of the group would be predominantly ASW weapons.
So configured, and with their high sustained speeds and wide area coverage, carrier battle groups could create and sustain “sanitized” moving havens in wide transit lanes for the initial convoys. European ASW forces could protect the lane terminals. At the juncture, the CVBGs could be reconfigured and released to prosecute other missions. Soviet submarines in or near the transit lanes would be faced with the choice of either slipping or fighting through the wide swath of the CVBG, or of attempting high-speed (and noisy) “end-arounds.” These high-speed attempts would increase their susceptibility to both area ASW (sound surveillance system and P-3C Orion aircraft) and the long-range detection and prosecution resources of the convoy escorts. This potential synergism might serve to sustain very high marginal gains from an accompanying surge allocation of the dedicated SLOC protection forces.
Such drastic diversions of the prime conventional striking arms of the U. S. Navy in the early stages of the war could be considered not only unwise, but unnecessary. This does not preclude consideration of more modest temporary force shifts, such as initially diverting direct support nuclear-powered attack subs (SSNs) and/or Spruance (DD-963)-class escorts from carrier battle groups to augment or supplement SLOC protection forces. The SSNs, for example, could be very successful in direct support of convoys, similar to what they provide for the carrier battle group.
It can be argued, and has probably been convincingly shown, that however great the need may be, this is not the most efficient employment of a carrier battle group or its constituents. However, what if the initial situation were to develop 10 the extent that higher NATO councils were convinced that such drastic actions were required for survival of the alliance ground forces in Europe? This could re suit in hastily conceived, ill-timed, and’ perhaps, ineffective diversions of ad hot naval forces to the SLOC protection mjs sion, as was sometimes the case with tn Murmansk convoys in World War II- In any event, it will be national an alliance priorities that ultimately deier mine the early allocations of naval forceS in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in rope. The ponderous nature of the NA> decision-making process and the like hood of preoccupation with the land earn paign indicate that it would be wise r° the U. S. and NATO navies to anticipattj the problem and initiate evaluations 0 such contingencies. This might help en sure that the manner, timing, and degre of involving such options will have bene fited from experienced naval judgme and planning.
'Fred Charles Ikle, "Strategic Principles of the gan Administration,” Strategic Review, Fall 1 pp. 13-18.
"Francois DeRose, “NATO’s Perils—and OpP^ nities,” Strategic Review, Fall 1983, pp. 19'-. Qf highlighted Editors’ insert in “Autoloading. P" j the Battlefield of the Future,” Paul C. Cornett" Allan Morrison, National Defense, October 19° • 25. , jQ
4After the Civil War, General Forrest was aske ^ describe his method of warfare. He replied t*1 ,
tried to “get there first with the most men.” R°£ .. Spiller, ed., Dictionary of American Military phy, Volume 1 (Westport, Connecticut: Green^ Press, 1984), pp. 339-340.
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A previous contributor to Proceedings, Comm3^^ Ortlieb graduated from the Naval Acade
and has a master’s degree in economics/defense
Academy, and deputy director of the strategic o ^ sive systems division in OpNav. He is now a sc systems analyst with Science Applications, InC-' McLean, Virginia.
Soon the surface navy may add a spectacular ship—the Sea Witch—to its ranks, one which represents the epitome of American seamanship. It will be presented to the nation by a group dedicated to preserving our maritime heritage.
The clipper ship Sea Witch was one of the most famous of the early clippers. She set many records, some which stand to this day. She was the first to break 100 days from New York to San Francisco around the horn and her record of 75 days from China to New York under sail has never been broken, even by the much larger ships which followed her.
Melbourne Smith, naval architect and maritime historian, has been the key element in the recreation of several traditional ships, such as the Pride of Baltimore, Californian, and Spirit of Massa
chusetts, all sponsored by a city or sta j Each shows the flag of her sponsor, 3 offers sailtraining for young Pe°; . These successes prompted the quest “Why not a ship representing the en nation?” Hence, the Sea Witch Pr°J was born. ^
Funding for the construction ot ship will come from corporate and t vidual sponsors; pledges are well un
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Proceedings / October
four.^out the size of the Danmark, or
<C s Eagle. However, as an authentic Sh°u,dr>'n n°rmal wind conditions she he able to sail circles around all
S. Coast
ti°nal^0nStruct'on w'^ entirety tradi- pleted' K ^ t*le Prev*ous ships, and coming , °y a professional staff now build- Sace Globe, a goldrush-era brig in Cons^ent°. California. Although the nation site has not been chosen, ^ Iatl0ns continue with several cities Poftu v'ew the project as a tourism op- for ju'!Ity' The keel laying is scheduled c°nst ^ 4t^’ *986, beginning a two-year .j, taction and fitting-out period. l0oke S^'P will be built of wood and will Per 7n^ar|y identical to the original clip- rig„j here are subtle differences: modem inter; ^ materials, steering gear, nylon vas t°rS to ^iocks, dacron instead of can- tr0]| , [ s> and twin screws driving con- c0nte Pitch propellers. Full damage Ptov'H 3nc* compartmentation will be Wi„ ' ed for Navy use. The Sea Witch about6 a^out *90 feet on deck, displace abov ^ ’ fT>0 tons, and tower 145 feet Squ® **)e water. She can spread 16,330 spegj6 *®et °f sail fully rigged. Her hull Hal l0Wl" *3e nearly 18 knots—the origi- ages> 8gcd many days of 15-knot aver- !iVelln the trade winds. She will be tigge°ut as one of the smaller square to t|JS’ tather easy to handle. Compared
Win k olher tall ships of the world, she f. °e ahnilt .1 : r>
Qoar|p^s l^e size °f the U
the current sail trainers.
The initial voyage of Sea Witch will be to China and around the world under the flag of her corporate sponsors as a visible representative of U. S. commerce. A clipper ship first carried U. S. goods to the Orient; now one shall return to remind both sides of the historic relationship.
At the end of this circumnavigation, the group has offered to give the ship to the U. S. Navy, to be used as a blue- water sail training ship. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman asked for comments from Chief of Naval Operations James D. Watkins and his deputies, and Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III responded vigorously: “Sail training is the traditional basis of the Surface Warfare Community.” He noted that the foundation of a blue-water sail training ship has been laid in the officer accession sources, now associated with the worldwide recreational sailing programs by a common personnel qualification standard system of sail qualification. Thousands of Navy men and women can participate in a tall ship program, which operates as a fleet unit with a small cadre crew augmented by regular groups of volunteers from all walks of Navy life, all anxious to spend three weeks before the mast of a traditional square-rigged ship.
Unlike the Coast Guard’s Eagle, the Sea Witch is earmarked for year-round operation involving the entire surface
The recreation of an authentic clipper ship takes time, money, and genius. Melbourne Smith, a director for the construction of the Pride of Baltimore (below) and other tall ships, is now building a replica of the Sea Witch, a prospective sail training vessel for the U. S. Navy.
navy, midshipmen from the Naval Academy, and the 60-65 NROTC units. Midshipmen cruises would dominate the summer vacation periods. For the rest of the year, fleet cruises would predominate, operating in the warmer climates of both coasts and the Caribbean.
The Sea Witch will be fully transoceanic. For the first time, Navy personnel will be able to participate in European tall ships events. Personnel will request temporary assignment via normal channels. Assignment is expected to be granted only to the top performers from the fleet.
A working group has been formed to flesh out the details of Navy acceptance and employment of Sea Witch. The decision to accept the proposed gift is still being weighed, but the construction of the ship is on track. Building a tall ship is seen as a logical extension of the Navy Sailing Program, which develops the Navy-wide approach to sail training and is a source of the kind of traditional adventure which has always lured young people to the sea and the Navy.
Captain Bonds has been the commanding officer of Naval Station Annapolis and Commodore, Naval Academy Sailing Squadron since 1984, and currently chairs the Sea Witch development group. From 1981 to 1984 he was the first Director of Navy Sailing. He was commissioned in the Navy after graduating from Rice University in 1963 and holds advanced degrees in International Affairs from George Washington University and Political Science from Brown.
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