In Greek mythology, Aegis was the shield of the god Zeus and, later, Athena. Its modern namesake appears to have benefited from such power. Surviving a first deployment in the hostile environment off Lebanon with the Multinational Peacekeeping Force and criticism in Congress and the press, the Ticonderoga has proven the Aegis ship combat and weapon systems. For years Aegis was a system looking for a hull, but in the Ticonderoga it finally proved its mettle, controlling an estimated 90% of the air track load and 50% of the surface track load during the ship’s period off Lebanon. The soul of the Aegis system is the AN/SPY-1A phased-array radar and video data display, which can track multiple targets and gives the ship, and indeed her entire group or force, unequaled command and control. Through the trials and tribulations of the Ticonderoga, it has become clear that this Aegis is no myth.
“Ticonderoga has performed most capably in a hostile environment after an incredibly brief period following commissioning. Her capabilities are impressive: her achievements remarkable.”
Rear Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, Commander Battle Force, U. S. Sixth Fleet April 1984
The first overseas deployment of the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) was a remarkable achievement. Despite being the lead ship of her class, she was able to deploy into a hostile environment nine months after commissioning, her shakedown requirements accomplished and weapon systems tested and operational. She operated under way for more than 80% of her deployment (including three periods “on the line” off Beirut under conditions of extreme tension and maximum alert). Most noteworthy, though, was the fact that the Aegis weapon system was deployed for the first time during the Ticonderoga’s Sixth Fleet tour of duty, from November 1983 to April 1984. The story of the Ticonderoga is the story of the success of Aegis, a weapon system concept that took 20 years of tortuous development to reach operational status. The deployment of Aegis restores the viability, and thus the credibility, of the carrier battle group as the most effective conventional instrument of projection of national power anywhere in the world.
It has not been the nuclear weapon that has been primarily responsible for widely held opinion that the surface ship is no longer a viable weapon in a general war environment, but rather the advent of the antiship missile. The surface warship, including the aircraft carrier, was perceived to be practically defenseless against the incoming antiship missile, a “sitting duck” in the parlance of those who argue against the effectiveness of navies. Few events in the history of naval warfare have attracted as much attention as the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath off Port Said, Egypt, on 22 October 1967 by Soviet-made “Styx” antiship missiles, fired from Egyptian patrol boats at a range of about 13 miles.
The perception described above, however exaggerated, had a basis in reality. Of all the circumstances that surround the significance of Aegis, none is more important than the fact that Soviet capability for antiship missile delivery against our forces afloat is extensive, complex, rapidly expanding, and deployed. The Soviet inventory includes air-launched, surface-launched, and submarine-launched missiles that are capable of varied attack profiles, and can be armed either with nuclear or conventional warheads. Until now, there has been no adequate defense available to the U. S. Navy or allied navies to contain this existing Soviet threat. Aegis, alone among all weapon systems, is adequate to counter the Soviet antiship missile threat. With the advent of the Ticonderoga and her sister ships, Aegis has become an operational, deployable system in the hands of trained crews.
Joseph L. McClane
Captain McClane graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1943, and served in destroyers in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters in World War II. He entered flight training in 1947 and served as a naval aviator in various squadron, ship and staff assignments until his retirement in 1973. He resides in Virginia Beach, Virginia.
James L. McClane
Commander McClane, son of Captain McClane, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1970, and from the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, in 1976. He served in USS Richard E. Byrd (DDG-23), USS Buchanan (DDG-14), and was combat systems officer in the first Aegis cruisers, USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) from pre-commissioning through the completion of first deployment, which included participation in the Multinational Peacekeeping Force off Beirut, Lebanon. He is currently serving as executive officer in USS Belknap (CG-26).
The Ticonderoga’s First Cruise
On 20 October 1983, the Ticonderoga, commanded by Captain Roland G. Guilbault, backed into the Elizabeth River from Pier 25 at the Norfolk Naval Station, then swung into Hampton Roads and down the Thimble Shoals Channel to sea. There were 16 ships departing Norfolk that morning, ostensibly on a routine deployment of a carrier battle group en route to the Mediterranean to relieve ships on station with the Sixth Fleet. Shortly after departure from Norfolk, the USS Independence (CV-62) and two accompanying destroyers broke away and steamed to the island of Grenada and the contingency operations associated with the rescue mission there. With her captain as officer in tactical command, the Ticonderoga took charge of the remaining 13-ship North Atlantic transit group, plowing eastward in gale-force winds and high seas through most of the crossing.
Before reaching the Strait of Gibraltar, the Ticonderoga left the group and headed north for a scheduled port call, a formal visit to Portsmouth, England. The visit to Portsmouth, made at the invitation of the Royal Navy, introduced Aegis as an operational reality to hundreds of senior British naval officers and defense officials.
On 12 November, following a three-day period at Rota, Spain, to complete preparations for her Sixth Fleet tour, the Ticonderoga rejoined the Independence and her escorts at sea following the latter’s trip from Grenada. The ships took station off the coast of Lebanon on 17 November as elements of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force.
Arrival off Beirut, and the following five months of operations in a high-threat environment, proved the effectiveness of the Ticonderoga’s logistic, technical, and tactical planning and preparation. The Lebanon crisis provided an opportunity to measure the capabilities of the ship under empirical conditions that could not have been generated artificially. The requirements for somewhat non-standard battle group operations created concurrent needs for system flexibility that only the Ticonderoga could provide and sustain for months on end.
The Ticonderoga was three days out of Norfolk when the terrorist attack was made on Marine headquarters in Beirut, the event for which the Lebanon crisis will be remembered. That tragedy established the tone, mood, and policy that governed fleet readiness in the battle force off Beirut that Ticonderoga joined on 18 November 1983. There were three carriers present: the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) and the Independence. The Ticonderoga was met with what might be described as an attitude of benign skepticism. Certainly the highly touted merits of the AN/SPY-1A radar were eagerly anticipated, but the Ticonderoga’s ability to sustain advanced readiness demands for indefinite periods on the line had not been demonstrated. It is fair to say that the range, quality, and reliability of Aegis were not fully understood or appreciated when the Ticonderoga arrived off Beirut as a “new boy.”
The initial stationing of the Ticonderoga did not include the inshore amphibious group and Beirut airport within the surface search horizon of the SPY-1A radar. With time, the quality of information provided by the Ticonderoga’s intercept controllers to the F-14 combat air patrol and the A-7, A-6 and S-3 surface/subsurface surveillance patrols became obvious, as did the reliability of the Aegis system itself. This growth in confidence naturally led to more productive employment of the Ticonderoga. She was moved closer to Beirut, and became responsible for the automatic detection, tracking, and reporting of all surface and air traffic in the area. This permitted Aegis/SM-2 missile coverage of the American embassy, Beirut airport, and the amphibious group. Amphibious warfare ships routinely carried out night steaming operations close to the Ticonderoga before moving shoreward for daylight cargo transfer operations. The Ticonderoga routinely performed flight-following of dozens of helicopters in the area (U. S., French, British, Israeli, and commercial). She became an unofficial, de facto sea-based air traffic control center. In addition to air and surface tracking, the ship maintained an active sonar search at all times off Beirut to counter the genuine threat of Libyan and Syrian diesel submarines.
The effect of the presence of Aegis on the entire battle group’s warfare capability became increasingly evident. The digital information processing, display, and transmission capability of the Ticonderoga fostered a very high level of stability, coherence, reliability, and tactical capability among the watch standers of the battle group. As the battle group commander became more confident of the Ticonderoga, more warfare coordination responsibilities were assigned to her.
Aegis equipments performed superbly through all operational periods, with no unscheduled down-time. On-line maintenance was possible during operations because of the redundancies, alternate paths of communication, and on-line testing and diagnostic capabilities built into the system. Progressive maintenance was programmed whenever possible.
During on-station time with the Multinational Peacekeeping Force, which totalled 90 days in three separate periods, readiness conditions on board the Ticonderoga were maintained at what is best described as a modified general quarters posture, 24 hours a day. Watch standing was on a port-and-starboard basis much of the time, occasionally reduced to a three-section normal wartime footing. All consoles in the combat information center (CIC) were manned at all times.
If this degree of readiness seems a bit extreme or over-done, one must consider the full spectrum of threats during the Lebanon crisis. These threats included the possibility of suicide-mission swimmers, boats, gliders and small aircraft, plus the full range of submarine, aircraft, and antiship missile attacks from unfriendly national forces. In response, the Ticonderoga was required to exercise her full multi-warfare capability—short of weapon launch— for periods matching her design capability.
During the Lebanon crisis, the Ticonderoga controlled 2,550 intercepts made by combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft against radar targets. The ability of the Aegis/SPY-1A system to engage targets anywhere within the battle group’s warning area, many of which were not held by any other sensor in the battle group, was demonstrated repeatedly. Outside observers credited her with maintaining at least 90% of the air track load and 50% of the surface track load while on station in the Eastern Mediterranean. This was accomplished under electromagnetic wave propagation conditions that were as bad as might be found anywhere. Proximity to land, severe ducting, and dust storms contributed to the problems of tracking and target identification. (At times, the adverse environmental effects in the area created requirements that challenged the capabilities of the Aegis system; the Aegis operators on board the Ticonderoga had to use both skill and ingenuity to master the task.) Visual identification or a validly encrypted identification friend or foe (IFF) response was an absolute requirement under the rules of engagement. On one occasion, the Ticonderoga vectored the duty E-2C radar aircraft to visual interception of a Cyprus-bound small plane that had experienced navigation system failure.
The success of the Ticonderoga’s Aegis performance off Lebanon was the result of factors inherent in the system, discussed at some length later in this article, and to a relative superiority over other antiair warfare (AAW) systems in the ability to track slow targets with small radar cross-sections. Most fire control radars used in AAW applications are pulse doppler type, and have been optimized for targets with high closing speeds. Such radars are relatively ineffective with slow targets such as light aircraft and helicopters. The SPY-1A radar is designed to track surface and air targets with equal facility. Because of the unique ability of the Ticonderoga to provide tracking and fire control data on any target in the radar horizon, surface or air, the ship usually was assigned a position where radar coverage included all amphibious forces stationed inshore from the battle force, as well as the Beirut airport, thus protecting the most likely targets of air attack.
The Ticonderoga’s combat information center proved to be truly that. Its array of consoles with video display and system controls, manned by the officers and men assigned to fight the ship, included the Aegis display system, which was the battle station of the commanding officer and the embarked flag officer. They sat side by side, observing displays of everything going on within hundreds of miles of their location—all air, surface, and sub-surface targets plotted against true geographical coordinates and shoreline contours. Each target was identified as friendly, unknown, hostile, or assumed friendly or hostile, with a vector showing each target’s course and speed. A full track history of every target was immediately available on request. Everything was shown as it was at the moment, in “real time.” Never has an area situation been better presented to a naval commander.
The embarked flag officer has, beyond question, the “best seat in the house” in an Aegis cruiser. Rear Admiral Richard C. Berry, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight, flew his flag in the Ticonderoga during much of her Eastern Mediterranean tour, usually as AAW commander and occasionally as composite warfare commander of the battle group. Thus, he was the first flag officer to experience the advantages of colocation with the Aegis display system in a hostile environment.
The reader knowledgeable in the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) may protest that everything on the Aegis display can also be found on an NTDS display because of the Link 11 hook-up between the two systems. This is really not the case, because only specified targets are exchanged: NTDS has no mapping capability, and only limited graphic capability. Some of the display features available on an Aegis console are not possible with any other system—target activity on and over a beach area, for example. The SPY-1A radar has clutter-suppressing capabilities built into its signal processor and computer program, so that target clarity is maintained against a background of heavy ground clutter. While airborne radar systems did not function well in Lebanon against a land background in comparison with the Aegis system, the Ticonderoga’s Aegis radar could monitor virtually everything going on in the Beirut area. This should not be surprising: an airborne system cannot be served by the large, heavy computer banks or signal-processing equipment that are available to the SPY-1A radar. This is not to disparage the role or necessity of airborne radar. The E-2C and other airborne systems are essential in many ways, the most obvious being the extension of radar coverage beyond the horizon of the surface radars of the battle force.
Another important and perhaps unique capability of the Aegis display system that was proven during the Lebanon operations was the automatic recording of all tracks, data, displays, and communications—virtually every kind of information entering or leaving CIC. This built-in battle diary offers the “instant replay” of television sports for naval operations. The location and track of every “player” is exactly recorded in time and geography. Even projectile impact sometimes can be detected and recorded.
The Ticonderoga’s first shots in anger were fired from her 5-inch guns at Syrian antiaircraft sites on 13 December 1983, in execution of a naval gunfire support mission that was somewhat of a surprise because of the emphasis on the ship’s AAW capability. The mission was carried out successfully within small-arms range of the Lebanese coast, while the ship continued to act as AAW coordinator for the battle group, because the SPY-1A radar is virtually immune to land clutter.
After three periods of duty as part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force—broken only by short calls to Israel, Yugoslavia, and Italy—the Ticonderoga departed on 2 April 1984 for Toulon, France; Rota, Spain; and back to Norfolk. However, about a month prior to scheduled departure, it became obvious that the Ticonderoga would have to undergo further combat weapon systems tests before returning to Norfolk. The Ticonderoga’s, capabilities had been extensively tested even before the ship was commissioned. In August 1982, she steamed briefly into the Gulf of Mexico for an unprecedented pre-delivery validation of her Aegis weapon system. Two SM-1 missiles were fired at target drones, both successful intercepts. After commissioning on 22 January 1983, the Ticonderoga began a nine-month predeployment period of shakedown, testing, operational evaluation, and preparation for deployment. There were two extensive testing periods of combat system capabilities prior to deployment—combat system ship qualification trials, and follow-on test and evaluation trials, carried out in April 1983; and combat system ship qualification trials, mobile sea range firings, and follow-on test and evaluation trials, carried out in September 1983.
A campaign of unknown origin, which began in the news media in early summer of 1983 and fomented congressional concern, alleged that Aegis was suspect because its testing was inadequate. U. S. Representative Denny Smith (Republican-Oregon) adopted the allegations as a cause. His questions concerning the integrity of the Aegis concept, particularly the operational testing of the Aegis weapon system in the Ticonderoga, prompted a letter response from Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22 September 1983. The letter, in part stated, “I share your concern about allegations in the press that we have done inadequate testing of TICONDEROGA and its AEGIS system. These reports are simply not correct.”
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman also wrote to Congressman Smith. His letter, dated 11 October 1983, was more extensive and explicit. An excerpt follows:
“Reports of inadequate testing of TICONDEROGA and its AEGIS system are not correct. AEGIS is the most carefully tested combat system ever built. . . . Extensive operational testing has continued since commissioning and all operational requirements have been met or exceeded . . . TICONDEROGA establishes an entirely new level of sea-borne anti-air warfare capability—it is the first Navy ship designed to counter large scale antiship missile (ASM) attacks. The fast reaction time and high firepower of the Aegis weapon system have proven successful in countering ASM threats in operational testing against the lowest flying and fastest targets available to the Fleet.”
To put to rest the media allegations and the political concern that resulted from them, Secretary Lehman directed, in a memorandum dated 15 February 1984, that the Aegis weapon system be given “a fully challenging test series to take place no later than May this year. That test series should include multiple presentation of high altitude, mid and low altitude drones, both subsonic and supersonic.”
North of Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, on the way back to Norfolk, the Ticonderoga conducted another set of combat system ship qualification trials and follow-on test and evaluation firings, from 23 through 29 April 1984. These tests were completely successful. By 31 July 1984, the ship had fired eight SM-1 Block VI missiles, 81 SM-2 Block I missiles, two Harpoon missiles, five ASROCs (antisubmarine rockets), and three Mark 46 torpedoes.
There is no high-risk technology contained within the Aegis program. However new and different they may seem to the uninitiated, the phased-array radar and the technology behind it are not new. Shipboard phased-array radars were used in some applications as far back as World War II.
One of the reasons some people find the Aegis weapon system test results to be controversial is that they confuse the missile with the system. Several points must be made with clarity and firmness. First, a guided missile is, in essence, a round of ammunition, reliable to an acceptable level of cost per round, but precluded from complete reliability by expense. Second, the Aegis system has never been “married” to a particular missile; it already has been tested with three quite different missiles—the SM-1 Block VI, the SM-2 Block I, and the SM-2 Block II. Third, excluding one anomaly that had nothing to do with Aegis reliability, there has not been one instance in which the system has failed to engage an incoming target. The critic sees failure in the test report in which a particular missile did not destroy the target; the knowledgeable person realizes that Aegis is so designed that if one missile does not destroy the target, another will. It is target engagement that is the essential criterion of system success. And in the achievement of that criterion, the Ticonderoga receives a mark of perfect.
On 4 May 1984, after an absence of 197 days, 158 of them spent under way, the Ticonderoga returned to the Norfolk Naval Station pier from which she had departed the previous October. First of her class, the Ticonderoga had proved—beyond controversy and argument—not only the merit and seaworthiness of her design, she had established the validity and effectiveness of Aegis.
The Nature of Aegis
A phased-array radar, such as the Aegis system’s SPY-1, differs from a conventional radar in many respects, but the most obvious one is that it does not have a rotating or oscillating antenna that “paints” the target with a mechanically-swept beam on each rotation or scan.[1] Instead, a fixed antenna projects a narrow beam of energy in a brief pulse at a particular point. With its pencil-like beam (or “dwell” as it is called) searching a specified volume of space for about a millisecond according to a computer-controlled search doctrine, the phased-array radar does away with the ponderous inertia of the mechanically-sweeping radar antenna. In application with Aegis, the SPY-1A provides extremely rapid target acquisition and tracking, and, equally important, the generation of constantly updated fire control data for launching and guiding missiles to their target.
The roots of Aegis go back to the early 1960s when a long-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile called Typhon was under development. Work on Typhon was discontinued in 1964 because its problems could not be resolved.[2] In particular, the huge size and weight of the Typhon weapon system made it too large to be accommodated aboard ship. Aegis, a weapon system concept not tied to any particular missile, rose from the technical residue of the Typhon project, with RCA the principal contractor. Early planning envisaged deployment of the system in a destroyer hull, but space and weight requirements grew to such a degree that assignment of a suitable hull became a major problem. The difficulty was complicated by a somewhat nebulous concept of the role of Aegis ships. The original idea of a weapon system for antiair protection of the surface fleet against enemy missiles became confused with a “strike cruiser” concept, wherein a ship capable of independent operations would employ Aegis in an offensive rather than a defensive role. Plans to install Aegis in the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), creating a prototype strike cruiser, came to nothing because of cost considerations.
The decision to install the first operational Aegis system in the CG-47-class cruisers, which are essentially modified Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers, was an expedient to get the weapon system to sea in this decade. Aegis could have been deployed years ago but for the lack of a suitable hull. The first shipboard testing of Aegis was in the USS Norton Sound (AVM-1), nine years before the Ticonderoga was commissioned. Beginning in March 1974, the engineering development model of Aegis was tested at sea, including live firings of SM-1 and SM-2 missiles at target drones. It was, however, not a complete Aegis system. The first complete operational prototype Aegis weapon system (less the Mark 26 launching system), as close as practicable to the system to be installed in the Ticonderoga and other ships of her class, was included in a mock-up of the Ticonderoga’s superstructure at the Combat System Engineering Development Site in Moorestown, New Jersey—a sort of landlocked “ship” in full view of the New Jersey Turnpike. Since 1980, the Moorestown site has been a training facility for naval personnel to be assigned as combat system personnel in Ticonderoga-class ships. The site is close to the RCA Missile and Surface Radar Division.
The uninitiated person, whether civilian or military, finds it hard to grasp exactly what Aegis is. The visitor who comes aboard the Ticonderoga, for instance, to see “the Aegis,” often has some preconceived, erroneous idea of a radar-directed fire control system for guided missiles. Aegis is all of that, but it is a great deal more, and in seeing what he expects to see, the visitor may miss the subtle but important differences that make Aegis unique. The first thought of most naval officers who have not been briefed on Aegis is that what they are seeing is an extension of the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS), with which they are familiar. If an officer is not quickly dissuaded from that opinion, he may miss the thrust of his briefing on Aegis.
The term “Aegis,” quite frankly, is ambiguous. There is no one specific piece or set of equipment by that name. And there is certainly no such thing as an “Aegis Missile,” which is probably the most common misconception. Aegis is a conglomerate term expressing two distinct ideas: the Aegis weapon system and the Aegis ship combat system. The former, identifiable by mark and mod (Mark 7, Mod 3 in Ticonderoga), consists of the heart of the Aegis concept—an AN/SPY-1A radar system and the tactical computer program—plus the elements necessary for the timely acquisition of air and surface targets, the generation of fire control data, and the launch, guidance, and terminal homing of missiles. Complete weapon system integration of all functions is achieved through the one tactical digital computer program. The Aegis ship combat system includes the Aegis weapon system plus all the ancillary systems and equipments used in the full exploitation of the ship’s multi-warfare range of combat capabilities.
In addition to the SPY-1A radar, there are two other search radars associated with the Ticonderoga’s Aegis ship combat system: the SPS-49 air search radar system and the SPS-55 surface search radar system. These conventional search radars are necessary, and not only for purposes of redundancy in target acquisition. A requirement for secondary radar coverage exists when the SPY-1A must be shut down, however briefly, for inspection or maintenance. The performance of the SPY-1 in the Ticonderoga during the 158 days under way in her first deployment involved no unscheduled “down time.”) Another possibility is that the SPY-1A might be “silenced” to conceal the presence of an Aegis-equipped ship under certain circumstances. A further consideration is the desirability of frequency diversity in an electronic warfare environment. An air search radar of conventional design is a constant requirement because the range limit of the SPY-1A is deliberately set at a certain number of miles. The radar Pulse, of course, has no limit: it will travel at the speed of light to infinity if not intercepted. The SPY-1A receiver, however, will accept no return from a target more than the specified mileage limit, in order to limit track generation and economize on beam (dwell) demand, because the radar can generate only a certain number of dwells each second. A newly detected target is assigned a high rate of dwell coverage by the computer until its track is established.
The SPY-1A phased-array radar projects its beams of energy, one at a time, to search the entire horizon from overhead zenith to the line-of-sight radar horizon. Each of four phased-array antennae, arranged in two sets of two, searches a 90-degree sector in azimuth (with slight overlap). When a target is detected by a dwell, the computer automatically programs additional dwells on that target to establish its speed and direction of movement, thereby determining the target’s track. This is accomplished so rapidly that to the operator it appears to be an instantaneous process. Not every target is put on track-monitoring status. The operator can decide to track the target or not. Track data, with vector indications, are shown on video displays at a number of consoles in the ship’s combat information center, with data automatically under constant revision. Full track “histories” can be reviewed on demand by console operators. CIC therefore has a constantly updated overview of everything within radar range, with immediate, “real time” accuracy. The video displays also show targets acquired by other shipboard radars, and other radars of the task force, whether surface or airborne, through data link transmissions. Data exchange is reciprocal, and Aegis system acquisitions are selectively communicated by data link to other ships in the force.
The SPY-1A is also generating fire control data available to the Mark 1 Mod 0 command and decision system and Mark 1 Mod 0 weapons control system should the decision be made to engage any of the targets being tracked.
The main battery for Aegis ships is the Mark 26 Mod 5 guided missile launching system—one launcher forward and one aft. Each launcher has two launching rails, so four missiles can be loaded and ready for launch at any time. That may seem inadequate to cope with multiple incoming targets, but the firepower associated with the launching systems is formidable. Total firepower is approximately 34 SM-2 missiles per minute. The missile in flight receives mid-course guidance from the SPY-1A radar by means of coded dwells. Terminal guidance of the missile is provided by signals from one of four Mark 99 fire control system antennas installed in locations high in the ship, which “illuminate” the target in the missile’s terminal homing phase. This arrangement permits the Aegis weapon system to engage many more independent targets than it has illuminators, since illumination is required only in the terminal phase of missile homing.
The Future of Aegis
The unqualified success of the combat system in the Ticonderoga has assured that Aegis-equipped ships will join the fleet in increasing numbers. Cruisers of the Ticonderoga class and destroyers of the Arleigh Burke class are programmed already, and it is entirely possible that Aegis will appear in planning for new aircraft carrier construction before the year 2000. It should be pointed out that Aegis is not competitive with other combat system improvement programs under way. Because space, weight, and geometry considerations virtually preclude Aegis as a retrofit program in most hulls, it is programmed exclusively for new construction ships.
Growth programs scheduled for Ticonderoga-class cruisers include adoption of the SM-2 Block II guided missile, with extended range capability, and installation of vertical launch system (VLS) missile launchers in place of the Mark 26 launching systems in CG-52 and subsequent ships of the class. The latter change will have the following corollary effects:
► The VLS will accommodate the Tomahawk cruise missile, which will become part of the Aegis ship combat system.
► Guided missile inventory will be increased 45% with VLS, with some increase in weight. However, because the center of gravity of missile storage will be considerably lower with the VLS, the stability of the ship will be enhanced rather than degraded.
► Damage control capability will be enhanced with the VLS installation, because missiles will be stored in individual containers installed vertically in the deck, rather than in an open-room magazine, removing the possibility of free-surface effect if spaces are flooded.
Other changes scheduled for CG-52 and following ships include lowering the ship’s center of gravity by cutting down topside weight, for example: moving the auxiliary cooling system from the 03 level to the main engineering spaces. Replacing the SPY-1A radar with the SPY-1B will save 8,000 pounds in topside weight.
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers will have SPY-1D radars and UYK-43 computers in their Aegis systems. The latter is a quarter the size of the UYK-7 four-bay computer used with the SPY-1A radar, but it does the same job with greater reliability. The introduction of the UYK-43 may not coincide with the construction of the first ships of the DDG-51 class, in which case some retrofit may be necessary for early ships.
Aegis ships will transcend their obvious value in protecting battle groups at sea from air and antiship missile threats. Naval history indicates that most exercises of sea power, including many naval battles, have been carried out at the land-sea interface. Today that means the degradation of electronic target intelligence, and the signal processing related to that intelligence, encountered by naval forces in proximity to land. A low-flying aircraft lost in the clutter of land return is a simple and common example of the problem. Aegis is currently the only operational solution to that problem.
Preserving the peace justifies the entire weapons inventory of the armed forces of the United States. It is in that broadest of contexts, and in the light of the present and increasing Soviet maritime threat, that the value of Aegis should be considered. Aegis is a reality. It is operational already in the Ticonderoga and Yorktown (CG-48); the Vincennes (CG-49) is due to be commissioned this summer; and another 23 Aegis cruisers and 29 Aegis destroyers are programmed to follow. The primary mission of the Aegis cruisers is antiair warfare, especially in defense against the antiship missile. Antisubmarine and antisurface warfare missions with a carrier battle group or surface action group are collateral. The superior combat system command and control facilities available in the cruiser will facilitate battle management by the commander.
The suspicion and controversy that surrounded Aegis were products of its tortuous history and the campaign of depreciation waged by the news media and abetted in certain political circles. Navy and Department of Defense public affairs officers evidently failed to present the facts positively and accurately enough, because the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations had personally (and repeatedly, because they were not believed) to provide the necessary public information to the press and politicians. By now, the public affairs community should realize that Aegis is not just some sort of NTDS extension, touted by its adherents with the zeal that usually accompanies something new. Aegis is, in fact, the “quantum leap forward” that Secretary Lehman has called it. The impact on maritime strategy and tactics will become clearer as more and more Aegis ships join the fleet and as Aegis becomes the rule rather than the exception.
The value of Aegis to the wartime survivability of the Navy’s surface fleet cannot be overstated. However skeptical the naval community may have been, it is time for misconceptions and parochial prejudices to be put aside. The truth about Aegis must be heard from the naval community itself.
Among the enthusiastic advocates of Aegis is the tail-hook naval aviator who has seen the system function in an operational environment. He realizes that at last the carrier battle group can survive the threat of enemy antiship missiles. Now the carrier air wing will be able to concentrate on the business of carrying the battle to the enemy, because the sword of the antiship missile has been countered by the shield of Aegis.
[1] Readers desiring an overview of the history of phased-array radar are referred to the article by Norman Polmar, "The U. S. Navy: Phased-Array Radars" U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1979, pages 119–121.
[2] For a description of the Typhon antiair weapon system, see Polmar, "USS Norton Sound: the Newest Old Ship," Proceedings, April 1979, pages 70–83.