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An Unaccountable Accounting
By Colonel William J. Ankley, U. S. Army (Retired)
But for a few grainy photographs, such as this one of White Russians and innocent bystanders fleeing the wrath of the rampaging Red Russians, there seems to be no official U. S. record of this 1920 incident. Why? Surely, this humanitarian effort reflects great credit on our Navy and on two bold rear admirals whose names and actions should not go unrecorded.
% _ _________ ^......... _
s United States, though never involving itself in Russia by extending military or economic assistance lj e its Allies, was providing humanitarian support. The U nited States’ military presence in the area was, therefore, ^ited to those U. S. naval forces operating in Turkish . aters under the operational command of Rear Admiral . ark Lambert Bristol as senior naval officer present. s,T|iral Bristol had initially been the senior U. S. reprep Native in Turkey but was appointed as the U. S. High °aimissioner on 12 August 1920.[1] , the United States’ representative to the Volunteer frny jn south Russia was Rear Admiral Newton A. n c^ully. McCully had previously served in Russia as a val attache during the Russo-Japanese war and later as ^tfiiral of U. S. forces in northern Russia. He understood k e Russian people and had many friends among the White Ussian leaders.
On 18 December 1919, McCully was “. . . designated
An official account of the U. S. Navy’s role in the evacuation of White Russians from south Russia during the turbulent days of 1920 appears as a one- Sentence comment in the Annual Report of the Secretary °f the Navy for 1920: “During the severe fighting in south ussia the vessels under the command of Rear Admiral r'stol aided in evacuating Americans, non-combatants, sick and wounded from the ports of south Russia areatened and later taken by the Bolshevists.”1 No other 0 |cial report appears to have been published of this act’on, though it involved 14 U. S. Navy men-of-war, Several thousand sailors and Marines, and several U. S. Merchant ships. What actually did happen?
By the beginning of 1920, the White Russians’ military Position in south Russia was deteriorating. The remnants ° (he Volunteer Army, formed with the highest hopes in °vember 1917 and the only major White Russian force st>H fighting the Red Army, was now confined to the Cri- ITlCa and adjacent shores.2 Other White Russian troops °Perating in north Russia and Siberia had been defeated or ^ere in desperate straits. The Volunteer Army’s leader- \ 'P was faltering as well and would soon change. General I- Denikin, who had led the Volunteer Army from its ^ption, was being blamed for its recent failures and °uld be succeeded on 22 March 1920 by Baron General . eter Wrangel.[2] General Wrangel would lead the remain- 11'8 White Russian forces until their final evacuation from eyastopol in November 1920.
Meanwhile, the Allied governments, which to varying .Agrees had aided and encouraged the Volunteer Army in s struggle against the Bolshevists, now believed there as no viable alternative but to settle with the Soviet Gov- l^nient. They vacillated on this issue throughout most of p *0- The French were more concerned with the Russo- °lish War but still offered a promise of aid to the White Ussians. The British initially provided the bulk of Allied ■litary support; however, their commitment to the White j.Ussian forces was now waning as the decision to cut Jffher military assistance was made at the highest levels. q ls decision was issued in a written memorandum to \iPneral Deniken and delivered to his successor, General rangel, on 2 April 1920.[3] a special agent for the State Department and directed to proceed to the south of Russia with a view first to make observations and report to the Department of State political and economic conditions in the region which you visit and second to establish informal contact with General Denikin and his associates.”[4] Continuing in this mission after General Wrangel succeeded Denikin as head of the White Russian Volunteer Army, Admiral McCully, using U. S. naval ships dispatched by Admiral Bristol, managed the U. S. Navy’s 1920 Russian evacuation efforts.
Novorossisk received the answer to his request for aid. It stated there were no funds available and suggested he . . take up with the Navy Department question of use of American Naval vessels.”13
Responsibility for any U. S. support of an impending evacuation now rested directly with the two senior naval officers in the region, Admiral Bristol in Constantinople and Admiral McCully in Novorossisk. (As neither admiral seems to have requested the assistance of the Navy Department, it appears that Bristol assumed this authority.) Consequently, any evacuation attempt would be throughout a Navy effort, with no funds or other means of support forthcoming from the U. S. Government.
By 15 March, the situation was nearing a climax. The Galveston's log showed the following entry, “8:00 AM sound of continuous heavy gunfire from north of port . . .”14 The struggle for the port had begun, and the time for evacuation was at hand. Between 15 March, the start of the Red Army’s campaign to take Novorossisk, and 27 March, the day the Red Army occupied the port, the harbor was busy as Allied men-of-war lent their support to the withdrawal of the Volunteer Army and aided in the evacuation of Novorossisk.
The Novorossisk evacuation was truly a multinational effort. Other U. S. Navy ships involved in this effort were the destroyer Alden (DD-211) and the patrol craft Eagle One (PE l).15 In addition, there were three British battleships and four destroyers, one French cruiser and two destroyers, one Italian cruiser, and one Greek destroyer. Merchant ships from the United States, France, Sweden, and Greece, as well as a hospital ship from Britain helped in the rescue efforts, not to mention several White Russian fleet warships. The British were nominally in charge and provided the shore security for the operation.16
The U. S. Navy’s activities during the next few days are best described by extracts from the ships’ logs. In addition to supplying a record of the ships’ movements, these logs provide a picture of evacuation conditions.17
At Novorossisk on 25 March, the Galveston's log picks up the story. The entry from 0400 to 0800 hours reads, “At 6:40 the U. S. S. COLE stood in flying the Rear Admiral’s flag.”18 The entry for 1200 to 1600 hours states, “12:30 Rear Admiral McCully came on board. 12:34 hoisted Rear Admiral’s flag.”19 The admiral was back from Novorossisk and on board the Galveston, where he would remain until the evacuation was completed.
On 26 March, the entries in the Galveston's log provide a vivid picture of that day’s events. Extracts of these entries show the involvement of Allied men-of-war supporting the last remaining forces ashore:
“12:00 Large column of Cavalry entering town.
12:20 H.M.S. EMPEROR OF INDIA fired 3 shots.
1:55 H.M.S. CALYPSO fired 4 shots. 3:00 H.M.S.
CALYPSO fired 5 shots. 3:20 H.M.S. EMPEROR
OF INDIA fired 4 shots. 3:45 H.M.S. EMPEROR
OF INDIA fired 5 shots. H.M.S. CALYPSO 4. 5:00
French cruiser ROUSSEAU opened fire with three
turrets. Took on refugees all day.”20
On 27 March, the Galveston's log describes the final
events of the evacuation:
“05:00 British cruiser, 3 destroyers underway with refugees. 09:40 transferred refugees to U.S.S- COLE, shore batteries opened fire. 12:30 French cruiser Jules Michelet opened fire. Underway to Theodosia.”21
The Cole’s log details the evacuation’s final moment*- The entry on 27 March for 0800 to 1200 hours read*- “Continued machine gun and rifle fire from city • • • 1 following Russian refugees were transferred from ^ U. S. S. GALVESTON . . . Got underway at 10:27- Admiral McCully summarized the evacuation fr°n Novorossisk in his message of 27 March to Admiral Bn* tol for retransmission to the Secretary of State:
“March 27, noon. Red forces occupied Novorossisk 10 a.m. today after some fighting on eastern part of town in which, besides land forces, only Russian destroyers took part. Large portion Volunteer Army was evacuated to Crimea but several thousand joined Red forces and others retreated east coast of Black Sea. All vessels gone to sea, British and French being fired on by artillery but care was taken not to fire on GALVESTON which was closer in and last to leave. McCully.”23
Se'
situation changed drastically during late Septem- Soviet Government, and other East European nations
niea- The Volunteer Army would straggle into the Crimea j'Nd under General Wrangel regroup its forces and attempt 0 continue operations. However these efforts, as the Al- jes foresaw, were doomed to failure. In November 1920, ere was to be one more evacuation from south Russia— Sevastopol.
Vastopol
Although General Wrangel, upon assuming command 0 (he Volunteer Army forces in early April, planned on a final evacuation from Sevastopol, it seemed for a time at the actual situation in Russia might change. Through cniendous effort, personal leadership, and the resilience 0 the Russian soldiers, General Wrangel reinstilled a mea- j^re of morale, discipline, and effectiveness in his forces.
ajor changes had been made in organization and leader? 'P> units were re-equipped and rested, supplies hus- anded, and the offensive was resumed. The Poles had een surprisingly successful in driving the Red Army east- ard, the Ukrainians were actively engaging the Red on their own, and General Wrangel’s armies had ®Ccupied most of south Russia. Vast stores of supplies, eaPons, and equipment had been captured, and the for- Unes of war seemed to be with the White Russians.-4 during this time, the U. S. Navy was involved princi- in transporting small parties of senior White Russian ficers and their families into, rather than away from, the jimea, with the logs of the destroyers USS Whipple (DD- f17) and USS Overton (DD-239) showing repeated trips r°m Constantinople to Sevastopol.25 Admiral McCully
EeP'ng the State Department advised of the situation. er- On 29 September, Poland signed a peace treaty with
e tu
ner terminated or hedged on their commitment to sup- j.0rt the White Russian forces.27 The Red Army was now jn6e to redeploy south against the White Russians, mount- & fiiajor offensives in that area. In spite of some very
heroic and stubborn fighting, the Volunteer Army was driven back, and General Wrangel began to make plans for a final evacuation.
On 28 October, he ordered preparations made for evacuation and called on the foreign commissioners, among them Admiral McCully, to request ships from their governments to assist in the operation. The destination foreseen for the refugees was Constantinople.28 On 4 November, McCully advised the State Department that the final Red offensive was under way and that General Wrangel planned “. . .to fully secure position in Crimea, develop liberal government along lines already laid down, and await opportunity for further action,”29 a strange bit of information considering Wrangel’s personal request only six days earlier for foreign aid in an evacuation. Any question of these conflicting statements was probably set aside by Admiral McCully’s next message of 10 November: ‘‘Evacuation of Crimea is imminent and I most earnestly request that United States High Commissioner Constantinople be authorized to extend all possible aid to evacuate wounded and families of officers who will without question be subject to outrageous treatment.”30 The State Department reply, dated 17 November, one day after the evacuation, advised McCully that Admiral Bristol had been authorized on 14 November to use Navy ships at his discretion.31
Once again ships’ logs describe the situation. The Overton' s log from 0800 to 1200 on 10 November records the ' receipt of an “. . . authentic report that General Wran- gel’s army has been defeated.”32 Later that day, the log
Cut from the same stout bolt of blue cloth, the two rear admirals were to play different roles in the unfolding drama. High Commissioner Mark Bristol, facing page, would be our man in Constantinople, influencing events from afar. Newton McCully, seen on the Galveston at Novorossisk, would be in the thick of things with his Marines, doughboys, caissons, and landing force guns.
d d
:rican
Responsible to ensure the safe eva^fy
and destination in transferring to a safe place all Anie citizens . . . .”41 tion of all Americans from the area, McCully made eV^J effort with the resources available and, without any SP cific authorization, did his utmost to aid in the evacua of White Russians as well. „qQ
On 14 November, the Whipple's log for 0800- hours records that U. S. warships were directed “■ • ' $ assist in evacuation of Sevastopol by Americans Wrangel’s forces before Russian Bolsheviki f°rceS'. js Between 1200 and 1600 hours, the Overton became j3 little fleet’s flagship, hoisting Admiral McCully’s while the Whipple proceeded to Constantinople on 5 ders.44 The Humphreys, as noted in her log, • at,-ers) commenced taking refugees (wounded Russian sol 1 on board . . . At 7:15 stood out enroute Constant1
reports the Overton under way to get far enough off the coast to establish communications with Admiral Bristol’s headquarters “. . . regarding the inevitable evacuation of the Crimea.”33
Meanwhile, in Constantinople Admiral Bristol was prepared to provide all possible aid by . . using naval vessels and other means that I can legally employ.”34 Bristol’s actions, taken prior to State Department authorization, are a tribute to both his moral courage and to the wide range of autonomy granted by the U. S. Navy to its senior naval officers present. As chronicled in an article for Warship International'.
“Upon receiving a message from McCully, Admiral Bristol sent the destroyers J. D. EDWARDS, HUMPHREYS, FOX AND WHIPPLE from other places in the Black Sea to the Crimea for possible use in the evacuation. These vessels (plus the OVERTON, LONG AND ST. LOUIS) took part with the American steamships Faraby and Navahoe in the evacuation of all Americans authorized by McCully.”35
Two additional U. S. warships dispatched to the Crimea were the cruiser St. Louis (CA-20) and the destroyer John D. Edwards (DD-216). According to ships’ logs, the'4 Overton was in Sevastopol the 10th, 14th, and 15th; the John D. Edwards on the 12th and 14th; the destroyer the USS Fox (DD-234) on the 13th; the destroyers USS Whipple (DD-217) and the USS Humphreys (DD-236) on the 14th; and the St. Louis and destroyer USS Long (DD-209) on the 15th. The only other foreign warships identified in the area were the French cruiser Waldeck-Rousseau and one French destroyer. There were also numerous White Russian ships in port, many of which were towed from the area after taking on board refugees.
On 10 November, General Wrangel had informed the
French that the situation was hopeless and requested t aid in the final evacuation.36 The next day, 11 Novernbe_ Admiral McCully, advising the State Department that evacuation of Sevastopol was inevitable, proposed . • evacuate all Americans, American citizens, proceed to Constantinople unless otherwise instructed^ Still without approval for assistance to the White sians, he nevertheless made provisions to include the On the 13th, General Wrangel reached an agreement 'vl the French regarding the expense of supporting the evac ation, signing over to them all the vessels in the w” Russian fleet under his control.38 ^
The U. S. Navy’s ships’ logs pick up the story °n . f 13th, as the final evacuation from south Russia got utl way. The John D. Edwards recorded transporting refu?e,9 to Constantinople, as directed by Admiral McCully- Meanwhile, in Constantinople the St. Louis slipped mo°^ ing at 4:17, got under way to the Crimea, and reporte McCully for further assignment.40 .
Also on this day, the State Department advt® McCully . .to use your discretion as to time, me*
ent1
^ e- 45 The log of the John D. Edwards reports that the hjP “• ■ . embarked ninety-six Kalanacki Don Cossack ^oldiers. . . At 8:15 got underway for Constantinople.”46 "^St. Louis, accompanied by the Overton, left Sevasto- P°1 during this period and sailed to Yalta for further evacu- atl°n aid
. Admiral McCully, composing an epitaph for Sevastopol 1? his message of 10 p.m. on 14 November to the State UePartment, wrote:
‘‘Without any fighting or disorder Sevastopol was quietly evacuated at 3 p.m. today and Reds have not entered city. About 20,000 Russian troops embarked in Russian vessels for destination unknown. General Wrangel was last to leave on cruiser Konkov. About 4,000 refugees evacuated by French, 1>000 by British and 1,200 on our naval vessels and American steamer Farabee.”47
On 15 November, with the final evacuation being com- ®ted, four U. S. warships entered the port at Yalta. 0m'ral McCully issued detailed instructions for taking 11 board as priority passengers wives and families of offi- 2rs at the front as well as wounded and sick officers.48 y ® St. Louis, according to her log, took on passengers at ;0 49and left on the 16th with the Long Fox and Over- °n• Later that day, the St. Louis took the transport
Orion in tow, there being on board about 5,000 refugees.
Lieutenant Commander Melvin F. Talbot, an officer on board the St. Louis, wrote in a personal account of the evacuation:
“We had not long to wait before the first boatload of refugees came alongside. Old men and women mostly, some well dressed, some with shabby clothes and disheveled hair, many dragging poor sleepy children too tired to be afraid and too young to understand.”50
On 16 November at Constantinople, the Overton's log for the period of 0800 to 1200 hours, reports: “. . . at 10:10 hauled down Rear Admiral McCully’s flag.”51 The saga had ended for the U. S. Navy.
With the evacuation completed, McCully submitted a list of those Americans who had been evacuated.52 Admiral Bristol reported to the Secretary of State that in an interview on 15 November General Wrangel had “. . . expressed deep appreciation for the assistance given by the United States,”53 and Bristol advised the Secretary of State on 17 November that the Russian force had hoisted the French flag on all their vessels to indicate they were now under the protection of France.54
Bristol summarized the situation in Constantinople on 19 November with the following comments to the Secretary of State:
“The number of refugees in the harbor is estimated at about 100,000. The French are taking
While the U. S. Navy’s role throughout the evacuation was humanitarian, its allies’ participation was more militant.
The Iron Duke, left, was one of three British battleships involved. When McCully arrived in Novorossisk, he found a harbor choked with ships including an Italian cruiser, the six-funneled French cruiser Waldeck Rousseau, and a White Russian destroyer towing a lighter full of soldiers.
charge of the Russian refugees, the Italians are giving no assistance . . . and the remarks amongst the British generally is that they are displeased that their government does not render any assistance.”55
According to George Stewart’s book The White Annies of Russia, the first account to report evacuation figures, there were . . 145,683 persons, of which 30,000 were women; 7,000 children and 100,000 were soldiers.”56 It is not known whether these figures include all those evacuated earlier from Odessa, Novorossisk, and other ports. The only statistic ever issued by the U. S. Navy appears to be the figure of 1,200 from Sevastopol given by Admiral McCully. Oddly, the very detailed ships’ logs, which tend to account for every event on board ship, are, almost without exception, vague on the number of refugees. Only in one instance, the listing of 96 Don Cossack soldiers, are numbers given. Consequently, the exact extent of the U. S. Navy’s participation in the evacuation will never be known.
One can only speculate that there was unhappiness over the vague support provided by the State Department. The Navy chose not to make any public pronouncements on a sensitive political subject, and there were no substantial remarks by the State Department after the evacuation, leaving things in a sort of historical limbo as far as the State and the Navy departments were concerned.
Foreign Relations of the United States, the annual record of the State Department, moves directly on to other issues, and Admiral McCully disappears from State Department correspondence when he leaves the area with his adopted children. Admiral Bristol, on the other hand, remained in Constantinople for another few years, becoming deeply involved with the economic aspects of the U. S. presence in the area. Both admirals continued their distinguished service with the Navy until their retirements, but their efforts in the evacuation, and those of the ships involved, appear to have passed from view, except for a few personal narratives by individuals involved.
It was not until the 1940s that anyone in the Navy Department wrote an account of the Navy’s role in south Russia in 1920. Though speculation at best, perhaps the public antipathy toward the U. S. interventions in north Russia and Siberia, the swing toward isolationism, or the Red Scare in the early twenties made the subject too controversial.
The U. S. Navy’s role in the 1920 evacuation of south Russia was a noble effort deserving recognition. Politics aside, the U. S. Navy has a long and continuing record of such humanitarian efforts. This was, then, merely one of many such efforts conducted in an effective and unsung manner by the men and ships of the Navy, and to their credit, without publicity or fanfare. As top Navy leaders would say, “Well done.” 'Josephus Daniels, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1920 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 38.
2George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 15.
3Richard Luckett, The White Generals (Edinburgh, Scotland: Constable, Ltd., 1971), p. 353.
4P. Wrangel, The Memoirs of General Wrangel, Sophie Goulston trans. (L°ndo Duffield & Co., 1930), p. 131. j 3
5U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920. 0 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1936), p- 598.
6Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 571.
7Ibid., p. 574.
8Ibid., p. 581. c0f(j
9U. S. Department of State, General Records of the Department of State, c Group 59. (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1963).
,0Ibid.
11 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 585. nGeneral Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59.
13Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 585. ^
l4U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Galveston, 15 1920, Record Group 24 (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives). j, ,5U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Cole, 24 M 1920, Record Group 24.
XbGeneral Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59.
I7(/. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Cole, 25 March 1920, Record Group 24. ^
,8U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Galveston, 25 March 1920, Record Group 19Ibid., 25 March 1920.
20Ibid., 26 March 1920.
21 Ibid., 27 March 1920.
22U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Cole, 27 March 20, Record Group 24.
23Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 588-589.
24Wrangel, p. 274. ^5
25U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Whipple’ Overton, Record Group 24.
26Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 616. ,,p,
-7Richard Luckett, The White Generals (London: Longman Group, Ltd. 19 374.
28Wrangel, p. 315.
29Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 622.
30Ibid., p. 624.
3lIbid., p. 626. crn.
32U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Overton, 1° N°V ber 1920, Record Group 24.
33Ibid.
34Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 622. t flip 35Henry P. Beers, “American Naval Detachment—Turkey 1919-1924” V>a International, November 1976, p. 220.
36Brinkley, p. 271.
37Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 623.
38Brinkley, p. 271. js,
39U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS John D- 13 November 1920, Record Group 24. t$r
“U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS St. Louis, 13 N°U ber 1920, Group 24.
41Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 624. jt.
A2U. S. Navy Ship's Log, USS Whipple, 14 November 1920, Record GW"P ,4.
4>U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Overton, 14 November 1920, Record GmuP ^
**U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Whipple, 14 November 1920, Record GW“P ,4
45U. S. Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Humphre" 1
November 1920, Record Group 24. ,, oUp
46V. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS John D. Edwards, 14 November 1920, Record 24. .
47Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3. p. 626.
48General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59. _ 24.
mU. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS St. Louis, 16 November 1920, Record GW"P g2, ’"Melvin F. Talbot, "In the Wake of War," Proceedings, February 1933, P- ,i. 5,U. S. Navy Ship’s Log, USS Overton, 16 November 1920. Record GW F 52General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59.
5,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 626.
54Ibid., p. 627.
55Ibid. 0 p.
56George Stewart, The White Armies in Russia (New York: Russel & RUSSC ’ 437.
A graduate of Lake Forest College with a bachelor of arts an^."ersjty, degrees from Northern Illinois University and George Mason Un|Vcj- Colonel Ankley served in World War II and the Vietnam War. Hi* J*jsjoO time assignments have included duty with the 82nd Airborne 5. and the 8th Infantry Division as well as serving on staff with ,jr3" Army Japan, Headquarters Department of the Army and the Orf- tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
44
Proceedings / Supple'11
ent
French, British, and Italian men-of-war filled the harbor.7
General Denikin was losing the support of his senior com
manders, the Red Army was driving the demoralized Vol
unteer Army from its positions, and the Allies were quib
bling among themselves over continuing their support. On
12 February, Admiral McCully radioed, “Odessa is in hands of Bolshevicks. Calculated over 10,000 refugees are on board vessels in harbor.”8 On 29 February, McCully issued a preparatory order to the four U. S. warships in Novorossisk’s harbor—destroyers Biddle (DD- 151), Cole (DD-155), and Smith Thompson (DD-212), and the cruiser Galveston (CL-19)—to protect U. S. personnel in the area and aid other forces in trying to preserve order.9 * *
By this time, it had become evident that a major evacuation of personnel from the port was necessary. For Admiral McCully, the means of aiding in such an effort were to become a source of frustration. On 9 March, he informed Admiral Bristol that the Smith Thompson had evacuated 29 people and the U. S. merchant ship Sangamon some 570. The Volunteer Army was now attempting to redeploy to the Crimea, with the hope of holding on there, but the Allies increasingly felt it was only a matter of time before all of south Russia would have to be evacuated. Meanwhile, McCully and the U. S. Navy would continue to lend what support they could to the Volunteer Army.
On 12 March, McCully sent off an impassioned plea to the acting Secretary of State requesting aid to evacuate refugees:
“Remaining in Novorossisk are about 5,000 people and in Crimea are about 25,000 others all of most intelligent class and of estimable character who are or who firmly believe themselves to be in danger of (omission) or maltreatment if Bolsheviks take charge, a contingency imminent in both places. For humane considerations, for our own self respect ... I think it is important that the United States should take part in the work of evacuating these people . . ,”u
On 14 March, the Galveston relayed a message to the Cole denying use of the U. S. merchant ship Patako to evacuate 5,000 wounded officers.12 The reason for this soon became clear when on 18 March Admiral McCully
the port city of Novorossisk on 18 January and reported
By 29 February 1920, the situation in south Russia had
grown increasingly grim. Admiral McCully had arrived in
finding refugees flocking en masse into the town while