Leadership Forum: Management: A Subset of Leadership

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How is the departing naval captain to be remembered? Will his subordi­nates recall his presence and example and emulate him both in the Navy and in their personal lives? Will anecdotes of his style and substance provide the verbal textbook inspiring future generations of sailors to follow? Will he have provided the light of leadership for generations of future sailors to inherit and emulate?

John Paul Jones . . . Lord Horatio Nelson . . . Oliver Hazard Perry . . . David G. Farragut . . . Winfield Scott Schley . . . Andrew Brown Cunningham . . . Raymond Spruance . . . Thomas C. Kinkaide . . . Every naval officer dreams of serving with the likes of such leaders. What did these men have in common?

They were skilled in the art of leader­ship, practicing the art of war itself. Hav­ing encouraged initiative, confidence, and competence in their subordinates, they could trust them to discharge their wartime duties when signals could nei­ther be seen nor perfectly heard. obviously, they were skilled in the ence of management, arranging the P arations for war. They knew how to . gate authority, while retaining comm responsibility.

How much of leadership is good ^ agement, and how much of manage is good leadership? Some claim that _g are two different things, but others ag^ with former Secretary of Defense jp McNamara who characterized leaders as a checklist of set management g^u ,j_ lines and responses taken from the ci

First,

bles

^{1 11} obscured the role of the intangi- ^ar>d the imponderables that distin-

8^Ulsh leadership as an art from manage- _e ^ent as a science.¹ Second, in the ⁿsuing debate, it allowed for a total sep- r^atlon between leadership and manage- ⁿL as though management could be 'mreed from leadership.

Management is the timely scheduling to u^{Vents an}d the movement of resources ^bring those events about. As a science, deals with quantification, subcom­ponents, and “things.” Leadership, on ^e other hand, means directing people to ^e those things to bring those events ^{an art}’ ¹¹ takes a more qualita- approach and places a premium upon

of

treatment of people. The knowledge

/*ⁿ world of business administration. He anted to bring civilian efficiency and ^-effectiveness to a military suppos- y hampered by the inability to quantify ^leadership skills.

But nothing could have been more -.armful to the concept of leadership.

tive the

jtd study of the science of management not hurt the leaders, though; indeed, magement skills can be of benefit, the leader practices the science of management within the art of leadership den the principles of that science are a P^art of his being. In doing so, the leader ^as assimilated the principles of manage- ^ent. The leader then draws upon those Pt'ncipies effortlessly as he applies the -give skills of the art of leadership.

Management is not a substitute for ^eadership; it is a part of the leader’s rep- doire. The leader understands manage- _Q ^ent principles and knows, consciously J otherwise, how to apply those princi- F ^es- The leader has also developed the ⁿ °f knowing when, where, how, why, ^a°d to what degree to use those principles ⁰ accomplish the tasks assigned to him ^and his unit.

lu the naval context, these thoughts n^ahe it clear why an executive officer *0) billet is a necessary prerequisite to a <ljor command billet. The commanding

0. ficer (CO) leads while the XO manages
1. ^e affairs of the ship. Serving as XO al­oe's mastery of the management aspects

command. The officer can then con­^Centrate on the leadership phases when he ^e*^ercises command. One cannot be an •ective leader without first having in­corporated the principles of management ^lni° one’s repertoire. This can be put 'dore colloquially: The XO’s manage­ment skill recognizes goldbricking, while ^e CO’s leadership skill prevents it. Problems arise, though, when the sci- !^nce of management becomes, divorced ^r°m the art of leadership. Under these ^c*rcumstances, management may become

akin to social or human engineering on scales from the small to the vast. The scale depends on the number of subordi­nates manipulated to achieve the manage­ment goal. The effect is one of engineer­ing: scientific principles developed into a technological method to achieve a set goal by the manipulations of objects. But, in this case, human beings, as com­ponents of a system, are manipulated. When these people perform their func­tions as prescribed, the system produces the desired output, and the manager has succeeded.

This process contains the seeds of its own downfall. For even if the manager is successful, he will be resented by his subordinates, whom he has treated as things. He has carried out human engi­neering, not a humane effort.

At a distant extreme, the advanced tyr­annies of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Tse-Tung in this century were vast experiments in human engineering, of management at a distance from society, of manipulations of people from afar, of applications of scientific principles to achieve supposedly well-determined goals.² The results are well known. Any such attempt to substitute the science of management for the art of leadership is doomed to a similar outcome.

The art of leadership is not merely the­oretical. The leader does not manipulate people from afar; he is in the midst of the action. He grapples with the imponder­ables and copes with them. In any en­deavor, this coping with the imponder­ables of action is what distinguishes art from science and, similarly, leadership from management.

The leader knows that his task is a humane one: He needs the active cooper­ation of his subordinates if the task is to be successfully completed. The art of leadership means gaining the cooperation of all participants, the cool assessment of the obvious and of the imponderable ele­ments of each situation as it develops, and the calm application of technique and command in the face of whims of for­tune, the randomness of events, the un­known consequences of decisions made in the face of inadequate information, and bad luck.

The Vietnam War was fought accord­ing to management principles, by men who stood aloof, and who directed its course by grand pronouncements from afar. The science of management was substituted for the art of leadership. This arose largely from a confusion of the sci­entific principles of how to prepare for war and how to carry out logistic support of war with the waging of war itself. It was not the art of leadership carrying out the art of war. The sciences of logistics, division trains, and military engineering were confused with the art of the conduct of war. The debacle was inevitable.³

The preparation for war is essential; it is the science of management applied to war. It is a necessary condition for vic­tory, but not sufficient; the sufficient condition is war itself. It is the art of leadership applied to war. There is no substitute for leadership. Management is not an acceptable substitute, because it is a subset of leadership. Leadership en­compasses management as the science which provides the basics, the infrastruc­ture. Thus, in war, management secures logistics, plans of training, and engineer­ing, but leadership provides direction, training, and the rationale for the timely application of engineering. Whereas management is the bare accompaniment to success, leadership is the accomplish­ment of success even in the face of im- “In case signals can neither be seen or perfectly under­stood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.”

Lord Horatio Nelson

ponderables presented by fortune, by ran­dom events, by bad luck, and especially by human nature.

What is required to develop leader­ship? Prepare your mind. Then you can better deal with the opportunities pre­sented by fortune. Prepare your men the same.

First, know the history of your profes­sion. As Niccolo Machiavelli writes in The Prince, “As for intellectual training, the prince should read history, studying the actions of eminent men to see how they conducted themselves during war and to discover the reasons for their vic­tories or their defeats, so that he can avoid the latter and imitate the former.”⁴ It is better to learn from the hard knocks of others than from your own. Your sub­ordinates will have more respect for a leader who can recount in detail the tradi­tions of which they are a part.

Next, master as many skills as possi­ble, and never be afraid to master another when opportunity or necessity require it. Miyamato Musashi states in his A Book of Five Rings, “Thus with the virtue of strategy I practice many arts and abili-

has made this possible by preparing evet> subordinate to be a leader. Hence,

he

ment, station, and/or ship and can themselves the appropriate tasks in absence of their superiors to support mission and contribute constructive y ^ its accomplishment. Third, they ^se ® the appropriate time to make construe i criticism of their unit’s performance. ^ nally, they reassign tasks and delega new chain of authority to maintain org nizational cohesion in accomplishme their mission.

A successful leader will have

responses to their actions: praise

It.

take

leave and confidently expect to con¹^ back to a smoothly running operation- increases the probability that when ^ does return, the unit’s operations a achievement will be a mess.

Good leadership is important for org nizational continuity in the Navy. 1° _{ of duty come to an end, and the unit m be left to the command of a successor, is much to the former commander’s cr ^

while the new commander becomes

ties—all things with no teacher.”⁵ Later, Musashi elaborates upon this idea with a detailed list:

1. Do not think dishonestly.
2. The Way is in training.
3. Become acquainted with every art.
   4. Know the Ways of all profession­als.
   5. Distinguish between gain and loss in worldly matters.
   6. Develop intuitive judgement and understanding for everything.
   7. Perceive those things which cannot be seen.
8. Pay attention even to trifles.
9. Do nothing which is of no use.⁶

The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu offers another set of indirect guidelines in his The Art of War, “On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? . . . On which side are officers and men more highly trained? In which army is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds sum­marily punished?”⁷ These questions can be easily turned into declarative state­ments about leadership.

Third, the effective leader makes him­self into a paragon for his men. The ef­fective leader is always well-groomed and looks the part. He knows and re­spects his men. His support of Navy reg­ulation, policy, and doctrine is beyond reproach. Sexual harassment, equal op­portunity violations, and drug abuse are not tolerated by an effective leader. The leader works well with both superiors and subordinates. He seeks and accepts re­sponsibility and expects others to do the same. He never forgets that the business at hand is war; to that end, he emphasizes training, cohesion, and morale in his unit. He is fair and is perceived as fair by his men. He understands he is a naval leader and is sensitive to how others see him in that role. There will be an aura of moral courage around him which his men perceive and accept, if not emulate. Basi­cally, this reduces to five principles:

• Know your field and as many others as possible.
• Know your men.
• Know your mission and the require­ments of the mission.
• Know yourself.
• Train incessantly.

To these we add a brief list of specifi­cally naval interests by which a leader’s skills are enhanced. These are concentra­tion on teamwork, seamanship, damage control, ship systems and propulsion, electronics, combat systems, and ord­nance and gunnery.

Finally, there is the delegation of au­thority to subordinates. Subordinates should be led and, in turn, lead when necessary. The former, properly exe­cuted, will facilitate the latter. It is here that the delegation of authority, in mutual good faith, reaps its greatest benefits.

This comes by following three steps. First, train your subordinates well. Next, have faith in them. Then delegate respon-

. Activities belonging to war divide themselves into . . . two classes, into such as are only ‘prepara­tions for war’ and into the ‘‘war itselfThis division must therefore also be made in theory.”

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

sibility and authority to them.

This is necessary because an effective leader may be unable to be with his peo­ple in a crisis. An element of uncertainty awaits any human endeavor. The science of management insists that these uncer­tainties can be eliminated to where they may be neglected. The art of leadership accepts that these uncertainties will be ever present and thus recognizes such prudent measures must be taken. This comes by having well-trained, well-moti­vated, and well-led subordinates.

How, as a leader, do you achieve this? Be present in the situation every day! Be on site, on the scene, every day! Interact with your subordinates. Practice delegat­ing authority to them. Educate them about the imponderables and how you cope with such matters. Admit your frail­ties which your subordinates, being human, must share. Above all, make them believe and understand that in your absence their judgment will be accepted as yours. That being so, train them! Train them well! Train them hard! Train them long! Above all, when you train them, be there with them so that you train together. Training must discomfort you as much as it does them, or else they will see you as a manager instead of as a leader. If you are there with them, they will see you as a leader, and they will reward you by back­ing each other and reaching the goal in your absence, whether you are called by other duties or are a casualty.

Great organizations emerge from great leadership. As such, they can accomplish their goals in the leader’s absence be­cause they function well. A good leader

thority may be delegated by the leader any subordinate, because he knows can rely on his people, as they know t have earlier relied on him. This brings to the ultimate test of leadership: Can organization function as well when ^ leader is gone as when he was there. the great leaders, the answer is, Yes. But for the less talented, history tells u ■ “No!” _d

Well-led subordinates take over a ^ lead when necessary. First, they themselves. Second, they remain ^avv

of the mission of their division, hep^a

assign the

in­culcated such attitudes in his subordinate^ through his example and by appropj^ _a

ivjpv/iuvo iv/ iiivii uvuv/iiij- i'                 , g

good performance at an assigned tas • grateful compliment for a task perform in the leader’s absence, positive recep of suggestions and public recognition they are adopted, or an acknowledg willingness to allow their initiative come into play when he is absent. In ^ sence, good leadership ensures that organization will function in the lea⁰ absence.     , _s

Some aspiring managers and '^ea . think that it is to their credit that t ^ organization cannot function in their sence. In other words, the organiza ¹ goes to pieces; the leader then retu ’ and all is well. But nothing could be ^ ther from the truth! At the personal le|^ it assures that the leader's absence wi noticed, unfavorably, by his superiors- thus, ensures that he cannot be ill °^r

if the transition is smooth, and the accomplishes its mission effici^eI1 ' ’

miliar with his job.               . ,

This sense of organizational continu*

1985