JCS Reorganization, A Separatist Case

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

In an article in the Armed Forces Journal, Russell Murray noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) “was, and still is, not a satisfactory source of disin­terested, professional military advice on joint mat­ters.”¹ He traced this deficiency to the members’ dual- hatted responsibilities. Each is supposed to be both an advocate for his own service and an unbiased advisor on broader issues.

These observations and criticisms are not new; they have been around since 1942 when our independent ser­vice chiefs first encountered their British equivalents and essentially were defeated in detail. However, these criticisms point out the dichotomy between what we say we want in the way of a joint staff and what we expect that joint staff to do. Congress has reiterated that we will not have an armed forces general staff, and has implied that whatever we have in the way of a joint staff will not have the authority to act in the name of the commander. Yet, Congress, independent analyti­cal groups, JCS internal study teams, and interested observers have all castigated the JCS for its inability to provide useful military advice (which otherwise might be called decisions) and the chairman’s inability to exe­cute that advice. Rather than call these judgments “de­cisions,” critics refer to them as nonparochial, “profes­sional military advice on joint matters.”

There are two distinct schools of thought on this issue. Since 1947, the Army and those favoring a strong, centralized JCS offering consensual advice have held sway. However, the separatist school, personified by the Navy Department, persists in its belief that the best approach is to present all views to the President.

The charge that the JCS is unable to render nonparochial, professional military advice on joint mat­ters does not come from the Navy, but rather from the integrationists. In another, perhaps more philosophical way, this criticism springs from the American way of looking at problems and decisions, i.e., there is only one correct answer to any problem, and if enough intel­ligent people address the issue, the correct answer will become obvious. Americans appear to prefer a military institution rendering unambiguous advice, advice pro­duced by the best minds available, without error, and which, in effect, could serve as a decision. Then the elected politicians and their appointees could rubber stamp the “decision” made for them by the JCS and not have to “bite the bullet” on hard issues.

Now we have a situation where the JCS is denied the authority to function as a military staff and its chairman is not permitted to impose decisions upon the services. Proposed solutions have ranged from the crea­tion of a new armed forces staff, to strengthening the chairman’s clout, to the White Bill (HR 6954), whic ^ would create an advisory council of ten retired ge^ne flag rank officers. Most proposed solutions would, iⁿ essence, make the JCS a fifth “center of power -~^a rival of the three military departments and the Depan ment of Defense, yet first among equals.

The Navy offers four major arguments against a fense organization with the authority to dictate strate­gies and allocate resources. These four arguments cen ter on: advisors vs. decision makers, constitutionality, the nature of war at sea, and tradition.

Advisor or Decision-maker?: Sections 141 through 143 under Title 10 of the United States Code are ex­plicit on the question of whether the JCS is to render advice or decisions:

Section 141. Composition; functions           ■>

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal m¹ itary advisors to the President, the National Securi y Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

Section 142. Chairman

3. While holding office, the chairman outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces. However, may not exercise military command over the J°'^nt Chiefs of Staff or any of the Armed Forces.

Section 143. Joint Staff

4. The Joint Staff shall not operate or be orga- ^ nized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff ^an shall have no executive authority.²

Figures 1, 2, and 3 depict the organization and exte^f nal relationships of the JCS. In Figure 1, the JCS is ¹ the chain of command linking the President and the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified com mands. The functions of the JCS leave little doubt t a under strong central direction the JCS would, in ’ be the military decision-making body for the Nationa Command Authority.

The separatist, regardless of service, has two P^rot)' lems with this blurred distinction between advice an decisions. The first concern was articulated by Karl von Clausewitz 153 years ago: “If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited the means available for war, then unless statesman an soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander in chief a mem of the cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities.”³ Similar observations were set forth in a U. S. Naval War College text, Sound Military Decision, published in 1936 and re­printed in 1942:

“The Advisory Function. Understanding between the civil representatives of the State and the leaders

°f the armed forces is manifestly essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it. Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of ill-advised measures are to be avoided,

*t is necessary that wise professional counsel be available to the State. While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work °f strategy be allotted adequate means, and be un­dertaken under the most favorable conditions.” “These considerations require that the military Profession be qualified, through the possession of mental power, clear vision, and capacity for expres­sion, to advise the State in military matters.”⁴

Ironically, it was Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von ^oltke (1800-1891) who best expressed this concern: At the moment of mobilization the political advisor P° the King] should fall silent, and should take the lead again only when the [military] strategist has in­formed the King, after the complete defeat of the enemy, that his task has been fulfilled.”⁵

History is rife with examples of satisfied needs incit­ing demand excesses, the so-called SNIDE Rule.⁶ One of the first in recorded history was Athens’ efforts to take Sicily following an initial victory over Sparta. Separatists insist that military strategy supports, not drives, national policies and objectives, even in war.

To understand the debate, we must trace the evolu­tion of the current decision-making process. In short, our forward-deployed troops and rapid deployment ca­pability are regarded by some as an anomaly. Before 1941, the Army had no experience of truly global con­flict, so the tradition was to have relatively small stand­ing armed forces. For all intents and purposes we were a maritime nation, for the Navy had been “forward deployed” for years. Military engagements usually had been against a single opponent over a single issue, with the land battle kept separate from, but supported by, sea engagements. The Spanish-American War of 1898 alerted Elihu Root (Secretary of War, 1899-1904) and

^oceedings / July 1985

89

others to the Army’s internal problems, which were largely resolved by the creation of an Army general staff. (The Navy avoided such a reorganization.) In World War I the United States again fought a land bat­tle—the maritime threat had been resolved largely by Britain’s fleet-in-being bottling up the Germans’ North Sea fleet.

However, World War II was a truly global affair, and a severe test of the U. S. command structure. Until war production could meet strategic objectives, materiel was distributed for limited, sequential operations. A good illustration was the shortage of landing craft, which resulted in the “Europe first” decision being continually revisited. The Commander in Chief had to resettle the issue each time Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and Army Chief of Staff General

George C. Marshall or their staffs had a falling out over which theater of operations had priority of re­sources. This was clearly the President’s right and re­sponsibility by provision of the Constitution, and a de facto decision by a military committee under the guis^e of providing advice was not to be tolerated.

When Admiral King and General Marshall agreed, all was right and proper regardless of the President’s decision. When King and Marshall disagreed, the Pr^eSl dent earned his pay by deciding between the two rec­ommendations. Yet, regardless of the decision, both saluted and moved out.

But with the advent of the U. S. Air Force, JCS advice became the province of a “committee of ex­perts,” and took on the appearance of a de facto deci­sion. With the appearance of the civilian-dominated Department of Defense between the service chiefs and

and

gating the capabilities of the armed services, necessi- ^In§ decisions on priorities, resource allocation, and strategies.

j Another factor determining the nature of JCS advice s the problem of intent. According to separatists, it °uld not be the intent of military advisors to so ^cGUch their advice as to make a de facto decision. Nor ^<)uld the organization be structured in the interest of ^atlV one solution.

If the intent of the organization is to provide only ^0tlc answer, then the advice becomes a de facto deci- s>°n regardless of whether it is supplied by a uniformed P* or an appointed civilian bureaucracy. While the Gmmander in Chief does have the power to reject the ^{a v}ice and make his own choice, with today’s need for ^aPid decisions and quick responses, he would be more ^kely to take the advice and act accordingly.

Perhaps even more objectionable to some would be

^a*r. Conventional war became a problem of inte-

j ^e Commander in Chief, split recommendations by the ^ placed the chiefs on the horns of a dilemma. Split ^commendations could be used by the Secretary of tense to further his position or make an independent c'sion. Unanimous recommendations by the JCS pro­. ^e<l the administration with political capital, espe- ,'^a y when Congress took exception to the President’s ^cision, but required language all four services agreed "the infamous “lowest common denominator.” Attributing JCS problems to having a third (or tttirth, or even fifth) member is simplistic. The nature 'warfare had changed since the late 1800s and by 42 the services could not act separately. Early in orld War II General Marshall realized that the com- Pexity of modem warfare dictated that “there must be ^e man in command of the entire theater—air,

^ °^und, and ships. We cannot manage by coopera- °ⁿ- ’ Contrary to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s predictions, ^chnological advancements had integrated land, sea, to have appointed civilian interlocutors (i.e., an Assist­ant Secretary of Defense for Operations) between the Commander in Chief and the armed services making the decisions and integrating the effort to their “own image and likeness,” and not necessarily to that of the Commander in Chief, let alone Congress, which was charged with “raising and maintaining” the services.

Generally, separatists believe that if there is a lack of agreement among the service chiefs the JCS structure and protocol should permit a full airing of all positions so the President has the facts available to decide in the best interests of the nation.

Constitutionality: The question of whether Congress has the authority to legislate the organization of mili­tary forces never has been, nor is it now, at issue. Rather, the separatist zeroes in on three interrelated constitutional issues: effect, centralization, and civilian control.

It was the intent of the framers of the Constitution, according to separatists, that civilians would control the military. And since the beginning of the 1947 discus­sions on unification, it has been argued that: “ . . . even though the plan [unification] purported to give ul­timate authority over the Department of the Armed Forces to its civilian secretary, the actual power would become lodged in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and especially the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

. . . ”⁷ Therefore, the effect of unification or of strengthening the chairman’s position in relation to that of the service chiefs may be contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution, subsequent sessions of Congress that provided armed forces guidance or legis­lation, and those sessions of Congress that introduced, passed, and amended the 1947 National Security Act.

One effect of strengthening the JCS and its chairman is centralization. In the early days of the unification proposals—immediately following World War II—the

Conduct of War at Sea in Support of National Poll cies: Compounding the problems of service unification was the international evolution of Trotsky’s “no peac^e no war” environment. The development of nuclear weapons, strategic delivery systems, and ambiguous national objectives and policies complicated the situa­tion. Since the end of World War II we have had a large standing Army, forward deployed in two widely separated theaters, protecting noncontiguous, foreign territory and involved in what some perceive as “en­tangling alliances.” This situation is unique in the 16 year American military history. And, given the moods of the American population, its politicians, and shifts attitudes abroad, who can say with certainty that even 20 years from now (the projected life-span of the nu­clear carrier Nimitz) the Army will be in the same con­figurations in Europe and in Korea. However, there is little doubt but that naval forces will be forward de­

The patron saint of centralized procurement, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense 1960-1968, applied management techniques that had succeeded at Ford Motor Company. But what’s good for Ford is not necessarily good for the country.

Navy concentrated throughout the congressional hear­ings on three major points:

• Unity of field command as practiced in World War II had been actively supported by the Navy. However, unity of command on a theater basis did not require a single chief of staff in Washington.
• A unified department would be too large to be effec­tively controlled by a single overall secretary.
• During World War II, the JCS pattern of collective strategic decision making led to better results than by a single chief of staff (the de facto decision versus de jure advice discussed earlier).⁸

Even in procurement, the Navy claimed wasteful duplications are best eliminated on an ad hoc basis. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal informed a congressional committee in 1944:

“ . . . that it [elimination of wasteful duplica­tions] required ‘the daily dustpan operation of many men. . . . ’ He then posed the following question to the Congressmen: ‘Do you prevent those duplica­tions by simply dumping into a larger basket all these function [sic]? I do not know. Maybe you will. Maybe there are genii that can do that.’”⁹

Lending credibility to Forrestal’s concern, Robert Mc­Namara, Secretary of Defense from 1960 to 1968, tried to centralize procurement of everything from belt buck­les to tactical fighter aircraft.

As with the issue of effect, the question of civilian control focuses more on who is the proper civilian to control the armed forces. The separatist is likely to pre­fer that the Commander in Chief remain as provided for by the Constitution. Creating a layer, or layers, of civilian or military authorities between the service chiefs and the Commander in Chief would separate those with operational knowledge from the one who decides questions of national security. This raises the issue of an elected versus an appointed civilian having authority over the armed forces.

The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommended a civilian Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operations be appointed to have direct supervision over the unified and specified commands. While the current proposals for JCS reorganization do not project increased civilian control, a separatist would rightfully fear that the civil­ian Secretary of Defense, having a greatly strength­ened, independent JCS chairman to deal with, might become the chairman’s “echo.” Even less desirable, though, is the possibility that a secretary with a person­ality resembling Mr. McNamara’s would become the chairman’s constant adversary.

Separatists are also purists. They prefer that the ef­fectiveness of the organization depend upon its struc­ture and not upon the personalities of its members. Thus, they prefer the pre-World War II, or even Wor War II, concept of coordination (as opposed to unity ⁰ command), and that strategic guidance proceed direct y from the Commander in Chief to the service chiefs- This direct contact is established in both law and trad¹ tion, but it has depended more upon personality than the letter of the law.

ployed, their configuration dependent upon national objectives and policies.

The Army units stationed abroad must be reinforce » deployed to new theaters if required, sustained, and supported, both in logistics and in combat support. T ^e Navy has its own “joint” arrangement for its land, sea, and air forces, and is aware of its strategic resp°ⁿ sibilities as a member of the strategic triad, as forces ° interposition, or as a show of force. Thus, by comp^ar1' son, the Army is virtually static, and the Navy is dy­namic. Being dynamic, at least in the perception of naval advocates, requires freedom of action for its oceangoing elements.

This requirement is reinforced by the nature of the Navy’s medium: Man cannot survive without external devices, to wit, ships. A ship captain’s traditional inu^e pendence is not a function of egotism or desire for power, but rather a necessity for survival. Joseph Con­rad’s novel Typhoon points out the need for profes-

P°^nal competence at sea to the same extent that C.S. tester’s The General does for land combat. And with ^ree figurative “services” operating on land as well as j* ^ove, below, and on the surface of the sea, the ^avy’s need for professional competence and indepen- ^ence of action at sea becomes all the more important. F°r any navy, the center of gravity is the fleet of the °PPosing force. Once that fleet has been neutralized or J-stroyed, support for operations in other mediums can ^rendered without interruption. Put differently, of i at value to the Army are 15 converted SL-7s (vehi- ^{c e} cargo/rapid response ships, T-AKRs) if the Soviet ^Cruiser Kirov and her surface action group—to say Nothing of the Soviet underwater fleet—are permitted ⁰ strike whenever they choose?

Naval advocates base their arguments on two princi- P ^es: the need to establish control of the sea and the p '^Hty to exploit that control of the sea in order to es- aolish control on the land.¹⁰ It is difficult to find a ^rePutable naval strategist or theoretician who does not ^knowledge that wars are won essentially by infantry, ^e,ther by taking and holding ground or holding a bayo­^net at the enemy’s throat. Thus, while the Navy re- j=ards itself as the first line of defense, its commanders ⁿ°w that as long as we maintain forward-deployed °ops, the Navy’s role will be critical for protecting ^{e s}ea lines of communication (SLOCs), for deploy-

T⁵ FORCE ment, and for sustaining those forward deployed troops. The definition, however, of the term “protection” is at issue. Some claim a brisk, worldwide offensive against Soviet naval forces would render the best SLOC pro­tection. Others take a far more conservative and pas­sive approach.

Centralized control would appear to be anathema to the Navy because centralized control by its very nature permits requirements from other elements to compro­mise the operation or detract from the primacy of the naval mission. Centralized control has inherent re­straints, but under the guise of operational necessity, it can involve a commander without a naval background. Sufficient naval technical competency and the willing­ness to grant the freedom of action necessary to protect the fleet could not be found in many land or air com­manders, hence the reluctance to place naval forces under non-naval control or command.

Only since World War II has the United States maintained so many troops on so many foreign lands, like these Army and Air Force special forces jumping from Military Airlift Command planes in Korea during Team Spirit 85. The Navy has always been forward deployed and relied on freedom of action more than service interoperability.

Admiral Wylie wrote, the American sailor “has never failed to meet the [American] soldier’s need.”¹⁴ While “God may be on the side with the larger bat talions,” Neptune is not necessarily so inclined. In contrast to land warfare, war at sea can be one purely of maneuver, positioning, and timing. A mere “fleet- in-being” can keep an opposing fleet contained and away from vital areas, as in World War I and in the Falklands Conflict in 1982. Another difference is that in sea combat there are no immediately available re­placements for losses of men and ships. These points, separatists argue, demand that sea combat be conduce by those most familiar with the sea.

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie summed up the dif­ferences between the conduct of war at sea and on land in his book, Military Strategy. Simply stated, the conti­nental theory of strategy focused on two factors foreign to both air and sea theories: terrain and continuous con­tact with the enemy. Wylie claims that “where the sailor or airman think in terms of an entire world, the soldier at work thinks in terms of theaters, in terms of campaigns, or in terms of battle.”¹¹

Wylie notes that these three spatial concepts are keyed to the interrelated elements of terrain and con­tact. Terrain must be taken, it must be considered as a variable factor in planning, and it can be two-faced: the same piece of terrain can favor one force and be a dis­advantage to the opposing force. Terrain also estab­lishes the limits of campaigns and boundaries of thea­ters. The sea and the air do not educe the same fixation for those forces as terrain does for the soldier.

Another difference Wylie establishes is that air and naval forces, in most situations, engage in combat when it is mutually agreeable; not so with land forces. Soldiers make contact with the opposing force and go to extremes to maintain that contact. Contact with the opposing force lends a degree of security to land battle commanders: when contact is lost, efforts are made to reestablish it as quickly as possible to prevent the enemy from maneuvering into a position of unknown quality and potential.

Terrain and continuous contact call for degrees of centralization, control, and subordination that are not desired by either air or naval forces. And therein lies the crux of the separatist’s argument with the in- tegrationists. The American soldier, in his forward-de­ployed position, cannot do his job by himself. He

“ . . . cannot function alone. His flanks are bare, his rear is vulnerable, and he looks aloft with a cau tious eye. He needs the airman and the sailor for ^lS own security in doing his own job. ... In order do his own job best, the soldier feels he should con trol the forces that must function in his support.

Thus, the integrationist and the separatist positions are diametrically opposed on the question of how that in­fantryman accomplishes his mission.

Separatists assert that the differences between the nature of war at sea and the nature of war on land are such that commanders must be given the maximum In itude possible. The separatist also argues that seaman­ship, as Pericles has observed, “allows one no spare time for anything else.”¹³ The greatest reliance possi­ble must be placed upon commanders’ abilities to exe cute their missions without interference. A skeptic could raise the example of Vice Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey’s actions at Leyte Gulf in World War (referred to in Marine circles as “Bull’s Run”) bub ^aS

The Need to Know

The following anecdote from William A. Hamil­ton Ill’s essay, “The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” illustrates separatists’ resistance to both centralized control and control by nontechnical personnel.

' ‘As the [Cuban Missile] crisis grew worse, the United States undertook a naval quarantine of Cuba. [Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara] began spending time in the navy’s Flag Plot, or operations center. This room, under Marine guard, contains visual materials locating the position of every ship.

It also has communications links with ship com­manders. McNamara insisted upon making decisions on the spot. He wanted to call ship commanders di­rectly on the voice-scrambling, single sideband ra­dios. [Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.] tried to dissuade the civilian official. The navy uses formal stylized voice communications with coded names going through the chain of com­mand. McNamara was inclined to ignore or belittle those techniques. He pointed to a symbol for one ship at sea and demanded of Admiral Anderson,

‘What’s that ship doing there?’ The chief of naval operations replied, 7 don’t know, but I have faith W my officers. ’ ’ ’

‘ ‘In fact, Admiral Anderson did know what the ship was doing in that location. The ship, a United States destroyer, was sitting on top of a Russian submarine which had been detected by a highly clas­sified means of detection. Present with Secretary McNamara were some of his civilian staff and with Admiral Anderson some of his own officers who were not cleared for this particular piece of highly sensitive information. Later, the CNO was able to get McNamara aside and explain the situation.”

—War, Strategy, and Maritime Power, edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III, (Rutgers University Press, 1977)

less

►

battle lines at sea do not exist, making rear areas

secure.

h.

'gure 4 Mahan and Corbett on Sea Power¹¹¹

In Defense 82, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward spelled

°^ut nine major differences between warfare on land and sea. ^J

^ Sea warfare is conducted in three dimensions simul- neously; above, below, and on the surface.

* Rattle i:_____________ _ __t__________ a. _ i •______

The Soviet naval threat exists worldwide, not just £°se to Soviet borders.

Sea control is local and often transitory, shifting ^0rn side to side without signifying victory for the gaining side.

^ All naval warfare involves maneuver.

Naval warfare must contend with the presence of ^⁰nbellig_erents.

During peacetime, naval forces frequently interact ^nh the forces of potential adversaries.

^ Naval forces have relatively shorter logistic tails.

The magnitude of ocean surveillance exceeds that of ^e land environment.¹⁵

In summary, separatists argue that unification or in­^Creased integration under either a strengthened chairman '|^r under an armed forces staff would exacerbate the ^similarities of land and sea combat and decrease the lectiveness of naval forces. The separatist would Ugrce with Clark Reynold’s conclusion in his foreword ⁰ Paul B. Ryan’s First Line of Defense that history has not been kind to those “ . . . who tried and failed to build and wield superior navies within authoritarian, army-dominated dictatorships: Colbert under Louis XIV, Napoleon’s admirals, Tirpitz under Kaiser Wil­helm II, Makarov under Tsar Nicholas II, Raeder under Hitler, and Yamamoto under Tojo.”¹⁶

Tradition: In the separatist’s view, the least logical, but most emotional, argument against a truly integrated joint staff is the maintenance of tradition. Separatists argue that traditions are formed from experience and are usually based on valid premises.

The elements of maritime strategy are establishing control of the sea and exploiting that control toward establishing control on land.¹⁷ Athens was one of the first powers in recorded history to have established and followed a maritime strategy, but it was not until the time of the British Empire that such strategies were generally employed. Britain’s economic, political, and social “successes” followed from that maritime strat­egy, according to Mahan and other chroniclers of Brit­ish history. Mahan’s formula for “success” included commerce, colonies, and naval bases from which naval forces could protect seaborne commerce. An early 20th century British strategist, Sr Julian Corbett, arrived at a slightly different set of conclusions. The basic differ­ences between Mahan and Corbett are presented in Fig­ure 4.

With the growth of “Social Darwinism” (simply stated, the “survival of the fittest,” applied to nations and peoples) and America’s evolution from continen- talism and nonentanglement to manifest destiny has grown the appeal of Mahan’s interpretation of history to naval enthusiasts. Mahan claimed that to survive economically, especially with the standard of living to which we have become accustomed, it is necessary to trade abroad. To trade, one needs resource bases and

95

markets. To ensure continued access to those resources and markets, the nation must have a navy to protect the shipping lanes and defeat fleets threatening commerce or its protective fleet. The economic survival of this nation, then, depends upon the Navy’s ability to con­trol the seas. Separatists, of course, embrace Mahan’s principles, while others find this traditional viewpoint dated.

The pervasive power of tradition in the armed ser­vices is illustrated by Arleigh Burke’s remarks on the Navy approach to staff-command relations:

“We believe in command, not staff. We believe we have ‘real’ things to do. The Navy believes in putting a man in a position with a job to do, and let him do it—give him hell if he does not perform— but to be a man in his own name. We decentralize and capitalize on the capabilities of our individual people rather than centralize and make automatons of them. This builds that essential pride of service and sense of accomplishment.”¹⁹

Clark Reynolds puts a different kind of slant on the same concept:

“Naval officers have always become admirals pri­marily because of their artistry as ship commanders and not because of political, diplomatic, or even strategic acumen. This is as it should be, for navies demand an expertise gained only by long experience at sea.”²⁰

The concept of a staff that forms and shapes the commander’s decision through the iterative process known within the Army as the command and staff deci­sionmaking sequence (Figure 5) is foreign to the Navy.

It follows that a more decisive role for the Joint Sta ^ or a strengthened chairman would be anathema to tho steeped in naval traditions.

Summary: There is a certain logic to the Navy s re luctance to participate in situations where compromise, the lowest common denominator, the lack of naval technical proficiency, and operational restraints hoi sway. Following the separatist’s logic, the best mm^ta j advice would be rendered by the independent services and provided to the decision makers without compf° mise, or consensus, with the understanding that the advice is not considered a de facto decision. To the Navy, the best of all possible worlds would app^{ear t0} be to return to the pre-World War II arrangement. m° ically, the most achievable world is the current Joint Staff arrangement.                       _an

Survival at sea requires technical competency an independence of action that would be threatened by ^a strong Joint Staff chairman. Throughout the Navy would be the constant, unspoken fear that the Unite States, like Sparta, would have a theater commander who would not understand the raison d’etre or the p° tential of his Navy and would keep it only in direct support of his land forces, thus losing both his fleet and the battle, as did Sparta.

'Russell Murray, “Policies, Prices, and Presidents: A Need to Enlight^{en a} Great Choices in National Security,” Armed Forces Journal Internationa > 1982, p. 58.             ._za.

²U. S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 4:                   j_2-

tion and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (w/Cl and C2), pp.

3; Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Joint Staff cers Guide, 1984, p. 2-14.       _n(j

³Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howar ^a Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1976), p. 608.

⁴U. S. Naval War College, Sound Military Decision, 1942, pp. 9—10- ⁵Michael Howard, “Introductory Essay,” On War, p. 31.        ..

⁶Mallory Wober, as quoted in The Official Rules, Paul Dickson (New Yor • Dell, 1981), p. 186.             _mbj_a

⁷Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, (New York: Co ^u University Press, 1966), p. 52.

⁸I bid., pp. 50-1.

⁹Ibid., pp. 106-7.                                                                                                                 i

^,0Joseph C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Contro (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 399. ⁿIbid., p. 49.

^x2Ibid., pp. 49-55.                                                                                                                y₀^_;

^I3Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (New Penguin Books, 1979), p. 121.

^l4Ibid., p. 56.                                                                                                                         g2,

^l5Thomas B. Hayward, “Navy: 3-Dimensional Capability at Sea,” Deffn (U. S. Government Printing Office/DoD, 1982), pp. 13-15.                  _; c-_inCe

¹⁶Clark G. Reynolds, Foreword in First Line of Defense: The U. S. Navy 1945, Paul B. Ryan (Stamford, CT: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), P- ^X1‘ ¹⁷Wylie, p. 39.

¹⁸U. S. Naval War College, Strategy and Policy Department, 1981. ^l9David A. Rosenberg, “Arleigh Albert Burke,” The Chiefs of Naval tions, edited by Robert W. Love, Jr. (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institu Press, 1980), p. 287.

²⁰Reynolds, p. ix.                                                                                                                __ ^

Colonel Hanne is currently assigned to the U. S. Army Intelligence^ and Security Command at Ft. Meade, MD. He received a B.S. ^r the U. S. Military Academy in 1960, a master’s degree in Geogf^aP from the University of Illinois in 1968, and is a graduate of the Army War College (1980) and the Naval War College (1981). “f served in command and staff positions in armor and since 1963 *ⁿ intelligence assignments in NATO, CONUS, and the Pacific- P^ria ^ pal editor of the Landscape Allas of the USSR (Government Pri^{n 1 c} Office, 1971), he has published in numerous military journals.