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The present Joint Chiefs are showing extraordinary grace under fire, considering the 38-year-old institution might not survive the 99th Congress intact. Legislative proposals range from elevating the chairman to the equivalent of a cabinet post to abolishing the JCS altogether. Since 1947, tinkers have been thwarted by the Pentagon’s “If it aint broke, don t fix it dictum. But reformers have kept pressure on. They charge that strategic failures in Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon, and recent procurement scandals suggest that it may be time to call a plumber.
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The breast insignia worn by members of the Joint Staff is a riveting attraction for most junior officers catching a glimpse of it for the first time. Assignment to a joint billet immediately earns one the right to wear this appendage, and almost as quickly embroils one in the standing debate about the performance of the Joint Staff and its relationship with the armed services. How is it that such an appreciable augmentation of brass to one’s uniform does not signify some meaningful elevation in status? Why does the joint system continue to operate merely as the sum of its parts?
These questions occur not only to mid-grade naval officers en route to their first staff assignments. A large military reform caucus demanding the radical reform of our military command structure has grown in various centers of influence to the extent that some changes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were effected with the passage of the 1985 Defense Authorization Act. Further legislative action is planned for the upcoming fiscal year, and some experts contend that prospects for changes grow with time. The case for reform is articulated widely by disparate groups leveling unrelated, spasmodic attacks on the current JCS system as well as other facets of the U. S. defense establishment. Supporters of the status quo, apparently confident of their position, maintain a relative silence.
The somewhat loose arrangement with which the United States successfully culminated World War II— the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or “United States Chiefs of Staff,” who were actually the U. S. contingent of the British/American Combined Chiefs of Staff—was considered unsuitable for directing the vastly expanded role of the U. S. military after the war. U. S. defense experts, including General Dwight D. Eisenhower, General George C. Marshall, and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, set about fashioning a new organization. The result of their efforts, the National Security Act of 1947, created the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). There were strong differences of opinion as to the nature of the military command structure. However, proponents of a centralized general staff ultimately yielded to the faction supporting a plan that institutionalized a corporate structure designed to protect service autonomy. The diversity of international roles and missions required of the U. S. defense establishment demanded diverse and independent organizational structures.
Today, the JCS is composed of the service chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
Chaired by a four-star separated from his service, they
are the principal military advisors to the National 0 mand Authority (NCA) and are responsible for join1 strategic planning and coordination. While not in t operational chain of command, the JCS transmits or from the Secretary of Defense to the unified and spe fied commanders. The service chiefs are also respon ble for the administration, training, and outfitting 0 their respective services. jn
This system has been scrutinized for many years, fact, over the past 38 years at least 20 major reorgaM zation studies have been chartered. Many experts ha demanded radical reform, while others depict a basi cally sound system in need of a few modifications a little lubrication. Nevertheless, these studies have no major impact.
The renewed enthusiasm for JCS structural reform dates to the waning tenure of General David C. -t°n ' U. S. Air Force, as chairman of the JCS. His admis ^ sion in 1982 that the JCS was ineffective was cleary bellwether to dormant military reformers that it was a propitious time for a new offensive by the military re form lobby. This group of legislators and self-pr°' claimed defense analysts, primarily motivated by a sire to improve the nation’s defense through rationa and efficient budgetary decisions, eagerly embraced JCS reform as a logical extension of its main agen a’
Essential Evaluative Criteria: No public institution immune to criticism in American society, but the J w ’ most would agree, has attracted more than its share- Amid the turmoil and peripheral noise salient facts a persistently ignored. First, when the military comma11 structure was being devised in 1947 the current syste ^ was chosen, not foisted upon us by a lone individua inimical neighbors. Second, the system has endured' with minor modifications, for almost 40 years while nation has maintained armed forces with a tolerable percentage of its gross national product (GNP)- Thir » and most important, the current system has been ejfeC tive for two generations of American world leadership. Thermonuclear war has been deterred through the ere bility of the U. S. deterrent. The United States defc11^ perimeter has been defended by highly visible forwar deployed American troops with negligible loss of , friendly territory. And in the vast majority of cases m which U. S. conventional strength was tested, we p°s sessed the wherewithal to control the tendency to esca late the conflict. In no other 40-year period of modem history have the world’s preeminent powers confront2 ^ one another without resorting to war. This is true in ^ small measure because of the perceived effectiveness U. S. military might. Charges that this battle or that skirmish was not executed flawlessly miss the mark- The size and complexity of a superpower’s arsenal en gender limitless opportunities for small imperfections-
the
system is fundamentally unsound. The criteria for ® systematic evaluation of a chosen, enduring, and Jjective system must go beyond isolated anecdotes and §et to the essentials. First, does the system serve na- ,j°nal defense needs and reflect the national psyche? ttless it does, the rest of the debate is moot. Second,
Problems generated by the system must be ad-
have
merely to protect against invasion is markedly
ut the fact remains that, during the tenure of the current JCS, significantly fewer American and allied ser- Vlcemen have died safeguarding the West’s vital interests than any period of comparable length.
Some problems do exist, but this is hardly proof that the
pressed and analyzed with reference to their ability to °irect themselves. And finally, the ramifications of y reform proposal must be evaluated to ensure that ey result in a net improvement.
Two essential points of the JCS reform debate that re studiously ignored by the reformers and largely i^icolated by the supporters are that the JCS system b°th a logical response to U. S. strategic requirements and a natural, American creation. Since 1945 the n'ted States has had to fashion a more diverse and A°mPlex military strategy than any nation has known. s the ultimate guarantor of the global deterrent, a ree-pronged force of intercontinental nuclear fire- j. Wer was created. Forward-deployed ground and air 0rces manifest the American commitment to defend allies’ soil and, by extension, our own security. e Navy’s presence worldwide has demonstrated this esolve to those allies and the Third World as well, and as ensured that all nations can use the world’s water- ays for free trade. An assault capability has been j. a'ntained, as well as the amphibious lift to make this ^orce credible. Behind this strength are the reserve rces able to deliver additional firepower.
Although force interoperability can never be gain- aid, the distinctive features of post-World War II Herican defense requirements are their scope and di- ersity. Each service must be uniquely trained and pre- °ared to provide its contribution to this complex inter- lQn. The range of equipment capabilities and ^rational doctrines required to execute these diverse JNuirements is extraordinary. The desirable level of k 'ntary integration in countries whose armed forces i .
'gher than in one with global responsibilities. Ameri- ^an military strategy would be ill served by eliminating e fundamental autonomy of its military services, m addition to complementing American grand strat- §y> the JCS is also the perfect match for the American at'°nal character. It is reasonable to expect the deci- lon-making institutions of any political culture to pos- ®Ss similar attributes, and in the case of the JCS, it is ^uiost as if Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson ere once again at work.
Our founding fathers were guided by a set of princi- P Cs that, over time, have become consensually recog- >zed as “American.” They are inculcated in U. S. cit- *ens through socialization, and working largely Consciously, they shape our political perspectives in
distinctive, identifiable ways that have not wavered appreciably in 200 years of successful constitutional government.
For the purposes of this discussion certain of these characteristics are germane. First, there was a suspicion of centralized power and a clear-eyed acknowledgement of human frailty. The fear of an all-powerful individual probably was the impetus for establishing several branches of government, each with veto power. Second, the founding fathers respected diversity of opinion, to the extent that public expression and dissent were widely tolerated. Third, there was an appreciation of the need to delegate power, centralizing functions only when absolutely necessary. Fourth, the founders insisted upon civilian control of the armed forces, thus military leaders answer directly to civil authorities on all matters of national import.
The JCS system is unmistakably American. No other nation in the world requires such a wide range of military advice both operationally and in resource policy issues. The head of such a military command structure would be hopelessly overwhelmed without trained, independent experts assisting him at all levels. The chairman was created to be a spokesman for the corporate structure—to direct the agenda, but never to control it. Unable to control any of the “branches” of the system, he cannot attain unchecked power. His opinion is continually enlightened, supported, and balanced by the ser-
import of vital strategic materials.”1 To a greater extef
vice chiefs. Freedom to express diverse opinions is a hallmark of the system. The contrasting points of view of the service chiefs may result in stalemate or compromise, but it can never be said that all sides of every issue do not get aired in the JCS arena. The spirit of delegation of authority is reflected by the presence of a chain of command that links the Secretary of Defense directly to the theater commanders in chief, eliminating an additional layer of Washington military bureaucracy. Civilian supremacy is guaranteed largely through the conscious circumscribing of the chairman of the JCS and by revitalizing the military’s inherent system of checks and balances, with each service keeping the others honest.
Although the logic of our present JCS structure and practice is sound, many observers fail to understand why the Department of the Navy is the JCS’s staunchest supporter. Is this support the result of the Navy’s reported proclivity toward some blend of conser- vativism and obstructionism, or is there substance to the Navy’s exhortation to stay with the status quo? The answer is simple: The principles which have, over time, come to be identified as the “maritime” perspective are closely aligned with the philosophy that spawned the current JCS system. Specifically, the JCS reflects the Navy’s ideas of decentralization and unit autonomy, and its decidedly operational focus.
The nature of sea duty has much to do with this attitude—months at sea totally dependent on one’s wits to
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arm’s length; an unspoken “out of sight, out of mind mentality prevails. The commanding officer is virtua y sovereign as life-and-death decisions must be made on a routine basis. There is little time or desire for centra ized staff solutions to field problems. Dependencies on others for basing, logistics, or overflight rights virtua ) vanish. Naval battle group commanders win battles by issuing general battle plans and rules of engagement, trusting their commanding officers to take the autono-^ mous and creative initiatives to defend themselves an take the war to the enemy. This mindset pervades ship board life. Although no one would argue that the Nayy has control of the JCS system, the philosophy that fits shaped the Joint Staff resonates naturally with this mar itime perspective.
It is no accident that our maritime tradition coincide with our political culture: America has a natural mat' time inclination. Although it is a naval article of fa'1 ’ it is a geo-strategic fact of American life that we are a “island” nation, surrounded by either friendly nations or vast oceans. It has been 170 years since foreign armies threatened our shores. Most of our land warfare experience, gained on distant continents, depended on our ability to control the seas. The United States, as President Ronald Reagan has noted, is “a naval power by necessity, critically dependent on the transoceanic than most other great powers, a maritime mindset is a natural reflection of the collective American psyche.
Although military command structures share certain characteristics, they must reflect their nation’s cultures and strategic requirements. Not only does the current JCS system do this job admirably, it is also strikingly congruent with the universal principles of the maritime power. This natural fit may have been achieved unwit tingly, but it imparts legitimacy to a system in a way
at systems contrived to optimize other criteria can ”ever match. In fact, attempts to tamper with this natu- JJ. 0rcIer are counterstrategic and countercultural. On ls essential criterion of evaluation, the current JCS Astern deserves to be maintained.
nherent and Insoluble Problems? The rationale of Qe assault on the JCS is simple: U. S. armed forces Perate with a decentralized service-oriented myopia,
Us disabling any serious attempts to achieve objec- consensual decisions. Each reformer has a slightly d! ferent slant, but generally the JCS “disease” can be ^ a§n°sed from the following four symptoms:
, °or military advice to the National Command Au- or‘ty (NCA): The most common indictment of the t resent system is that it is incapable of producing j'ttiely ancj usefu| military advice to the NCA. General ones claimed that the “corporate advice provided by c Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very use- or very influential.”2
effective strategic planning: No less an authority than Samuel Huntington suggests that an inability to perform its strategic planning role is the main shortcoming of the JCS. Service interests, he argues, create preoccupations that do not allow service chiefs, their staffs, or the Joint Staff to focus planning on the military threat or to develop new strategic concepts.3
- Unwise resource allocation: Again, service priorities are seen as taking precedence over defense priorities.
In an age when, even in the best of times, hard choices must be made continually between nuclear and conventional forces, modernization and readiness, and personnel and procurement, individual services are allowed to determine their own priorities by shaping their budgets unfettered by control from above.
- Inefficient management: The decentralized nature of the armed services within the Department of Defense, in which each service is relatively autonomous in its budget development, is said to be inefficient. Centralized control of the hardware acquisition process is the preferred reform strategy, owing to simplicity of inventory control and the efficiencies attendant to economies
of scale. To be sure, the unusually high number of mini-scandals involving exorbitantly priced items such as coffee brewers and claw hammers have delivered public opinion into the hands of reformers on the single issue of cost-savings.
Is there substance to the charge that the members of the JCS produce poor advice to their chain of command? This criticism reached a crescendo during General Jones’ tenure as chairman. In fact, having left office he was most supportive of the criticism. However, his reputation as a compromiser and arbitrator could have added some transitory substance to this charge. This drive to attain unanimity at any cost was probably inculcated in Robert S. McNamara’s era, when President John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense commonly used split-decisions to subvert uniformed authority in the Pentagon.4 It is noteworthy that upon assuming his current position as chairman of the JCS, General John W. Vessey, Jr., U. S. Army, announced that dissenting opinions would be carried to his superiors. This promise has been kept to the letter, and the torrent of criticism on this point has now diminished significantly.
Bad advice is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. For example, the Kennedy administration rebuked the members of the JCS for not maintaining the “big picture” in their advice for the Bay of Pigs invasion.5 The current charter of the JCS ambiguously directs the body to produce advice that incorporates all factors (economic, political, social, etc.), or to merely stick to its areas of expertise. Each administration will have the final say as to what constitutes “good” advice. This lesson can be learned by the JCS, but “mistakes” will continue as long as the standards for evaluating JCS’s work change. A particular administration’s idiosyncra- cies cannot serve as a structural indictment of the JCS system. Admiral James L. Holloway III, a member of the JCS from 1974 to 1978, suggests that in claiming the JCS members offer “bad advice,” the NCA has devised a “euphemistic way of saying that ... the JCS do not provide the desired answer. . . . ”6
The JCS reports frequently and directly to the Secretary of Defense on all matters, and it is he, more than any other individual, who would benefit from improved advice from the JCS. It is significant that Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger has expressed no concern in this area. The fact that all service chiefs must be heard obviates the possibility that uninformed advice will influence public policy. Any deviation from the status quo would sacrifice integrity to arrive at consensus.
Second, the issue of poor joint strategic planning continues to haunt the JCS system, largely because at one time there was some substance to the criticism. However, a walk around the Pentagon today clearly reveals dramatic improvements. The fact that our last test case (Grenada) fared much better than its immediate predecessor (Desert One) is merely symptomatic. Two voluntary and far-reaching memoranda of agreement that address the stuff of effective and cooperative warfighting have been signed by the major services. Specifically, many mission areas previously consider “sacred turf” by one service or another have been opened as the rational military need arose. Service staffs, the bane of the reform lobby, have begun to prove they can cooperate on important planning niat' ters. Naval officers of the Vietnam era hardly notice that the Air Force was fighting its own battle in the Southeast Asian skies. Today, our junior officers com monly witness data-link operations with airborne warn ing and control systems (AWACS), incorporate F-D Eagles into the carrier battle group (CVBG) defense-m depth concept, and monitor simulated B-52 minelaying operations. The Army and Air Force have signed a re lated agreement that facilitates and rationalizes the con duct of the combined land-air contingency in Centra Europe. The three services continue to move to strengthen interoperability in theaters of common inter est (e.g., NATO Southern Flank). Even General Jon£S has praised current initiatives such as the creation or the Joint Deployment Agency and the vast improvement in the joint exercise program.7 Although disagree ments remain, we are past the stage where a differs111 color suit in the Pentagon makes one “the enemy-
The criticism that “orphan functions” are not Prop , erly handled by the services also continues to lose ere ibility in light of current developments. Specifically’ mine warfare has reputedly been given short shrift by the Navy bureaucracy, yet, witness the Navy’s two major mine warfare shipbuilding programs—the Avenger (MCM)-class mine countermeasures ships an minesweeper hunters (MSHs)—and significantly enhanced mine development programs. Strategic sealift- another stepchild, is now represented by its own branc of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav). Because warfare strategy and technology a^e dynamic, there will always be “orphans,” but they ca find homes within the current system.
To reverse the argument that the JCS fails to produce effective strategic planning, one must first come to grips with just what precisely constitutes “successful strategic planning. Consensus is a cherished common1; to most critics of the current system, and consensus lS the norm within a centralized staff. Over the years, however, this inbred consensus is likely to lead to a unilateral mindset. The market place of strategic ideaS will dry up without competing strategic interests actively engaged in trying to corner a larger share of 111 market. The Navy’s relatively new maritime strategy’ spawned by the current decentralized system, is neithc supported in all the Pentagon’s competitive strategic bureaucracies nor is it a bona fide national military strategy. Yet, its impact has caused reactions within Navy circles and in the joint arena, much as the Army’s innovative air-land battle doctrine did in l9o*- Although the strategy is unabashedly maritime in per' spective, it is designed to act as a catalyst in the evo tion of a national military strategy.
Third, the problem of rational resource allocation >s linked directly to the discussion of strategic planning-
Cw would argue that because there is interservice c°mPetition in this area that our main goal is to eliminate this competition as an end in itself. Rather, the rat>onal determination of defense priorities must be ji'ade irrespective of the system doing the staffing. To e sure, a unified, centralized staff could provide the Clvilian leaders with these hard decisions. Unfortu- nate|y, the consensual nature of these decisions de- Sfades their usefulness.
. ft is misleading to depict the current system as an ‘acessant cat-fight. The JCS members see eye to eye on e vast majority of issues. However, resource alloca- '°n is invariably contentious. Dividing a $300-billion efense budget attracts more than a fair share of “exPerts’ ’ willing to assist with the decision-making proCess- Because competition for these funds will never stoP, the central question is not how to eliminate competition, but rather, at what level do the competitive c a'ms get evaluated and rejected?
The reformers argue that the current system, whereby Secretary of Defense and Defense Resources Board ,URB) under the supervision of the Deputy Secretary 0 defense make the final recommendations, operates at too high a level. Service secretaries do battle for the udget at the DRB, presenting their respective plans full knowledge that the buck is about to stop. Refers prefer that the military services, operating in ^nsort, perform the role of the DRB. Unfortunately, ae competition does not vanish. Instead, the level of e*Pertise and political sensitivity at which the game is Piayed changes. At least, the current system empowers People close to the ultimate policy maker to make these ^source (strategic) decisions. The Office of the Secreary of Defense is empowered to adjudicate those maters that now are insoluble at the JCS level.
That same competitive dynamic that incrementally H*0yes the Department of Defense to make strategic visions is also at work in resource allocation. The Ur,nual Defense Guidance need not be seen as filling a v°id created by the JCS, but rather fulfilling a necesSary function of providing clear and genuine policy Suidance from the political leadership. If the Defense Guidance allows for too wide a set of requirements, gating a “strategy-force mismatch,” it can be fixed y the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If it is imprecise as to the specific capabilities required, it can be '‘ghtened. The civilian leadership providing this guidance is executing, in the end, the commander-in-chiefs desires. This determination of vital national interests and priorities should not be delegated to any military staff. Ironically, resource allocation and interest prioritization were not particularly irrational to military reformers until the current administration transformed previous administrations’ Eurocentric focus to a more global perspective incorporating the notion of maritime superiority.
Finally, defense reformers are obsessed with the relationship between centralization and cost-efficiency. This issue, more than any other, has caught the public imagination. The issue affects JCS reform because of spillover from the idea that centralized equals efficient. If the Soviet economy has not thoroughly debunked this notion, the current state of affairs in U. S. defense appropriations should lay this bogey to rest forever.
The Navy, in classic American fashion, has reinserted competition into the procurement game, with considerable success. Competition in shipbuilding has risen from 26.3% in 1981 to 86.4% in 1984, with the result that ships are now being delivered on time or early and commonly below anticipated cost. Competition and second-sourcing have increased markedly, reducing the costs of spare parts and equipment. Cost- plus-type contracts are no longer the norm. The Navy’s “Buy Our Spares Smart” program is beginning to have a positive effect in an age when centralized procurement agencies wallow in the throes of repeated cost scandals. The best-seller list may not be an accurate indicator of the public mood, but it is telling that the authors of In Search of Excellence endorsed breaking a corporation into small companies and encouraging them to think competitively. The examples are legion, but it is accountable, not centralized, management that is cost-efficient. In the current decentralized system, the Navy’s example will force the competition to emulate its standards and techniques. That is, until the “competition” offers a better plan.
The efforts of military reformers have helped identify the flaws of the JCS system. However, the criticisms are blunted by the performance of the malleable JCS system, which, when confronted by an external threat, responds vigorously. The degenerative aspects of interservice competition are being eliminated while both within the services and at the DRB level strategy is beginning to drive programs—instead of programming driving strategy.
The Reform Solution: Worse than the Problem. Although reformers disagree among themselves as to the precise details of structural changes required to “correct” the current system, there is a surprising congruity in the main thrust of their proposals, all of which echo the refrains of JCS reformers since the 1950s. Most reform schemes call for the following:
- Strengthening the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the centerpiece of any reorganization, the chairman would enjoy a significant enhancement of his position as both spokesman and arbiter of the Joint Chiefs. Several reform proposals have suggested that he assume personal control over the Joint Staff, join the National Security Council as a full member, control promotions of high-ranking flag officers, enter the operational chain of command, and become a key player in budgetary decisions.
- Eliminate dual-hatting of service chiefs as members of the JCS. This proposal to reduce “servicism” is designed to divorce the functions of running a service from strategic planning and providing military advice to the NCA. Not only, reformers argue, will the members of the JCS not be encumbered by service biases, they will also have the time to ponder the greater issues of national defense without having to grapple with the daily exigencies of running their services.
- Creation of a permanent, independent joint staff.
This body would be composed of members of the services chosen in mid-career to become career joint staff members. Their promotions would be controlled by the joint staff hierarchy. They would provide the expertise and continuity in joint planning some believe is now lacking.
Since even inveterate JCS reformers agree that an injudicious selection from the above menu will spell certain disaster, this activity seems fraught with danger.8 However, a cursory look at this package is required to determine if it addresses current shortcomings.
That a significantly augmented chairman of the JCS would improve the status quo can be rebutted with several arguments. Naturally, all chairmen have personal styles and various degrees of influence. The chairman’s current position allows (indeed, demands) free communication with his superiors. Recent legislation has provided him with increased control over the JCS agenda. The creation of the Strategic Program Review and Analysis Agency (SPRAA) within the Joint Staff appears to provide him with increased leverage in the budget process. Minimally, it would be wise to evaluate these far-reaching changes over time before further modifying his charter.
To indict the system for producing slow, bad, and useless advice is, to some extent, an indictment of the personal stewardship of the chairman. The charge, therefore, is more or less cogent for each chairman and cannot be addressed by structural change. With even fewer service constraints, an unfortunate choice of chairman would only multiply and magnify opportunities for censoring ideas and hiding conceptual disagreements.
The proposal to add the chairman to the National
Security Council is another step in the wrong direction' Such a position would violate military custom and organization by granting the chairman equal status witn his direct superior, the Secretary of Defense. It woul also magnify his role as a singleton player, which would devalue the roles of the other chiefs and perhaps lead to the ultimate neglect of their advice and exper-
The proposal to make the chairman fully accountable for all military activity by placing him in the operational chain of command should be dismissed swiftly- A staff with a headquarters perspective may be suite to integrate war plans, but it cannot fight wars. A cen tral lesson of the Falklands Conflict is that complete accountability for a military mission must reside in th field. Even in a democratic society it is appropriate t the on-scene commander return either carrying his shield or carried on it. The current system, which pr° vides for the JCS to offer military advice while acting as a “transmission belt” to the field commander, °Pef ated as planned in the Grenada operation. The current chiefs, well aware of the effects of Washington micr°' management, consciously allowed Admiral Joseph Me calf III to proceed independently following a series ot preparatory briefings.
Any discussion of accountability leads to the dilemma of trusting one all-powerful bureaucrat, who, like any one Supreme Court justice, may or may not blossom into a philosopher king/charismatic national leader. More likely he will retain his mortality and h>s stripes. In this case he is subject to two endemic flaNvS' First, he is free to inflict his previously held biases on the system. Second, his biases will probably not be current since he is no longer actively involved with t e day-to-day operations of any service. Turmoil and inconsistency will prevail since with each new all-povver ful chief there is every reason to expect quadrennial military house cleanings in the Pentagon and the polte) discontinuities experienced in the civilian leadership when one political party turns over the White House to another. Any omnipotent chairman is likely to cause these problems because he is human. The consequences, while discomfiting, are not fatal. But, if he possessed the supernatural ability to harness all the tools at his disposal, the results could be disastrous 1° society firmly committed to absolute and indivisible civil supremacy.
The effectiveness of the chairman has been a reflection of the corporate strength of the service chiefs. I*1 advice proffered by this group is worthless if there Is not a high level of receptivity to it in the White House- The Reagan administration appears to value this corporate advice, and likely would be less receptive if all s vice chiefs did not have an opportunity to be heard. A independent chairman would undoubtedly be better suited to strike deals and give opinions unilaterally, o11 in due course the audience’s attention would wane.
The elimination of dual-hatted service chiefs is one of those ideas that has intuitive appeal until it comes 10 the implementation stage. There is no plausible way t0
cniove a service chief from his service without emas- fU atln§ and demoting him. To argue that he would P'nly lose his operational and technical currency is ^rkill, albeit valid.
,^rvice identity and attraction are facts of life not ..pj'y explained. However, their power is formidable, romoting” a service chief out of his service will er be construed as a bona fide promotion. Legislation cannot change this.9 Such long-lived traditions as th^'ce loyalty do not endure artificially. Furthermore, ■ y are indispensable to the development of that intan* e we label “morale.” Perhaps psychologists and ^ociologists can offer lucid explanations, but “joint- job8 ^°eS not automaticalIy follow from a change of description after 30 years in one of the services, rat' *lat j°intness” can be taught at mid-career is the ‘onale behind the formation of a formal general del Se staff with permanently assigned officers. The idea ind the general staff is a classic case of discarding a a r ectly good baby because of murky bathwater. Such §r°up, given the internal power of assignment and 0tT|otion, conceivably could attain the mental Cr ateralism sought by reformers. According to reform’ any move short of this does not constitute an ap- reciable change from the status quo.10 But at what Jlce consensus? The officers of this proposed staff uid become service stepchildren with diminished ^rational currency. They would gravitate inexorably a staff mentality, where orderliness, coordination,
: a articulateness count more than diversity, warfight- § knowledge, and propensity to take risks. The crea- n of a permanent general staff is possible; unfortu- I ely it would constitute an unmitigated disaster for j n°Vative strategic thought. Without the competitive . namic of powerful independent strategic bureaucra- es> avenues for “better ideas” are blocked. This pro' °Sed type of staff was exhorted by those hoping to °§ain military control over strategic policy. The result 0uld be bad strategy by another group of uniforming civilians.
^ j^hy do “defense experts” believe they can have it I ways? Warfighting in the 20th century is so com- k ex that no service member can claim to have mas- Cfed all of its facets. Each service can create genuine Warfighting experts” in a single department. Naval a,rategy teams would be hard put to speak convincingly a °ut the Navy without representatives from all warfare ereas- In a perfect world we might have “joint staff w Perts,” but in our world we must sacrifice a little J°intness” to get operational competence, khe centralized general staff is an alien concept to e naval mind because the maritime tradition defies it. reat power navies operate in wartime theaters even r*n8 peacetime. There is never an opportunity to stand-down” the entire fleet and return the forces t,0lTle to await the next war. Naval forces must main- am freedom of navigation on the high seas at all rtles. Guaranteed free trade is the sine qua non of a aceful free world. A current Office of the Joint lefs of Staff organizational chart indicates that the
combined Department of the Navy occupies fewer Joint Staff positions than the other services.11 JCS billets are not highly sought after, not by the dictum of Naval Military Personnel Command, but by virtue of inherent independence of the sea services and the operational mentality that holds that the “action” is elsewhere.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the “Washington Navy,” through little fault of its own, is not representative of the fleet in a very crucial way:
The relative shortage of nuclear-trained officers and tactical naval aviators results in virtually every Navy billet in warfare-neutral directorates (policy, planning, operations, logistics, communications, etc.) being staffed by surface warfare officers and non-tactical aviation aviators. Thus, even if the Navy could be assimilated into the centralized staff, traditional manning patterns would dictate that only part of the Navy would be properly represented.
The shield of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not now represent membership in any U. S. elite corps. Rather, it symbolizes affiliation with a system designed to protect service loyalty, autonomy, and competition while improving and rationalizing joint dialogue and planning. The system can make few claims about perfect consensus. But given our heritage and the system’s proven adaptability and, most importantly, effectiveness, there is no better American alternative.
'President Reagan's 1981 address to Congress, as cited in the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 1985 Report to the Congress (Posture Statement), Alexandria, VA: Navy Internal Relation Activity. 1984, p. 3.
"General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, as cited in A Report by the Committee on Civilian-Military Relationships, Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, 1984, p. 56.
’Samuel P. Huntington, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy.” Public Interest, vol. 75, Spring 1984, pp. 25-27.
’Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 24.
’John G. Kester, "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” American Enterprise Institute Foreign Policy and Defense Review, vol. 2, February 1980, p. 3.
’Admiral James L. Holloway, USN (Ret.), “The Quality of Military Advice," American Enterprise Institute Foreign Policy and Defense Review, vol. 2, February 1980, p. 26.
"General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” Hays Associates Magazine Directors and Boards, February 1982. "John G. Kester, "Thoughtless JCS Change is Worse Than None,” Armed Forces Journal International, vol. 21, November 1984, p. 113.
’Korb, op.cit., p. 20, indicated that the service chiefs have always had ihe capability to play a larger role in Joint matters while divesting themselves of service responsibilities. The fact of life, however, is that they do not want to forfeit the “superior” position to a subordinate.
'“General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), "What's Wrong With Our Defense Establishment?” New York Times Magazine, 7 November 1982, p. 78, concurs that general staff members should necessarily be separated from their parent services by emphatically asserting that “he who controls dollars, promotions, and assignments, controls the organization.”
"“Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” published annually by the JCS. June 1984.
Commander Fedyszyn, a 1969 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, is the current Navy Fellow at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. His initial sea tours were in the USS Leonard F. Mason (DD-852) and USS Donald B. Beary (DE-1085). He earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in political science at the Johns Hopkins University. Following a tour in the Political Science Department at Annapolis, he served as operations officer in the USS Worden (CG-18) in Yokosuka, Japan. After serving in the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch, specializing in NATO strategy and policy, he was executive officer of the USS Barney (DDG-6).