JCS Reorganization, The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Operation—in 1956

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Admiral Burke served an unprece- ?nted three terms as Chief of Naval _r^^erations, from August 1955 to his ^Prement on 1 August 1961. This arti- [.^e.^,s token from an adaptation, pub- ^ed 'n the March 1957 Proceedings,

1 a speech Admiral Burke delivered in '^he foil of 1956.

T' he Joint Chiefs of Staff are the , men upon which our government ^ePends for military advice. If their

^e to survive and prosper. If the mili- ty advice they give is bad—and it ^ed be bad only once on an important ^{a ter}—our country may find itself in ^v^fy precarious condition.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system has

who is actually a member of that orga­nization to tell how it operates.

Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the exception of the Chair­man, is the uniformed chief ot his re­spective service. As such, he is directly responsible for the military operations and military readiness ot his service. This dual role has proved by actual war experience to be a major source ot strength of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff system. It is the means by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are able to utilize all the military talent avail­able to the nation—the combat experi­ence—the staff support—and the oper­ational capabilities—of the Services they represent, in the preparation of military plans and recommendations.

matters which affect their future. Knowledge of the existence of differ­ences of opinion provides assurance that opposing points of view can be heard and that differences of opinion are tolerated. When differences of opinion are discussed, the people know what is going on. If government runs too smoothly, too quietly, and no dif­ferences of opinion become apparent, free people would have reason to be apprehensive.

Because of the obvious necessity for security in most of the matters handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, matters such as future war plans and the tech­nical performance of weapons, it is not usually in the best interests of the United States to air some major issues.

^0rked successfully in time of emer- settcy. i_t j_s important to the future of th ^f ^^eP^ubli^c that we understand how ® Joint Chiefs of Staff operate and ⁿy our system is effective.

So much has been said and written gently about the Joint Chiefs of Staff ^at >t seems appropriate for someone

Differences of opinion, of course, make news, whether the differences occur in a political campaign, in Con­gressional debate, or in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, differences of opin­ion in government are the principal means by which the people become acquainted with the major issues in

The 1956 JCS: Admiral Burke; General Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman; General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; and General Randolph Pate, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

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“sidings / July 1985

However, even in these highly classi­fied matters, which necessarily must be discussed behind closed doors, the presentation of important differences of opinion to the responsible civil heads of the government is the best way to acquaint them with the issues involved and the alternatives available. It is im­possible to examine all possible facets of a problem if you don’t know the major differences of opinion.

If complete agreement characterized all recommendations coming from the uniformed services, the President and the Congress, as well as the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense, would have difficulty know­ing what was actually going on inside the uniformed services. The result would be that the effectiveness of civil­ian control would be impaired.

The point is simply this. If the re­sponsible government officials know the issues and the alternatives available before making decisions in important military matters, you have effective civilian control. If knowledge of the alternatives, as well as the main issues, is not regularly available to them, you do not have effective civilian control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is, of course, not perfect. The Joint Chiefs sometimes find themselves working on problems which could very well be handled by subordinates. Occasionally they get involved in matters which con­tribute little to meeting their responsi­bilities as principal military advisers. But the faults of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are little faults, faults which can be, and are being corrected by respon­sible men of good will, working to­gether toward a common goal.

To offset its minor deficiencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system has major strengths.

It is an American system. It is as American in concept as the Congress, the Supreme Court, the National Secu­rity Council, and other American insti­tutions. It has built-in checks against the excesses of any single individual, any single concept, or any single inter­est.

No member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is powerful enough to short-cir­cuit the painstaking debate and analysis which provides the only basis for sound, practical military recommenda­tions. No member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is powerful enough to run roughshod over his colleagues in pur­suit of some program or concept which cannot withstand close scrutiny. As an additional safeguard, every member^ the Joint Chiefs of Staff is f^{ree g} the President or the Secretary of ^e ^ fense and present his views, anytim considers it desirable.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system e ables the responsible, operating ¹ of the military services to present views. It insures that all practical courses of action are carefully ^cons ,jj_ ered. It insures that Service respond ^ ities and capabilities are considere • insures that military plans and P^r° grams are consistent with the abi i z the combat forces to carry them ou • because the people who prepare t ® plans and programs share responsi for carrying them out.       • _a

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system safeguard—a safeguard against has! arbitrary decisions which could ^c0^ our sons, our resources, and our try to some future defeat. It is m^e safeguard known against the always present danger of the fatal strategic blunder.        •

The Joint Chiefs of Staff systern unique among all known systems ^ the strategic direction of a war. • brought victory where other system have failed. It has withstood the a important test of war.

Fifteen prize-winning photos will be chosen and awarded $100 each in the U. S. Naval Institute's 24th Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest. The win­ning photos will be published in a 1986 issue of Proceedings.

Entry Rules ------------------------

1. Each photograph must pertain to a naval or maritime subject. (The photo is not limited to the calendar year of the contest.)
2. Limit: 5 entries per person.

Mail entries to:

Naval and Maritime Photo Contest U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE Annapolis, MD 2140*.