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We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
Nicaragua
Too Much Management, Too Little Leadership
The Enduring Gulf War
What’s in a Name?
Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries
If You’ve Got It, FLAUNT It
Mines of August: An International Whodunit
Standby for Shotline The First Salvo Leyte Gulf Remembered Manning Nuclear Submarines A POW Camp Lost in History?
Skill or Luck?
No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2 No Bastions for the Bear
frontiers in the Americas.
For more than 100 years, the Monf0^ Doctrine was a shield against aggress’ ..
edy
for
Apr’1
1961, when President John F. Kenw reneged on his promise of air cover
“Nicaragua”
(See J. F. Morton, pp. 49-55, June 1985
Proceedings)
Captain G. Russell Evans, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired), author of The Panama Canal Swindle: Consent to Disaster (Signal Books, 1985)—The missing ingredient in Mr. Morton’s article seems to be a suitable framework for the U. S. “resolute and prudent application of coercive diplomacy” against Soviet adventurism in Central America. Morton notes that too often our people forget history and have been kept ignorant of context.
The Monroe Doctrine is the history I have in mind; it is the missing framework that could have been used to advantage in Morton’s excellent analysis.
Why do the media and others shy away from this long-standing, successful foreign policy which clearly stated more than a century ago that the American continents are not subjects for colonization or exploitation by foreign powers? This is the crux of the Monroe Doctrine, announced on 2 December 1823 by President James Monroe. Monroe declared,“We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety,” and that any suppression or control of nations in the Western Hemisphere would be “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan seems ready to invoke the Monroe Doctrine, but an uncooperative Congress ties his hands so Nicaragua and other Soviet surrogates can subvert what is left of the Latin American democracies in order to install Marxist regimes in outright challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.
What is wrong with reasserting a foreign policy that worked so well for so long? We should remember that it was Russian arrogance that caused this bold doctrine to be proclaimed in the first place. In the early 19th century, Russia’s Tsar Alexander I advanced his forces into North America, establishing a settlement within 50 miles of San Francisco Bay.
The new America did not stand for this. On 17 July 1823, John Quincy Adams, Monroe’s Secretary of State, warned Russian Minister Baron Tuyll that the United States would contest any terri
torial establishment on the American continent. Tuyll rejoined that his empero would “guarantee the tranquility of a States of which the civilized world 15 composed”—sounding for all the wor like a 19th century precursor to the 20t century Soviet invitation to the tranquilly of communist slavery. ,
America had an answer in \ol ■
Adams told Tuyll that such guarantee5
would be “limited to the affairs of Eu
the
rope” and could not “embrace 1 United States of America, nor any P°r tion of the American Hemisphere.” 1 s Alexander denounced the Doctrine ^ exaggerating “principles so contrary the rights of European powers that it met its only the most profound contempt- Even so, the Monroe Doctrine prevail > and Russia withdrew its claims.
A number of U. S. presidents have since invoked the Monroe Doctrine- James K. Polk used it three times- 1845, against British and French design on Texas; in 1847, against British pl“J”'s for Oregon and California; and in 1° ^ against a European takeover of Mexico Yucatan. Ulysses S. Grant used it tvV'c^ once against France’s installation of be^ dinand Maximilian Joseph in Mexico a later against Spain’s move to reann Santo Domingo. In both cases, Genet" Phil Sheridan’s army of 50,000 was convincing persuader to both powers abandon their adventures. Grover Cle^ land added another corollary in 1895 1 the boundary dispute between Br’u^ Guiana and Venezuela: No advance
in the Western Hemisphere until
• vwv^vu v/11 111.1 V/11I1JV v/1 - 1 if
Cuban patriots trying to retake the homeland. Cuba became a Soviet satel and Kennedy the first president to quit Monroe Doctrine.
President Jimmy Carter carried the su render further. He helped install the 5 ^ dinistas in Nicaragua and transferr America’s great military asset, the * ama Canal, to the communist-lean”1-
regime of Omar Torrijos. . 6
Two recent presidents applied Monroe Doctrine. Lyndon Johnson se^ in the Marines to prevent a commut* takeover in the Dominican Republic
heh;
hix
avior is necessary because in the ma- °rganization of a systems command,
April 1965. President Reagan routed the communists from Grenada in October "83 to the cheers of the conservative World and to the bitter outcries of the oviets and their sympathizers. Both Presidents stood their ground and the P^ple gave them high marks.
. This is the history that writers and pol- Kymakers should keep in mind. The ubans, and now the Sandinistas, have Used their own brand of “coercive diplomacy” to up the ante. Mr. Morton would °rce the communists to accept “half the Ple- ’ However, the strategic and eco- aomic importance of the Caribbean and e Panama Canal should permit no pie to he Marxist would-be conquerors of Cental America. This is our southern flank, ATO’s “strategic rear,” and it is truly Vu'nerable.
^ Except for Grenada, the Brezhnev °ctrine of once communist, always ^°mmunist has prevailed, but the Monroe °ctrine of America for the Americans as been around much longer. It should e Proclaimed as the framework for “coercive diplomacy.”
Too Much Management, Too Little Leadership”
(See R. E Gonzalez, pp. 86-87, February 985; H. G. Rickover, R. C. Thomson, p. 92 ^Pril 1985 Proceedings)
°mmander George Galdorisi, U. S. avy—i take exception to Commander °nzalez’ implication that program managers are not leaders.
\ recently served for two years in a jhajor program office within the Naval "Material Command and found that program managers must exhibit more pure eadership qualities than must ship or ?Tuadron commanding officers. This
Pr°gram managers have only small cad- °f individuals working directly for em. The hundreds of other individuals °rking in the matrix organizations, inc U(Jing Navy labs and test facilities and °ntractor plants and their agencies, owe 0 aPegiance to any particular program, °n|y (hopefully) to the Navy as a whole. These individuals must divide their 1116 and efforts among scores of projects, and thus, in order to inspire them to rCv°te sufficient time and effort to their sPective projects, the program manag- frs must be uniquely capable leaders who ave the ability to articulate the impor- ance of their projects, imbue their per- J'/'nel with a desire to excel, praise them *)en deserved, criticize them when re- ’Ulred, and do it all over an extended period of time. Project managers can’t hire or fire, and they do not write fitness reports or performance evaluations; they must simply lead.
Project managers must look to the future and not be concerned with only short-term results. Many of our courageous leaders who are project managers today have had the foresight to build growth potential into our weapon systems to accommodate emerging technology, to fight for sufficient logistics support, and to keep projects on schedule for the fleet. These leaders are successful even though they must operate under the intense pressure of the defense acquisition system that views system cost as by far the most important leg of the cost, schedule, and performance acquisition triangle.
I really believe that the last thing that Commander Gonzalez wants is to have the Navy institutionalize leadership training. To do so would dilute the responsibility of the commanding officer to continually lead his junior officers whether it be on the bridge, in the cockpit, or in a program office. Learning to praise in public and condemn in private from a programmed text at Naval Postgraduate School is not nearly as effective as watching a commanding officer practice good leadership.
Harry Miller—Command implies implicit trust; the officer selected for command enjoys the trust of his peers and superiors. He has demonstrated those fine qualities of competence and leadership which set him apart. His sense of fairness and justice, his perception and understanding, his tolerance for human frailty, and his disdain for incompetence earn for him the respect and trust of those whom he commands.
This trust enables him, at times, to accomplish the seemingly impossible in the face of overwhelming odds. He is humbled by his responsibilities; it is this humility which enables him to accept the challenges of command and maintain the multidirectional balance of trust which successful command implies.
“The Enduring Gulf War”
(See T. M. Daly, pp. 148-161, May 1985 Proceedings)
Captain Thomas M. Daly, U. S. Navy— In the production process, the enduring war of words, we missed one. On page 150, the sixth bullet, left column, should read: “The announcement in March of Soviet funding for an Iraqi nuclear reactor.” Any confusion caused to Proceedings readers is regretted.
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ho were jn Washington, D.C., on emorial Day for its dedication. Emo- l0ns ran at the surface that day. I neither raw n°r felt any hint of indifference, pity, utorse, or resentment. True, there was orrow for lost friends and the finality of ®lr fate. But there was also an overhelming aura of pride among those who PProached the memorial, pride in having rv'ed with these comrades living and ad, and having been a part of the strug® e’ whatever its outcome.
No one who has been to the memorial ,^n deny its impact. It is no more morbid 1[s intent or effect than the Arizona 0j°nument in Pearl Harbor or the Tomb q *be Unknown soldier at Arlington cemetery. That wall carries a litany of Prifice and heroism that ennobles all
*ho
“What’s in a Name?”
■Jee S. A. Swarztrauber, p. 110, April 1985;
• C. King, p. 16, June 1985 Proceedings)
e,er A- Young—Rear Admiral Swarz- rauber’s stirring call for a major com- ®tant to be named for a Vietnam ar battle seems to be at crossed pur- P^ses. While advocating this gesture as a Morale booster” for Vietnam veterans, ,. miral Swarztrauber spends much of ls argument vilifying the Vietnam Veterans Memorial as a “morbid” symbol of shame.
..Admiral Swarztrauber’s obvious dis- . of the memorial and his dark percep- °n of its effect on Vietnam veterans arve to dilute the strength of his pro- ^°sal- I do not agree that “most” Viet- „am veterans view the memorial as something to be resented.”
Admittedly, I was not enthusiastic °ut the memorial’s design when it was lrsl announced. But I was one of the Usands of Vietnam veterans in 1983
served. It is indeed “our” memorial.
Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries”
C. A. Leader, pp. 92-95, November 1984;
. T. Hayward, p. 126, January 1985; W. E. Tver, p. 18, February 1985; H. G. Rickover,
' *->■ Thompson, p. 92, April 1985 Proceedings)
^'Plain J. C. Gamboa, U. 5. Naval Re- s.^Ve—Although I am a captain, I conser myself at age 45, with my only off- |(fnng still in first grade, to be, ^peramentally at least, still quite oung ThUS) as a “young” officer, I can tab reca" (be leadership course we had to „ e as midshipmen. We used to call it I Leadersleep.” It was a “fruit” course 'vhich the answers to quiz and exam (^estions were of two divergent kinds: p,c real ones and the party line variety. rewd minds learned the difference fast.
Nowadays, when I read the leadership articles, the distinction fades somewhat. Perhaps it’s the result of successful indoctrination, perhaps the wisdom of age. Regardless, the value of the articles, in reply to Admiral Rickover’s questions, is that in many cases the views expressed reinforce our own perceptions and conclusions. (Those of us who are still impressionable sometimes need such reinforcement.) They also remind us that there are others among the magazine’s readership who share our views on leadership. Conversely, we sometimes find views not in agreement with our own, and the articles spur us to reexamine our ideas and thus to reprove or disprove our notions.
The subject of leadership is vital and dynamic, and one that in the civilian community, as well as in our own, is once again being discussed and written about with fervor.
Colonel Phil Weinert, U. S. Army (Retired)—As a recently retired Army officer with 28 years of service and over 30 years of membership in the Naval Institute, I can say that I have benefited from the leadership articles, but not in the way Admiral Rickover may be contemplating. I don’t feel that leadership is a quality acquired by a set process or adherence to checklists.
Aspiration to a meaningful life in which one makes the maximum contribution to country and service demands a constant reinforcement of ideals and philosophies quintessential to leadership. Most of us need this reinforcement as reminders of our professional obligations and to be better leaders. Whether the source of such awareness is found in a forum dedicated to leadership or in an article like “The Mustang and the Pigeon" (April 1985 Proceedings, pp. 154-156) matters little.
We all need reinforcement not only to be better leaders, but to keep or regain the standards of conduct that we have held high in our consciousness for so long.
“If You’ve Got It, FLAUNT It”
(See T. P. Faulconer, pp. 135-139. April 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Mark Hurst, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I was both surprised and pleased reading about T. P. Faulconer’s giant flying boat dream. I have one myself.
My dream boat is a combination twinhulled dirigible-heavier-than-air flying boat. It has two 150-foot diameter 1,000- foot long rigid hulls 200 feet apart tied together by an airfoil center section 15% thick with a 300-foot chord. It has twin rudders and is tied together at the front with a horizontal stabilizer elevator combination in a canard configuration. The wing span can be 1,000 feet with an average chord of 200 feet.
As we continue dreaming, 200,000 square feet of wing at 20 pounds per square foot might lift four million pounds. Thirty-four million cubic feet of helium at 60 pounds per 1,000 cubic feet might lift 340,000 pounds. This adds up to 4,340,000 pounds gross.
Now all we have to supply is 300,000 horsepower to make it cruise 200 knots. The fighter-bombers could slow to 200 knots and hook on to a trapeze on the underside of the center section. Then the aircraft could be hoisted inside the center section of the dream boat.
Retractable skis on the bottom of the hulls for take off and landing sound good, but that flip ship technology to make it stable in open seas seems a little farfetched and heavy. It might be more suit- [1][2]
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“Mines of August: An
International Whodunit”
(See S. C. Truver, pp. 95-117, May 1985
Proceedings)
V. H. Van Bibber—Dr. Truver shows the need for mine countermeasures. This article portrays the type of areas likely to be prime minelaying targets, demonstrating the importance of initiating and developing new equipment for minesweeping in equal measure to the development of minehunting.
As noted by Dr. Truver, Italy and the Netherlands logged 480 suspected mine contacts; all turned out to be innocent. The U. S. RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters, towing the AN/AQS-14 minehunting sonar, were used for 22 days. They identified 44 contacts: 55-gallon drums, pipe, coral heads, and wire baskets but no mines. Then the two French tripartite- class minehunters, the Eridan and Cas- siopee, located ten mines and destroyed them. (The time required for this operation was not noted.) On 12 September, the British minehunter Gavinton detected a “mine-like” object in 150 feet of water near Port Tewfik. The Swedish civilian remote-controlled “Sea Owl” was used to examine the mine for several days. It was found to be a triple influence Soviet late model (1981) mine design. Dr. Truver termed this action as an effective modem warfare operation.
This operation required more than a month to be completed. There were many contacts made by the minehunters relative to the known mine contacts. In a threatening hostile area, the conditions could be far more critical, and it would be difficult to provide adequate protection for the minehunting fleet group for a 30- day operation. Minehunting operations are effective, but they are very slow.
The mine countermeasures of the NATO allied group have employed their research and development organizations to improve only minehunting. Using and developing modem techniques and equipment for minesweeping has become a thing of the past. Minesweeping can be greatly enhanced by using modem ship types and state-of-the-art engineering technologies to improve sweep effectiveness. Modem, effective sweep systems can be developed. These ships could be deployed in more hostile areas and operate at considerably faster sweep rates. Minesweeping could provide the fleet with rapid movement over important sea- lanes of operation that are within imminent contact range of the enemy.
Many mine threat areas are covered with clusters of junk debris that cannot all be prelocated because they shift daily.
The combination of advanced minehunt ing and minesweeping would greatly re duce the time required to clear a mins field. Time, in an imminent hostile area, could be crucial to a fleet operation.
“Standby for Shotline”
(See M. O. Miller, pp. 75-79, April 1985
Proceedings)
Captain Ivan R. Samuels, U. S. Reserve (Retired)—I enjoyed Mr. Mi ler’s history of the development of under way replenishment (UnRep) but was dis^ appointed at his short memory or I30*1 0 research in giving credit to Admiral A leigh Burke for initiating the mod®111 methods of UnRep in 1957. With all dne respect to Admiral Burke, under whoss aegis considerable progress in UnReP was made, much development and tje testing was accomplished years earher-
While serving on staff, Command^’ Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet and1 the USS Altair (AKS-32) during 56, I recall extensive testing of van0 means to increase the speed of replems ment, such as the automatic tensioning winch (later named the standard ten sioned replenishment alongside mem [STREAM]), hydraulic hatch covers and, particularly, our use of the U Conecuh (AOR-110), the former Germ3 Dithmarchen. ,
In “For Want of a Nail ...” (AuguS 1963 Proceedings, pp. 44-51), Lieutenant (junior grade) John T. ‘'e' referred to the Conecuh as having converted in 1952 for evaluation states: “Such ships were used extensive1 by the Germans for their U-boats during World War II,” but incorrectly qu°te| her speed as 21.5 knots. Retired Nava Reserve Commander David W. Gere J was Conecuh’s assistant engineer n 1954-55, and he related that she ^ built in 1936 with a combatant plan! ca pable of making 30 knots to be able ^ steam with the German cruisers an
•steel hul
and supports Mr. Miller’s com: about the current UnRep doctrine covers such use.
(Continued on page
106)
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 26)
back. st our ship I scared-
“The First Salvo”
(See A. D. Zimm, pp. 55-60, February 1985;
V. A. Karlson, p. 16, April 1985; D. A. Ulmer,
p. 133, June 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Lars Wedin, Royal Swedish Navy—Commander Zimm’s article is an interesting attempt to come to grips with an important operational problem. In a future war, the first battle may be of vital importance. However, some objections can be raised with his reasoning.
According to Commander Zimm, the Soviet Navy operates under a unified strategic concept directed on the national level. This is described as a weakness which can be exploited by the U. S. Navy.
The implication is that the U. S. Navy does not operate under such a concept. The U. S. carrier battle group (CVBG) seems to be free to manage its own war. It can “disappear into the world’s ocean . . . and fight in an environment of . . . its own choosing.” One wonders if the Soviet Navy, with its centrally directed strategy, will let the CVBG fight in this way?
Though a non-U. S. naval officer, I do think that even the U. S. Navy operates under some strategic concept, the main goal of which is not just to win battles but to win the war. Commander Zimm’s discussion is weakened because he puts a naval tactic against a strategy. It is unclear in which way the “definable weaknesses” in a tactical Soviet preemptive attack should be exploited. Are these weaknesses really unique to the Soviets? Is not, for example, the U. S. Navy susceptible to friction? Of course, one should exploit the opponent’s weaknesses while compensating for one’s own, but prudence is important. It is difficult to judge military weaknesses and strengths before the outbreak of war, especially when it comes to things like control or friction.
Commander Zimm’s discussion about center of gravity is dubious. A strategic center of gravity is not necessarily a thing, like a CVBG. In World War II, one can argue that the sea-lanes between the United States and Europe constituted a center of gravity because without them the Allies might have lost the war. The Allied escorts were a means to this end, not the end in themselves.
In the same way, a CVBG represents a force which can be applied to a strategic center of gravity. If the force moves away so that it no longer influences the center of gravity, some other force must be applied. Otherwise, the center is lost to the opponent. If, for instance, it is important that a CVBG operates outside Norway but moves away according to Commander Zimm’s tactic, the Soviet Navy might have accomplished exactly what it wanted. To find a real strategic center of gravity in a conflict, though, is probably difficult.
“Leyte Gulf Remembered”
(See J. D. Ahlstrom, pp. 45-53, August 1984;
F. J. Frank, p. 25, October 1984; H. A.
Pyzdrowski, p. 112, November 1984
Proceedings)
Gunner’s Mate Third Class Robert M. Murray, U. S. Naval Reserve— Unfortunately, I did not read until recently the article by Captain Ahlstrom. I enjoyed it very much.
It brought back many memories. I was an 18-year-old gunner’s mate on board the USS Tingey (DD-539), the destroyer which picked up Ensign Curtright after he ditched his plane in the midst of the Japanese fleet.
On 25 October 1944, we were operating with Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet, when we received word that the Japanese were attacking our landing ships. About the same time, our air reconnaissance located some Japanese ships, and we launched aircraft against them. A battle group of cruisers, battleships, and destroyers was formed. Our destroyer was assigned to picket duty, maintaining a position ahead of the main fleet, as we set course for the San Bernardino Straits.
At about 0200 on 26 October, we detected a surface vessel on the radar. Unescorted, we immediately closed distance between our ship and the contact in an attempt to identify the vessel.
It was the darkest night I had seen in
more than two years in the Pacific- Ivv ^ a pointer on the aft 40-mm. gun. As approached the vessel, I could hear orders being given to our gun cre"^ “Load armor piercing ammo, and be prc pared to fire same. . . . Closing to 4,0
yards, we will use radio communicatio
to attempt identification.” Then silene^' “No response to radio communicatio • . . . We will now use blinker light-
God! What that light will do as a targj^ if it is an enemy ship, I thought. The hg code was flashed. With no response, w opened fire with our five-inch go” broadside. When our guns opened >ir next to our mount, they blew our anu11 canvas cover free, up into the air, an down over my head. I thought I w dead. The concussion was so had- knocked out our motor trains on our mm. guns.
We continued to fire. Just as suddenly’ the vessel responded by firing could hear the shells whistle p£ and splash in the water. Was
It seemed a long time until we sa tracers coming from over the horizon- wasn’t sure if they were heading for us- turned out to be fire from our battleship group. It wasn’t long until the surfacij craft was sunk. We found out later w® we had helped sink a Japanese cruiser-
The next day, as we patrolled the area for Japanese ships, we came across t sign Curtright.
“Manning Nuclear Submarines’
(iSee F. G. Satterthwaite, pp. 61-67, February 1985; N. R. Thunman, p. 32, April 1985; M- McHugh, N. F. Dingeraans, pp. 22-28, May 1985; F. M. Nielsen, pp. 16-21, J. A. Pask°’ pp. 21-24, June 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander S. D. Lisse, Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy—Capta,n Satterthwaite has provided another >n stance where career-motivated supeno petty officers can be used to fill tn, chronic shortage of technically trains naval officers.
In the past, the Naval Enlisted Scien tific Education Program (NESEP) Pr0( vided a significant, quantity/quality inP, into the Navy, in particular, the Navy •
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v J nuclear program. Top-notch petty officers were given an engineering/scientific education and commission, and, in return, acquired a five-to-six-year additional service obligation. Published 20- year officer retention figures clearly indicated that NESEP retention was the highest in the regular Navy and was twice as large as the second best rate, that of Naval Academy graduates. The economics of “growing our own” career naval officers as opposed to “buying engineers” through programs like Nuclear Power Officer Candidate School have been proven over and over again; the state of manning the nuclear program is just one example of this “if you need it, buy it” mentality.
The entire Navy, not just the submarine force, would benefit immensely from the reestablishment of a fully funded NESEP. Recent substitute “pay-your- own-way” enlisted commissioning programs provide neither the career incentive nor the academic standards that NESEP did. Too many sharp petty officers are still leaving the Navy to pursue technical degrees, using what is left of the GI Bill or other post-Vietnam programs. A return to the Navy’s most successful commissioning program is long overdue.
Reestablishment of a fully funded NESEP would not solve all the Navy’s manning problems, but it would certainly be a step toward enhancing the quantity and quality of engineers in the Navy’s officer corps.
presentation was finally set up
_____ __ _ ______ bailie
missile submarine (SSBN) deployn’ents)j The Soviet Navy operates only a srna percentage of its total SSBN force atse j more than 80% remain in port, compar® with only 30% of ours. Increasing [3][4] number of combatants at sea—carriers' subs, and other front-line units—in 11 of crisis and decreasing deploym® when the crisis has passed are the ways to send a message to the other si _ The Soviets keep far fewer missileS °. alert than does the United States. The^ missiles are liquid fueled, and thus m^ difficult to get ready and keep ready and they don’t even have a strater bomber command. Are any of our Stra gic Air Command bombers on airbor alert anymore? How many on run"' Y alert are fully armed and ready to Captain Satterthwaite makes the P°' __ that it isn’t the money that causes nu
ing to hold on to top people. Operat|<,ra aren’t fun anymore. We’ve forgot what a great life the Navy can be. rarely do we read about fascinating cruises, life in foreign countries, adv tures with families? We no longer J01 ^ the Navy and see the world.” Recruits posters stress technical training for a reer in industry. c
The Navy should cut down the leve useless deployments and conduct ir>aJ^ training exercises, type training, a competitive drills while deployed me ing necessary commitments—and n during home-port periods when fan11' life needlessly suffers. When in h°^ port, exercise only the mooring lines- must keep uppermost in mind the adnt°^ nition, “If it isn’t fun, you aren’t doing right.”
one on the building’s side. One roof’s stacks is emitting white What appears to be barrels, as
of the
smoke-
well as atiy
A POW Camp Lost in History?
Dino A. Brugioni—There are few aerial photos taken before liberation of prisoner of war (POW) camps holding Allied prisoners during World War II in the National Archives. I came into possession several years ago of an uncaptioned aerial photo of a camp for Allied POWs. It belongs in the U. S. historical records, but the camp first must be identified. I have conducted a detailed interpretation of this photo in the hope that this information may aid a Proceedings reader in identifying this POW camp.
The photograph was probably taken in Japan in late summer and probably around noon, judging from the length of the shadows. The foliage is full. The camp is in a hilly but heavily tilled area. Row crops seem to be at full growth. Still another indication of summer is that many POWs are bare-chested, while others are wearing undershirts and shorts.
The photograph must have been taken late in World War II, perhaps even after Japan had surrendered but before Allied troops had liberated the camp. The camp may have been photographed during a food drop to the POWs. Printed on one of the buildings’ roofs are “HONG KONG
MEN THANK YOU” and “PW.” On the edge of the print, the wording “GIDOR—THANK WA [illegible] P” can be discerned. This might be interpreted as “Corregidor Thank Wasp,” a reference to the World War II carrier that may have been involved in food drop operations to this camp.
This POW camp is on a terraced hillside with three distinct levels. On the upper level is a large open-sided building. Vague, elongated objects—perhaps bunks—can be seen inside. Also, on the upper level, there appears to be an exercise area. Row crops are planted near the wall. On the edge of the exercise area are a narrow gauge mine-type car and rails. Atop and alongside the rail car is cut lumber. There are many steps leading to the second and third levels. On the second level, a structure on the left appears to be a barracks. The center building is marked with a cross and is probably a hospital. In front of the third building are large white bags which could identify the building as a laundry. In front of these buildings are clotheslines upon which blankets and white objects hang. On the third level, one building appears to be either a mess hall or a facility related to some sort of light manufacturing.
There are four smoke stacks associa1 with the building: three on the roof a
crates and boxes, can be seen ne- stacked in front of the building- On y portion of the camp apparently is sn in the photograph. The camp’s buildijV appear to have been constructed at dit ent times since a variety of roofing nia^ rials are used: shingles, tar papeU corrugated metal. The camp 1S j rounded by a solid fence topped with ther barbed or electric wire. ^
There are several dichotomies in photo. The local people outside the fen are looking in the same direction, 10 position slightly ahead of the phot0'1 ing aircraft; few POWs are looking in1 direction. Some POWs have their han ^ to their heads as though shielding th® eyes from the sun. Twenty-three PO are standing on the roof tops; one apP^ to have his hands cupped to his mouth though shouting at the aircraft.
If the location of the Allied POW canaP in this aerial photograph is identified _ copy will be placed in the National chives, Washington, D.C.
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“Skill or Luck?”
(See R. H. Millsap, pp. 78-87, Supplement
March 1985; R. Lane, p. 130, June 1985;
Proceedings)
John Lorelli, author of The Battle of the Komandorski Islands (Naval Institute Press, 1984)—Commander Millsap and I have disagreed about various facets of the Komandorski action ever since he agreed to help me. With regard to his criticisms of my story, I stand on the evidence as outlined in the book. (I do find it particularly interesting that Commander Millsap
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finds the evidence of one Japanese officer so persuasive while the evidence of another, also a firsthand witness, is not mentioned.)
Of course, I have my own opinion about Commander Millsap’s stalwart defense of Admiral Charles H. McMorris. While conducting my research, many scathing comments were made to me about the admiral. What became clear is that the man inspired admiration and dislike in equally intense measures. Commander Millsap clearly admires Admiral McMorris. What a disappointment, then, to be in an obsolete ship, assigned to the backwater of the war, fight the battle of a lifetime, and come out to find officers and sailors of the other ships present calling the USS Richmond (CL-9) the “Grey Ghost of the North Pacific.” In the eyes of many others who were there that day, the admiral’s performance did not measure up well.
Commander Millsap seemingly takes the attitude that since I wasn’t present, I can’t judge what happened. I talked with many who were, including most of the responsible people in the gunnery organizations of both the Richmond and the USS Salt Lake City (CA-25). Commander Millsap, the Richmond’s communication officer, is the only person who presently believes that the Richmond could have hit the Nachi at the time he claims. Once again, I stand on the evidence presented.
Finally, Ralph Millsap is a gentleman in the true sense of the word. I hope no reader will err and assume that he and I have an ongoing grudge.
“No Bastions for the Bear”
(See D. B. Rivkin, pp. 36-43, April 1984; F. J. Glaeser, W. J. Ruhe, pp. 14-15, June 1984;
R. H. Smith, pp. 14-20, July 1984; L. E. Lacouture, p. 101, August 1984; R. O. Welander, J. D. Williams, p. 164, September 1984; J. A. Marcely, pp. 172-178, October 1984; L. Brooks, pp. 97-100, November 1984; C. H. Builder, p. 129, January 1985; P. G. Johnson, pp. 14-17, May 1985 Proceedings)
Commander James J. Tritten, U. S. Navy—Commander Johnson’s recent comment is consistent with his outlook on arms control as expressed in previous issues of the Proceedings. His April 1982 General Prize Essay, “Tomahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactical Mix,” seemed more concerned with perceived verification problems for Tomahawk than with that system’s potentia contribute to deterrence. In August 19 ’ Commander Johnson suggested in his tide, “Arms Control: Upping the Ante, that we look to the Washington Con e ence on the Limitation of Armaments 1921-22 as a model of successful arm control without addressing the veri ie non-compliance of that agreement j pre-World War II Italy and Japan.
In May 1985, Commander Johnso declared that “U. S. attacks on S°v* SSBNs [nuclear-powered fleet balhs missile submarines] or SSBN bastl° supporting forces would be provocati and escalatory.” This statement apPea^ to be more a mirror-image of Wes views than it is an undisputed fact ba on Soviet evidence. Open-source hte ture from the Soviet Union over the Pa 20 years clearly provides the eviden that anti-SSBN operations may be e pected in any future war. The “No B tions for the Bear” articles would lea to believe that Soviet behavior and fd structure support this conclusion. Whet • then, is Commander Johnson’s eviden that the Soviet Politburo would rega attacks as provocative or escalatory •
If we are to accept Commander Jo son’s conclusions, then what do we c elude about systems that he does mention? Are we to assume that SSb located outside the bastions are game? How about SSBNs located in bastions but assigned theater roles- ^ actly what does Commander Johnson * tend to exclude under the category “bastion supporting forces”—the en Soviet Northern and Pacific Flee ^ Under what type of limited nuclear W should Soviet forces be granted immum > from attack, and how does that serve as form of deterrence?
Continued deterrence of nuclear 'Wj may be best served by a declaratory P icy and a credible capability to alter correlation of forces during a war’s im conventional phase. The need to de general nuclear war does not go away the superpowers engage in convention or limited nuclear war. However, environment and means available to tig in such a scenario do change. Under su conditions, the West has the opportun1J to alter the strategic nuclear balance an ' thus, force the Politburo to recalculate t Soviet potential to achieve its objective*' If the Soviet Union is unable to respon j war may be terminated without undesir vertical escalation. What may be Pe^ ceived as provocative and escalatory Commander Johnson may be viewed resolve to the Politburo. It is the Po11 buro that we want to deter.
able to land in protected waters like Lake Michigan or the Chesapeake Bay.
[2] had hoped for nuclear-heated jet engines to come along. But without this development, we might build a half-scale model for research with a dozen Air Force C-5B engines.
Captain Paul R. Schratz, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Shades of NIBWM!
[4] find Captain Satterthwaite’s sad story about the personnel problems of the Navy’s nuclear submariners hard to believe. We thought the Blue and Gold crews, and operating schedules known years in advance, were the best of all possible worlds. Now we learn that excessive operating time is killing the attractiveness of nuclear duty.
Excessive time at sea has always been a Navy problem. For a hundred years, the British maintained that if they ever fought the U. S. Navy in a war, they would do nothing for six months while we exhausted ourselves with intensive training, standing watch-and-watch, and shuffling paperwork.
So what is this NIBWM (pronounced Nibwam)?
Years ago, the Atlantic Fleet was suffering the same periodic excess of operational commitments with insufficient forces, and we couldn’t convince our leaders that the problem was serious. A