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Commander Stafford’s Little Ship, Big , ar is a notable and well-constructed °°k- The format and flow of the story '''ere undoubtedly well thought out before de author began work on the manuscript.
Co,
its
most elemental form.
Seek and Strike: Sonar, Antisubmarine Warfare and the Royal Navy 1914-54.
L^tle Ship, Big War: The Saga of DE 343
Commander Edward P. Stafford, U. S.
avy (Retired). New York: William Morrow ?nt* Company, 1984. 336 pp. Illus. Bib.
«d. $17.95 ($16.15).
[^viewed by Admiral Robert B. Carney,
' S- Navy (Retired) rcwnander Stafford treats different assets of the DE-343’s history, infusing l e into an inanimate structure before aying it to its final resting. Through the narration, he provides a low-level view of some high-level matters, vivid descrip- >ons of combat and other duties, and one the best accounts ever published of shipboard life during combat situations, etlSe alerts, and the inevitable interludes of boredom.
Commander Stafford’s reputation as an author is strengthened by the meticulous and wide-ranging research invested in his effort. The bibliography and impos- Jh? list of enlisted contributors tell some- huig about the laudatory persistence of he author in attempting to interview ?.Very available person who could shed 'ght on the subject.
The saga of the Abercrombie does not ehd itself to a conventional review. The hiany distinct segments of her history— eVen in terms of dry statistics—are too hUmerous and varied to cover. Little l‘P. Big War is a prime reference source. The sequential details of events, deluding places and times, and their ef- ects on men and material are history in
The deadly kamikaze attacks off OkinaWa have widely been reported elsewhere, but Stafford’s composite word Ptature of the Abercrombie's ordeal as a !?har picket adds a definite dimension, he same is true of other actions in which Abercrombie participated.
The destroyer escort’s story is an amal- 8am of the recollections and emotions of he entire company of one warship. How- jiVer> in a way, the Abercrombie speaks hf all of the “small boys” that fought he Pacific War. Many World War II-vin- tage destroyer and escort sailors will see in this book a mirror of their own experiences. For those who are interested but not blessed by—or haunted by—relevant memories, this book provides insight and understanding. Commander Stafford rates kudos for his gifted translation of statistics into first-class descriptive prose.
Little Ship, Big War is an important book.
Admiral Carney is a 1916 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy. During World War 1, he served as gunnery and torpedo officer on board the VSSFammg (DD- 37) when she sank the German U-58 in November 1917. His World War II service included convoy/ ASW operations (1941-42), command of the USS Denver (CL-58), Chief of Staff to Admiral W F. Halsey, Jr., with the South Pacific Force and later with the Third Fleet (1943-45), and Commander m Chief of Allied Forces, Southern Europe. He> served as Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1953 until his refirement m 1955 Admiral Camey served as President of the Naval Institute from 1950 to 1952 and agatn from 1954 to 1956.
;m Hackmann. London: Her Majesty s anery Office (HMSO) Books, 1984. ributed in North America by Beman iciates, Lanham, MD.) 487 pp. Illus.
______ . . ^nc /COl
Reviewed by John H. Beattie
Willem Hackmann, the assistant curator at the Museum of History and Science Oxford University, has written a classic book on the history of sonar development from 1914 to the launch of the U S nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus (SSN-571) in 1954, especially with regards to the Royal Navy. This detailed work—six years in the writing—is of a semi-official nature and provides the most important and scholarly examination of the Royal Navy’s involvement in the research and development of the science of underwater acoustics.
This history has benefited from the help of a large number of people in the government services and corporations in both Great Britain and the United States, as well as from support rendered by the research team working on this project at the Science Museum in London. Above all, it has drawn from the mass of contemporary official documents in the U.K. Public Record Office as well as from vital source material in the U. S. Naval Historical Center, the Navy Department Library, the Office of Naval Research, the Naval Research Laboratory, and other institutions and corporations. There are 45 pages of references, a bibliography of 27 pages, and a very detailed index and appendices.
The book begins with a discussion of underwater acoustics before 1914, and the review is international. Hackmann covers American pioneer hydrographer M. F. Maury’s scant recognition of the opportunities, the pioneer work of the U. S. Lighthouse Board in underwater bells, the formation of the Submarine Signal Company in 1901, and the work of many others like R. A. Fessenden, who held one of the greatest number of patents, second only to Thomas Edison. Fessenden achieved iceberg detection at two miles in 1914. With the appearance of the U-boat menace, the story moves to the Allied organizing of science for the war at sea and the technical cooperation between the Allies. The wartime development of hydrophones in various countries is also fully covered.
Between the wars, the work of the Germans in the development of passive sonar and the parallel development of active sonar in Great Britain and the United States are detailed. By 1939, the Royal Navy was far ahead of any other navy in sonar and antisubmarine weapons development, application, and training, and it remained so until 1945, when the U. S. effort turned the art into a science. The steady U.K. refinement of sonar between 1918 and 1939, through some 35 different models of asdic (the old British term for sonar), resulted in a largely perfected device, which was also simpler, more rugged, easier to use, and performed better than U. S. types.
The considerable extent of reverse “lease-lend” is shown with the U. S. adoption of the Royal Navy’s streamlined domes, range recorders, depth sonars, training aids, and the vital Hedgehog and Squid ahead-throwing weapons. The reasons for the Royal Navy’s success, which may be more important, but which are less well-covered, must have been be-
cause of a clearer recognition of the antisubmarine problem, particularly the more demanding fleet operational requirement which resulted in the creation of the antisubmarine branch and specialists and the task organization assigned to deal with the problem. The scientists, designers, production and quality assurance men, maintainers, and, above all, the seagoing users, were concentrated in a single shore establishment, HMS Osprey at Portland from 1927 to 1939.
A comprehensive perspective of the huge wartime development in sonar, as well as a briefer treatment on antisubmarine weapons and countermeasures are included. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and tactics are hardly discussed. The postwar years, until the arrival of the nuclear submarine, are treated in the final chapters and will be revealing to those not familiar with the art or science. We are indebted to Mr. Hackmann and his team for this outstanding work on the technical development of sonar. Seek and Strike will give radar historians something to mull over as they have produced nothing quite comparable on the subject. However this book still leaves plenty of scope for others to cover the history of ASW and the use of sonar in wartime.
Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation
Myra MacPherson. New York: Doubleday, 1984. 663 pp. Glossary. Notes. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Michael N. Pocalyko, U. S. Navy
Long Time Passing, The Washington Post political reporter Myra MacPher- son’s extended critical illumination of the voices and perceptions of the Vietnam War, is an intense, lyric, and extraordinarily well-crafted study of “a generation in transition.” In her words, the book is an effort “to heal the wounds of our nation’s most troubled decade of war.” It is also a volume with a distinct and not often subtle political bias: that of the matured anti-war left ten years after the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. This work is an in-depth dissertation that is primarily an oral history designed to illustrate that subjective orientation.
MacPherson does her very best writing when she personally feels strongest about a point. She sets the U. S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina, as a remembrance of “shaved heads, [and] . . . drill instructors taking pictures out of wallets, saying, ‘Who is this whore? Who is this pigV and it would be a recruit’s mother,” before she almost parenthetically notes that “Parris Island is a science. When the bullets start flying—because of Parris Island—you don’t panic so much.” But the recruit’s purposeful experiences in Marine boot camp are, to the author, no more or less honorable than that of the man who “cut off his finger as a protest statement, as
in 1970. She perceives only the secon man to have made a moral commitn'er ■ The Vietnam veterans in Long . Passing tend to be those most interesting to MacPherson’s reporter’s eye—'3 those most afflicted. In discussing u10 veteran’s suffering from post-trauma stress disorders, she notes that the I3 attached to their affliction “seems 3 * tingly obscure phrase to come out 0 war that gave us ‘harassment and in ^ diction’ and ‘protective reaction strike’ and other code words for kiUin^/, does not have the stark ring of World I’s ‘shell shock’ or World War II’s con bat fatigue.’” . . s
jectivity
bility is i
e case history of former Marine lieutenant David Novak, who “had it all.”
A Ph.D. in mathematics, coming up for tenure ... a contract to write three textbooks; there were four bright daughters, an attractive wife, a handsome Victorian home. Then the crumbling began; the perfect record of sobriety and dependability shattered. He came home drunk at 2 a.m. He’d been out looking for a marine to talk to. He had to talk about Vietnam with someone who understood. There were more evenings; being picked up for drunken driving, being found by po- hce passed out in his car in a dangerous neighborhood. Finally he left home and moved into a $5-a-night flophouse. ...”
pj^ch passages are indicative of Mac- erson’s literary vantage on the Viet- am veteran, despite her inclusion of a Umber of “successful veterans,” men ho “have reflected on their Vietnam xPeriences and worked through them” 0 fhe author’s satisfaction.
MacPherson is, however, infinitely ore comfortable with the position taken y another character, Kate Litchfield, in er broad panoply of voices against the a ar- Mrs. Litchfield, a Gold Star mother ud part Qf a Vietnam veterans contingent . at had protested the nuclear arms race u front of the White House in 1981,
,.Possessed,” according to MacPherson, a quality the Moral Majority would do eu to emulate: [she was] nonjudgmental others.” The author writes:
She has six children. Her firstborn died in Vietnam. ‘I begged him to go to Canada, but he said, ‘Mother, you always taught me to stand up and stick to things. 1 made a commitment.” In the cell [where she and the author were held after a protest arrest] her eyes filled with tears. ‘I taught him too well.’”
.To MacPherson’s credit, she recog- ?IZes—albeit late in this lengthy volume— er problem with “losing journalistic alance ” She maintains that “while obis an impossible goal . . . credi- not.” But to professional military Juicers, her credibility as a reporter must e questioned. Navy Rear Admiral Jere- UUah Denton receives only passing men- s'°n as “the former POW and Alabama enator who sees Communists around every comer” without any regard to his ^utsiderable and honorable service in ^anoi. Later, the author refers to Senator yCru°n to provide an example of North letnamese atrocities to American prisoners of war. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs James Webb is portrayed as a champion of “revisionist hawk talk” and a dealer in absolutes before he is established as a compassionate and strong leader of Marines. Retired Navy Captain John McCain, a former POW and now a congressman from Arizona, fares much better—but only because of his speaking “passionately in favor of enforcing the Constitution’s commandment that Congress, not the President, has the power to declare war.” Long Time Passing is clearly not a book in consonance with the temperament and perceptions of the military profession, but it is, nonetheless, a strong contribution to the ongoing debates about Vietnam that continue to be enlivened with the passage of time. The book is poetic, dynamic, and substantive, and the voices from Myra MacPherson s “haunted generation” can do nothing but educate and enlighten our profession about a distinct and resonant chord in Vietnam debates that has diminished little in the past ten years.
Commander Pocalyko is a naval aviator and a member of the Strategic Concepts Group (Op-603). He received his MPA degree from Harvard University s John F. Kennedy School of Government in June.
Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality
Richard F. Starr, Editor, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1984, 218 pp. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Paul G. Johnson, U. S. Naval Reserve
This volume contains an insight into many of the arms control issues of our time, as viewed by the conservative element of academia and the think tanks. Arms Control is a collection of papers and selected comments from a recent conference on arms control conducted at Stanford University’s Hoover Institute. The book, edited by Richard Starr, head of the U. S. delegation to the recent Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, contains essays by such notables as William Van Cleave, Colin Gray, Edward Teller, and Richard Pipes.
The purpose of the work is to expose the “myth” of arms control as it has been practiced since the early 1960s and to confront the reader with the “reality” of the Soviet threat while demonstrating how arms control in the past may have actually hurt U. S. security. The strength of this book is that it acquaints the reader with the traditional arguments—current as of mid-1984—made by conservatives against arms control. The arguments are presented logically and with intellectual power in selections by Gray and Pipes, among others, and in less compelling form by various other conference participants. The authors address a wide range of discrete topics of current interest in the strategic arena despite the book’s relatively short length.
Arms Control is a work of many contrasts. Many papers are well reasoned and written, while some are not. Many opinions expressed come directly from the conservative element in defense politics, while some are from more moderate sources. Much strikes the reader as sensible, but other portions reflect unrealistic views of Soviet ability and American inability in defense and arms control.
The book’s most serious drawback is its overstatement. It loses the impact of the valid arguments presented that contribute to the healthy ongoing debate about the value of arms control by pressing viewpoints which are clearly outside the discussion mainstream.
At the general level, many who write for this collection stress that arms control is not an end in itself, but that, if properly practiced, it can contribute to U. S. security. The more positive implications of arms control and the fact that arms control must contribute to security are often overlooked because of today’s understandably popular desire for indications that the arms race is abating. Several authors, including Van Cleave, while professing adherence to the above formulation, go on to disparage the past efforts and future prospects for meaningful arms control in terms that make it appear they are only paying lip service to the initial premise about a proper place for arms control.
An example of this conflict appears in an essay by Gough C. Reinhardt. In speaking of the costs associated with arms control, Reinhardt notes: “Not the least of these [costs] is the loss of talent that comes about when strategists and analysts of the caliber of those attending this conference devote themselves to arms control, rather than to more productive service to the Republic. ...” Mr. Reinhardt then encourages his colleagues and the book’s readers to “ponder how to dismantle the arms control apparatus most painlessly and efficiently.” It is difficult to see what statements of this kind add to the debate, and why they are included in a book of this type.
Another inconsistency in the work is the difference in tone employed by the editor in his two contributions. In the preface, Starr blames the Soviets exclusively for the breakdown of arms talks in 1983, while intimating that U. S. concessions in the theater talks had led to a situation in which the two sides differed only over the number of missiles in the final equation. This analysis strongly understates the remaining gulf between the sides, while absolving the Reagan administration of any blame. A more careful observer might have pointed to the deep divisions within the U. S. Government which made agreement unlikely in the first place.
At one point, Starr oversimplifies in a way that tends to mislead the reader. He notes that the United States withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from NATO in 1980 and was planning to remove 1,400 more in 1984. He then goes on to state: “In other words, a total of only 572 GLCMs [ground-launch cruise missiles] and Pershing IIs [new U. S. nuclear missiles] will be replacing the 2,400 being taken out.” While the statement is literally true, it implies some kind of equality between the two sets of weapons that does not exist. As the informed reader knows, the statement ignores the qualitative difference between the weapons, and that is why this argument has not been made by others to justify the new U. S. weapons. The 572 single warhead missiles going in are the most advanced weapons in the U. S. inventory and have the capability to hit targets inside the Soviet Union, while the 2,400 warheads being taken out are obsolete weapons which have only a marginal military use.
Later, Starr supplies an informative and moderately phrased essay on the MBFR talks. This piece summarizes the Western approach to the negotiations and provides some insight on the obstacles which stand in the way of agreement. After digesting these offerings, the reader is left to ponder Starr’s true position.
The highlight of the book is Gray’s essay on the ways in which arms control and the nuclear balance affect strategy. Gray, a prolific writer on current strategy, gives the reader a closely reasoned analysis of the breakdown of credibility behind extended deterrence and advocates correcting what he views as trends adverse to the United States in the strategic balance. Gray demonstrates what many others writing for this volume lack: the power to persuade because, although Gray relies on politically conservative assumptions, he defends those assumptions, gives examples, and resists the temptation to engage in negative rhetoric which might cause readers to miss the message. Pipes also makes a strong contribution by outlining Soviet negotiating tactics that U. S. representatives should
be on guard against. His conclusion the United States should assemble a bo of experts familiar with the art of nego ating with the Soviets is a sound one an should be implemented. f
The book is comprised of several e tures that are helpful to the reader. Itc® tains a good index and short biograp 1 of all the contributors. The editor a uses less well-known conference Partl , pants to comment on the papers presen ^ in the book. The comments are short an follow each respective paper. This t nique gives the reader other perspecti' about the piece and encourages reader8 further evaluate what they have rea • ^ Arms Control stakes out the curre arms control vision of leading advoca of the “Right.” Everyone who reads work should also seek out a balanct^ perspective from a more moderate " on the subject, and, after reading * analysis, realize that the truth about ar control lies somewhere in between.
r ,he Nava'
Commander Johnson is a graduate ot 111L w Academy, the Naval War College, and Harvar ^ School. While on active duty, he served on b°ar ^ USS John Young (DD-973) and in Washington. v- Commander Johnson is the 1982 Proceeding^ ^ eral Prize Essay Contest winner for his article „ ahawk: The Implications of a Strategic/Tactiea ^ and has written previously for the Proceeding arms control.
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lrn E- Peacock. New York: Facts on File 'cations, 1984. 169 pp. Ind. $15.95 ($14.35).
at ls the correlation between MacArthur’s |,'n® at Inchon and the battle between the mark and American Greetings card com- Jnies? What similarities are there between the ^ntebbe Raid and Swansons’s tactics in deal- d® w'th Stouffer’s and the Green Giant? How cs the principle of “unity of command" fig- C(;C m the Battle of the Bulge and in the suc- an^s the Texas Instruments company? These q °*her questions are answered in Corporate t.°"’bat, an unusual work which applies mili- p z strategy and tactics to the business world. sieac°ck, whose background includes extend e, CorP°rate and government experience (in- *U lng service as an Assistant Secretary of the my), contends that the same principles als'1*1 arC successfuI on the battlefield will 0 prove successful in business. For each aciPle discussed, the author provides case 'es of both military engagements and cor®lcs- This book serves as "a field guide of e-tested strategy and tactics for any corpo- ratc commander.”
1>,
,. e Emergence of a New Lebanon: antasy or Reality
Puh|ard Azar’ Editor. New York: Praeger ti, 'shcrs- 1984. 302 pp. Notes. Ind. Tables. ”2-95 ($29.65).
otlr>g the paucity of literature on Lebanon Conce the War of 1982, this book, divided into b-ffr*>artS’ s^el*s on the complex, often a hag situation in Lebanon today. The first h describes what has happened to this strife- ev^i C0Untry during 1982-83, when major s °intionary changes were taking place. The dis°n^ ^art' ent't'et* “F°cus on Lebanon.” cusses the effects of recent years on the nan s political culture by analyzing the key ^ "‘cal, economic, and military events that thrVe impacted on the overall situation. Part ce focuses on two Lebanese communities their responses to external threats. Militia u Paramilitary forces are also examined and ftfasted in this part, and the influence of “cial changes in the Christian and Shi'a communities are considered as well. The final sec, n deals with international perspectives of c anon with the concluding chapter specifi- a y reviewing U. S.-Lebanese relations.
Nuclear Crisis Reader
jg^yn Prins. Editor. New York: Vintage Books,
ls collection of essays draws together the
findings of a conference held at Cambridge University in September 1983. The contributors are noted authorities in political, economic, and military fields, and the list includes such well-known names as McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, and John Kenneth Galbraith. The conclusion drawn is "that nuclear weapons, far from providing secuiity, actually make it impossible. Retired Navy Admiral Noel Gayler, the former director of the National Security Agency, provides the concluding essay in which he spells out the way in which we could now safely begin to dismantle the world’s nuclear stockpile.
The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform
Edward N. Luttwak. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1985. 340 pp. Notes. Append. Tables. $17.45 ($15.70).
A senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author of five books on military history and strategy. Dr. Luttwak builds an impressively cogent case for reform in the U. S. armed forces. Citing the failures in Vietnam and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, among others, he argues for the replacement of managers and bureaucrats with leaders and tacticians. Dr. Luttwak contends that the interservice rivalry which often cripples our forces effectiveness must be eliminated, and he offers a viable plan for the accomplishment of this task. His analysis looks beyond the topics which often capture the attention of the public, the press, and the Congress fraud, waste, and cost overruns—and digs into an even more fundamental and more important matter, the lack of a coherent military strategy.
Review of U. S. Military Research and Development 1984
Kosta Tsipis and Penny Janeway, Editors. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 229 pp. Illus. Notes. Tables. $25.00 ($22.50).
Produced by the Program in Science and Technology for International Security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, this review provides information about ongoing U. S. research and development (R & D) projects. The review is intended as a method to keep the general public informed and “to act as an early warning about weapons systems that could be either destabilizing, unnecessary, or technologically unsound.” The articles are useful to readers, regardless of their scientific backgrounds. Three of the chapters deal with the R & D process, while others cover specific projects such as the Aegis weapon system, anti-satellite weapons, and the M-l tank.
The Sailing Lifestyle: A Guide to Sailing and Cruising for Pleasure
John Rousmaniere. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 288 pp. Illus. Gloss. $16.45 ($14.80).
As stated in the foreword, “This book is for anybody who is fascinated by the sailing life and yet is a bit intimidated by it.” Written by the author of The Annapolis Book of Seamanship (S & S Press, 1983), the book is a primer for neophyte sailors but includes material that even experienced mariners will find useful. One of the primary strengths of this book is that it answers the kind of questions most people want to know but are afraid to ask: “Will this thing tip over?” or “How can a boat sail into the wind?” Complete with a glossary, helpful illustrations, checklists, and even some recipes, this book will take the reader from bookstore to pitching deck in no time.
Ships, Ports, and Pilots: A History of the Piloting Profession
Roger Clancy. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1984. 215 pp. Ind. $16.95 ($15.25).
Almost since man first took to the sea. pilots have been guiding mariners safely in and out of port, keeping them from finding sandbars, sunken wrecks, and other hazards that might bring disaster to the uninitiated. This book traces the history of this ancient profession from pre-Biblical times to the present. Pilots are described in peace and war, in America and overseas, and as seamen and businessmen. The development of licensing procedures is traced, and the various legislative conflicts through the years are discussed. The pilots of
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Ma^n °n ^w<): Hp Front with the 27th
l%aS ^ Vcdller. Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
4- 226 pp. Ulus. Ind. Maps. $15.95 ($14.35).
^he 5th Marine Division arrived at I wo Jima in ' hansports. They departed a month later not th'te ®>ng eight. This book is the story of Se ^ daYs on I wo Jima as seen through the g^es °f the chief medical officer for the 3rd attalion, 27th Marines. It is a story of valor in ?u2.h°ut, but it is a human story as well, ino Ud'n§ instances of lost nerve, duty shirk- e an<i tactical errors. Dr. Vedder, who med the Silver Star for his courageous ac- ns while accompanying his litter-bearers to n from the front lines under fire, delivers a 'Sue account from the vantage points of sur- 0n. leader, and semi-objective observer.
United States Navy and Coast “-d, 1946-1983: A Bibliography of En- lsh-Language Works and 16 mm. Films
r?yr°n L Smith, Jr. Jefferson, NC: McFarland &
xtensive bibliography is a researcher’s de- j t. With more than 10,000 entries, the Urces include books, monographs, U. S. vernment documents, postgraduate disser- '°ns and theses, research projects, scholarly 5fPers- and articles from nearly
Periodicals. Non-critical annotations are vided where necessary, and introductory Tatives to the various sections round out the Work.
The Vietnam War in Retrospect
Martin F. Herz. Washington D.C.: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1984.
72 pp. Illus. $5.75.
Presented in a series-of-lectures format, this book is a thought-provoking look at America’s most controversial war. Long renowned for his outspokenness. Professor Herz pulls no punches in his criticisms and overt explanations. In his foreword to the book, Peter F. Krogh, Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, writes ”... his criticism . . . [is] directed less at those who got the United States into the war . . . than it is directed at sloppy thinking, willful denial of obvious facts, lack of historical knowledge and perspective, and interesting instances of dishonesty that in his view attended much of the past discussion of the conflict and also the reporting about it. The lectures are enhanced by the use of prize-winning photos and political cartoons. The overall effect is not one of dry, academic lecturing, but cogent and fascinating presentations that inspire interest and understanding.
HI Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
Henry H Adams. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 1985. 366 pp. Ulus. Notes. Append. $22.95 ($18.36).
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy fought in only one battle in his 42 years of active service—he was in a gun turret on board the battleship Oregon (BB-3) during the Battle of Santiago in the Spanish American War. Yet, at Franklin D. Roosevelt’s side as Chief of Stalf during World War II, he and Roosevelt’s special assistant, Harry Hopkins, were the only two people, besides the President, who knew literally everything there was to know about the war. Admiral Leahy advised the President throughout the war, in reality as an “ex-officio chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and played an extremely crucial role in indoctrinating President Harry S. Truman when he took over upon Roosevelt’s death. Previously, Admiral Leahy had been Chief of Naval Operations, governor of Puerto Rico, and ambassador to the Vichy government of France. Wit-
ness to Power is the story of these and many other achievements. It is the biography of a man who accomplished much but is not well remembered because his achievements were always “behind-the-scenes.” He rarely held the limelight, yet his contributions to history were extraordinarily significant.
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SHIPPING CHART
Add postage and handling to each order for Naval Institute books, book selections, and insignia items according to the following schedule: $2.25 for orders up to $15.00: $3.00 for orders from $15.01 to $30.00; $3.75 for any order in excess of $30.00.
Add $ 1.75 per book for special orders from U.S. publishers other than the Naval Institute Press.
Add $2.50 for postage and handling to each special order for books from foreign publishers.