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There appears to be a great deal of duplication in the aviation programs of the Navy and Air Force, especially in tactical aviation. Unlike such weapons as frigates, submarines, or howitzers, modern aircraft are so versatile that they are invaluable for any service’s arsenal. However, this versatility has a heavy Pnce tag as relatively simple jet fighters c°st nearly $10 million apiece. Perhaps die duplication is merely appearance, and the services use their aircraft for such different missions that they are virtually noninterchangeable.
Yet, there are some surprising similarities between the tactical fighter-bomber assets of the Navy and Air Force once °ne gets past the inherent difference of heir basing methods. The aircraft they j?Se perform similar functions: air de- ense, offensive support, attack, and re- c°nnaissance. In some cases, they even the same aircraft, such as the F-4 and . T> and weapons, including the Maverick missiles and laser-guided bombs.
°th services’ aviators rely on sophisticated electronics to find their targets and 0r self-protection, and often the electronics are functionally similar. Both rely on air refueling but use different—and largely incompatible—systems.
Given these similarities in missions and equipment, why is there a total dichotomy of tactical assets between the two services? There are many historical considerations involved. The Navy insisted on having its own air arm distinct from the Army’s. However, unlike the Army, the Navy maintained control over its air arm. Even today, the Army and Air Force work closely to cooperate in fighting the tactical air-land battle, while the Navy tends to fight its own separate battles. There has long been a question about differences in training and equipment in terms of quality, but there has never been a clear winner in that argument. The two services have sufficient pride in their own accomplishments to make maintenance of an independent mission an organizational imperative, regardless of whether it is necessary.
When discussion turns to scenarios and actual examples of employment, the issues become much more ambiguous. In both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts,
Navy and Air Force fighters attacked targets that were quite similar. Target selection was set by the nature of basing rather than by the suitability of one force over the other. During World War II in the Pacific theater, target selection was again decided by basing and a politically created dual strategy, rather than by the inherent ability or inability of Navy or (Army) Air Force fighter-bombers to perform the missions, although in the 1940s land-based fighters did tend to have an edge in range and payload over pre-catapult, carrier-based fighters.
In the immediate future, there are four distinct areas where conventional air power may be called upon to bring U. S. power to bear in defense of our interests
In the Vietnam War, Navy and Air Force fighter-bombers, such as these Air Force Phantoms, attacked similar targets, which were selected by the nature of basing rather than by the suitability of one force over the other.
The Air Force needs to emphasize its unique missions by procuring far more B-l bombers, top, and far fewer of the comparatively limited tactical aircraft, and to concentrate far more on airlift with such planes as the Air Force C-141, above.
and those of our allies; Western Europe, the Western Pacific “rimlands,” Southwest Asia, and the Middle East, and the Caribbean Basin. No significant part of any of these theaters of potential conflict is more than 750 miles from a navigable sea, and most are much less. Also, while there is no limitation on Navy aircraft operating from conventional land bases, no Air Force aircraft or aircrews are capable of carrier launching. That capability has essentially vanished along with the piston-engined aircraft of the 1940s, and will not return until the Air Force acquires vertical short takeoff and landing combat aircraft.
In Europe, in some of the Pacific area, and in the Caribbean, there are Air Force tactical air groups deployed permanently. This has both positive and negative aspects. Being on the scene permanently does have additional deterrent value compared to having merely the potential to come onto the scene. Also, there is no problem with operating from a carrier deck and flying over water before beginning the overland leg of the mission. Finally, a generic land base is cheaper to operate—if it is only supporting one air wing—than an aircraft carrier. On the negative side, except for the Caribbean theater, our deployed forces are in theater at the pleasure of foreign governments. These governments may limit our forces’ operations for political reasons, or squeeze us for more money and arms in return for basing rights, or put pressure on U. S. government officials to carry out, or not carry out, certain aspects of foreign policy against their will. They could even unceremoniously eject us, either out of anger at some aspect of U. S. policy or out of fear that a U. S. military presence brings more risk of attack than it brings protection. We can see examples of this throughout the world. The NATO governments have severely limited use of our NATO-based forces in the Middle East; the Philippines has demanded ever higher rent for our bases; the Greeks and Turks have at various times threatened to force us out of their countries because of our attempts at maintaining relations with both of them; and the Japanese have prohibited us from maintaining nuclear weapons on bases within their territory- Other parts of the Air Force’s tactical forces not deployed in particular theaters must be prepared to deploy there during a crisis or even after the outbreak of hostilities. This includes most of the aircraft owned by Tactical Air Command, which amounts to 23 wings, each averaging more than 50 aircraft. These aircraft will have to be readied on short notice and launched on a long flight over open ocean often exceeding 3,000 miles. These
flights rely on both well-synchronized aerial refueling and access to stopover bases, such as Newfoundland or the Azores in the Atlantic or Guam in the Pacific. Also, these deployments count on an unopposed flight—the aircraft are usually flown lightly armed, if at all— and on landing at a secure air base with intact runways. In the event of a sudden attack in either Europe or Korea, these conditions could not be guaranteed. In Southwest Asia, we might have to scrub missions if airfields we had planned upon using are denied us by local states fearful of the consequences, both internal and external, of allowing U. S. use of their facilities.
Navy tactical aviation rarely faces the problems of Air Force tactical aviation. Even though carrier operations are diffi' cult and the carrier is a large, valuable target for a potential enemy, the Navy has a significant edge. No one can deny us the use of our own fleet, which can move at more than 20 knots and defend itself effectively against most foreseeable threats. Naval tactical aviation can provide support without being physically present within the country we seek to support and is less likely to bring negative repercussions upon the ally we intend to help. Finally, no terrorist or SpetznaZ commandos can hide under cover and fire a rocket-propelled grenade onto a carrier’s flight deck or overrun the carrier in a suicide raid. As we have tragically seen in Lebanon, fanatical terrorists and guerrillas may be our most difficult threat to
deter or defeat.
I am not advocating eliminating the Air Force. I do believe, though, that the Air Force is pulling in too much of the funds available for tactical aviation and is also slighting its unique missions by emphasizing tactical aviation to the extent that >t has. A critical part of our ability to Project our forces lies in the use of long- range, strategic aircraft carrying nonnuclear ordnance. The strategic bomber force has dropped a sizeable portion of the total tonnage dropped on tactical targets in the past three major conflicts in which the United States has fought. The Air Force needs to reexamine its devotion to relatively small, fast fighter-bombers with limited endurance and payload. In the past, once hostilities have begun, the bombers have been pulled out of their other missions and used in conventional roles against tactical interdiction type targets. With the enhanced survivability, range, and payload of aircraft such as the R-l and the “stealth” bomber, the Air Force should procure far more of these aircraft and far fewer of the comparatively limited tactical attack aircraft. While not as glamorous as the small, sleek fighters, the bombers can deliver more bang for the buck and are not trying to fulfill the same missions as the Navy’s fighter-bombers.
Another role that the Air Force has underemphasized has been airlift. Even the tactical fighters need airlift to support their deployments. Complex modem fighters work on the basis of diagnosing faulty components and removing them for repair. This optimizes the amount of flying hours versus maintenance hours but also requires a sizeable stockpile of tools and test equipment and a large staff of skilled groundcrew. Along with the Air Force’s own increasing airlift requirements, the Army has also tied itself to increasingly heavy, bulky, and complex equipment. While this equipment may perform well in the field, it must be delivered in a timely fashion, along with all the necessary support personnel and equipment needed to keep it running. Sealift, while essential, is lacking in both speed and numbers for high-priority cargoes and faces its own threats unless heavily escorted.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that the non-deployed assets of the
Air Force’s tactical inventory be given lower priority than either their strategic assets or airlift and that the emphasis on tactical aviation be gradually transferred to the Navy. While effective in the past, heavy reliance on Air Force tactical aviation is increasingly becoming too costly in both effectiveness and funding to be in the best interests of our security.
Maintaining a large tactical aviation organization in the Air Force based on historical missions alone or on the natural desire of the Air Force fighter community to perpetuate itself is not the way to handle increasingly tight budgets and high costs.
Captain Daskal was graduated from the University of Connecticut in 1978 and received a master’s degree from the University of Phoenix in 1981. His active duty experience as an air intelligence officer includes tours with the 355 Tactical Fighter/Training Wing (A-10), 416 Bombardment Wing (B-52G). and Rome Air Development Center/lntelligence and Reconnaissance Division. He is currently employed by Analytic Services, Inc., as a research program analyst, working in support of the Air Staff in research and development. His assignment in the Air Force Reserve is with the Air Force Intelligence Service in the Mobilization Augmentee Program.
We Should Conserve Flying Time
by Commander Joseph Hart, U. S. Navy
Recently, we have experienced a reduction in flight hour funding for nondeployed squadrons. The days of plenty when sortie races and massive amounts of accumulated flight time were marks of the successful squadrons are now history. The equipment provided by our taxpayers ls not only expensive, but expensive to °Perate. Only forward-deployed squad- r°ns involved in real world tasking will be given the unlimited Chevron credit card. The amount of flight time available during this low period impacts directly on Pdot proficiency and safety.
As pilots and managers concerned with 'he problem, it is not our job to sit around grumbling about the “good old three sor- tle days and 50 hour months” and then throw up our hands and predict increased accident rates. This approach will guarantee the prophecy is fulfilled. We must approach this challenge positively to develop and implement alternate ways not °nly to maintain proficiency but to operate safely and maximize the training per dollar.
Solutions to the problem require increased emphasis on all the aspects of our Profession that do not actually involve the expenditure of flight hours, and then 'Uaking the absolute best use of every flight hour we do fly. Your creative ideas can extend the following list to achieve the goal:
- Detailed planning, both long and short range, must be used to map out the training cycle; accept the fact that there will be valleys of minimum flight time and place them where they will have the least impact; allow a sufficient buildup period after coming out of a valley before jumping headfirst into a major evolution such as a weapons deployment.
- An aggressive ground training syllabus must be established; Safety, Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization, and weapons system training must be pursued eagerly.
- Simulator usage must be maximized; keep these training aids in use and devise an effective and challenging syllabus; although not an actual flight, a simulator sortie should be thoroughly planned with definitive tasking that involves not only emergency procedures review but instrument, weapons systems, and electronic warfare training.
- Every actual flight sortie must be viewed as a treasured event with opportunities that cannot be squandered; flight leaders must do prior pre-brief planning to prepare for that sortie; planning the sortie in the brief is not good enough when flight time is at a minimum and can lead to confusion or omission of critical items; brief time must also be longer than normal with sorties cancelled if brief times cannot be met.
- Strict standardization in as many areas as possible is a must, and standard operating procedures must be understood and complied with.
- Multi-mission sorties must be planned; longer sorties with multi-mission events are more cost-effective than shorter, one- event sorties.
- Cancel sorties when training goals cannot be realized because of weather or other external factors.
- Fuel conservation must be preached; if tasking and training can be achieved at lower power settings then do so; transit legs to and from training areas should be executed at maximum range air speed; do not fly at maximum endurance simply to gain more flight time and make the statistics look better—the goal is maximum training per dollar, not maximum flight time per dollar.
- As painful as this may sound, crosscountry flights cannot be a part of the training program unless realistic warfare mission training can be accomplished.
As funding for flight hours for nondeployed squadrons decreases, it becomes increasingly important for simulator sorties to be planned and enacted exactly as if real planes were being flown.
- Pilots must demand full mission capable aircraft from the maintenance department; squadrons that tolerate partial mission capable sorties can expect a reduction in attained training and decreased safety margins.
- Commanding officers and operations officers must recognize the reduced proficiency and its relationship to overall pilot experience; flight schedules must be closely monitored to avoid overtasking a pilot who is maintaining minimum proficiency; sending a nugget out on a night sortie in marginal weather when he has not flown at night for a couple of weeks is sheer folly—why not lead him back slowly with a day launch and night recovery in good weather?
- Major training evolutions cannot be jumped into full speed after operating at minimum flight time proficiency; a lead in, walk before running approach must be devised; emphasis on aerodynamic basics, checklists, and flying by the numbers must be established in this phase.
- Pilots must realize a certain lack of proficiency and learn to back down from overtasking themselves in any particular training evolution.
The reduced operations target we are
now experiencing is a fact of life that may be with us for some time to come. Wc must deal with this change professionally to avoid accidents and maximize training. Every pilot must take advantage of every training opportunity even though it does not involve actual flight time. With proper planning, the problem of reduced flight time can be met as safely and effectively as possible.
Commander Hart received a bachelor of science degree from Miami University in 1967. He was commissioned an officer via the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program. He has served tours of duty in VA-72, VT-23 (as a flight instructor), VA-164, and VA-97 (as maintenance and operations officer). He also served in the Personnel Exchange Program in Australia where he flew the A4-G from HMAS Melbourne. He is currently assigned as commanding officer of Attack Squadron Twenty Seven.
Other Entrances to the Naval War College
By Commander Thomas B. Grassey, U. S. Naval Reserve, and Captain Robert A. Hall, U. S. Navy
So, here you are with “pride and professionalism” ringing in your ears, the latest edition of the Naval Officer’s Guide (Naval Institute Press, 1983) advising you to “count yourself fortunate if you are ordered to a war college,” and the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins advocating Naval War College attendance for the ambitious offiCer- But you have not been ordered to Newport, and your career pattern does not show summer permanent change of station orders to the Naval War College in the foreseeable future. Are you out of luck as far as earning a Naval War College diploma? No.
Admiral Watkins has declared, “We are looking for new ways to give many m°re of our finest unrestricted line offiCers a chance to experience War College before selection to flag rank—one of my bey objectives.” With only about 100 Navy officers reporting to Newport in August each year, these “new ways” WlH be important to many officers. There are several alternatives to August enroll- mer>t in the two traditional resident elasses, the College of Naval Warfare for c°mrnanders and captains and the Col- 'ege of Naval Command and Staff for heutenant commanders and commanders.
. First, August is not the only report- m§ period. Command tours, operating schedules, and other commitments that °nce limited Naval War College attendance can be accommodated because dealers are able to schedule officers to report in November and March. You could Become a “phased input” student spend- lng a calendar year instead of a ten-month academic year in Newport. Half of all the
■ S. Navy students at the college will commence their studies in the winter or spring trimesters. (Officers from the i urine Corps and other services still fol- °w the academic year calendar.)
Second, since 1983, a series of post- c°mmand courses initiated by the Chief °f Naval Operations have been provided to officers as they complete operational command tours. Although not a substitute for the full-length resident academic Pr°gram, this eight-week assignment Presents selected commanding officers 'Vlth an executive-level look at national strategy, defense resource decisions, and uaval force employment. The experience ls capped with a fast-paced, high-level 'Var game. Annually, the post-command course brings some of the benefits of a Naval War College education to about 60 senior officers moving into higher positions. Even with heavy emphasis on increasing the number of post-command students in the regular courses and the creation of the shorter Post-Command Course, only half of those officers who successfully complete operational command tours can be accommodated in resident courses at Newport.
Consequently, a third option which you should consider is the nonresident Off-Campus Seminar Program in the Washington, D.C., area. The three Naval War College core courses—Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics and Decision Making, and Employment of Naval Forces—are taught in evening seminars at the Pentagon, Washington Navy Yard, Crystal City, Dahlgren, White Oak, and— for the first time this year—at the U. S. Naval Academy. Lieutenants through captains, active and reserve, plus individuals from other services and appropriate civilian agencies may apply for admission. Because so many eligible officers serve in the Washington area, and because the Naval War College’s seminar format limits class size, admission to the Off-Campus Seminar Program is selective; only 250 students can be admitted each year. Since its inception, nearly 150 naval officers in the Off-Campus Seminar Program have completed all three courses and have been awarded Naval War College nonresident diplomas during the annual June graduation ceremonies in Newport. Their accomplishments are recognized by the Naval Military Personnel Command as the equivalent of intermediate-level service college attendance for purposes of assignments and promotions.
A fourth opportunity for participation involves the Naval War College’s newest program. Encouraged by the high standards and success of the various Washington classes and actively supported by the Chief of Naval Air Training and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, the President of the Naval War College in 1983 inaugurated off-campus centers at naval air stations in Corpus Christi, Texas, Pensacola, Florida, and the Naval Academy. Like their counterparts in the Washington area, these new centers offer the core courses given in Newport. One hundred officers are now students at Pensacola and Corpus Christi, and another 34 at the Naval Academy.
As an off-campus seminar student, you attend one two-hour class each of the 36 weeks of a typical academic year, September through May. Your professors are Naval War College adjunct faculty members, and your classmates represent diverse professional military backgrounds. You read the same textbooks as your peers who are students at Newport, do similar assignments, and earn academic credit. (The American Council on Education recommends to member institutions that individuals who complete the Strategy and Policy course should be awarded six semester hours of graduate credit in the mixed disciplines of history, political
Seen below are about half of the 34 Naval War College students currently undergoing instruction, not at Newport, but in Annapolis.
science, and international relations, while those who complete the Defense Economics and Decision Making course should receive credit for eight graduate semester hours in quantitative economic analysis and management.) It will take you longer than resident students to qualify for your Naval War College diploma, and you may not experience all of the pleasures of being a full-time student. However, there are three important considerations: your Naval War College diploma is a valued mark of achievement in today’s Navy, you simultaneously have held important operational or staff billets which should enhance your career, and your studies will have been intrinsically rewarding to you.
The Off-Campus Seminar Program may soon include centers in additional locations such as Norfolk and San Diego. This depends upon the availability of qualified faculty members, support commitments from area major host commands, and sufficient student interest. Studies are under way in Norfolk and San Diego to determine whether these criteria can be satisfied. Officers themselves can assist in the process of establishing new off-campus centers in other areas by expressing their interest to their commanding officers.
Fifth, the Naval War College Center for Continuing Education administers a series of professionally challenging correspondence courses, through which you also can qualify for a Naval War College nonresident diploma. Active or reserve Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers 0-3 and above (Army and Air Force 0-4 and above) are eligible. The correspondence program route to the Naval War College diploma consists of the three core courses, each requiring approximately 300 study hours, plus one shorter elective course in either international law or international relations. A dedicated student should be able to complete the required four-course package in about three years. While requiring considerable self-discipline, the correspondence courses involve extensive and valuable writing assignments which are carefully reviewed and commented upon by Naval War College professors. In no other Naval War College program must you formulate your thoughts so precisely—and have them evaluated quite so carefully.
Finally, to encourage you to undertake one of these programs now, the courses have been standardized to make them interchangeable. You can satisfy all the requirements for a Naval War College diploma through traditional academic year attendance, “phased input” attendance, participation in off-campus seminars in Washington, Annapolis, Pensacola, or Corpus Christi (and perhaps eventually in other areas), or through correspondence courses. You should bear in mind that the nonresident methods are complementary. They can be blended and mixed. For example, you might take the Defense Economics and Decision Making course at Pensacola, then the Employment of Naval Forces course while on a Washington tour, and conclude with correspondence courses in Strategy and Policy and International Relations during an assignment at sea.
Commander Grassey is commanding officer of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Training Center Naval Reserve Unit 0194 in San Diego. He is a philosophy professor at San Jose University.
Captain Hall is Director of the Center for Continuing Education at the Naval War College and is a member of the Resident Strategy Faculty of the college.
For further information, write: Director, Center for Continuing Education, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 02841-5009.
Admiral Gorshkov’s BBVN?
By Scott C. Truver
A great deal of space has been devoted in these pages and in similar publications to discussions and analyses of the growing, multifaceted Soviet naval threat confronting the Western Alliance. The Department of Defense’s 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power documents the significant advances the Soviet Navy has enjoyed recently, concluding that “the Soviet Navy has developed into a globally deployed force composed of an impressive array of ships, submarines, and aircraft, including the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser KIROV.” This expansion in the Soviet Navy’s offensive, blue-water capabilities is the bete noire compelling the Reagan administration’s revitalization program for the U. S. Navy. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has consistently cited burgeoning Soviet naval power as justification for the 600-ship Navy that would be capable of a forward maritime strategy.
One common element in all of these analyses and pronouncements, however, is an error of omission. Nowhere is there any mention of the centerpiece of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s drive to acquire a “balanced” fleet: a 60,000- to 70,000- ton nuclear-powered “battleship” now under construction at the Nikolayev (South) Shipyard on the Black Sea. Although strikingly similar in design to Western navies’ aircraft carriers, the new Soviet air-capable battleship, or BBVN, will probably be the first of a new class of capital ships around which powerful strike groups will be formed.
Preposterous, you say? Of course the ship now abuilding is an aircraft carrier. What else could it be, with an angled flight deck, arresting gear, and steam catapults, as Soviet Military Power has described it? But if this were the case, why would the Soviet Navy devote so much national treasure to a ship type which will be confined to operating solely in the Black Sea?
On 18 July 1976, the 38,000-ton heavy antisubmarine cruiser (tyazholyi protivo- lodchyi kreyser) Kiev made an uneventful passage from the Black Sea, through the Turkish Straits, and into the Mediterranean Sea. Looking for all the world like an aircraft carrier on this, her initial deployment, the Kiev operated 25 aircraft: nine Yak-36 “Forger-A” and one Yak-36 “Forger-B” vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, and 14 Ka-25 “Hormone-A” and one Ka-25 “Hormone-B” helicopters. Despite the explicit exclusion in the Montreux Convention of 1936 of a right of passage for aircraft carriers, the Turkish Government agreed with the Soviet declaration that the Kiev was a capital surface ship and permitted her to transit the straits unimpeded. Accepting the capital ship designation was important, as only Black Sea Powers are permitted to exceed a 15,000-ton aggregate limit on naval forces which may be in the course of transit through the straits.
In light of the Montreux Convention, therefore, the Kiev and her three sister ships remain capital ships, not aircraft carriers. So it is likely to be with the BBVN, which should be operating with all forward-deployed elements of the Soviet Navy by 1989 or 1990. Given past Soviet shipbuilding practices, a total of four or maybe even eight BBVNs should
be operational by 2000-2010, all unconstrained by the legalities of the Montreux Convention. Such a conclusion may be a bit premature, however, or may at least be controversial.
Although the July 1976 transit by the Kiev and all subsequent passages by her and her sister ships went unchallenged by Turkey as long as the convention’s provisions regarding transit by the capital ships °f Black Sea Powers were observed, genial opinion in the West regarded these as contravening the spirit if not the letter of the law. Most Western observers agreed 31 the time that the Kiev’s transit constituted a flagrant breach of the Montreux Convention, although no formal objections were made by the other ten states Party to the treaty. By the 1980s, the Soviet Navy was referring to the Kiev as a tactical aircraft-carrying cruiser (takicheskoye avionosnyy kreyser), with s°me Soviet naval officers using the terms “antisubmarine carrier” or simply
aircraft carrier” to describe the class. The use of these terms underscores the controversy and casts doubt on the legally of passage through the straits by these ships or by the new ship under construction at Nikolayev.
While the passage of warships through mternational straits is subject to only little regulation by the littoral states (whether Under a non-suspendable innocent pasSage rule or the transit passage regime embodied in the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty), passage through the Turkish Straits—the Bosporus, Sea of Marmara, a°d Dardanelles—is subject to special ^les. The current legal regime was es- lablished by the 1936 Montreux Conven- hon, which revised the Lausanne Treaty °f 1923. The 1936 convention reaffirmed Ihe principle of freedom of transit of the straits by sea in peacetime, providing that this shall continue without limitation in time. Regarding warships, the convention allows free transit for light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels of both Black Sea and non-Black Sea Powers, up to an aggregate tonnage limit of 15,000 tons or nine vessels in transit at any one time.
Black Sea Powers are accorded certain privileges not generally enjoyed by other states. For example, Black Sea Powers may exceed the 15,000-ton limitation in the case of capital ships, as long as they make the passage singly, in daylight, and are escorted by no more than two destroyers. Furthermore, only Black Sea Powers have the right to send submarines through the straits. However, there are several stipulations. The submarines may only transit during daylight for the purpose of rejoining their base, if purchased or constructed outside the Black Sea or to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black Sea. In all cases, the transit of warships must be preceded by diplomatic notification to the Turkish Government, normally eight days prior to the beginning of the transit. The Turkish Government is empowered to deny transit privileges if the convention’s provisions will be or are contravened in any way.
As might be expected, definitions and their interpretations have become the controversy’s central focus. With regard to the question of what constitutes an aircraft carrier, the convention provides (among others) the following definitions of “vessels of war” to which its provisions apply:
“Capital ships are surface vessels of war belonging to one of the two following sub-categories:
(a) Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of sub-category
The Soviets new BBVN would be called an aircraft carrier in any other navy, but the Soviets don’t want to violate the Montreux Convention by sending an aircraft carrier—like their Kiev-class “ASW cruiser,” above— through the Bosporus Strait.
(b), the standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons . . . or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in.;
(b) Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 8,000 tons . . . and which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in.
Aircraft-Carriers are surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying or operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft-carriers. ...” Despite Soviet contentions in 1976 and afterward that the Kiev-class ships are antisubmarine warfare (ASW) cruisers, the 1975-76 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships (Key Book Service, 1975) called this an “interesting” designation for such a large ship, perhaps reflecting an emphasis on ASW missions, but more likely aimed at circumventing the restrictions contained in the Montreux Convention on passage by aircraft carriers. Norman Pol- mar, in the third edition of his Guide to
the Soviet Navy (Naval Institute Press, 1983) remarks how the “official” designation for the Kiev class has evolved to include “tactical aircraft-carrying” functions, while “unofficially” the ships of the class are referred to as “aircraft carriers.” As with the earlier Moskvas, the Kiev-class ships are well armed with offensive and defensive weapons: long- range SS-N-12 antiship cruise missiles, RBU-6000 and SUW-N-1 ASW weapons, torpedoes, antiair warfare missile launchers, and guns. In addition to their warfighting capabilities inherent in the embarked aircraft, the A'icv-class ships possess sufficient weapons to carry out several missions in the absence of the VTOL aircraft and helicopters. Polmar suggests, too, that the new ship being built at Nikolayev, where the Kiev and Moskva classes were constructed, will have a similar design philosophy— “heavily laden with weapons and electronics.” This would permit her to carry out several warfare tasks in addition to whatever aircraft are embarked.
The pivotal question, then, is whether the aircraft constitute a primary mission capability or are ancillary to the warfighting capabilities organic to the ship’s own weapon systems. If ancillary, then under the definitions of the Montreux Convention, ships greater than 10,000 tons must be classified as capital ships, which, if they belong to a Black Sea Power, enjoy special privileges of transit through the Turkish Straits. If the carrying or operation of aircraft at sea is a primary function of the Kievs or their follow-ons, then the provisions of the convention prohibit their transit as aircraft carriers through the straits.
Of warships greater than 10,000 tons, only the capital ships of Black Sea Powers have a right of transit through the straits. Aircraft carriers of any state are excluded from the category “capital ships,” and, therefore, are not permitted to pass. Nevertheless, the convention prohibits all ships in transit through the straits to make use of any aircraft which they might be carrying, implying that other ships, not aircraft carriers, which operate aircraft have a right to pass through the straits. Ships which have been designed or modified to carry and operate aircraft at sea for ancillary missions are, therefore, not excluded from a right of passage. Auxiliary vessels (i.e., noncombatants) may be fitted to carry, but not to operate, aircraft at sea, if they expect to be permitted transit rights. Thus, the rule is that ships designed or modified to carry and operate aircraft at sea as a primary mission capability do not have a right to transit the Turkish Straits in time of peace.
The controversy turns on an acceptance or rejection of the specific official designation of a ship. In July 1976, the Soviet Government chose to call the Kiev an ASW cruiser; for Turkey, that sufficed. The same will probably be true for the Soviet BBVN now under construction. Just as in 1976, when the Turkish Government chose to steer a perilous course between rejecting the Soviet contention (and perhaps inviting a Soviet denunciation of the convention) and a recognition that the convention had been flagrantly violated, so it is likely to do in 1989 or 1990 when the BBVN makes her first appearance outside of the Black Sea. Calling her an aircraft carrier would place Turkey in an untenable position. In the arcane world where international law blends with super power politics, a rase by any other name may not smell so sweet. Admiral Gorshkov’s BBVN is a case in point.
Dr. Truver received the first Ph.D. in the field of Marine Policy Studies. He has written extensively on naval, maritime, ocean policy, and international legal issues, including a study entitled “International Straits of the World: The Strait of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.” He has lectured on Mediterranean issues at the National War College. He is currently Head of the Naval and Maritime Policy Department at Information Spectrum, Inc.
For Want of a Nail
By Commander P. R. Martin, U. S. Naval Reserve
The Navy, as would be expected, continues to fund the development of more and more sophisticated weapons systems for shipboard employment. Sensors, both active and passive, have made stealth and surprise increasingly difficult. Sophisticated surveillance and intelligence-gathering devices and systems are capable of collecting and processing data that would boggle the mind of the World War II commander. But have we really placed the modem commander or commanding officer in an improved position to use the many new technologies to their best advantage in a conflict?
The geographic isolation of the United States no longer acts as a shield to protect the nation from distant enemies. Decisions in both strategic and tactical spheres may be limited by time that shrinks to a dimension as small as minutes or seconds. The availability of current, accurate information is critical to each decision-maker. Time is always of the essence. Yet that World War II commander would be intimately familiar with most of the internal communications devices found on board today’s ships.
To meet the challenges of today’s environment, the sound-powered phone circuit stands ready to respond—as it did more than 40 years ago. Designed to be an invulnerable battle circuit, it ignores modem technology for the advantage of being able to operate without depending on ship’s power. Requiring voice communications (active human participation at each terminal), the system is slow, awkward, and labor intensive. When phone talkers are used to man the ends of a circuit, there is a high probability of errors in any communication.
But sound-powered circuits are only the primary battle circuits. What about the other communications systems found on board almost every Navy ship, administrative telephones as well as general and intercommunication announcing (MC) systems? They supplement the information that can be transmitted between work stations; the speed of transmission is even dramatically improved in many cases.
But, by their very existence and regular use, they tend to verify the inadequacies of the ship’s primary interior communications during battle conditions.
At critical locations where major command and control decisions must be made, key personnel find themselves surrounded by a wealth of communications devices. Multiple sound-powered administrative telephone and MC terminals are often within arm’s reach. Added to these are several exterior radio handsets with numerous speakers to monitor both external radio circuits and shipboard general announcements. Simple discussions between individuals at adjacent work stations in the same compartment become more difficult as each circuit begins to demand personal attention.
During a period of high-intensity operations, the many control actions required to operate these largely independent systems begin to draw heavily upon the operators’ physical and mental stamina. During a prolonged period, the chances of a critical error occurring will increase
substantially. Even in a peacetime environment, such common evolutions as docking, transiting crowded waterways, firing weapons systems, and conducting air operations require rapid, concise communications that tax existing systems and operating personnel.
That the operating forces perform as well as they do is a tribute to the American sailor, who has adapted the technol- °gy of one era to support that of another. Tet, over the years, even those efforts have proven counterproductive where *ocal modifications, “stereo shop” adaptations, and less than adequate shipyard repairs have left each ship with a unique system which was developed to remedy a tang
series of seemingly minor interior Communications crises. Can the 600-ship Navy afford the cost in degraded performance that 600 physically unique interior communication systems will provide? Would the modem commander want each °f his ships to have a uniquely designed and supported weapon system? Probably n°t on both counts.
Still, is it worth the commanding officer’s attention and the Navy’s dollar to devote the considerable effort required to uPdate shipboard internal communica- fions? Ask the aircraft carrier air boss '''ho has lost his flight deck announcing Astern (5 MC) during a period of electromagnetic radiation control (EMCON) restrictions that prevents the use of the Nlan-on-the-Move system. Or perhaps question the harried combat information center officer who is wearing a split headset while attempting to answer ques- h°ns simultaneously over three circuits: an administrative telephone, a sound- P°Wered circuit, and an MC net being used as an intercom. Better yet, ask the commanding officer on the bridge (or, in d's absence, the officer of the deck) who cannot determine which of his handsets is nnging and must answer each one until °ne of them yields a calling party. These are real people who experience the inade- 'taacies and related frustrations of interior communications systems on an everyday basis.
fiut there is good news for those who '',°uld like to see the Navy bring its shipyard interior communications systems >nto the late 20th century. The private Sector has already developed systems that meet Navy requirements for speed, flexi- mty, simplicity, and maintainability. be risk in system research and development is low. In fact, even the Navy’s own /'N/STC-2(V) Integrated Voice Commu- n'cation System (IVCS) can answer many * /he requirements of new-construction taps. Making the issue more compli- ated, however, are the large number of
options and the expense of upgrading an entire fleet.
Modernization is already under way, driven in a random manner by the operating forces because of a less than fully responsive Navy research and development community. The use of the Western Electric Dimension 2000 phone system to replace the aging ship service telephones has provided a means to upgrade the available administrative phone service on board ship quickly, and initial reports indicate that the system is functioning well. With all aircraft carriers and an increasingly large number of other surface vessels installing this system, it could soon become the standard (by default) rather than an interim replacement for a militarized system. Yet the Dimension 2000 remains a contractor-supported system with minimal maintenance training provided for Navy technicians. Serious system operating problems might leave the Navy high and dry when an international crisis calls upon a battle group to sustain prolonged operations in the Indian Ocean or Antarctic waters where logistic priorities and mission requirements could preclude the availability of civilian contractor assistance by any means.
Several of the NATO allies of the United States have also recognized the shortcomings of the existing internal communications systems and have begun to use the latest technologies on board their ships. Additional systems which are under development reflect designs sensitive to the latest requirements of operating units to include the incorporation of digital transmission and circuit integration techniques. The fully militarized
U. S. Navy IVCS AN/STC-2(V) performs most of the functions that make the Dimension 2000 so appealing to its users.
With a large array of options available to the planner who wants to improve shipboard internal communications, the next question might logically be, “Why have installed systems lagged so far behind the obvious requirements and the available technologies?” There is no simple answer, but the fact that there has been no such planner to monitor these related systems may be the key. Only now as the squeaky wheel begins to derail the entire train does appropriate attention
These men are in today’s modern Navy, but their internal communications link — the sound-powered phone — is 1940s’ technology and almost as outdated as a child’s string- and-tin-can telephone.
focus on this vital element of the combat machine.
Communications have always been regarded as a crucial element of the command and control process. Traditionally, however, interior communications have taken a distant backseat to exterior communications. Whenever a command, or, in this case, a ship communicates externally, it is at least subconsciously graded by peers, seniors and juniors alike. The reputation of a unit may well be established by the manner in which it responds via various communications methods. Often the only contact between some units will be through communications other than face-to-face. Senior leaders are well aware of this fact and exercise considerable control over the means of external communications. (This should not be considered a criticism, however, as solid, professional exterior communications simultaneously improve inter-unit coordination and performance.)
Interior communications, on the other hand, may appear on the surface to be less vital to unit performance and may receive less attention. While problems with exterior radio systems may be evident immediately to all within reception range, a malfunctioning telephone or announcing system can be bypassed without external notice. The duplicity of systems and the physical proximity of the receiving party allow alternate (although perhaps not optimum) means of getting the message to the station for which it is intended. Only during highly stressful periods—as during battle conditions— does the inadequacy of internal systems become fully apparent.
Also, perhaps the lack of improvement in installed systems has existed for such a long time that many of those who have been system designers and users have begun to tailor their thoughts concerning operational requirements so that they remain within the limits of equipment capabilities that currently exist on board ship. The continued use of sound-powered phone systems as primary battle circuits rather than as reliable emergency circuits mirrors this point. Ship interior communications specifications must reflect equipment and systems which most effectively meet the current operational requirements of the respective ship class.
Pressed by an increasing awareness of the importance of interior communications and deficiencies of existing systems, senior Navy officials have begun the process of defining an official Operational Requirement (OR), which is the first major step in initiating a full-fledged development and acquisition cycle. Following the issuance of an approved OR and the assurance of appropriate funding support, the designation of a single entity responsible for ship interior communications development will become crucial to long-term success and the most efficient allocation of resources. The mechanics to achieve this centralized control is under way in the Naval Sea Systems Command.
But the key to success will ultimately lie with those who must make things happen in the fleet. Their success will naturally lie with the manner in which they plan and execute the implementation of system improvements, a process which must address three distinct groups of ships: those currently assigned to the operating forces, those currently under construction, and those planned for future construction.
This type of program organization with short-, medium-, and long-range elements should provide for a rapid, systematic upgrading of shipboard systems while promoting the standardization of equipment. The problems of today’s systems must be solved as quickly as possible but not so as to add to the support problems that characterize the existing patchwork quilt equipments.
Concurrent with the development of new systems and the improvement of installed ones, a simultaneous review of technical support should be conducted. The role of system maintenance and its impact upon personnel assignments, training, and, ultimately, fleet performance must be examined. As the variety of interior communications systems has proliferated, so have the requirements of the interior communications rating.
Now tasked with maintaining equipment incorporating increasingly complex technologies but with considerably less electronics and system training than some other technicians, these personnel inevitably face personal work-related frustrations as well as degraded system readiness for assigned systems. Interior communications rating management requires the use of more than 25 Navy Enlisted Classification codes to identify basic equipment maintenance qualifications. Locally modified systems, ship-to- ship equipment variances, out-of-date ship drawings, and the limited number of interior communications technicians assignable to most ships add significantly to system maintenance difficulties as well as increasing the technical problems for assigned personnel. Problems retaining personnel may then further impact the situation by creating manning shortfalls.
In addition to the creation of system improvements that address the readiness of the system to perform, methods of information transfer that do not involve voice communications should be explored. Electronic Data Display Systems, indicator systems, and various computer networks are readily available to reduce the volume of information that must be passed via voice circuits. These alternate systems are reliable and can be designed to meet user requirements. Most also possess the means to incorporate sources of emergency power for use during periods when normal ship’s power is interrupted. Modem methods of circuit integration can reduce the number of terminal devices at a given work station without limiting access to varying communications means, reducing system survivability, or restricting access (under normal or emergency conditions) to a given individual or station. The complete integration of ship weapon systems consoles can also serve to reduce the amount of voice communications between operators. These and other options must be evaluated for potential use.
The final solution, then, will require high-level coordination as well as the exercise of willpower to avoid attempting to find the quick, cheap fix, a flawed process that has set the stage for today’s problem. Interior communications must be given an appropriate degree of attention and the related funding support. Solutions must address the past (existing fleet), present (current construction ships), and future (conceptualized design ships).
For each of these periods, an orderly process that evaluates the current system status, applies appropriate technical solutions, and considers operational and maintenance requirements must be applied. Ship specifications must reflect current technologies, and ship drawings must accurately represent installed systems and equipment. Both the technical and human sides of the issue must be explored simultaneously. Classic problem-solving, planning, and coordination skills must be applied.
Once an orderly process has been established to upgrade the current status of interior communications, a long-term, continuing research and development program must be initiated and sustained to keep the same problem with updated trappings from occurring in the near future. There is little glamour in a telephone or intercom system when compared to a modem weapon system, but that same weapon system rapidly loses its value in a degraded command and control environment that depends heavily upon rapid, accurate interior communications. We must not forget the nail whose loss preceded that of the shoe, horse, rider, battle, and kingdom.
Commander Martin was graduated from the Naval Academy. He was a Fulbright scholar at the University of Paris and also received a master’s degree it1 business from the University of Northern Colorado- He served in the USS Buck (DD-761) before being designated a naval aviator. He served with HC-3, including deployments in the USS Sacramento (AOE-1), While Plains (AFS-4), and Niagara Falls (AFS-3). He then became a reservist with HC-194, while he was the senior educational specialist with Defense Systems Division, Cubic Corporation. He was recalled to active duty with HC-11. He then became a human resource management specialist on the staff of Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacifle Fleet. He is currently an engineer at Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, and a drilling reservist with ASWW1NGPAC 0194 at NAS North Island.
Intelligence: A Fleet Learning Deficiency
By Lieutenant John P. Fortugno, U. S. Navy
It had been a busy afternoon for the squadron. No night flying was scheduled. As evening came, officers filed out and spaces darkened. Except for one. Here, a half-dozen young men stood in a semicircle, their faces reflecting the soft glow of the image which hovered, filling the room. Some talked excitedly. Others somberly studied the multicolored ellipses which fanned from the center. Hands Hew in time-honored fashion, describing arcs in, around, over, and through the figures. This morning, air intelligence (AI) had received an updated holographic cartridge covering the Kiev battle group.
Is this an unlikely scenario? Yes, for two reasons. First, when midnight oil is burned in squadron and shipboard offices, the occupants are more likely concerned with budgets, evaluations, legal, and personnel problems than they are with discussions of tactics and intelligence. Second, holograms and other advanced teaching aids are not available to squadron and shipboard intelligence officers. A carton of slides and a drawer of technical manuals are all that are on hand. The two problems are related. In- igence ranks low among the priorities of our junior officers, and much of the problem lies with our teaching tools and methods.
The teaching tools we have now but do not use enough include war gaming, open-source journals, and video programming. War gaming is a learning technique which is undergoing a rebirth at the Staff College level. Some say that serious study of enemy weapon systems, tactics, and strategy is needed only among senior officers. Yet in today’s electronic battlefield environment, there is a better than even chance that commanders will not be able to communicate with subordinate units. We continue to tell ourselves that superior tactical flexibility, based on the excellence of our training—which in turn fosters initiative— will make us winners in this type of battle. If so, junior officers also need to be aware of enemy capabilities. The Navy could purchase off-the-shelf games which simulate conflict with a high degree of reality. Two such games are “Airwar,” which is a complex, complete, and detailed game of air combat between individual aircraft in the contemporary period, and “The Next War” which is a fairly complex game of a hypothetical war in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, covering air, land, and naval operations. More useful, though, would be games which cover the operations of specific units like Spruance (DD- 963)-class destroyers, A-6Es, or Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered attack submarines versus particular groupings of enemy units in specific scenarios. To our advantage, war gamers say that naval and air (as opposed to land) games are more effective when they reflect individual units. Game development need not be dependent on contracted consultants. They could be designed as class and individual projects at the Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Intelligence College, Naval Academy, and Staff Colleges. This would make the games more responsive to operator needs, stimulate discussion within the service colleges, and promote the spread of war gaming techniques.
War games usually consist of a game map/matrix, playing pieces, rules, and game charts/tables. They are inexpensive and easily stored. “Navtag,” a war game currently in use within the surface community, is a good example of this type. Additional games, particularly those which are platform specific and which can use the growing availability of small computers both for game data and to provide opposition, should be developed to make formidable intelligence volumes leamable in a “hands on” fashion. If they are available and realistic, officers will play them and learn from them.
A fundamental weakness in the Navy —and in all the services—is a dearth of knowledge concerning non-Soviet weapon systems and tactics. Open-source publications, an excellent source of information in this area, should be used as a teaching tool. Commercial journals have the advantage of being unclassified, allowing the widest dissemination in squadron/shipboard spaces, and of being current and highly readable. Proceedings is a good example of the type of journal which encourages discussion among a fleet-wide readership based on its articles concerning weapon systems and tactics. Unfortunately, Proceedings and Aviation Week and Space Technology are the only periodicals of this type with a wide dissemination in the Navy. Other publications which address areas of concern to naval officers include Defence, Naval Forces, International Defense Review, Warship International, Maritime Defense, and Military Science and Technology. None of these journals concentrates its reporting solely along the East-West Axis; their coverage is global. As naval officers who might be called upon to fight anywhere on that globe, we should have wider knowledge horizons. Although we have not fought any pitched battles with the Soviets for 64 years, we have had the need to understand better Iranian, Libyan, Palestinian, Grenadian, and Cuban weapon systems and tactics in the recent past. A reading of open-source literature would have served to close the knowledge gap in those and other areas. Morskoy Sbornik, the official journal of the Soviet Navy, should serve the same purpose in increasing operator understanding of that organization. These periodicals are relatively inexpensive. Their distribution can be handled through the post office. Fleet personnel enjoy reading them and will learn from them. A subscription to selected professional journals should be provided for each naval unit.
Video tape technology has become fully integrated into the popular culture during the past five years. Yet it has not even begun to approach its promise as a tool for teaching enemy weapon systems and tactics. As a dissemination medium, video presentations allow for both a consistency and a flexibility beyond other available means. A professionally produced video cassette can use the finest research, briefers, and graphics at a central location. The cassettes can then be reproduced and distributed, providing a consistent and current ground work for intelligence training at the local level. Flexibility is provided by the extensive availability within the Navy, not only of video tape recorders (VTR) but of video production sites. Most of the VTRs are currently used for entertainment purposes on board ship and the occasional training film. The production facilities on board all carriers, some other major units, and all major shore stations are often dormant. The highly mobile camera and sound equipment could be used at the local level to tape presentations on tactics developed within a unit and to pose detailed questions on current intelligence concerns.
The idea is to generate more dialogue between fleet units and national intelligence centers, as well as among the units themselves. Dialogue is currently lacking because of the weakness of the written word (message traffic) as a mechanism for promoting discussion and the skyrocketing costs of sending specialists to address units in person or of sending unit personnel to other areas for extensive queries/familiarization. Messages and publications get routed, filed, and chopped, none of which promotes discussion of their content. The fact that each individual reads the message or publication at a different time and in a different place detracts from interaction. Depending on seniority and the length of the routing slip, it is several days to several weeks since the first person in the command has seen it. The likelihood of any discussion of the points presented is minimal, and the chance of a written response is nil. If this were a ten-minute video presentation played before a weekly all-officers meeting in conjunction with other presentations, the likelihood of discussion would increase. I am not advocating the abolition of printed traffic or of temporary additional duty trips. I am simply pointing out that, in many cases, video strikes the appropriate balance between the high cost of travel and the inadequacies of the written word.
We should use technology to master the increasing complexity of enemy systems as well as our own. Teaching tools which exist in basic form but would need extensive development to be of use include holograms and flight/ship simulators which encompass enemy weapon system inputs. At its best, a hologram is a glowing, three-dimensional image that shows parallax and depth. This spacefilling display has a variety of applications in teaching weapon systems and tactics. A number of people can view the display at the same time without wearing special glasses and see an object as it would appear from their own perspective. A hologram can also reproduce parallax effects so viewers can look over, under, and around the image simply by moving their heads. An advantage of space-filling displays over conventional two-dimensional ones is in recognizing patterns and regularities in data, grasping the threedimensional aspects of overlying sensors, and weapon system parameters.
If a program is not cost-effective it cannot be considered. The ideas presented earlier are well worth their minimal costs. Improved training translates directly into a greater probability of kill when weapon systems are brought to bear. Naval units operational today amount to roughly 600 ships and 140 aircraft squadrons. For ease of figuring, add an additional 260 units ashore which might benefit from these training tools, for a total of 1,000 units. A library of 20 war games at $30 per game would cost $600 per library or $600,000 for the 1,000 units (or the cost of a single AIM 54A Phoenix missile). Subscriptions to six professional journals at an average cost of $50 per year would run $300 per unit and a total cost of $300,000 (or half the cost of an AGM 84A Harpoon Missile). Thirty blank video cassettes at $10 apiece would also total $300 for each unit. The approximate cost for the entire program on a Navy-wide basis is $1,200,000 or less than the cost of a single RIM 67C Standard missile.
We are the Avis of the superpower confrontation, at least in terms of numbers, so we must try harder. The triad upon which we have traditionally relied to offset Soviet numbers is made up of technical, tactical, and training superiority. The first “T,” technical superiority, is eroding at a geometric pace fueled by technology transfer and theft by the Soviet Union. As a result, the United States must place an even greater reliance on tactics and training. These two fields have a common area—intelligence.
First impressions are lasting impressions. Fleet operators’ first impressions of naval intelligence are of their Al/first tour ships intelligence officers on board squadrons and ships. These individuals are often judged on what they can provide to the fleet. They should be given support and training geared toward making the fleet want to think in terms of intelligence first, instead of considering it only as an afterthought in the development of training and tactics.
The key is to put intelligence into operators’ minds, not their hands. A major goal of naval intelligence should be the presentation in a graphic and gripping form of the weaknesses and strengths of an enemy platform and the men who man it (be it the Kirov, “Backfire,” or “Oscar”) in such a way that an operator can juxtapose his system’s strengths against an adversary’s weaknesses and develop the best tactics to defeat the enemy. Modem technology should be adapted to this purpose. We have spent billions to gather intelligence; we should use available resources and technology to disseminate the information to users.
Lieutenant Fortugno has served as the intelligence officer of attack squadron 145 and the naval investigative service. He was a watch officer with Postif Rota, Spain before joining the Soviet Seapower Presentation Team in Norfolk.