This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Contents:
October Special Reserve Issue
A New Role (Soviet Stand-In) for the Naval Reserve
A Conflict of Strategies
The Status of the Naval Reserve
A Reservist Is Not A Regular
Come Back, Little Beaver
Reserve: Best Kept Secret at the Academy
Identifying Our Mobilizable Assets
Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries
The Regulars Are Pretty . . .
The Helo: Potential Ship Killer?
The Loss of HMS Coventry
The Sinking of the Belgrano
No Bastions for the Bear
The Role of U. S. Marines in the Defense of North Norway
A Junior Officer’s Reading List
Not Ready on the Firing Line
October Special Reserve Issue
(See October 1984 Proceedings)
Captain Donald R. Chapman, U. S. Naval Reserve—In publishing a special and separate issue about the reserves you have done a disservice to the Total Force concept by reinforcing the image of the reserves as a “separate” force. I doubt very much if that was your intention, as the October issue contained many excellent and informative articles about the reserves. No doubt it served an important function in educating Proceedings readers about our capabilities and limitations.
However, if the Total FQrce concept is to be successful, we must totally integrate and become one cohesive unit. I have seen rather dramatic gains toward the Total Force concept in my Naval Reserve career, as my gaining command is now completely involved in the training and education of my unit. Unfortunately, many of my reserve shipmates are not so fortunate.
Proceedings can further assist in promoting the goal of the Total Force by featuring articles about the reserve contribution on a regular and continuing basis and not in a separate and special issue.
Quartermaster First Class Ronald A. Booth, U. S. Naval Reserve—As a reservist, I found the October issue immensely enjoyable and right on track. The excellent and timely articles presented an accurate view of the reserve today and provided many solid suggestions for improvements.
For far too long, the reserve and reservist have been enigmas to too many regulars. Even today, the “One Navy concept has not caught on entirely. A large dichotomy still exists in the minds of both regulars and reservists. All too often, reservists are treated condescendingly by some active-duty individuals and commands. While such condescension is usually irritating, it can be amusing.
Recently, I had a young active-duty petty officer second class with about five years of service inform me that I was wearing my white hat improperly. It was, in his words, “shaped wrong.” Upon learning his age and time in service, I informed him, quite correctly, that I was learning how to wear a white hat while he was learning to read Dick and Jane.
Let’s all put our prejudices aside and learn as much as we can from each other and about each other. The October issue goes a long way toward the creation of a true “One Navy.”
“A New Role (Soviet Stand-in) for the Naval Reserve”
(See C. C. Staszak. pp. 154-157, October 1984 Proceedings)
C. H. Ellis—I fully agree with the concept of having a mock Soviet naval group in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans for training. But I believe, maybe because I am ex-active duty, that such a mock force, for the most part, should consist of active-duty personnel.
The reservists are available for only two weeks to a month per year. This is not enough time to train the many service people, U. S. battle groups, and individual ships needed to put such a mock naval Soviet force together.
The active-duty fleet, on the other hand, trains on a year-round basis, giving the Navy a steady and ever-prepared pool of manpower and ships from which to draw for simulated Soviet attack exercises. These mock Soviet groups, one for the East Coast and West Coast respectively, could be more easily briefed with updated information from the latest reports of Soviet weapons and tactics. In this way, the U. S. Navy, as a whole, could be better prepared to meet its adversaries in the event of hostilities.
Following such a program, these groups could be used to indoctrinate a larger segment of the Navy in defense against Soviet weapons and tactics. This would be much better than relying on a once-a-year gambit to teach various groups from the air, surface, subsurface, and amphibious communities all at one time. The best way to teach is in a small group or on an individual basis.
The Navy should also have one cruiser, a couple of frigates and/or destroyers, and some conventional and obsolete nuclear submarines in each of the two mock Soviet groups. Approving construction of new diesel-electric submarines for these mock Soviet groups would be a great idea as well. Besides gaining experience fighting such submarines, we could also sell some of the prototypes to Third World countries. This would boost the United States’ economy and help us technologically.
After the replacements for the USS
THE THREAT AND THE ANSWER
EMPRESS tests in the Solomons demonstrated the vulnerability of ships to Electro-Magnetic Pulses from atomic detonations. Cable interconnections in particular are exposed, seriously effecting all shipboard electronics.
Eliminate this hazard with Breeze shielded and protected cables!
Breeze cables are hardened against EMP, EMI, and TEMPEST. They are corrosion and environmentally secure, and are custom designed to be compatible with the systems they serve.
Breeze cables are field proven-on board the Navy's Phalanx CIWS, the Tomahawk missile and the Harpoon system, to name a few.
Breeze products are qualified to S9407-AB-HBK-010 (formerly NAVSEA 0967-LP-283-5010) and are pending qualification for MIL-STD-1310E.
Midway (CV-41) and the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) become active, these two elderly carriers could be used to simulate the Kiev-class carriers. One squadron of Soviet P-3A and P-3B Orions could be used to simulate land-based naval aviation Soviet style, too.
Overall, I believe that if such a program is undertaken, it will give the American sailor more confiden<:e in the event he does have to fight the Soviet fleet. This may cost the U. S. Navy some money, but it may well save lives and ships from being lost.
A Conflict of Strategies
(See V. H. Krulak, pp. 84-90, November 1984
Proceedings)
Dennis Ross, Associate Professor of Nursing, Castleton State College— Although General Krulak’s article focuses on interdiction of supplies as they entered North Vietnam, he does mention the alternative strategy of local support and pacification of the people of Vietnam. I was a hospital corpsman attached to a Marine Civic Action Program in the village/hamlet complex of Hoa Phu, southwest of DaNang in February and March 1968, until I was wounded and evacuated from the area. Before reading this article, I thought that the Marines and Navy corpsman who volunteered for these units were a. minority within the Marine Corps, if not within the entire Military Advisory Command structure.
I have always contended that the way to “win” in such a guerrilla war is not to destroy the people. If the guerrillas require the support of the peasants to wage their war, then it only makes sense to try to convince the peasants that our way of life is better than that offered by the communists. This is not done by invading the area and destroying the peasants’ homes and land. If someone came to my small Vermont town and tried to convince me that democracy was the best form of government and then proceeded to destroy my home and those of my neighbors while killing innocent people in the area, you can bet I’d fight like hell to stop them.
The Civic Action Program was developed to provide security for the villagers through aggressive local patrols by a squad of Marines. The Marines also provided instruction and logistic support for local defense groups called popular forces.
This was designed to prohibit infiltration, terrorism, and control by the Viet Cong. The corpsmen provided baseline medical support for the villagers while teaching basic sanitation and health care to village members. Secondary support was provided through Marine engineers who built schools, sanitation services, roads, and similar structures for the village. As one village was “pacified,” another village in a Viet Cong-controlled area was opened to the increasingly larger sphere of pacified control. Although this would have been a slow process, it would have been much less expensive in loss of American lives and money than what was finally invested.
In Vietnam, my view of this process was limited to what 1 saw on the village and hamlet level. Although I saw a lack of logistic and physical support for the American troops and gross misuse of funds by the Vietnamese hierarchy, I am still convinced that this strategy would have been much more effective in combating the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. I think it also provides a lesson for those advocating strategies to combat wars of liberation in Central America.
I applaud General Krulak’s efforts to convince the upper echelons of the worthiness of this form of strategy. I hope those currently with influence will learn from this lesson of history. I look forward to reading the rest of the general’s book.
“The Status of the Naval Reserve”
CSee C. J. Kempf, pp. 58-64, October 1984 Proceedings)
Commander David W. Moulton, U. S. Naval Reserve, Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) Officer, Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light Eight-Four (HSL-84)—As Admiral
Kempf said, “The Naval Reserve is undergoing a change in capability and mission assignment without precedent in peacetime America.” Having been intimately involved in this change as officer- in-charge of HSL-84, the Naval Reserve’s first LAMPS squadron, I must say that our transition could not have taken place without the unequaled support of our regular Navy counterparts.
Without exception, every fleet HSL squadron offered its assistance. TAR maintenance personnel were given the opportunity to spend months of temporary assigned duty at sister squadrons; reserve aircrews were allowed to begin the transition in “fleet” aircraft; tactics instructors gave up weekends to help set up the program; and with the delivery of the first aircraft, maintenance assistance was offered whenever we encountered difficulty. We were never treated as
3 FREE ISSUES!
All newly commissioned officers and warrant officers in the U.S. Navy. Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are eligible for three free introductory issues of Proceedings!
For more information contact: Membership Services. U.S. Naval Institute •Annapolis, Maryland *21402 (301) 268-6110
?
4
Would you like to become a member of a very exclusive group of Hobbyists? Look no further, here we arc!
S
“• • • a group of nonproducers who could not stand the rigors of Navy life.” We were treated as shipmates.
I grew up in the HSL community, completing two sea tours prior to my departure from the active service in 1980.1 am proud to be back in a community whose actions attest to the “One Navy” concept. We truly “think One Navy, act One Navy, and are One Navy.”
“A Reservist Is Not A Regular”
(See J. G. Abert, pp. 34-41, October 1984
Proceedings)
Senior Chief Gunner’s Mate Frederick C. Jasmine, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The picture on page 40 of the October issue showing the secondary battery plot of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) brought back memories. If that is not Ford’s (Hannibal not Henry) Mark I computer, I will eat the page.
I can see it now: the cogs, differentials, tapered rollers, and cams—a mechanical marvel in its day that still poses a threat to slow-moving targets.
Contrary to popular belief, the computer age did not begin recently. Only the electronic computer age is new. I can remember the Ford Instrument model in operation in the 1930s.
I have been out of uniform since 1960, but I try to keep abreast as best I can and still avidly read and enjoy Proceedings.
Come Back, Little Beaver
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 44-49, September 1984;
A. Burke, pp. 14-16, November 1984
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral V. A. Dybdal, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Powers does not appreciate how far our Navy has come in achieving destroyer squadron integrity, especially since the Vietnam War. At that time, destroyer flotilla commanders were running a boat pool, changing destroyer assignments to carrier task forces on practically a daily basis. The result, in many cases, was that individual destroyers or groups of destroyers did not know how to effectively coordinate aircraft. It was wonderful news to have a destroyer squadron assigned to a carrier battle group for an entire deployment.
Since our fleet is organized operationally on a task force basis, a destroyer squadron commander had better be prepared to carry out tasks above and beyond operating his own six ships. For a special mission, he might be assigned only one or two of his destroyers plus a number of fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and a submarine. With proper use of such var
ied weapons, he would be able to increase his effective range far beyond that of his own destroyers.
One example comes to mind while I was Chief of Staff to the Commander, Seventh Fleet. During the early months of operations in the Tonkin Gulf, the Seventh Fleet finally carried out the “perfect” operation of this type. A destroyer squadron commander’s two destroyers, augmented by aircraft, were able to vector the aircraft onto two North Vietnam torpedo boats, sink the boats, and capture a dozen or so prisoners. Commander, Seventh Fleet, recommended the destroyer commander for a medal. 1 later heard that higher-ups in the destroyer command wanted to reprimand the commander. Why? They thought he was weakhearted in not moving into gun range without the aircraft to sink the boats. Commander, Seventh Fleet, wanted to do the job with least risk of damage to his forces.
Squadron unit integrity is essential. But the integration of other weapons, aircraft, and submarines with the destroyers is even more essential.
“Reserve: Best Kept Secret at
the Academy”
(See E. Francis, pp. 98-101, October 1984
Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Charles R. Larson, U. S. Navy, Superintendent U. S. Naval Academy—I commend the U. S. Naval Institute for publishing several informative articles in the October 1984 Proceedings regarding the Naval Reserve forces. I was especially pleased to note that one of the articles was authored by a midshipman at the Naval Academy, since this institution has the obligation to educate our future naval officers about the varied responsibilities, readiness capabilities, and force structures of the Naval Reserve. This educational process is comprehensive and chronologically implemented to ensure relevancy to each and every phase of a midshipman’s professional development.
Midshipman Francis suggests that there is a lack of knowledge about the reserve forces at the Naval Academy and that our officer complement should be changed to provide increased role model leadership from Selected Reserve officers. While his position is perhaps shared by other midshipmen, his perceptions are not all-inclusive, and our efforts in these important areas are much broader in scope and are continually developing.
The Naval Reserve mission and organizational structure are taught in NL303, Leadership III: Applications, a course
NAVAL, MARITIME MILITARY & AVIATION BOOKS
Our quarterly catalogs contain 40pp. and over 1300 entries of mostly out- of-print books.
Our reasonable prices and excellent service are enjoyed by people like you who use and enjoy books. Judge for yourself. Send only $3.00 for the next 4 issues.
ANTHEIL
BOOKSELLERS
2177P Isabelle Court No. Bellmore, NY 11710
V___________________ /
--------------------------
MINIATURE SHIP MODELS! *
[
f In our 32 page catalog you will find models of over 1500 J 3 ships, finely cast of metal, in the exact scale of 1:1250 3 f and 1:2400, from ancient times to the present. f
5 Are you looking for the Pre-Dreadnoughts, the Fleets of * WW I or WW II, or the present warships, ours or theirs? \ f Arc you also interested in the magnificent ocean liners ?
2 (Troop Transports) of the past, and the few of the present? J
f Would you like to build harbors in that small scale, or J 3 equip your carriers with aircraft of the era? It’s all listed ) f in our catalog. We also carry a large array of continental I 4 model railroads and accessories, as well as R/C equip- 3 f ment and accessories. [
We are a US owned company . . . bank in the US . . .so that there is no problem with payment . . . and our customers are also our friends, many of them for 20 years now. Would you also like to become one of our customers (oops, friends)? Send $2.00 for our complete Dollar Ship Catalog and Model Train Price Lists to:
PRESTON HOBBY MODELLE OHG
P. O. Box 2280—8600 Bamberg, West Germany Telephone: 0951-1 2222
TH€ VID€0 BOOK PflK
We proudly offer a great published work: U.S. NAVAL FIGHTERS (1922-1980's. Navy/Marine Corp.) by Lloyd S. Jones. Afull 352 pages with exciting photos. Agreat reference bookof America’s Navalair might.
Plus
Naval Air Power
A special video program combining three outstanding naval aviation films.
- WingsOf Eagles, Wings Of Gold Theevolution of naval aviation from its first days on the decks of the USS Langley to WWI I. through Korea and Vietnam — nerve-shattering action including carriers in combat ...
- Down To The Wire Five naval aviation cadets prepare as carrier pilots. Unusual insight into the flying techniques which train them to touch down on 10 feet of deck space.
e Flight To The South Pole Our naval airmen in a peacetime conquest of the Pole, where cold runs 100° below, and a day lasts six months ... and you land atop solid ice at 9,000 ft. above sea level. A contrast of rare footage of the original Byrd expedition withcurrent flight operations. Running Time:1:23 minutes. The video volume and book, both only
Specify Beta or VHS. $79.95
send to FERDE GROFE FILMS 31OO Airport Ave., Santa Monica, CA 90405
U.S. and Canada, add $2.50 shipping, foreign orders, add $3.50. CA res. add 616% Sales Tax. Visa & Master - include card no. & expiration. ORDER TOLL-FREE (800) 854-0561, axt. 925. In Calif. (800) 432-7257, ext. 925.
given during second-class year. Associated with the classroom material are several applicable readings about the history and responsibilities of the Naval Reserve. In spring 1985 and thereafter, this material will be further supplemented by the CNavRes (Chief, Naval Reserve) Naval Reserve Information Pamphlet.
The Naval Reserve Force subject is also part of the “Plebe Weekly Professional Book.” Lesson 16 of this required reading addresses the reserve organization, hardware/mission programs, reserve classifications, and mobilization. Each midshipman is assessed weekly for comprehension of this information by the chain of command tasked to administer the plebe indoctrination program.
Specifically, 38 reserve officers, exclusive of medical/dental personnel, are presently assigned to the Naval Academy and serve in a variety of meaningful and challenging assignments. Within the Professional Development Division, five of these reservists are assigned to the Department of Leadership and Law and six to Seamanship and Navigation. In addition, the civilian faculty at the Naval Academy includes 12 drilling and ten retired reservists. With this number of reservists dispersed throughout the organizational structure, the daily opportunities for information flow and role model leadership are great.
The Naval Academy’s approach to the Naval Reserve is influenced by the unprecedented changes to the Naval Reserve Force’s capabilities and mission assignments. Periodic review of our educational endeavors is a way of life, and we are continually looking for innovative methods to apprise our future officers of the important role played by this dedicated and talented citizen-sailor force. Guest speakers, such as Colonel Hays Parks, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve (the foremost authority on Linebacker Operations), who addressed all midshipmen enrolled in NL300 (Law of Armed Conflict) last June, help to “spread the word.” Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, himselfa reserve officer, addressed the entire Brigade of Midshipmen on two occasions in 1983.
In essence, the Naval Academy recognizes the importance of the Naval Reserve Force and will continue to aggressively educate our midshipmen about this contributing element of the Navy-Marine Corps team. The efforts of the Naval Institute in providing its membership with a broad exposure to the Naval Reserve issue is truly essential to the creation of a “One-Navy” mentality.
(Continued on page 126)
the "MEAN SIXTEEN" is the one
FOR PATROL AND PURSUIT....
Increased speed, durability, and cruising range are now available from Stewart & Stevenson’s new “Mean 16.” This 2000 HP high-performance DIESELDRIVE was adapted from the proven GM Detroit 16V-149TIB basic engine.
Its inherent, quick response will move the patrol boat from patrol speeds to flat-out pursuit in seconds. For complete details,
contact Stewart & Stevenson’s Marine Department.
STEWART & STEVENSON SERVICES, INC.
Wbrld Headquarters. PO. Box 1637, Houston, Texas 77251-1637 (713) 868-7700. Domestic Offices. Beaumont, Corpus Christi, Dallas, Lubbock, Odessa, San Antonio, San Juan, Wichita Falls, Texas; Denver, Colorado. Foreign Offices: Caracas, London, Maracaibo, Singapore; Al Kohbar, Saudi Arabia.
Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 28)
“Identifying Our Mobilizable
Assets”
(See J. D. Mead, pp. 153-154, October 1984
Proceedings)
Commander Kenneth J. Putt, Chaplain Corps, U. S. Navy—I am embarrassed! I could not believe my eyes when I read Chief Mead’s article and saw the naval enlisted classification codes chart. The embarrassment was to see the cutesy, bellringing inclusion of the photo and reference “CONSUM-MATE (CM).”
Chief Mead may think Proceedings is an in-house professional journal, but I have seen our superlative magazine on desks and magazine racks belonging to sea service professionals around the world. This item is most inappropriate.
To add insult to injury, I looked for the Navy’s fine new rate and badge of the Religious Program Specialist and found it missing.
Commander William D. Blevins, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I would be interested in knowing if many readers have written to ask about the “CONSUM-MATE (CM)” rating that ran with a photo of someone in the illustration accompanying Chief Mead’s article.
Was Chief Mead having a joke at the editor’s expense, or was the editor having a joke at the readers’ expense?
To whomever was responsible— thanks for a good laugh.
Editor’s Note: We have received lots of mail on this issue. The chart of naval enlisted classification codes we selected to illustrate Chief Mead’s article had one empty spot. Editors, like nature, ' ’abhor a vacuum." Our vacuum was filled with a photo of a naval reservist serving on board the USS New Jersey (BB-62).
“Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries”
(See C. A. Leader, pp. 92-95, November 1984 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Leader’s article is interesting, but I certainly don’t agree with it. I didn’t have to read his bio to know that Mr. Leader works for a management consultant firm and that he has an MBA. His statement that leadership and management are synonymous is particularly misleading.
The classic example of this fallacy in my time is the management style pursued by Secretary Robert McNamara at the Department of Defense in the 1960s. I am sure that Mr. Leader’s employer would classify Mr. McNamara as a good manager, but as a leader he was a failure. Some people, in fact, wouldn’t even say he was a good manager. An article in the same issue as Mr. Leader’s—“PPBS: Rude Awakening”—documents the failure of Mr. McNamara’s PPBS (planning, programming, and budgeting system) approach to the defense budget.
Mr. Leader’s discussions about the Japanese approach to leadership and management with regard to their industry were interesting. Having done business in Japan, I am always impressed at how they arrive at their business decisions. The consensus approach is a good one; they develop a group identity and a loyalty to their organization. Their culture certainly encourages this approach by supporting lifetime associations with their organizations. His statement, “What the Japanese businessmen have accomplished is no different ultimately than what any commander strives to achieve,” is certainly not correct. However, from a management consultant’s evaluation, which is the bottom-line point of view, it is good management.
This makes it all the stranger why Mr. Leader would advocate the German General Staff approach. The bottom line in the German General Staff’s business was winning the wars they fought. History shows that it was bankrupt in the long run. The problem it faced was relatively simple compared to that of the United States, yet the German General Staff didn’t succeed. The approach it followed completely ignored the value of sea power; its navy was given token support compared to the effort put into the army.
I can find no documentation that the United States in its deliberations on the unification of the armed forces ever considered the German General Staff approach for the organization of our services. I commend Mr. Leader for his reading the History of The German General Staff, 1657-1945 (Greenwood, 1953), written by Walter Goerlitz. I believe a good study of this book shows why that approach would never succeed in the United States.
Having been in the Navy for 43 years and served in three wars, I have had the privilege of working with some excellent leaders. From this experience, I have formulated my own requirements for good leadership:
- In-depth knowledge for the position held
- Enthusiasm for the work
- Self-confidence
- Integrity
- Ability to communicate verbally and in writing
- Goodjudgment(Thiscanbeoneofthe hardest qualities to assess in a leader. For example, Admiral Mitscher said, “Regulations are made to be intelligently disregarded.” This is good judgment.)
In times of strife and war, these six attributes can be summed up in two words: “Follow me.” And people who possess these qualities will be good leaders, whether they be chief petty officers or admirals.
“The Regulars Are Pretty . . .”
(See J. O’Leary, pp. 52-53, October 1984
Proceedings)
Sergeant Henry J. Vannelli, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve—I was one of those inactive reserves in July 1950 and overnight was activated along with thousands. I am a little bitter only as to the way we were activated and then, in a little over a month’s time, were rushed into combat.
I was one of the lucky “Retreads,” having seen some action in World War II- But many were not so fortunate; some with no prior training were sent to boot camp, but others were sent over “as is.’
There were men in my outfit, Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, who never loaded or fired the M-l, although some training was given on board ship en route to Korea. We even had some 17-year-olds.
Since that Marine Reserve blunder, the government has never, to my knowledge, activated an entire unit.
The payoff is that the reserves who went to Korea do not even rate a reserve ribbon. Maybe the colonel should do an article on that.
“The Helo: Potential Ship Killer?”
(See J. F. McGowan, p. 138, September 1984; C. Zartman, pp. 106-107, November 1984 Proceedings)
“The Loss of HMS Coventry”
(.See B. R. Lewis, pp. 141-143, September 1984; C. Zartman, pp. 106-107, November 1984 Proceedings)
A. D. Baker III—I concur with Captain Zartman. These photographs, taken by Dr. Robert Scheina in September 1983, show the Comodoro Somellera alive and well at Ushuaia, with her executive officer holding a newspaper headlining the events of the day in Lebanon.
The publicity for the “successes” of
Though reportedly sunk by British helicopters firing antiship missiles during the Falklands Conflict, the Argentine tug Comodoro Somellera is seen here in photographs taken more than a year after the last shot was fired.
the Sea Skua system stems, not unnaturally, from its manufacturer, British Aerospace, which has made a number of unsupportable claims for its performance in the Falklands. What is not pointed out, also naturally, are the Sea Skua’s weaknesses as a helicopter-borne antishipping weapon: It has a very modest range, and the target must be illuminated throughout the missile’s flight by the helicopter’s radar. While that may be a survivable engagement for the helicopter on a dark night against a 44-year-old tug armed with a ringsight-aimed, 40-mm., Bofors gun, 1 wouldn’t want to try it against anything approaching a modem naval surface combatant’s capabilities.
This is not to say that Lieutenant Mc
Gowan does not have a good idea in suggesting that shipboard helicopters be given a missile strike capability. Indeed, the U. S. Navy is currently being urged to adopt the Norwegian Penguin Mk. II missile to the SH-60B Sea Hawk for that very purpose. Penguin, unlike Sea Skua, has a fire-and-forget system with sufficient range to place the helicopter beyond the horizon range of nearly all Soviet defensive systems. Penguin is also one of the few such weapons which can be readily adapted to the lift capabilities of the SH-60B. Helicopter-carried antiship missiles like Exocet, Marte, and AS-15 are being used by a number of navies, and the concept deserves careful study here.
“The Sinking of the Belgrano”
(See J. Coote, p. 117-118, August 1984
Proceedings)
Desmond Rice and Arthur Gavshon, authors of The Sinking of the Belgrano— Captain Coote’s review of The Sinking of the Belgrano is so inaccurate that one must doubt if he read the book at all. His misspelling of Labor Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell’s name three times is symptomatic. His other errors include the following:
► Neither Dalyell, the U. K. media, nor we invented “with no obvious attempt at verification” the theory that the Belgrano was on a steady east-west patrol well south of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) when she was sunk by the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror. Verification is abundant, and not just from Belgrano's Captain Hector Bonzo or from one of the Conqueror's crewmen, as cited in the book. According to a Ministry of Defence document just leaked to Tam Dalyell, “the cruiser reversed course toward her home base at 9 am London time on 2 May 1982, eleven hours before the Conqueror torpedoed her”—clearly, the Belgrano constituted no threat to the fleet.
- Dalyell did not point out that the Belgrano was capable of 30 knots because she did not have such a capability. When first commissioned in 1938, she was capable of such a speed, but at the time of her attack, she was a 44-year-old relic due for retirement with a top speed of 18 knots. With her 15 six-inch guns, she may have sunk a Japanese warship at a range of 13 miles in under half an hour in 1944, but in 1982 the Belgrano was no match for the 15 British task force surface ships armed with Exocet missiles which have a range of 20 miles..
- Captain Coote remarks that only two of the 16 Argentine contacts we name in our preface are senior to captain. But if he had read the preceding page, he would have seen that we were also helped by “past and present foreign ministers, ambassadors, and military personnel. . . Many [of whom] requested anonymity.” Captain Coote can set his mind at rest. Much of our Argentine military information came from the high levels he evidently respects.
- Captain Coote challenges our belief— a belief shared by most of the rest of the world—that it was the sinking of the Belgrano and the killing of 368 of her crew that made the shooting war irrevocable, claiming instead that the decisive event was the Royal Air Force’s bombing of the Port Stanley airstrip about 0830 hours British Summer Time (BST) the day before. His explanation is very unlikely- The single Vulcan aircraft from Ascension did indeed drop 21 1,000-pound bombs, but only one of those bombs hit the runway, which still remained in service to Argentine Pucara fighters and Hercules transports throughout the conflict. In addition, the Vulcan’s bombs caused no Argentine casualties.
► Captain Coote writes that we provided no evidence that Peru’s President Be- launde had delivered a peace formula acceptable to both sides in sufficient time for the Conqueror to be warned off. We refer him to the transcripts (pages 84-93) °f the telephone negotiations on 1 -2 May 1982 between Haig, Belaunde, Costa Mendez—then Argentine foreign minis- ter—and Galtieri, which indicate that by 1600 BST on 2 May, Galtieri had told Helaune, who had told Haig—who at the time had British Foreign Secretary Fran- cts Pyrn with him in his office—that Argentina had accepted the Haig-Belaunde Peace proposal in principle and needed 0nly the Junta to ratify it that same evening.
Haig himself was clearly convinced of the agreement. “We reduced the proposal t0 five simple points,” wrote Haig. “Belaunde gained acceptance in principle from both parties, and on 2 May sent an official ... to Buenos Aires with the new paper.” And Dr. Javier Arias Stella, ften-Peru’s foreign minister, was as cer- ta'n that London was well aware of the advancement of the peace negotiations. He told us in January 1984 that he was in contact by phone right through that critiCal weekend with the U. K. Ambassador ln Lima, Charles Wallace, whom he knew well and kept updated on every development in the negotiations. Stella JVas sure that Wallace was in touch with London all the time.
' Finally, Captain Coote observes that how far the Belgrano was outside the 1EZ and whether she was heading east or West seems to have been irrelevant,” fince Admiral Lewin, then-Chief of L- K. Defense Staff, had made it clear foat “the Argentinians were served notice a week previously that their ships and airCraft would be attacked wherever they Were found, if their deployment could be c°nstrued as hostile.”
To this assertion, we have three comments. First, the deployment of the Bel- 8rano, outside the TEZ, sailing directly aWay from the British task force for 11 Pours before she was torpedoed, could hardly be read as hostile. Second, if Lew- ln s week-old blanket warning was dominant, then why on earth did he have to go fo the great trouble of calling the War y-abinet to a special meeting at midday “ST 2 May 1982 to change the rules of engagement to permit the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano? Third, the Conqueror had the Belgrano in sight for 30 hours before she sank her. If the 23 April hjanket warning was determinant, why ,td the Conqueror not sink the Belgrano jaght at the start, when the Belgrano may have been nearer to the British task force?
“No Bastions for the Bear”
(See D. B. Rivkin, pp. 36-43, April 1984; F. J. Glaeser, W. J. Ruhe, pp. 14-15, June 1984;
R. H. Smith, pp. 14-20, July 1984; L. E. LaCouture, p. 101, August 1984; R. O. Welander, J. D. Williams, p. 164, September 1984; J. A. Marcely, pp. 172-178, October 1984; L. Brooks, pp. 97-100, November 1984 Proceedings)
Carl H. Builder—Commander Marcely has faulted Mr. Rivkin for not discriminating between fact and speculation. He cites several specific examples but then goes on to comment on a more substantive issue: Mr. Rivkin’s proposal to threaten the survivability of Soviet nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in their bastions. But in doing so, Commander Marcely falls into the same trap and fails to discriminate himself between his assumptions and speculations.
Commander Marcely may be correct in stating that the Soviets might be unable to tell that we were attacking only their SSBN defenses, not their SSBNs. Likewise, the Soviets might be unable to recognize that U. S. bombers were about to attack their ships guarding the Soviet Union’s bastions, not its homeland.
All of this, though, is speculation predicated on assumptions about Soviet behavior under rather extraordinary circumstances. One could just as easily make the opposite speculations, as Mr. Rivkin has, by assuming a different model of Soviet behavior.
Since neither has clearly declared their models of how the Soviets behave, we must, alas, infer the postulates of their respective paradigms from speculation. Mr. Rivkin’s model of Soviet behavior says that they are smart, discriminating, calculating, and extremely loath to start a nuclear conflict, even if under pressure. On the other hand, Commander Mar- cely’s model of the Soviets suggests that they are likely to be confused by “the proverbial fog of war,” prone toward striking first, unsubtle, and ready, under pressure, to initiate a nuclear conflict.
Which model is correct? Who knows? Despite Commander Marcely’s reference to Soviet literature on these subjects, it is arrogant to assert that we understand anyone’s behavior, ours or the Soviets’, under the extreme circumstances of nuclear brinksmanship.
Commander Marcely’s speculative U. S./Soviet behavioral models are based on asymmetries in perception. He portrays a United States that would (or should) greatly fear escalatory or provocative actions which might stimulate the Soviets to unleash nuclear war. His Soviets show no such timidity; take away their shield, chip their sword, and they will bring on Armageddon.
Mr. Rivkin’s models of U. S. and Soviet behavior, on the other hand, appear to be much more symmetrical. Both sides would back away from being the first to resort to nuclear weapons, both afraid that such action could start an uncontrollable, suicidal chain of events.
If Commander Marcely’s asymmetrical models are correct, then maybe those behavioral asymmetries are the real problem, not Mr. Rivkin’s proposal.
Stripping away the defenses of Soviet SSBN bastions is an action fraught with enormous dangers for the combatants, their nations, and the world. But at the brink of nuclear war, wouldn’t that action be preferable to initiating nuclear war?
All options at the terrible chasm of nuclear war are likely to look bleak and miserable to both sides. Who shall have the least miserable option? Who shall be the one to keep the pressure on, or tighten the screw, without being the first to step over the edge?
Mr. Rivkin has outlined such a (miserable) option, one that might be more easily exercised by the United States than by the Soviets. Commander Marcely is concerned that exercising this option might provoke the Soviets to step off the edge, taking us with them. But at the brink of nuclear war, we don’t know how unstable either side might be or what options might provoke what. Mr. Rivkin’s option doesn’t scare me one tenth as much as the circumstances under which it was intended to be considered. Just because we don’t like the idea of maneuvering at the brink of nuclear war doesn’t mean that his stratagem for that Unhappy prospect should be rejected.
Even if the Soviet SSBNs in their bastions were attacked, it is far from certain that the Soviets would find themselves unequivocably in a “use ’em or lose ’em” situation. The Soviets have more than enough instruments with which to threaten us with Armageddon. Moreover, all Soviet SSBNs would not be at risk; their attrition would take time, providing days for coercive pressures and negotiation opportunities. This could put additional pressure on the Soviets; but which way it might drive them, to the table or to nuclear war, is unclear. For added perspective, one might ask if the U. S. would respond to conventional attacks on some of its SSBNs by launching its remaining SLBMs?
That’s not my model of U. S. behavior. But it is the only model of Soviet behavior that Commander Marcely invites us to use in evaluating Mr. Rivkin’s proposal to deny “bastions for the Bear.”
“The Role of U. S. Marines in
the Defense of North Norway”
(See J. H. Alexander, pp. 180-193, May 1984
Proceedings)
Jarl Storgards—Colonel Alexander mentions Finland only in a few sentences. However, in those few lines, he reveals his ignorance of Finnish (military) history. “[The Soviets’] recapture of Finland in 1944-45 against both the Finns and the Germans was masterful.”
When did the Soviets capture Finland the first time? Neither Finnish nor Soviet history books can tell us.
How can Colonel Alexander claim that the recapture in 1944-45 was “masterful?” First, the war between Finland and the Soviet Union was finished on 4 September 1944, so we can omit the year 1945. Second, how “masterful” were the Soviets before that? Let the reader judge.
On 9 June 1944, the Soviets started an offensive against the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus. The whole isthmus, approximately 50 miles, was defended by
- Finns. On the 16-mile wide westernmost part of the front, the Soviets had amassed 300,000 men, more than 3,000 howitzer guns, 600-800 tanks, and many aircraft numbering more than the total Finnish Air Force. The Soviet superiority in infantry was 6:1, in artillery 20:1, and in tanks 100:0. The attack was begun with one of the heaviest artillery concentrations of World War II. Against one Finnish regiment, the Soviet artillery fired 17,000 grenades in five minutes and
- grenades in under two-and-one half hours. After this assault, the regiment had to give way for 18 batallions and 200 tanks.
The Finnish Army was forced to retire to the north, losing only about three to four miles a day. After about five weeks and a gain of 60 miles, the Soviet advance was stopped by resolute Finnish resistance. The Finnish Army won several local victories; the Soviets found it too expensive to continue; and the offensive was called off.
According to Finnish estimates, the Soviets lost some 200,000 men during summer 1944, most of them on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviets lost about 700 tanks compared to the Finnish loss of 35 tanks, which, for the most part, were inferior, vintage Vickers tanks from the early 1930s, and probably the last ones in use anywhere in the world. During all of 1944, the Soviets lost some 1,200 aircraft against Finland, whereas Finnish combat losses numbered 84 aircraft.
Soviet military historians are not known for admitting setbacks, but today they openly admit that the Karelian front could not accomplish the task given to it by its Supreme Headquarters. In addition, the race for Berlin had started, and all Soviet troops were needed more urgently in Germany than in Finland.
Some ten days after the start of the Soviet offensive, Finland received German help in the way of one division and 70 aircraft. On 21 June 1944, the Soviets started an offensive against the Finnish troops north of Lake Lodoga, deep in Soviet Karelia. This offensive was also successfully stopped when the front reached Finnish territory.
During World War II, only two capitals on the European continent (excluding the neutral countries) were not occupied: the Finnish and Soviet capitals—and the situation in Moscow was a close call. In November 1941, the Germans were already in the Moscow suburbs, only ten miles from the Kremlin.
During the 1941-44 war, German troops were stationed in Northern Finland (Lapland), but there was no Soviet action worth mentioning against these troops before, or even after, the Finnish-Russian Armistice was signed in September. According to the armistice, the Germans had 15 days to leave Finland. In the north, with the long distances and poor roads, this was a logistic impossibility. Thus, the Finnish Army had to “help” the Germans get out; these somewhat bitter fights lasted till late April 1945.
The Finnish-Soviet wars showed that in modem warfare, superiority in manpower and equipment is less important than the will to fight, the motivation of the troops, and a superior training to use whatever equipment is available.
In our time, both superpowers have learned this lesson in Vietnam and Afghanistan, respectively.
“A Junior Officer’s Reading List”
(See M. N. Pocalyko, pp. 119-120, August 1984 Proceedings)
Captain James Drahos, Captain of the merchant vessel Biehl Trader—No matter what high-ranking future endeavors for which a junior officer might prepare himself, should not he have a basic knowledge of his country’s Merchant Marine? Lieutenant Pocalyko does include a category of “Maritime Affairs,” but where in his list is there a selection relating to the civilian sealift capability which the military needs to accomplish many of its missions?
“An awareness of history and world affairs,” as Lieutenant Pocalyco writes, is incomplete without an understanding of shipping. If Lieutenant Pocalyko’s reading list is to give a “full grasp of U. S. sea power,” then why is the Merchant Marine excluded? The state of the industry, technology in new ships, operations in the offshore segment, trends in ship operation and shipbuilding, and the condition of the seagoing labor force are all affairs that should concern the naval officer.
Marine EngineeringILog and Ocean Industry would provide an excellent start. Membership in the U. K.-based Nautical Institute and reading its journal Seaways would give the naval officer a broader exposure to international shipping in general, and the U.K.’s shipping in particular, since the Institute has close ties with the Royal Navy. A regional publication, such as the Marine Digest (Puget Sound/ West Coast), would provide the local focus for a home port. Specific parts of the maritime industry are covered in publications like Waterways Journal and National Fisherman.
While this short list is not complete or all-encompassing, it will provide the junior officer with a deeper appreciation of maritime affairs, not just of things naval in orientation.
“Not Ready on the Firing Line”
(■See R. E. Darling, pp. 142-143, July 1984;
J. E. Sheets, p. 160, September 1984; P. V.
Hanninen, W. C. Weikel, p. 172, October 1984;
W. J. Sweet, pp. 112-116, November 1984
Proceedings)
A. S. Bradford, Assistant Commander For Engineering and Design- Commander Darling is to be commended for identifying a current Navy-wide training deficiency and even more notably for outlining a concise plan for correction. However, I take great exception to his implication that range design criteria contained in NavFac DM-27 (Design Manual, Training Facilities) is the single most damaging impediment to an improved Navy small arms training program.
A primary concern in the design of any small arms range is the safety of people and property both on the range and in the surrounding community. DM-27, updated in 1972, and other NavFac range publications outline criteria for the design and construction of safe ranges. Insufficient funds, lack of adequate real estate, and administrative inconvenience must never be justification for relaxing safety- Many ranges, including those mentioned by Commander Darling, have been closed not because of outdated criteria .in DM-27 but because they were unsafe.
NavFac DM-27 will be updated in December 1985.