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Contents:
Navy Combat Rescue: The Forsaken Mission
Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries
AV-8B/LAMPS Mk-III LHD-Class Ships
A Conflict of Strategies
Are TAR Officers Necessary?
PPBS: A Rude Awakening
Ships That Can Deliver Military and Politics: A Bad Mix?
A Chinese Blockade of Taiwan
Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners
Protecting the Northern Flank
“Restoring Order” South of the Border
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Navy Combat Rescue: The
Forsaken Mission”
(See K. Sullivan, pp. 155-158, November 1984
Proceedings)
Captain R. M. Butler, U. S. Navy, Chief Staff Officer, Commander Amphibious Squadron Four—The accuracy of calling combat search and rescue (CSAR) “The Forsaken Mission” was repeatedly proven off Beirut in winter 1983-84. With two carrier battle groups (CVBGs) flying strike, reconnaissance, and close air support missions over Lebanon, CSAR was a “too hard” mission for the CVBGs.
The author noted that “the Marine Corps . . . does not have a CSAR mission requirement for the Navy.” Maybe not, but the Marines were handed the CSAR mission off Beirut. Almost daily for several months, our CTF-61 Amphibious Force staff assisted the battle force by accepting CSAR mission responsibility, and every time a U. S. Navy jet flew over Lebanon, we launched a Marine Corps CFL46 helicopter manned with a pickup Navy Seal and Marine Corps aircrew CSAR team and a Marine Corps Cobra gunship manned for CSAR shotgun duties.
Even though the mission requirement for CSAR existed for several months, and CSAR was a burdensome extra tasking for the amphibious forces and our embarked FIMM-261 already flying at sustained record levels, no effective effort was undertaken within the Sixth Fleet to equip the battle force with its own CSAR capability off Lebanon.
CSAR was not the only mission our CVBGs were ill prepared to carry out off Beirut. Even with USS New Jersey (BB- 62) and several gun line destroyers on line for several months, and CVBGs in support for the same period of time, when the first fire mission call went out for CVBG airborne gunfire spotters, the Marines ashore and our supporting arms center team in USS Guam (LPH-9) were amazed to learn that not a single trained airborne spotter was embarked in either CVBG air wing. As with CSAR, the amphibious task force Marines had to help out with the loan of a spotter because of another “forsaken mission.”
Commander Sullivan’s timely warning and our experience off Lebanon suggest that those who train and operate CVBGs
would do well to refocus on the required operational capabilities for power projection over hostile territory—close air support ordnance delivery, air spotting support for amphibious task forces and their gunships, and the capability to rescue their own downed pilots.
“Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries”
(See C. A. Leader, pp. 92-95, November 1984, J. T. Hayward, p. 126, January 1985 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, U. $■ Navy—The most glaring error in Mr- Leader’s paper is his assertion that “leadership and management are synonymous.” I think his argument is totally incorrect and represents dangerous, peacetime rhetoric. His contention is definitely not supported by any dictionary that I have examined. In fact, military examples for the word “leader” and “leadership” are common. I have yet to find a dictionary that makes a military reference to the words “manager” °r “management.”
There is a singular distinguishing characteristic between the two words. “Leadership” means to be out in front—in advance of our own forces. In °uf profession, this involves fighting, killing’ and dying. That is not synonymous with management.
“AV-8B/LAMPS Mk-III LHD-
Class Ships”
(See G. P. Tierney and M. W. Allinder, pp.
145, November 1984 Proceedings)
Major J. F. Jennings, U. S. Mari>ie Corps—Commander Tierney’s and Colonel Allinder’s article on the use of the multi-purpose amphibious assaujj ship (LHD) as a sea-control vessel should have caused red warning flags to go up aj Headquarters Marine Corps. If the LHH is used as a multi-mission ship, she wn evolve into a single-mission ship—an0 that mission will not be one of amphil’1' ous assault. .
Those of us who have participated 1(1 amphibious exercises in the last few ynarS have seen the amphibious command ship5 (LCCs) taken away from the landing force commanders to be used for fleet command and control and general pur'
140-
pose amphibious assault ship (LHA)- based Harriers diverted for amphibious task force combat air patrol missions to the total exclusion of their close air support mission (for example, in Northem- Wedding/Bold Guard 1982).
The Navy/Marine Corps’ goal for amphibious forces in the 1990s is to be able to deploy a Marine amphibious force and a Marine amphibious brigade simultaneously. In order to meet this goal, within reasonable shipbuilding constraints, the Marine Corps agreed to forgo dedicated AV-8 spaces on board amphibious ships. Even so, the projected amphibious fleet is just barely able to carry a sufficient number of helicopters and air cushion landing craft (LCACs) to land the assault echelon of the landing force.
More critical is the fact that each embarked helicopter will have to share its spot on the flight deck with two to four other aircraft. Therefore, the loss of even one LHD to the sea-control mission could have a serious impact on our ability to conduct ship-to-shore movements. The 15- to 30-day in-port time required for mission conversion guarantees that if an LHD leaves home port configured for
sea-control, she will be sea-control configured until well after the landing is over.
The authors identified a valid weakness in their proposal—pilot training requirements. We don’t get enough good training with AV-8s in their primary role of close air support now, and we cannot afford to lose training time to other missions. I understand the need for sea control and the problems of a Navy with too many oceans and too few ships, but we Marines need every square foot of amphibious lift and all the close air support we can get.
Go steal somebody else’s ship.
“A Conflict of Strategies”
(See V. H. Krulak, pp. 84-90, November 1984; D. Ross, p. 18, January 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander William E. Eaton, U. S. Naval Reserve—Someone should tell the Marines how to obtain the maximum strength out of sandbag walls, looking at the photo on page 87 of the November issue. Lapping bags over end- joints on alternate layers gives better strength laterally.
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Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Kutt, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—The Marxist-Leninist view of politics as a continuation of war by other means does not contradict the writings of Karl von Clausewitz.
General Krulak’s disclosures will surprise few. What many Americans might overlook is the nature of the influence of public opinion on the development of foreign policy and strategy. Technology and ideology have rendered declared wars passe. A combination of psychological warfare, terrorism, para-intelligence operations, guerrilla warfare, and traditional military and naval action each across a broad spectrum of intensity now provides for the achieving of political objectives “by other means.” The media cannot quite make foreign policy, but they can certainly influence it.
Over a period of several decades, military and naval professionals have been slow to recognize the evolution of modem political warfare and its impact on their business. The development of doctrine to deal with this impact is a complex task; in the light of national tradition, ethical constraints, constitutional law, and the ideological, even religious, character of modem conflict, it is reasonable to ask whether that doctrine is being developed deliberately, rationally, or ethically.
General Krulak’s considerable intel
lectual powers were simply irrelevant in the formulation of strategy to deal with that undeclared war. Averell Harriman.
Dean Rusk, and President Lyndon Johnson were all making irrational decisions- The political boundaries which made victory impossible and decisiveness unthinkable were drawn largely on the shift' ing sands of public opinion.
“Are TAR Officers Necessary?”
(See W. H. Langenberg, pp. 114-118, October 1984; A. A. Balunek, p. 16, December 1984 Proceedings)
Captain Guy Nickerson, U. S. Navdl Reserve—Admiral Langenberg does no1 claim that the Naval Reserve program has suffered at the hands of the training and administration of reserve (TAR) officers- In fact, he cites progress made in strengthening the Naval Reserve over the past years. It would defy reason to ignore the enormous contribution of TAR officers to this improvement. And yet, the author takes a “more Selective Reservist (SelRes) than thou” approach, failing 10 acknowledge that TARs are reservists recalled to active duty. In fact, they are included in strength figures for the Selected Reserve.
Until this year, about 75% of TAR °fi
fleers came into the program directly from the Selected Reserve, with the other 25% coming from reservists on active duty. Since 1978, the accession quality cut has been about one TAR officer selection from every three applicants. All male TAR officer selectees have active-duty U. S. Navy experience and warfare qualifications. Therefore, the only thing that distinguishes a new TAR officer from a hypothetical regular officer replacement is the fact that the TAR volunteered for reserve management duty and then was subjected to a one-in-three quality cut. He is also dedicated to a career in the Naval Reserve and has a vested interest in its well-being.
Admiral Langenberg’s main gripe about TAR officers isn’t that they perform badly, but rather just that they exist. He supports this complaint by citing that TAR officers influence policy and decisions far beyond their relatively small numbers, enumerating various influential (and demanding) positions held by TAR officers. He doesn’t, however, cite a single example of abuse, bad policies, or poor decision-making. Further, he doesn’t develop a single substantive area of his disagreement. In fact, his only criticism is his perception (certainly not conceded) that “TAR officer inputs do not necessarily represent the views of the Inactive Naval Reservist.”
What alternative does he offer? He proposes replacing TAR officers with regular officers. Does it logically follow that those regular officers are going to more closely represent the views of the inactive Naval Reservist? Or should this be the yardstick? What does count is the effective management of the Naval Reserve, and the TAR community is accomplishing this right now.
Admiral Langenberg’s proposal to replace TAR officers with regular officers is accompanied by his attempt to explain away what he sees as the three common arguments against such a scheme. First, he deals with the argument that we could not draw outstanding regular officers to the reserve program because of a possible adverse impact on their careers. He concedes, up front, that reserve management billets are not career enhancing for regular Navy officers, but he has little doubt that these assignments could be made career enhancing by specific direction from on high. He cites the “rejuvenation of the Recruiting Command” as evidence that this method works.
The truth, however, is that although certain assignment and promotion results can be directly ordered, attitudes and opinions in the community cannot be changed so easily, and controversial policies seldom outlive the policymaker. It may be enlightening to take a hard look at recent promotion figures for the fine Recruiting Command officers of today, working without benefit of the high profile that was developed under pressures to make the “All-Volunteer Force” work.
The reserve program right now is where the recruiting program was after the controversial end of the draft. We are riding the crest of a strong wave of support from Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins, Congress, and the Reagan administration. But if history is any teacher, this attention shall wane, and our star will also fade. The one constant, as the fortunes of the Naval Reserve rise and fall, has been, and will continue to be, the single-minded dedication of the SelRes and TAR communities to maintain the strongest possible Naval Reserve under existing circumstances.
The second argument that Admiral Langenberg dismisses is one that supposedly claims that the Naval Reserve is so unique and complex to administer that
full-time
- specialists are required to fill cla' t^lrouSh 0-6 billets. Instead, he aims that the Naval Reserve is no more
true h* ^an t*le re8ular Navy- This is w, ’ °ut the observation leads us no- Warf6 same could be said of one •hat ^ Community ubout another, but fare 'VOU!<^nt justify interchanging war- tr . sPcc,alty managers. Unique adminis- sh ? an(f training considerations arply distinguish the drilling reserve jyj11'niunity from the active-duty forces. „an:;g'n8 a part-time work force, with a h'3 k ^'""nlshed authoritarian controls, in '^"'y v°latile inventory, reduced staff- 8. and the special problems of demo- |Phlcs. is indeed different.
Nav t-16 managernent °f the regular 11 would make little sense to put a ace warfare officer on a staff as the ''‘•'arf"*3^31^ °ff*cer- An officer of any u r are specialty, however, could head aI"any administrative billets because of rep°JTlrn0nality °f administration among to°U ar officers. When comparing reserve cjCi^e8ular though, just the opposite ten- aU y aPplies. There is greater common- i. y !n the technical areas than in admin- re ra,°n' A reserve pilot fits right in with in®U ar Pilots in the flying business; it’s auministrative areas that he’s completely different. He works a different schedule, computes his pay differently, can relocate, change units, or quit at will; he has different fringe benefits, is promoted by a different process, is recruited and accessed differently, assigned differently, has vastly different competing non-Navy responsibilities, is treated separately by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and is separated and retired differently from the Navy.
One shouldn’t ignore these differences in administration between reserve and regular any more than the technical differences among regular officers of the various warfare specialties. Just as it makes sense to put an air warfare specialist in an air warfare billet, it also makes sense to put a reserve management specialist in a reserve management billet. The only place that this logic disconnects is at the top. The fact that a regular Navy flag officer is so effective in commanding the Naval Reserve is not because he has reserve experience or that the program lacks complexities (he has plenty of access to reserve management expertise), it is because he has not wavered from the U. S. Navy career path and, thus, is viewed as a full-fledged “player” with his contemporaries in the Pentagon who
can operate effectively at that level.
The third argument, said to be laid to rest, is the complaint that there is a shortage of regular Navy officers to fill billets in the fleet, therefore too few to man reserve management billets. Admiral Lang- enberg’s approach is simplicity itself: increase the inventory. Since this officer shortage was first recognized in 1946 with the establishment of the forerunner to the TAR program and still exists today, it’s reasonable to be suspicious of that proposed solution. Austere Navy manning and fleet demands could assure that filling reserve management billets with regular officers would be problematical.
Even if the above counter-arguments against replacing TARs with regular officers were discounted, there is still, under law, clear direction in assigning reserve officers to reserve management. One of the bases of the TAR officer program was codified in Section 265, Title 10 U. S. Code, in 1956. It says, “Each armed force shall have officers of its reserve components on active duty (other than for training) at the seat of government, and at headquarters responsible for reserve affairs, to participate in preparing and administering the policies and regulations affecting those reserve components.”
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Some have suggested that TAR offiCers are insulators between active and reserve, inhibiting the Total Force. I tank a more enlightened view is that they are facilitators, the glue that bonds these "'o factions into the Total Force.
Are TAR officers necessary?” asks dmiral Langenberg. I think the thought’ objective answer, unencumbered by u-interest from any quarter, would be an unqualified YES.
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TAR officers have been fulfilling this r°le for some 30 years. If TARs were Phased out, it would still be necessary to recall some other reserve officers to fill the “265” function. Those other reserves could be recalled for a short term of years, in which case the corporate memory would be routinely wiped clean, or |hey could be retained for longer periods.
retained for longer periods, the reserve Would maintain continuity and fully employ the expertise developed in these recallees. That would, of course, also be tantamount to establishing a TAR program by another name, and we would have come full circle.
Gaining commands are recognizing and helping to train their reserve augmentation units, and reserve units are provid- lng unprecedented service to their gaining commands. This is exactly as it should e> but it doesn’t bear on the question of who should fill active-duty reserve management billets.
The role of the TAR in the field regains that of facilitator, to make the Total Force” concept work. TARs will continue to cut orders, schedule the air- ms, and perform the myriad of other asks to clear the way for meaningful, 'cient contact between the reserve unit and its gaining command. In addition, hey will continue to take the burden of recruiting, assignment, accountability, advancement, pay, and other tasks from he shoulders of the gaining commander who doesn’t have time to chase those rab- ns. In that way, the parent command is assured of being a net gainer—receiving Production without the concomitant ad- ta'nistrative burden.
A Rude Awakening”
pee M. F. Cancian, pp. 44-52, November 1984 oceedings)
j”aPtain Joseph K. Taussig, Jr., U. S. avy (Retired), Deputy Assistant Secre- ^r- °f the Navy for Civilian Personnel olicy anc[ £quai Employment Opportu- 'ty—^ 1949> faced with the impossibil- y °f producing a sound “Atomic Disas- Plan” for the Pearl Harbor Naval ^ase, the late Rear Admiral Richard D. *uzen, U. S. Navy, issued the operations order, “In the event of an atomic attack on the Naval Base, Pearl Harbor . . . DUCK!” When called upon by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to “defend” his plan, Admiral Cruzen asked if someone could tell him where the bomb might strike and possibly how many might go off?
In retrospect, he saved his staff thousands of hours of work and reams of paper, anticipating Major Cancian’s point that there never will be enough resources to counter every possible threat.
“Ships That Can Deliver”
(See R. A. Stewart, pp. 36-43, November 1984
Proceedings)
Commander M. W. Shelton, Civil Engineer Corps, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Amphibious Construction Battalion Two—While Major Stewart’s interest in the doctrinal issue of whether the maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) role is amphibious is understood, his passing comments relative to the offshore offload capability of MPS are misleading. In addition, he fails to mention the key to any MPS operation, the naval support element (NSE). Without the NSE consisting of the naval beach group and the cargo handling contributions, the MPSs’ Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) can do nothing offshore and little pierside. The primary unit of the NSE for offshore offloading is the amphibious construction battalion (PHIBCB). PHIBCB Two is designated as the unit to handle the offloading of the first MPS MAB.
I take exception to Major Stewart’s statement that the MPS can be offloaded in a 50-knot wind and that a MPS offloading offshore may take longer “than the 12 hours required in port.” He has completely ignored such pivotal factors as sea state, distance from shore, and beach gradient. A more correct statement would have been to say “under ideal conditions.” The real offshore offloading parameters will only be determined under actual exercise conditions, but it will certainly take more than 12 hours.
Too rigid adherence to untested offloading timetables may lead planners to fundamental errors in assuming an accurate rate of buildup of combat power. While the NSE will give its all to meet the advertised offload time, U. S. Marine Corps planners must be intimately familiar with the problems which complicate offshore offloading and plan accordingly; doctrinal issues are just that. Real-world capability is something else, and that is what planning should be all about.
(Continued on page 92)
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Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 27)
“Military and Politics: A Bad Mix?”
(See R. R. Harris, p. 124, November 1984
Proceedings)
Captain B. P. Clark, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I believe Commander Harris’ story would have been strengthened if the question mark had been left from the title and the text eliminated. Officer corps professionalism requires members representing the ultimate authority of the state to eschew politics and to limit their statements in public forums (including at war colleges) to military concerns, technology, tactical matters, and strategy. According to the commissioned officer’s oath of allegiance, the officer is to obey the orders of the President of the United States and those of his superior officers and to support and defend the Constitu
tion of the United States.
The Constitution certainly empowers the Congress to make laws and to pass resolutions. Members of the officer corps should never fail to obey the orders (legal) of their superiors or to criticize openly in public forums the laws or resolutions passed by the Congress. The War Powers Resolution of the Congress certainly is outside of the purview of the officer corps to criticize.
Nothing prohibits a member of the officer corps from offering advice and counsel to members of an administration or to congressional committees if so called upon. This procedure has had many salutary effects for the nation. The members of the officer corps are respected for their knowledge and competence in the fields of military matters.
There is no room in our country for a
politicized military, as evidenced by 'I16 travails throughout the world such groups bring to their countries. In our countrys infancy, many of our military officefS were politically motivated, but this grouP survived only up through the Civil War These politically motivated officers w'ere found waning because they did not ser^ well then and would not now. ,
In the late 19th century, Rear Admir3 Stephen Bleecker Luce and General Tas ker Howard Bliss took leading roles 111 the formulation of plans respectively Navy and Army War Colleges. Thelt studies, too, had an impact on the U- officer corps. They studied in detail th® development of the German General Star and German officer corps concepts. After the Battle of Jena, where
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Prussians were soundly defeated by poleon’s tactical genius, the general - and officer corps concepts incorporate the revolutionary changes in sociolo^ and technology, modernizing the ancieij art of war. These innovations include - the institution of systems, organizati011' and specialized training; the developm611, of an almost monkish divorcement 0 military policy from political affairs* 3 hallmark in preparation for the evolut*0*! of a corporate anonymity in planning an command, emphasizing individual con* petency and responsibility; and the esta lishment of strict moral standards, in1® lectual attainments, and caste standard5.
These changes worked well to i® culcate a selfless devotion to the state'"' sometimes even to the extreme. The 1,3 tional policy of fascist states certain; failed, yet the military served well-
Officers must show restraint in the1 exercising the right of free speech. The- are leaders, representatives of the ul® mate power of the state, and individun tasked to support and defend whateve policy is dictated by the state’s top d®cl( sion makers. Consequently, they 111115 adhere to a different code of conduct-
If an officer believes he must enunci® views opposed to a given national poliO' he should either resign or retire, rath® than publicly oppose the policy he h3 sworn to defend.
The purpose of an officer corps lS serve the state and thus provide for ® state’s security. Consequently, devo®®
Jf
to duty will impose restrictions on military officer’s right to free speech-
the
unng a long blockade of Taiwan. ^iockade is a clear act of war. U. S. with Wor'(i public opinion, a Congress and Ltron® conservative ties to Taiwan, Wo i Pressure °f other allies in Asia a U ^ force the government to take Stat°n "^ile it is true that the United ea h S n° 'on8er has a treaty with Taiwan, it cl a(^m'nistration since 1978 has made in th^ has retained a deep interest pr , e Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan the o' iet Taiwan be strangled by People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Wo i ° Republic lies ^ unacceptable to other Asian al- ^ sUch as Japan and the countries of the s°ciation of Southeast Asian Nations. • . the present or near future, it is unlikely that the PRC would take
A Chinese Blockade of Taiwan”
{p‘e D- G. Muller, pp. 50-55, September 1984 Proceedings)
CNnin Michael Miller, U. S. Navy, The a 1,1 The National War College—
sent Commander Muller has pre- tell'6^ 3 Worthwhile, interesting, and in- >gent discussion of a potential problem aa ln tbe Pacific, I must, however, dis- ne^e vv'(h his basic premise that any Chi- Wn i military action against Taiwan 0fu ^ ta^e the form of a blockade instead nan *nvasion. Commander Muller ig- tic T CUrrent political, strategic, and tac- a realities that are likely to remain in- ®ntial in the foreseeable future.
(j ’^st> >t is difficult to imagine any Volv ^ministration remaining unin-
and
highly
^tlitary action against Taiwan. There is ho ^or action. The PRC now faces not * 6 ^orccs along two borders and does eastNVant anotfler military action to the ppr Unofficial relations between the the 3nC* Taiwan ^ better than ev^r, and ton StatUs 9U0 seems acceptable to all tier)Cerne<f- The PRC can afford to be pa- the °n tbc Taiwan issue. In fact, it is in ■pa- national interest of both the PRC and !*an to wait out the problem.
0Wever, if the Chinese decided to Pr .L^ifary action against Taiwan, they Pu b w°uld opt for a quick massive WqS i across the straits. The Chinese Outk See lb's as preferable to a drawn tio b 0c^a<fe with the prospect of intema- ^ nal support for Taiwan. They would t to present the international commu- cr, „w*th no chance to intervene in the
inflict.
Ta^*S°’ *n a tactical sense, a blockade of wan might not be as easy as it first In preparation for an invasion, a 0 carried out surprise air attack could t|)eerWhelm the Taiwan Air Force. Once *aiwan Air Force is neutralized, it $h . be only a matter of time until the Perior weight of invading forces wore
down Taiwan’s defenders. This would not be true in a blockade in which Taiwanese air power could be used to strike the blockading forces.
In 1977-78, as a student at the Chinese Naval War College in Taiwan, I participated in wargaming of the blockade and invasion scenarios. On completion of the wargaming, it was my classmates’ opinion, shared by me, that a PRC blockade of Taiwan could be broken by Taiwan alone. It was also believed that, with international assistance, breaking the blockade would not be difficult.
We found that a PRC blockade would not work unless the Taiwan Air Force was taken out of the game. Otherwise, PRC surface forces, especially those to the east of Taiwan, would have to operate in a hostile air environment without air cover. This they could not do. In addition, there is some doubt that the PRC submarine force could be effective in the blockade role. I know that Taiwan military planners would much rather face the option of breaking a PRC blockade than the prospect of an invasion from the mainland.
It is highly unlikely that the PRC will take military action against Taiwan. Strategic, political, and tactical factors argue against military action. But if the PRC does take action, it will be in the form of a massive, quick, and decisive invasion which will allow little opportunity for the international community to intervene.
“Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy Planners”
(See a. O’Rourke, pp. 74-78, August 1984;
J. W. Ferrill, p. 124, December 1984 Proceedings)
Captain J. E. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)— Captain O’Rourke’s fine article superbly portrays the characteristics, thinkings, likings, modus operandi, and career patterns of three distinctive naval types. Commenting particularly on naval planners, I wish to add a few less obvious categories occasionally encountered among naval officers.
The Navy, as do other services with the possible exception of the Air Force, suffers from a lack of continuity of long- range planning. Perhaps with ever- changing world events, with unpredictable annual military budgets, and with periodic changes in political leadership (and the resulting changes in military strategies), long-range planning becomes impossible.
Over a ten-year period, for example, the Navy went from a force of more than 1,000 combat ships to a force of less than 260 major warships. Now the trend has been reversed, and naval forces are building up to a goal of 600 major warships.
Similarly, U. S. naval strategy under Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was reduced almost entirely to convoying ships from the United States to Western Europe to support the battle on the Central Front. Now under President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, using initially the same forces, the Navy’s mission has changed; it is now to control the major sea-lanes of communication on a worldwide basis and to be able to go in harm’s way and attack the Soviets at their home bases.
Granted, these dramatic changes in force levels and politically dictated strategies make planning difficult. This still does not excuse our planners’ inability to assimilate the intelligence community’s inputs on Soviet naval capabilities and strategies and develop force mixes and strategies to ensure victory in a conflict with the Soviets. For example, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov for many years has relied on increasing numbers of long-range precision-guided missiles fired from Soviet ships, aircraft, and submarines to combat our carrier forces and to maintain control of his ballistic missile submarine sanctuaries. Furthermore, he has frequently announced and practiced the doctrine of massive coordinated missile attacks to combat our naval forces.
Realizing this threat, our planners, you would think, would have planned to build our major ships bristling with antimissile weapons. Instead, our Navy has recently built 31 new Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers with no Standard surface-to- air missile (SAM) capabilities and more than 40 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- class frigates with only one Standard SAM launcher. You would think our planners would have planned to provide our ships with sufficient defensive weap-
ons in their magazines to cope with massive and repeated Soviet missile attacks, yet carrier group commanders have repeatedly warned they would have expended their defensive missiles such as Phoenix and Standard after one day of
fighting. You would think our planners would have planned to equip our ships and aircraft with effective and available electronic and infrared countermeasures equipment; again, such has not been done.
It is easy to cite other examples of poor or nonexistent naval planning. For instance, although space-based systems have become increasingly important to our Navy’s combat capabilities and the Soviets have given every indication they intend to control space, our naval strategists and planners have not developed a plan and strategy for the use of space- based systems and for exerting military control of space in a wartime situation.
Another even more serious example of poor planning and strategic thinking involves the continued buying of tactical nuclear weapons with the deluded idea they could be successfully used in a limited nuclear war to defend NATO against Soviet attack. Actually, their first use would guarantee a NATO defeat and probably the destruction of the United States as well. The nonnuclear defense of Western Europe is both feasible and affordable, and plans and weapons purchases should concentrate on this goal without the distracting delusion of thinking tactical nuclear weapons could be used without catastrophic consequences.
In short, I can only concur with Captain O’Rourke’s conclusion that since the days of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Navy has been in the hands of “Lousy Planners.” Perhaps one reason for this is that the Navy has few strategic thinkers. Obviously, greater emphasis should be given at the Naval Academy, the Postgraduate School, and at the Naval War College to develop strategic thinkers and to expose all naval officers at all schools to the subjects of strategy, tactics, and current intelligence on Soviet weapons, strategies, and capabilities. If as much time were given to these important subjects in the naval officer’s training as is currently given to engineering subjects, the Navy would have more and better strategists, tacticians, and planners.
Since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan, there have been few noteworthy strategic thinkers, with the possible exceptions of Admiral Forrest Sherman and Admiral Burke. Presently, the Navy is fortunate to have an articulate, experienced strategic thinker at its head in the person of Secretary Lehman. With more emphasis on strategic subjects at the Navy’s schools, there is no reason why the Navy cannot have a succession of Mahans as able and articulate spokesmen for naval plans and strategies.
In this nuclear age, the Navy could also use an articulate philosopher or two. Actually, there have been few philosophers in our Navy.
The “Father of our Navy,” John Paul Jones, was a complex and remarkable man who had a philosophic side to his character. For instance, he once said:
“Tho I have drawn my sword in the present generous struggle for the rights of man, yet I am not in arms as an American, nor am I in pursuit of riches. My fortune is liberal enough having no wife nor family and having lived long enough to know that riches cannot ensure happiness. I profess myself a citizen of the world, totally unfettered by the little, mean distinctions of climate or of country which diminish the benevolence of the heart and set bounds to philanthropy. Before this war began I had at an early time of life withdrawn from sea service in favour of calm contemplation and poetic ease. I have sacrificed not only my favourite scheme of life, but the softer affections of the heart and my prospects of domestic happiness, and I am ready to sacrifice my life with cheerfulness, if the forfeiture could restore peace and good will among mankind.”
Another naval philosopher is Admiral James Stockdale. He first became interested in studying philosophy and in developing his own personal philosophy in postgraduate school at Stanford just prior to the Vietnam War. Subsequently, as the senior prisoner of war for eight years in3 Vietnamese prison camp, his philosoph) of courage and leadership was the sustaining inspiration that enabled most o his fellow prisoners both to survive and to maintain a united resistance in the face o enemy bribes and torture. Since his return from Vietnam, he has taught philosophy first as president of the Naval War Co lege, then the Citadel, and currently as3 professor at Stanford.
If Captain John Paul Jones and Adm1 ral Stockdale are examples of what the philosopher’s mind and heart can produee in the stress of combat, perhaps m°rij emphasis should be placed in exposing our warriors to the classics of philosophy' Perhaps we should follow the suggestion* outlined by Admiral Stockdale in h|S September 1980 Proceedings article- “Moral Leadership.”
One type of naval officer not men tioned by Captain O’Rourke, yet often ends up in the top jobs, is the poh*1 cian. In a government dominated by p0*1 ticians and the political deals they for?e' it is to be expected that some smart youth! officers take this route to the top. .
Most naval officers with a politic11 bent excel more at Washington desk j0^ where smart politicians flourish than the) do at seagoing jobs as operators. Most o these officers are taken under the wing 0 a senior military officer or political leadLf
who back their rise to the top. Some off1 cers are given top jobs because the pol*1! cal leaders feel they can influence the1 proteges’ thinking and actions. Occasio^ ally, the reverse is true, and it is the nav, officer who influences the politician thinking and actions, as was such the caSt> with Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.
Captain O’Rourke’s article will he looked at with interest and humor hf most readers. Navy leaders should take to heart what Captain O’Rourke says abou “Lousy Planners” and correct this frigh1 ening defect.
Hish
Embassy—While not contesting
fteb;
rs of the Brigade Headquarters, their j'l'sh and Dutch Marine units, and their arjne and Army supporting arms and ryices are fully familiar with the terrain ^ r which they might operate and are ler°ughly conversant with the chal- of fighting in the mountains of 0fWay in the winter. We have been dicing continuously every winter ^Ce 1969. (Colonel Ingraham will find
"firi
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Use our convenient order form in the “Books of Interest” section.
. . . May we suggest our own insignia tie? The tie, made of a silk blend, displays the Naval Institute seal in gold and white. Choose from a background of either burgundy or navy. $14.00 each.
FOR THE DIS CRIMINA TING DRESSER
Protecting the Northern Flank’
knf ^ngraham, pp. 70-77, November Proceedings)
^°lonel A. F. Whitehead, Royal Ma-
Jles' DSO, Assistant Defense Attache, arr: ■ - J
asic premise of the article, I was dis- PPointed that there was no mention of ‘O’s only specialized and dedicated Untain and arctic warfare formation. ,5 United Kingdom/Netherlands Am- 'bious Force, based upon 3rd Com. ando Brigade, Royal Marines, is a fully ce”ratcd Anglo-Dutch combat brigade, unsisting of four battalion-sized infantry 'is, together with appropriate artillery, t'neer, helicopter, and logistic sup- t^rt- Given an early political decision, g® brigade would deploy to Northern r°pean Command during a period of S|°n within no more than seven days’ P 'Ce- Our recent outloading for the ahnds operation is evidence of our P lluy to meet this target comfortably. e Hlbermore, the brigade is fully HUipped and trained for mountain and i'c Warfare and is ski-borne, every year the formation spends three nths training in the harsh environment j Norway in winter and normally partic- .... s >n exercises there with our NATO beJSS ^ur'ng the autumn as well. Mem-
M;
serv:
e details of this force in my article r*tain’s Sea Soldiers,” which the i aVal Institute published in its November l98' issue.)
Restoring Order’ South of the Border”
j?ee R- K. Kolb, pp. 56-61, July 1984; T. C.
°ne, B. R. Davidson, p. 99, September 1984; d 9- De los Rios, p. 172, October 1984; P. Y.
1 ^er>, p. 102, December 1984 Proceedings)
^eu'enant Elias Rivera, U. S. Navy— l^e are treated to an extensive analysis in fjf t a,d Kolb’s article of the military role . u- S. forces in Central America. His tty'ert'on t*lat 'here are no parallels be- (^een our current role in the region and e French and U. S. involvement in Vi- S|.artl, however, can be argued by a Hjhtly different reading of those same Kj)ns c'tcc^ *n Bie article.
”°tice the use of phrases “the sound
core of American imperialism” and “colonial infantry” to describe our policy at the turn of the century; they reinforce the impressions voiced by our antagonists in the Vietnam War. Quoting President Theodore Roosevelt on the “exercise of an international police power” reflects the tone of the U. S. presidential perception of the Southeast Asia debacle dating from France’s initial involvement in Vietnam.
The author, later describing the dispatch of U. S. forces to Managua in 1912 to suppress revolution, reveals that our men “died to keep a pro-American government in power.” Viewed within historical context, this generally meant the protection of a U. S.-led agricultural oligarchy which owned most of the country’s land and controlled its economy. Again, this mirrors the political picture in Vietnam when France propped up King Dao Bai as part of its policy to undermine Ho Chi Minh’s attempts to unify a partitioned northern and southern Vietnam.
Mr. Kolb’s description of our activities in Mexico hardly presents an exemplary picture of our government’s behavior. Military forces do not “find” themselves on the wrong side of a clearly defined border like the Rio Grande River unless they mean to be there. Add this, as described by Mr. Kolb, to President Woodrow Wilson’s mobilization along the Rio Grande River of 112,000 National Guardsmen, that there were nine clashes with Mexican regulars between 1918 and 1919, and that 129 Mexicans died in a skirmish with U. S. troops in August
- and 200 Villistas were killed in June
- during a major clash in Juarez, and we have begged the question of what our government would have done if the Mexicans had so brazenly invaded our own territory.
The Wilson administration’s “evangels of democracy” served to install governments in Latin America that gave us such examples of absolutism as Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and Anastacio Somoza (the elder) in Nicaragua. We can easily make comparisons between these governments and those of Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem, Duong Van Minh, or Nguyen Kahn between 1954 and 1964.
The author surprisingly provides ammunition to counter his own argument supporting military intervention in the Central American area. For example, the specter of “Mexican-inspired ,communism” mentioned by President Calvin Coolidge in 1927 seems to have fizzled out as a modern day regional threat. Maybe this was so because of our lack of major involvement in that country’s in-
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