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Having flown more than 5,000 miles from the mainland, our most westward-conscious President must have been pleased to set foot on the westernmost U. S. soil at what may be the best of all possible bases to support a new naval strategy in the Pacific.
Forward deployment in 1985 is most meaningful in terms of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Although strategic priorities do change, these areas are likely to be a principal concern to the United States for an extended period.
The Indian Ocean area is a natural arena for the operation of naval forces. The ocean is a vast complex of tanker routes with critical choke points through the Maldive- Indian Ocean passage, the Mozambique Channel, and the straits of Hormuz, Bab al Mandeb, Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok. More than 90% of Japan’s oil is carried over these routes. About 70% of Western Europe’s and more than 40% of U. S. imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf. Every day, about 19 million barrels of oil transit the Gulf. Should these sea lines of communication be closed to the United States and its allies, the consequences would be serious.
The Pacific is not only strategically important in its own right, but it is also the most direct approach from the center of U. S. continental power to the Indian Ocean. The projection of U. S. power into this area requires facilities in the Indian Ocean to base land and naval aircraft and for the repair, refueling, and in-port relief for ships of deployed carrier battle groups, Marine amphibious units, the Maritime Prepositioning Force, and the small Middle East Force. Currently, the prospective bases for ports of call in the Indian Ocean include Manama, Bahrain, the Persian Gulf, three ports in Oman, the Kenyan port of Mombasa, Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia, Colombo in Sri Lanka, and the British-owned Diego Garcia. There may also be opportunities for the use of facilities at Simonstown, South Africa, and Karachi, Pakistan. Plans have been made to extend existing Indian Ocean facility and acquire additional ones as political and economic considerations permit.
But no matter how successful the United States is >n acquiring access to Indian Ocean facilities, it seems inevitable that the major supporting structure for Indian Ocean naval forces will be in the Pacific.
The Malacca Straits are the front gate to the Indian Ocean. The Pacific is the highway from the heart of out main support base, the continental United States, to that gate. As the number of active ships in the U. S. Aee grows to 600 and as the tempo of operations in the Indian Ocean increases, the burden on the Pacific bases will mos likely increase as well. What is required of either a new nf expanded naval base is a good, deep water harbor, a modern ship repair facility, a medical facility, a supply com plex, ordnance and fuel storage facilities, a hospital, g°° communication and personnel support facilities, and a naval air station. Historically, the United States has centered its Pacific supporting structure on three indispens3' ble anchors: Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines. Monrecently, Japan has figured prominently in the support o Seventh Fleet operations. Each of these Pacific supp°rt complexes has advantages and disadvantages. .
Of all the areas available for expansion or construction of U. S. naval bases, Guam is the best prepared and has the greatest elasticity to accommodate an increase in dK tempo and volume of Pacific operations.
Guam has the best harbor in the Pacific between Mann3 Bay and Pearl Harbor. It has 80% of the capacity of Pear Harbor. It is within four days’ transit time to Japan, jhe Philippines, northern Australia, and the Malacca Straits- Units based on the West Coast of the United States are 1 days’ steaming time from the same critical areas.
During World War II, Guam’s deep waters in Apra Hat bor carried more tonnage than any other harbor excep Antwerp in Belgium. During the Vietnam War, the nava ship repair facility in Apra Harbor employed 2,500 ship' yard workers. Today, it is operating at less than half tha capacity. The facility has the necessary equipment to expand rapidly to full capacity. Machinery and facilities are rotated or routinely exercised and are in excellent condition. The core of the experienced work force has beef
stained. Local officials estimate that there is a readily available work force of about 1,000 men to bring the ship repair facilities up to higher tempos. In a few years, the total work force could be brought to 2,000 workers.
The requirements for a supply complex to support additional home-porting may be met by the Guam naval supply depot, which currently services both the surface and subsurface elements of the fleet and the air components at the naval air station. The depot facilities were originally designed to serve much larger fleet units than they currently support. These facilities provide a good base for rapid, relatively inexpensive expansion. There is a cadre oi well- irained, experienced personnel in the depot that could be easily increased from the local manpower base.
The naval magazine on Guam is currently operating under capacity and can provide the additional ordnance storage and handling burden that would be required of a home-ported force up to a carrier battle group.
A new naval ammunition pier in Apra Harbor, which will further enhance Guam’s capabilities, is under construction. There are large fuel storage facilities on Guam toat, if current plans are observed, will be increased at toast five times current capacities. Existing commercial storage and the Air Force system provide a backup to the uaval fuel storage reservoir.
There are four U. S. naval communications area master stations in the world, one of which is located on Guam. This station provides complete coverage of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. The station, with about 1,400 personnel currently assigned, has adequate capacity to handle any increased activity that may be generated from expanded naval force levels.
Agana Naval Air Station has the capacity to host a complete carrier air group while in port. It is the home base for two (plus) Navy patrol squadrons, and it is also used by commercial airlines. Andersen, the largest U. S. Air Force base in the world, lies north of Agana, and the two air facilities are mutually supporting.
Three of the four Pacific Fleet combat stores'ships have been recently home-ported in Guam. Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 3, available for deployment in September 1986, will likely be based in Guam.
There is sufficient naval housing on Guam to accommodate the crews of an additional four to five large ships that could be home-ported on the island. There is not, however, sufficient space to house the personnel influx that would be represented by a carrier battle group; this would require about 2,000 new family housing units. The commissary and exchange facilities on Guam are excellent. The exchange is the Navy’s fifth largest, while the commissary is the largest outside the continental United States. The school system is properly accredited with a student population of 27,000. The 425-bed naval hospital of the Navy Regional Medical Center is currently operating well under its rated capacity. Recreation facilities are superb with new, modern gymnasiums and other sporting areas ashore augmenting the extraordinary water sports of the Pacific. The same attractions that make Guam a mecca for tourists are available to the Navy residents.
Home-porting additional ships on Guam or merely increasing the tempo of port calls of major units of the Seventh Fleet have both advantages and disadvantages that are based on sound political, economic, and military rationale. The more significant advantages that accrue to an increased use of Guamanian facilities (to include home-porting) include Guam’s strategic location and the fact that it is the most Western extension of the United States. One cannot get any closer to the gate of the Indian Ocean and still be on U. S. soil. Expansion of facilities or an increase in personnel and ships’ use of existing facilities would not require negotiations with another country. As a U. S. territory, Guam offers political stability and the advantage of operating under U. S. law. (As a number of unfortunate and sensitive incidents in the Philippines and Japan will attest, operating under the laws of another jurisdiction can sometimes be traumatic to base commanders and their subordinates, who are not always guaranteed the same rights they enjoy under U. S. law when operating under status of forces agreements.)
Disadvantages to an increase in the Navy presence on Guam do exist, however. Experience indicates that there are both tolerable and dangerous military-civilian ratios in Navy communities. In situations where towns and cities are clearly Navy-dominated, where a great share of the population depends upon or indirectly relies on the Navy for its economic well-being, there appears to be a good relationship between military-civilian communities most of the time. Norfolk, Virginia, and Jacksonville, Florida, are examples of this extreme. At the other end of the spectrum is the situation where the naval facilities represent but a small part of the economic and social fabric of the community. The Alameda Naval Air Station in the vast San Francisco Bay area of California is such an example.
In the former, Navy-dominated case, the economic interdependence of the civil-military community is manifest and promotes cooperation. In the latter, civil-dominated case, whatever problems the military contingent may represent, they are relatively small and easily absorbed by the community.
Military-civil community problems arise when there is an ambivalence about the merit and contributions the Navy can make relative to other industry. The consequences of the mix in any rapid buildup on Guam must be considered. Since Guam has historically embraced a Navy-supported economy, there should be few problems of recognizing civil-military relations, but they cannot be ignored. A buildup, poorly coordinated with the civil leaders, could pose significant problems and could be seen as a threat to the Guamanian tourist industry.
In the near-term, then, Guam can easily reactivate and expand facilities and recruit work forces to home-port four to five logistic or amphibious ships with a total crew complement of about 2,000 men. No major military construction would be required.
There are other possibilities of ports and bases to sup port U. S. naval forward deployments in the Indian Ocean. These include those in Japan, the Philippines, an Australia.
The Japanese facilities are indispensable for Northwest Pacific operations. Japan’s strategic location dominating the Soviet Pacific Fleet base of Vladivostok and the egress routes from the Sea of Japan is an effective counter to the Soviet Union’s freedom of access to the Pacific. In recog nition of the significance of Japan’s position, there is creased interest in rebuilding the Japanese fleet to provide for control of the Korean Strait to the south and Soya Strait in the north, as well as providing for local air defense-
Expansion of Japanese facilities to accommodate the increased naval activity in the Pacific is a possibility- Yokosuka is a good harbor with excellent repair facilities- It has a competent, large naval supply depot and good, deep waterfront accommodations. The naval air facility at Atsugi, used jointly by the United States with Japan, is “ plus. In a negative sense, Yokosuka is a busy, crowde port that has little elasticity for expansion.
Sasebo, in the south, is also an excellent port that
served the U. S. Navy well in the Korean War. There are n° hospital facilities at Sasebo, and no naval air facility is In toe vicinity. Expanding Sasebo could be an expensive Proposition for the United States, Japan, or both. One of the biggest disadvantages to the expansion of facilities on •Japanese soil is that they are not American.
Subic Bay in the Philippines is one of the best naval complexes in the world. Wharfage, ship repair, supply, naval air, and on-base recreation facilities are excellent.
tions. Significantly, the logistic lines back to the continental United States into the Arabian Sea via Perth are 2,000 nautical miles longer than from the continental United States through Guam, through the Malacca Straits.
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has laid the groundwork for a 600-ship navy. The programs he has initiated will have a lasting effect on the maritime strategy of the United States. His concepts are anchored on an increased number of ships committed to operations far forward from
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Subic Bay is the closest currently operational U. S. base to toe gateway to the Indian Ocean. One drawback to the expansion of facilities to accommodate the expected surge of activity in this part of the Pacific is the lack of adequate Navy housing. Another is that one must assume that the Filipinos, having been very hard bargainers in exacting Payments for the use of our military bases in the past. Would continue to be so. Although it is not our purpose to speculate on the political stability of the Philippines in these pages, it must be a minus in consideration of longterm commitments to U. S. base expansion.
Australia’s West Coast, in the region of Fremantle (Perth), is enticing for its access to the Indian Ocean. There is a small Australian naval base on Garden Island about 30 miles from Perth. The advantage to Fremantle is that ships which sortie from the area are not required to Pass through the Malacca Strait choke point. Constructing facilities to accommodate elements of the Seventh Fleet could be expensive, however, for little currently exists to serve as a basic infrastructure for the support of fleet units. Notwithstanding the fact that Perth looks out over the Indian Ocean, it is a long view indeed to that portion of the ocean that is strategically important to the United States. Perth is really as far distant from the Arabian Sea as is Subic and is incapable of supporting Western Pacific operathe United States. The concepts translate to a greater requirement for advance naval bases for home-porting, resupply, repair, and relief of naval forces. All available bases in the area will undoubtedly require increased readiness to accept larger numbers of ships and increased tempos of activity. Of all the possible bases, however, Guam is particularly suited to serve the new naval strategy.
General Blaz was elected to the U. S. House of Representatives in 1984, where he serves on the Armed Services Committee and the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. Commissioned a second lieutenant in 1951. he served in a wide variety of combat, command, and staff positions before his promotion to brigadier general in 1977. He holds a bachelor of science degree from the University of Notre Dame and a master's degree from George Washington University, and an honorary degree from"the University of Guam. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval War College.
Colonel Scharfen enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1943. In 1967. he became General War Planner for Europe on the staff of Commander in Chief. Europe, and from 1972 to 1973 he served as Assistant Director of the Joint Planning Group for Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He holds a B.A. degree in psychology from Stanford University and an M.A. in international relations from Georgetown University. He has done advanced work at East Carolina University, the University of Missouri, and Boston University. He is also a graduate of the NATO Defense College. Colonel Scharfen is a senior analyst for TITAN Systems. Inc.. Vienna, VA.