Leadership Forum: The Spirit and the Sword

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By giving his life for Stephen Deca­tur, Reuben Janies proved that “in the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.” Tradi­tional military leadership will keep the Reuben James spirit alive in the U. S. Navy.

In his foreword to the 1984-85 Jane’s Fighting Ships, Retired Royal Navy Cap­tain John Moore states that there is “good news” for the U. S. Navy:

“Pride is the stepping stone to high morale and the best way of ensuring the deterioration of both in a ship’s company is to suggest that the people are being managed rather than led- The USN has made great strides in eradicating this approach; away from the cost-effective management analy­sis of the McNamara era.”¹

The Pentagon, the editor contends, has made real progress in recognizing that people are people and not “manpower resources.” He contends that this distinc­tion is essential when dealing with a highly trained, technically oriented vol­unteer force, contrasting U. S. Navy p^er" sonnel with “such groupings as the Ira­nian army of fanatical, semi-armed youths,” a group to whom the “odious term” of “manpower resources” may apply.²

Yet, the U. S. Navy’s own Leadership and Management Education Training (LMET) program, a training requirement for the junior officer entering the fleet, contradicts the “great strides” Captain Moore cites. LMET teaches leadership through the application of managerial techniques. The course is built around a group of “competency clusters,” the mastery of which is the key to successful management, and, therefore, the infer­ence is effective leadership.³ The pro­gram promotes the development of such skills as “maximizing resources” and “defining realistic yet attainable goals with the buzz words “time management and “delegation.” Leadership styles are defined as ranging from “the coercer’ to “the affiliator.” But these are manage­ment styles, not attributes of leadership- In fact, an effective leader could conceiv­ably be categorized in either of these management styles. The skills taught m LMET, although effective and useful, are the tools nevertheless of a peacetime Navy, borrowed from industry, and ap­plicable to only one facet of the varied challenge of the 1980s facing leaders in the fleet.

The Navy’s mission is to defend vital national interests in any part of the globe ^at any time. “Power projection” and “sea control” are the means to this end. In the 1980s, however, the concepts of “limited war” and “presence” often dictate actions by naval commanders contrary to traditional notions of power projection and sea control. Yet the terms “limited war” and “presence” are used more frequently to describe U. S. mili­tary operations and commitments. Into this environment the junior officer is not only thrust but expected to lead. And the tools handed to him to perform this task are “time management,” “delegation,” and a cluster of other “competencies.”

In the last two years, U. S. Navy oper­ations off the west coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador in late summer of 1983, in the invasion of Grenada, and in support of the Multinational Force in Beirut, Leb­anon, have been nontraditional. The real­ities of global, superpower politics sad­dled the local commanders in each of these areas with restraints far outweigh­ing traditional methods of achieving mis­sion success. More so than the others, the invasion of Grenada presented an actual military objective, readily recognizable by troops at all levels. But the quick withdrawal of most American forces after achieving those objectives serves as a reminder that the easily identifiable mili­tary objective is the exception in the 1980s and not the rule.

The leadership challenge, then, in this nontraditional environment becomes compounded. The determining factor here is the human variable, the people to whom Captain Moore refers. And the molding of this variable is the junior offi­cer’s clearest opportunity for making a significant contribution to nontraditional operations. Strong leadership each day is the cornerstone of the division officer’s job, from quarters through the working day and during those late-night watches which seem ever more frequent during long underway periods at Condition III. Leadership is a desired prerequisite to all the routine jobs with which the division officer is tasked. Clearly, “defining real­istic goals” and “maximizing resources” will help the division officer who recog­nizes what has been known in the Navy for years: hard work keeps sailors busy, reducing the problems often associated with long underway periods and uncer­tain operating schedules.

But just as clear is the necessity for a new “competency cluster.” Leadership techniques—military leadership tech­niques—and not management styles bor­rowed from industry are the building blocks of this new “competency clus­ter,” a cluster familiar in appearance and tailored to the contingency ops of the 1980s:

• Develop pride
• Encourage toughness
• Use the basic beliefs on which Amer­ica is built
• Develop teamwork
• Use the support of the folks back home
• Use the experience of those who came before us
• Demand courage

Captain John Paul Jones said in his “Code of a Naval Officer,” “It is, by no means, enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that, of course, but also a great deal more.”⁴ Implicit in that “great deal more” are the qualities a naval leader must instill in the men who serve with him. It is to this challenge that this com­petency cluster is addressed. The guide­lines listed have a familiar ring, because in various forms, they constitute the high-minded ideals which are handed to the young midshipman as the legacy of the U. S. Navy. The halls of our acade­mies, Reserve Officer Training Corps units, and officer candidate schools, the very places where the future officer is developed and nurtured, are dotted with the quotations and pictures of naval lead­ers of each generation, all of which elab­orate on the simple building blocks of leadership, the same building blocks the Navy has traded for management tech­niques in its own “leadership school.”

Just as the “rules” that govern military operations in the past 20 years seem to have changed, so too have the percep­tions of what constitutes a leader and the makeup of the men to be led. The over­riding movement during this period has been, ironically, back to the more tradi­tional leadership styles. Each of these building blocks, although traditional in appearance, can be the basis for daily ac­tions by the division officer in the envi­ronment of nontraditional operations. Use of these blocks will provide for the men on board ship a framework for the high morale and tough spirit required for the “uncertainty ops of the 1980s.”

Develop pride. A nonspecific term like pride should be reduced to its component parts—pride in oneself, pride in the divi­sion, pride in the ship, and pride in the Navy. Personal pride is the easiest to address. A division officer can have a major impact on the personal pride of his troops through the simple implementation of a military tradition. Inspect regularly and often. And inspect not just personnel, but also spaces. The troops may not real­ize it, but few things destroy morale more quickly than dirty heads or messy berth­ing compartments. The division officer can ensure that neither case will ever exist. In the past, prolonged underway periods have been treated as an opportu­nity to relax Navy grooming standards, but just the opposite should be done. Under way, there is no peer pressure from civilian friends, pressure that often manifests itself in poor grooming. And' the pride generated from a smart military appearance every morning at quarters can infect a whole division.

This personal pride leads to pride in the division. Here is an opportunity to em­phasize vehicles for pride that diverge from the mission of the division. Many ships offer activities to take the mind off of the job at hand (such as boxing smok­ers or acey-deucy tournaments); when entering the second or third consecutive month “on station,” participation in these activities should be ordered by the division officer. He must be prepared to make statements such as, “Yes, Chief, I know we don’t have any tiddledywinks players, but if this ship is having a tour­nament, then by golly this division’s going to have a team.” A sometimes grudging acceptance will eventually be followed with the high spirits fostered by team competition. The opportunity also exists to take an activity which is usually work, like lowering the boats, and turn it into play, like a motor whaleboat regatta. The recreation opportunities for the sailor at sea in an operational environment are so meager that no opportunity can be al­lowed to pass, and participation will nat­urally engender pride.

On the other hand, pride in one’s ship can be entirely mission-oriented. Here the line officer should remember that strategic and tactical considerations which to him seem commonplace, that he reads about every day in the message traffic and discusses over meals in the wardroom, are oftentimes unknown to the seaman—and more likely are heard about only as the subjects of rumors. The division officer can assume the role of teacher here, using this as a powerful leadership position to build on the pride each individual should feel knowing his role in the accomplishment of the ship’s mission.

Pride in the Navy as a whole is the eas­iest element of this building block for the division officer to develop. It has been on the rise in the past four years. Recent di­rectives from the Chief of Naval Opera­tions prescribing that traditional nautical terms, like galley and mess decks, be used and the standard maritime terminol­ogy, so much a part of seagoing life, are examples of the leadership Navy-wide that the division officer can tap. The slo-

. . people are people and not ‘manpower and resources.’ . . . And the molding of this variable is the junior officer’s clearest opportunity for making a significant contribution to nontraditional operations.”

gan “Not in my Navy,” originally used by the Chief of Naval Operations in refer­ence to drug abuse, has become a defiant and commonly used expression embody­ing the ways the Navy community per­ceives itself as different from and better than the population at large. The success of this leadership approach is now proven. Morale has risen. And combat readiness has, not coincidentally, steadily improved. The effective division officer can provide the same leadership in his own small sphere. President Ronald Rea­gan makes a great leader because people naturally warm to a man who verbalizes and embodies the beliefs and aspirations of those people. He is able to do just that. The same possibility exists for the divi­sion officer.

Encourage toughness. Former Presi­dent Richard Nixon wrote in The Real War, “We must face the stark reality, World War III has begun, and we are los­ing it.”⁵ He also stated that we are in danger of losing it without firing a shot, attributing this to the West’s lack of will. This frightening assessment comes from none other than the architect of detente and, yet, if these words sound harsh in the context of peacetime, they are never­theless appropriate when confronted with the challenge of motivating the sailors sent to fight against the enemies of free­dom. The junior officer must be unafraid to say we are at war. For the Marines and sailors who were on station in Beirut or involved in the invasion of Grenada, the reality of bullets being fired in earnest and friends and cohorts dying far out­weighed the importance of the stringent requirements of the language of diplo­macy. For men seeing front-line action, their job is made easier and becomes less of a burden when a leader tells it like it is. So this leader can say, “This is war,” instilling a toughness in his troops and in their perception of their leader that pays dividends.

Use the basic beliefs on which America is built. Americans wear their constitu­tional amendments on their sleeves: even a criminal is likely to “know his rights.” And for all Americans, these “rights” form a unifying force not unlike that pro­vided in Great Britain by the royal fam­ily. They are there to be proud of, to be guarded, and to be fought for if neces­sary. But to the young sailor who has not had the benefit of a college education, as his division officer has, a few reminders on the meaning of these rights can go a long way in justifying the sacrifices that he is asked to make.

The raw material for transmitting these reminders to the troops is already in place, the many “special occasion” mes­sages from the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the fleet commanders, the type commanders, and those commemorating holidays like the Fourth of July, Memorial Day, and Christmas. These messages regularly thank the troops for their loyal service and unflagging sacrifice and usually make reference to the basic beliefs on which America is built—our legacy of freedom, free enterprise, equality, and the inherent worth of the individual. Our troops are on station in these trouble spots as free men being led by free men, and this should be reinforced with the troops

at every opportunity.

All junior officers should read these messages verbatim at quarters. By doing so, the desires of the top leadership who draft these messages will be fulfilled. The opportunity exists, however, for the crea­tive division officer to do much more than this. The Declaration of Indepe'^[1]' dence and The Gettysburg Address, two of our most cherished documents and works hailed as classics of English prose, are seldom read by adult Americans, in­spiring as these pieces may be. A quote pulled from one of these documents and delivered at quarters in the context of the ship’s operations can motivate a sailor who is lacking inspiration. Our heritage is replete with many sources.

Develop teamwork. Inherent in the modern concept of a naval presence is the Navy’s ability and willingness to conduct prolonged operations in remote locations like, for example, our commitment to an ongoing presence in the Indian Ocean-