No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2

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In his 1984 prizewinning essay “No Bastions for the Bear,” David B. Rivkin, Jr., argued that a 15-carrier- battle-group, 600-ship Navy is required to support a U. S. forward strategy in response to an emerging and revolutionary change in Soviet naval posture. This new posture is the positioning of Soviet nuclear-powered bal­listic missile submarines (SSBNs) in bastions to target the United States from the safety of well-defined home wa­ters, including areas near or under the polar ice cap. With protection of these assets assigned a high priority in the Soviet Navy, Mr. Rivkin believes a major U. S. mission requirement is to combat the Soviet fleet in its home wa­ters with U. S. carrier battle and surface action groups, thus jeopardizing the Soviet SSBN threat. But there is another way—using SSNs as bastionbusters.

This essay will assess the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) threat and suggest how it might be met now and in the future. The proposed solution is central to the use of U. S. nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSNs) operating under and near the polar ice cap. The SSN can penetrate Soviet SSBN bastions at will.

The 600-ship Navy with 15 carrier battle groups is not at issue here. This requirement has been defended elo­quently by others, and without tying it to an anti-Soviet submarine bastion mission. At issue is finding the best way to jeopardize Soviet SSBNs in their bastions.

In the early 1920s, the new Soviet Republic was too weak to defend its Arctic or Pacific frontiers. To offset this limitation, Professor M. Petrov developed an “active” defense strategy for the Soviet Navy based upon its inabil­ity to exercise command of the sea (except in selected, important inshore areas of the Soviet Union). This “ac­tive” defense employed small naval forces designed to contest for command of the sea in the Soviet coastal areas within range of land-based naval aircraft.¹ This was a cost-effective but ineffective approach to naval warfare. However, there is a similarity between the “active” de­fense of the 1920s and the idea of the U. S. Navy attacking “actively” defended Soviet bastions with carrier battle and surface action groups. The cost would be high and the strategy potentially reckless.

The Soviet SSBN Threat: The Soviets most likely re­sorted to new SSBN types and methods of deployment for two reasons: the changing nature of the U. S. strategic threat, and the success of Western antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Traditionally, the Soviet Union has relied upon land-based ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for about 75% of its strategic nuclear strike force. These missiles are secure in their hardened silos if the United States maintains a mod­est retaliatory force of countervalue (city-busting) weap­ons. With notable progress in the U. S. strategic force modernization (consisting of new generations of hard-tar­get capable systems), the Soviets probably saw their stra­tegic land-based force in jeopardy.² Changes had to be made. Mobility was the Soviet response.

The SS-20 mobile theater system and the SS-X-24 an -25 mobile intercontinental systems (currently in ^test stages) represent the land-based mobile “fixes.” In ^ air, the Soviets are fielding new aircraft, the “Backfire and “Blackjack,” along with new generations of ^air' launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). At sea, new and revo­lutionary types of SSBNs and SLBMs have reached initia operational capability.

Since Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have lagged behind U. S. types in noise reduction and general quiet­ing, and U. S. ASW technologies have outstripped the Soviet Union, all but the newest Soviet SSBNs are both detectable and targetable. The defensive bastion concept then appears an expediency—especially if defended by major formations of the Soviet Navy in areas within an umbrella of Soviet land-based air.        .

Quantitative and qualitative deployment of new Soviet submarines and missile systems presents an unacceptable increase in threat level to the United States. Therefore, ^a method to successfully neutralize them is required. F°^r example, the Soviets have 80 missile-firing submarines (t° America’s 35) with a total of 980 launch tubes for firing SLBMs. Sixty-two of the 80 boats are modem boats. The 37 “Delta”-class SSBNs carrying SS-N-8 or SS-N-m missiles comprise the mainstay of the force. Flight testing of the new SS-NX-23 SLBM has begun, and the U- S- Navy expects to see it deployed in “Deltas” or “Delta derivatives in 1985-86.³

The newest Soviet SSBN is the “Typhoon.” Displacing 25,000 tons, she is three times larger than the “Delta and displaces 35% more than the U. S. Ohio-class Triden SSBN. Her speed exceeds 30 knots, and she is double' hulled with protected propellers for both survivability an quieting. The “Typhoon” carries 20 SS-N-20 SLBM^S’ each with a range of more than 8,000 kilometers wit eight to ten reentry vehicles. Without doubt, a mix ⁰ “Typhoons” and “Deltas” patrolling in protected bas tions poses a formidable threat to the continental Units States.

If U. S. carrier battle groups or surface action groUp^s were to steam into harm’s way in pursuit of Soviet SSBn in their bastions, significant U. S. losses would be ex pected from Soviet land-based aircraft, missile-firing ^sur face ships, sea-based aircraft, and Soviet submarin^e armed with torpedoes, cruise missiles, and subsurfa^ce launched antiaircraft missiles. This is particularly true ^ an East-West conventional conflict or in the early stages o a nuclear exchange.

The “Oscar”-class nuclear-powered guided-mis^sl

carrier battle groups. The “Oscar” carries 24 submarine- launched SS-N-19 antiship cruise missiles with a maxi­mum range of 300 nautical miles. She also carries 32 tor­pedoes, displaces 13,000 tons, and has a speed above 30 knots. She is an effective anticarrier weapon system, par­ticularly since her double hull makes her “virtually imper­vious to light-warhead, air-launched ASW weapons.”⁴ The third “Oscar” should be launched in 1985. It is also believed that some classes of Soviet submarines carry long-range underwater-launched cruise missiles every bit as effective as the U. S. Tomahawk.⁵

As Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, explained, the Soviet Union will probably keep its SSBN force under the ice as a secure strategic reserve, a war termination bargaining chip, and the ultimate “ace in the hole.”⁶ This option must be denied.

Meeting the Threat: Ironically, the bastion strategy is a tribute to U. S. ASW. Although it presents the U. S. Navy with a new set of problems, it also presents it with the opportunity to lock the Soviet Northern Fleet into a defen­sive posture above the Greenland-Iceland-United King­dom (GIUK) Gap and neutralize it as an effective fighting force.⁷

If it is true that up to two-thirds of Soviet general-pur­pose naval forces will protect Soviet SSBNs in their bas­tions, then an unprecedented opportunity exists for the U. S. Navy to neutralize these forces by ignoring them.⁸ What could be more cost-effective at the time U. S. SSNs are locating, detecting, and destroying the primary threat, Soviet SSBNs? Concurrently, in coordinated and timed strikes, U. S. Strategic Air Command bombers, armed deep open ocean, they are capable, especially with certain “upgrades,” of being effective in anti-bastion roles.

For example, beginning with the SSN-751, the subma­rine advanced combat system (SUBACS) will become pad of each Los Angeles-class submarine. SUBACS will up­grade the present AN/BQQ-5 sonar and Mk-117 fire con­trol systems, thus changing the entire combat suite, in­cluding electronic warfare, exterior communications, anu navigation systems. The second phase of SUBACS wit include an improved sonar suit.¹⁰ This, in combination with existing and developing terminal homing weapon systems, presents a lethal threat to Soviet submarines. In addition, all new-construction SSN-688s are being equipped with special high-strength steel hardpoints on their sailplanes for ice penetration.¹¹

The idea of a 100-ship U. S. SSN force was not univer­sally accepted as necessary to attack and neutralize Soviet SSBNs in their bastions. For example, several key Carter appointees in the Department of Defense questioned seri­ously the Navy’s priority for a contingency capability to attack Soviet bastion-based SSBNs and SSGNs in the Bar^ ents Sea, Norwegian Sea, and behind the Kuril Islan chain (northwest of Japan).¹² Now, it appears 100 SSNs are to become a reality, and pressure is increasing for 120-

But the Los Angeles-class submarine, effective as she is, is a product of late 1960s technology. As Admiral Wat kins said, “We cannot rest on our laurels. To maintain a competitive edge, we must continue to improve our cur­rent classes of submarines and design a follow-on subma­rine for deployment before the end of the century.”¹³ forthcoming 10,000-ton SSN-21 design will be quieter, deeper diving, larger, faster, and carry double the weap'

with standoff ALCMs, could rake the Soviet surface fleet supporting bastion command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I).

Thirty-seven U. S. Sturgeon (SSN-637)-class nuclear- powered attack submarines were designed for year-round Arctic operations. Many of these ships and their crews have had significant experience in under-ice operations.⁹ However, the most modem of U. S. SSNs is the Los Ange­les (SSN-688) class. Although submarines of this class were designed to operate with fast carrier task forces in the

ons capability of current attack submarines. She will sup port conformal sonars and sophisticated signal processing equipment, allowing for vast increases in passive son detection ranges at increased speeds. Conformal sonars (mounted on the submarine’s hull and conforming ^{t0 1} shape) will allow identification of hostile subs long bef°^re they reach their effective weapons’ range.¹⁴

With the new SSN-21 hunter/killer submarine in *^lC fiscal year 1985 budget, production should begin in 19° _ The first units should join the fleet five years later. 1

SSN-21 class will supplement the 62 Los Angeles-class SSNs the Navy plans to build.¹⁵ A key to anti-bastion operations lies in employing a combination of SSN-688s ^and SSN-21s along with other new and improved ASW technologies.

Both the Soviet “Typhoon”-class SSBN and the Arctic environment present ASW problems for the U. S. Navy. P°r example, there is evidence that “Typhoon” is de­igned to operate under ice, surfacing or at least penetrat- ^lng the ice for weapons’ launch, satellite navigation, and eornmunications. Her large reserve buoyancy, high main deck when surfaced, propeller/rudder arrangement, and *°w, flat sail structure support this contention.¹⁶

Soviet SSBNs, according to Admiral Watkins, are asso­rted with SSNs “riding shotgun for them.” The SSBN- SSN teams have demonstrated strong interest in operating ^ln the “marginal ice zones” of the Arctic.¹⁷ Soviet SSBNs will probably seek hiding places in the “polynya” (where the ice has melted), presenting U. S. submarines With degraded sonar detection and weapon systems acqui­^sition problems.

However, for surveillance purposes, the Arctic provides excellent acoustic propagation, particularly at very low frequencies associated with submarine blade rate tonals. Bven if the use of towed sonar arrays becomes limited because of ice damage, a possibility of air dropping “hard '^v>re” self-contained line and three-dimensional arrays for ^self-penetration through the ice, or even planting by sub­marine, seems feasible.¹⁸ Arctic sound surveillance data ^c°uld be passed to deeply submerged submarines through extremely low-frequency antenna fields using the pre­Cambrian granite underlying most of the Soviet Union, enhanced. Emulating U. S. SSBN operations would free the Soviet general-purpose naval forces assigned bastion defense for other purposes, and permit the dispersion of Soviet SSBNs into areas where their detection and de­struction would be less likely.

Assessing NATO’s naval capability, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, U. S. Navy, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLant), wrote, “Across the board, SACLant is currently about 50 percent short of requirements ... for carrying out the basic principles of NATO naval strat­egy. . . ,”²⁰ He continues, “If the Soviet Northern Fleet submarine force is not contained north of the GIUK gap, then the battle for the Atlantic and ultimately the defense of Western Europe would become critical.”²¹ In all proba­bility, the NATO general-purpose forces assigned to con­tain the Soviet Northern Fleet attack submarines are the same forces that would have to prosecute egressing Soviet SSBNs.

Beyond NATO’s ASW capability is the U. S. sonar surveillance system (SOSUS). The Navy relies heavily on this passive ASW system consisting of large arrays of hydrophone listening devices planted on the deep ocean floor and linked by cable to shore-based processing cen­ters. The success of SOSUS is dependent upon reliable C³I to direct SSNs and long-range ASW P-3C aircraft to localize the attack submarine targets. SOSUS is para­mount in containing the Soviet Northern Fleet submarine force north of the GIUK Gap. Even if the report claiming- NATO could ”... track only two enemy submarines at a time” is true, there remains little doubt that SOSUS termi­nals and processing facilities ashore are targets for cruise missiles launched from “Backfire” bombers or SSGNs.²²

Canada, Norway, and Alaska. The construction of low ^^ata rate, small, and highly survivable transmitter sites is Possible.¹⁹

What About the Future? The answer to this question may lay in the efficiency and survivability of Western ^ASW and the rate of advance of Soviet submarine technol- °§y. In other words, if the former decreases and the latter mcreases, the opportunity for Soviet ballistic missile sub­marines to freely roam the world’s open oceans will be

curve.

Another complement to U. S. ASW is the surveillance towed array sensor system (SURTASS) deployed on the new twin-screw, 11-knot, 217-foot, diesel-powered ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS). SURTASS augments SOSUS with its several-hundred-foot-long hydrophone array hooked to a 6,000-foot cable. The surveillance area covered by SURTASS is in the hundreds of miles, as com­pared to the tens of miles for the tactical towed array sys­tem (TACTAS), carried by surface ASW ships.²³ SUR­TASS, like SOSUS, is vulnerable to cruise missile targeting.

If U. S. ASW can be downgraded in the early stages of hostilities, and Soviet submarines become quieter and more capable, the future may reflect the end of Soviet SSBN bastion strategy in favor of open ocean patrols. Evi­dence exists to support the contention that qualitative im­provements are being made to the Soviet submarine force. For example, Dr. Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, warned Congress that although U. S. submarine detection technology, in­cluding silencing, is superior to the Soviets’, the relative advantage in technology is changing significantly to erode the U. S. lead.²⁴

During the 1970s, Soviet submarines showed little im­provement in acoustical prowess. Introduction of the “Alfa,” “Oscar,” and “Mike” classes demonstrated that the Soviets have learned a great deal about submarine quieting..²⁵ Now, they have a series of even quieter subs under development, and they appear to have a program to quiet older classes of boats. As Soviet submarines be­come quieter, U. S. passive acoustic sonars become less effective.²⁶

To further challenge U. S. submarine acoustic advan­tages, all new Soviet submarines have a several-inch-thick anechoic hull coating that degrades the effectiveness of both active sonar and terminal-homing torpedoes. A prob­able consequence of this technology is that U. S. attack submarines will need to approach the target closer or use active sonar—either of which makes the attacking subma­rine more vulnerable.²⁷

Other Soviet detection minimizing technologies include the reduction of submarine magnetic signatures. These signatures are important for ASW aircraft in detecting and maintaining contact with the target. For instance, the So­viets have used degaussing coils between the inner and outer submarine hulls. They also use nonmagnetic tita­nium alloy in the hull. For the future, the use of nonmag­netic fiberglass in Soviet hull construction is expected. Improved hull shapes, along with the application of com-

Silhouetted against the midnight sun, the Sturgeon-class Queenflsh (SSN-651) and her crew conduct operations in the Arctic. She and her sisters, along with the newest Los Angeles-class SSNs, which are under-ice capable, would do well in bastionbusting.

The U. S. Navy’s towed array system called SURTASS, deployed on new T-AGOS ships, like the Stalwart, opposite, will provide surveillance of areas in the hundreds of miles but appear vulnerable at the outset of hostilities.

pliant hull coatings, have reduced hydrodynamic and in­frared signatures. Improved propulsion designs are reduc­ing wake disturbances and acoustic signatures.² Sue Soviet actions may force U. S. ASW “behind the power

Soviet submarine designers have imitated the bionic principles of “underwater speedsters” such as dolphins, sailfish, and squid with special materials and technolo­gies. The result is submarine drag reduction (speed en­hancement) through boundary layer control techniques- With higher speed, deeper diving submarines, it becomes possible to operate in the deep sound channel (3,000 fee or more below the surface). This ocean environment de­grades surface ship sonar capabilities and increases the performance of the submarine’s own sonar.³⁰

Soviet submarine damage-limiting techniques for in’ proved survivability have been reported. For exampl^e’ Soviet submarines are all double-hulled, with spacing ⁰

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ing the Khrushchev years, the Soviets called aircraft car­riers floating coffins and tools of Western imperialism. Now, the Soviet Union has the carrier Kremlin under con­struction at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. (This is possibly the first in a series of eight Soviet high-performance air­craft carriers.)³³ If the U. S. Navy is to successfully de­tect, track, and attack Soviet SSBNs with minimal U. S. losses, it must emphasize its submarine force’s potential, without losing sight of possible future changes in Soviet SSBN operations.

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^UP to four or five meters between hulls in newer classes. This improves survivability from attacks by lightweight ASW ordnance. In addition, the use of two nuclear reac- |°rs and multi-propellers provides a hedge against disabil- •ty- For insurance, the Soviet Union uses a “two-compart­^ment rule,” meaning the boat can be surfaced with two nonadjacent compartments flooded. This feature is supple­mented by about a 20% reserve buoyancy engineered into *he boats, as compared to about 12.5% for U. S. subs.³¹

Overall, the possible degradation of Western ASW in ^c°ncert with a rapid improvement in Soviet submarine ^er>gineering and technology presents an opportunity for the Soviet Union to abandon the bastion strategy. Admiral Watkins clearly pointed out that there are aspects of the Soviet submarine program “we need to worry about.” He ^Suggests that “the new submarines are much quieter,” ^and the Soviets are learning to hide in the oceans much as ^We have learned to do.³²

Conclusions: U. S. carrier battle groups and surface ^action groups are not the best instruments for attacking Soviet SSBNs deployed in defended near-shore bastions, /he threat to U. S. general-purpose naval forces operating 'o these high-risk areas (within the range of Soviet land- ^and sea-based aircraft) appears unreasonably high. Present ^and future U. S. SSNs, aided with “on the shelf” and developing technologies, are better suited to take on this mission.

As the U. S. Navy develops and practices under-ice, ^aoti-bastion capabilities, it must be mindful of the devel- °Ping threat to Western ASW and of the advances occur- riig in the Soviet submarine service. NATO’s ASW forces ^today are reportedly inadequate to meet the Soviet subma- ^r’ⁿe challenge. SOSUS and SURTASS appear vulnerable ^at the beginning of hostilities. Evidence exists in support °f Soviet efforts to quiet and improve the characteristics of ^new submarine classes, making them more difficult to de­tect and destroy.

In the future, it appears the Soviet Union may emulate II- S. open-ocean SSBN operations. After all, a change in the Soviet mind-set is not unprecedented. Recall that dur- 'Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968), p. 13.

²The strategic force modernization consists of the MX (Peacekeeper) 1CBM, the B-1B bomber, air-launched cruise missiles, and the Trident C-4 and D-5 missiles to be placed in 0/tro-dass SSBNs.

"“Butts Briefs Hill on New Soviet Gains,” Sea Power, April 1984, p. 84. ■•Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Navy’s ’Silent Service,’ Concerned Over Complacency About U. S. Submarine Superiority, Concludes It’s Time to Make Some Noise,” Armed Forces Journal International, February 1984, p. 78.

"Wesley L. McDonald, “The Growing Warsaw Pact Threat and NATO Maritime Forces,” NATO Review, June 1984, p. 5.

"Edgar Ulsamer, “Bobbing, Weaving, and Fighting Smart," Air Force August 1983, p. 89.

⁷Hamlin Caldwell, “Arctic Submarine Warfare,” The Submarine Review July

1. p. 8.                                                                                                                           ’

"Caldwell, p. 6.

⁹Jan S. Breemer, “Battleground North: The U. S. Navy Plans for a Different Type of War,” Sea Power, August 1984, p. 25.

'"Schemmer, p. 77.

"Ulsamer, p. 89.

¹²Anthony H. Cordesman, "The 600-Ship Navy: What is it? Do We Need it? Can We Get it?” Armed Forces Journal International, April 1984, p. 61.

¹³L. Edgar Prina, “A Sea Full of Dragons,” Sea Power, October 1983, p. 59.. ¹⁴Defense Week, 11 April 1983, cited in “First Repeater,” Sea Power, May 1983 p. 30.      ’

'"Schemmer, p. 77.

'"Norman Polmar, “Sailing Under the Ice,” Proceedings, June 1984, p. 121. "“Marginal ice zones” mean areas of up to three meters thickness of ice that submerged submarines can break through with their buoyancy and special hardpoints. See Ulsamer, p. 88.

¹⁸Caldwell, p. 11; Polmar, p. 122.

¹⁹Caldwell, p. 12.

²⁰McDonald, p. 7.

²¹Ibid., pp. 7-8.

²²Manfred R. Hamm, “Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern Eu­rope,” The Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), 30 May 1984 p 14 ²³Prina, p. 57.

²⁴Schemmer, p. 78.

^“Quiet Soviet Subs Can Evade U. S. Defenses,” Defense Week, 16 July 1984, p. i.

²⁶Ibid., p. 17.

"Phoenix, “Emerging Soviet Submarine Technologies,” The Submarine Review, July 1983, p. 17.

“See Phoenix, “Soviet Submarine Trends,” The Submarine Review, April 1984, p. 24, for a complete discussion.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 20-21.

""Ibid., pp. 21-22.

³¹Ibid., p. 23.

³²Ulsamer, p. 89.

³³“Soviet Navy Takes a Giant Step,” U. S. News & World Report, 20 August

1. p. 10.

Commander Ackley, a retired naval officer, received his BA in history from the University of Southern California, his MA in political science from the University of Hawaii, and his PhD in international relations (defense and strategic studies) from the University of Southern Califor­nia. He is a graduate of the Naval Intelligence Postgraduate School and the Russian language course at the Defense Language Institute. He com­manded the USS Bream (SS-243) and Submarine Division 31, and he served as a naval attache to the U. S. Embassy, Moscow. A consultant to Science Applications, Inc., and Analytical Assessment Corporation of Washington, D.C., Commander Ackley is a professor of political science and the director of the graduate program in national security studies at the California State University, San Bernardino.