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By Captain Daniel S. Appleton, U. S. Navy (Retired)
A few months ago, a major symposium was convened at the Naval Science University of America to examine factors affecting the U. S. Navy’s ability to fight.
The following is an account of the second session of the symposium.
Vice Admiral Vincent Gresham, President of the University, began the session.
Members of the conference, 1 offer you the following Scenario: You are members of the staff of the Commander, C ■ S. Carrier Task Force 177, under way in the South China Sea. Satellite surveillance has told you that a large Soviet surface force has just cleared Cam Ranh Bay and is landing south toward Singapore at high speed. Suddenly, y°u receive the following message from the commander of {he Soviet force:
To the commander of the U. S. Task Force 177:
1- The Soviet Union has recognized the legitimate claim of the People’s Revolutionary Government of Malaysia (PRGM) to the effect that the Malaccan Strait constitutes part of its national territory. The Soviet Union has been requested to assist in enforcing the efforts of the PRGM to halt and inspect ships passing through the strait to ensure compliance with laws prohibiting contraband cargoes. 1 am proceeding to provide the requested assistance.
- You are advised that any attempt to interfere with my actions will constitute violation of international law and will be overcome by force.
- You are further advised that if you initiate use of nuclear weapons, I shall destroy your aircraft carriers and replenishment ships with similar weapons.
The question I place before you is simply, “What will your taskforce do?” To make the soundest possible deci-
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Proceedings / April 1985
sion, you will require some understanding of what has prompted this Soviet action. Let me give you a bit of help. Allow me to present Admiral P. Ulyanov, until recently Deputy Commander in Chief for Combat Training of the | will see, some or all of the steps to achieve this aim are already within Soviet capabilities. This is a most dangerous time for the Western world. |
Navy of the Soviet Union. Admiral Ulyanov. Thank you, Admiral Gresham. Ladies and gentlemen of the conference: This morning, I shall explain why a major naval battle between forces of the United States and the Soviet Union may be closer in the future than you may have thought, and further, why the outcome of this first battle could be critical to your country and to the world. To make these points, I shall describe the circumstances that led to the confrontation Admiral Gresham has suggested. You may consider some of these circumstances to be imagined. When they are all combined, however, you will see that they represent a formidable challenge. How real and how urgent this challenge may be is a matter you must judge for yourselves. First, I must tell you why I am in your country. The reason is simply that 1 have become convinced that the course on which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is embarked will, if not altered, lead the people of the world into tragedy. This has already happened in my country. Even Lenin believed it necessary to apologize to the Russian people for the course on which he had led them. I begin by explaining how the present master strategy of the Soviet Union relates to the future of the United States.1 The Soviet Strategic Objective: The Soviet Politburo does not seek immediate dominance over the United States because it believes this will come naturally over time. What is imperative to the members of the Politburo is the end of U. S. support of Western Europe. The continuing strength of Western Europe weakens the adherence of Eastern European nations to Soviet influence. In case of war, this could require a massive commitment of Soviet resources needed for other missions. Thus, they perceive the sustained material support and influence of the United States in Western Europe as an eventual threat to the security of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Defense Council believes elimination of this threat must begin at once. It advances two reasons for this urgency. First, Soviet political problems are increasing. National economic programs are not meeting prescribed goals. Pressures are building among the many nationalities within the Soviet Union and among Warsaw Pact states for greater autonomy. Worldwide communist parties are departing from Soviet party doctrine. Second, the Soviet Union now possesses a substantial military superiority over any combination of its potential enemies; however, because of the foregoing national difficulties and the growing strength of other world powers, this superiority may be lost within 20 to 30 years. Therefore, the council intends to ensure Soviet security for the long term while the opportunity to do so exists. Its immediate strategic objective is to eliminate the United States as a first-rank world power within 20 years. As you | The Soviet Strategic Estimate: The Soviets’ plan to achieve their strategic objective is called Endgame, a term familiar to players of the game of chess. It is based on the following assessment: .
By taking advantage of these conditions, the Sovie planners believe they can achieve their aims without en gaging in a great land war, a condition that is important to them for many obvious reasons. Their primary target Wj be your ocean transport. Their step-by-step tactics wi seek to deplete the U. S. economy to a point of nation^ helplessness before your public becomes willing to rests ■ Their method of attack will consist of three phases of in creasing intensity. Endgame Phase 1: At first, the Soviet scheme hardly be noticeable. In foreign ports, where your cargo - are loaded or discharged, terrorism and sabotage will m crease against harbor pilots, channel markers, dockwor ers, and port facilities. Explosions will be caused by 1"^ pet mines that cling to ships transiting canals. Ships narrow waterways will suffer breakdowns and rLl aground. Piracy and hijackings will double. Rumors 'V1 be spread about the dangers of manning any ship that c ries U. S. cargo. Labor and maintenance costs will |n crease, and insurance rates will rise. The few U. S. sW ping concerns that remain will fail at a rate even faS than the current one firm every year. . All these acts can be executed by “non-Russm11 agents and terrorists backed by “non-Soviet” organ! tions, which will do the planning, identify the tarSv” organize and direct training, and provide logistics, are aware that structures for these purposes already eXj‘ All that remains is for their energies to be focused of ships, people, and facilities that handle U. S. cargos |
| ____ _ / Anril i’85 |
Meanwhile, during the years of Phase 1, the Soviet Merchant Marine will continue its steady growth and Price-cutting policies until it becomes the leading carrier °f the world’s—including America’s-—ocean cargoes.
Thoughtful observers of international strategy will soon n°tice that these happenings are purposefully guided. However, your public has become so inured to the warnings of these “Cassandras” that their new alarms will hardly be taken seriously.
Endgame Phase 2: In parallel with their clandestine Measures, Soviet planners will have begun consolidating a global system of bases from which more powerful attacks can be directed against U. S. trade routes. Such bases can he established by means of treaties of friendship and nonaggression, trade delegations, agreements for economic and military aid, fishing agreements, and alliances for mutual defense. In some areas, local international conflicts will be of considerable advantage to the Soviet Union. Let Me be more specific.
Your government has declared 31 ocean trade routes to he essential for promotion, development, expansion, and Maintenance of U. S. foreign commerce. As you see from auy map of the world, the most vulnerable of these sea- lanes pass through the Caribbean, near the eastern and Western coasts of Africa, along the southern Mediterra- °ean littoral, through the Middle East, past the Southeast Asian islands, along the East Asian coast, and along the c°asts of Central and South America. Especially important "Muld be the critical choke points: Iceland, Gibraltar, Suez, Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Malacca, and Panama.
Some of the nations along these routes will be persuaded by Soviet advisors to establish control zones reading up to 200 miles offshore as territorial seas or as exclude economic zones. Similar zones may be “reserved”
Endgame Phase 1: “At first, the Soviet scheme will hardly be noticeable. Ships will suffer breakdowns and run aground. Rumors will be spread about the dangers of manning any ship that carries V. S. cargo.” The Liberian- registered Argo Merchant ran aground on the shoals off Nantucket.
for naval exercises or long-range weapons tests. Within such zones, ships bearing U. S. cargoes may be intercepted, trailed by fast patrol craft, warned to change course, subjected to low overflights, and even fired upon or boarded and searched. They may then be brought into port for lengthy inspections, have their crews detained or their cargoes confiscated, or be subjected to exorbitant fines and fees. Where regional conflicts are in process, the belligerent nations, guided by the Soviet Union, may declare blockades or announce intentions to take violent action against ships intruding upon “their” waterways.
If the foregoing actions prove inadequate, then guerrilla attacks may be launched from unidentifiable vessels or mobile launchers ashore against ships of Liberian, Honduran, and Panamanian registry, which together carry more than 50% of all U. S. foreign commerce. Soon, these and similar nations will begin to withdraw the privilege of flags of convenience from U. S. shippers.
Potential Consequences for the United States: The first two phases of Endgame will increase U. S. shipping costs to the point that your ocean commerce should be reduced by about two-thirds within 15 to 20 years. Think what the economic, human, and political consequences of these actions could be.
The industrial output of the United States could be reduced by more than half because of cuts in fuel, raw mate-
rials, and overseas markets. Your farming industry would be decimated. Your national deficits and rates of inflation would increase by severalfold. As costs of living and rates of unemployment rocket upward, your citizens would suffer drastic drops in their standards of living. Drug traffic and crime rates would soar. Fuel for transportation and heating would be rationed. Local law enforcement and fire protection services would be cut to the bone.
Inevitably, these human impacts would result in severe civil unrest. Massive demonstrations in major cities would require declarations of martial law. Strong political pressures would build toward accommodation with the Soviet Union.
All of these effects together would produce major adjustments of governmental priorities and thus lead toward wide-scale changes that the Soviet Union has long sought: general withdrawal or expulsion of deployed U. S. military forces, cancellation of many U. S. foreign overflight and base rights, collapse of NATO, abrogation of other Western collective defense treaties, and loss of remaining U. S. influence over control of the Panama Canal.
Endgame Phase 3: You may object that the United States would certainly not allow such events to go unchallenged. Your country has gone to war before in defense of freedom of the seas. Already, your President has declared certain ocean areas to be vital to your national security and to be kept open by military means if necessary. But the Soviet planners pose this most critical question: at what point would the United States resort to military action against Soviet forces? And what sort of extended war would you be willing to risk? Perhaps, a general war with the Soviet Union? A war limited to the sea? A sea war including use of nuclear weapons? Let us examine these possibilities.
To begin with, the Endgame plan provides that no single event within Phase 1 or Phase 2 could remotely justify, in the eyes of your people, initiation of general nuclear war. Indeed, many events similar to those they contemplate have occurred or are occurring even today. There has already been substantial impact on your ocean commerce, yet with no serious thought of so radical a response.
As the Soviet garotte tightens around America’s jugular, however, armed confrontations at sea are bound to occur. The first such confrontation will signal the start of Endgame Phase 3, wherein the next and final Soviet objective will consist of unassailable domination of the world’s commercial sea-lanes. And the critical aspects of this first meeting—whether a violent battle takes place, what weapons are used, whether a decisive victory results— will have much to do with the future of our world. Let me take you back to the battle scene.
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The Battle Scene: Now, you are again the commander of that U. S. carrier battle group in the South China Sea- Your force is in good position to safeguard commerce wit your Asian trade partners and to protect the more than 10 ships that transit the Strait of Malacca every day, many 0 the latter carrying crude oil, rubber, chromium, industria diamonds, gold, manganese, platinum, and silicon destined for U. S. refineries and factories. You have just received the Soviet commander’s warning to stand clear- You are also aware of certain characteristics of Soviet warfare which are not spelled out in the Soviet message- When this enemy attacks, he will attempt to overwhelm your defenses. He will focus his main assault on )/0^ carriers, antisubmarine units, and replenishment ships- He will attack your forces simultaneously at sea and in port!j bordering the South China Sea. He will employ chemica weapons without restriction. His submarines and shore- based aircraft are undoubtedly already within missde range, and many are prepared to fire nuclear warheads on command.
And now again, what will your task force do?
I will tell you what the Soviets expect you will do, today or 20 years from today. They expect you will retire without a fight. Here is their reasoning.
To begin with, the United States would not believe tha this battle could automatically trigger a general nuclei war. Therefore, such a prospect by itself would not detef America’s willingness to engage. However, your PreSl dent would have to consider very seriously the prospect o this battle’s escalating into a large-scale war at sea. In thts respect, he would perceive that the war-fighting capabiWy of the Soviet Navy exceeds that of the U. S. Navy s° greatly that, if this incident should expand into a grea naval war, the United States would unquestionably l°se' This audience will naturally argue my prediction ofS11 perior Soviet sea power. But you must understand m logic behind this Soviet belief; for if you do not, and fail to counter what the Soviets consider their special areas 0 overwhelming naval advantage, then the world may s°°n stand at the threshold of its final conflict.
The Soviets believe it to be common knowledge amonk military strategists that their huge submarine Hee ’ equipped with modem long-range missiles, could imp°s overwhelming burdens on critical operations upon whic your Navy has focused construction, tactics, and traimng- For example, your amphibious assault and fleet loglstl operations involve ships whose movements are so re
Proceedings / Apr’1 ^
stricted by their missions as to render them acutely vulnerable to attacks by these missiles. Convoy operations can be interdicted simply by inflicting damage upon sensitive cargo-handling facilities. Prepositioned combat support ships can be destroyed from long range even before getting under way. And, of course, your military forces Placed ashore in any distant land would be most difficult to support in light of the depleted condition and extreme vulnerability of your merchant marine.
The Soviets recognize that your Navy relies heavily on ,ts ability to use nuclear weapons to offset these Soviet strengths. Always, therefore, as part of the Soviet strategy, the specter of nuclear war will be kept before the eyes °f your people. The Soviets will continue using diplo- toacy, world propaganda, and your own news media to ensure overwhelming opposition to any possible use of nuclear weapons. Their success to date has been dramatic. The notions of detente and of freezing nuclear arsenals have been accepted in the United States with enthusiasm.
The Soviets believe that engaging in an outright naval battle would be perceived by your leaders to lead to certain disaster; either to a war at sea that the United States could not win without nuclear weapons, or to national suicide if such weapons are employed. Thus, they are nearly certain 'hat when this naval confrontation occurs, your force will be ordered to back down. But perhaps this certainty could be their downfall.
For you will also know that if your force turns away or 's severely defeated, your country will.remain in such desperate trouble that its only recourse may be to risk a greater war. If there is a battle today but no clear winner, 'he future could be equally ominous. Only if your force fights and wins a resounding victory, or if the Soviets avoid the engagement, will there remain a reasonable chance of preserving the American way of life without a catastrophic war.
As these two forces prepare to oppose each other, therefore, any Soviet tactical decision based on the assumption that the Americans will back down could amount to a critical mistake. The following would more likely happen.
As the U. S. commander, you will aggressively challenge the Soviet force. The enemy will respond with a massive attempt to win the “battle of the first salvo.” Your weapons will be in flight at nearly the same instant. Within moments, both sides will suffer enormous damage. Many hundreds of men and women will be quickly killed or wounded.
From this point on, the course of the battle will not depend on comparative levels of high technology; the outcome will depend on the skill with which those sorely wounded men and women are able to save and use the weapons and machines that remain functional. At this moment, naval seamen will become warriors. This is even more true today than in the days of the galleys or the great sailing ships, or of Tsushima or PearfHarbor.
The design of every modern naval ship, though it appears to focus on high technology, has come to place extraordinary reliance on human beings. The number of people in every ship has been reduced to the fewest possible. When a station calls for a man, his competent performance has become indispensable.
Yet in extreme violence, human beings in warships are far more vulnerable than complex machines. Human competence suffers not only from physical injury, but also from fatigue, fear, suspense, disease, hunger, exposure.
Endgame Phase 3: “The specter of nuclear war will be kept before the eyes of your people. The Soviets will continue using diplomacy, world propaganda, and your own news media to ensure overwhelming opposition to any possible use of nuclear weapons.” Antinuclear protesters demonstrate in New York City.
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and lack of trust in their fellows or belief in their cause. All these things affect their ability to fight and win.
Which side will prevail in this battle in the South China Sea, or wherever in the world this confrontation might occur? The side that will prevail is the side whose people are most superbly prepared to perform skillfully in titanic violence: that force which is composed of truly “elite” fighting men. Each side’s confidence in its possession of this extraordinary quality may decide whether this battle will even begin.
Toward the Elite Force: How can your naval seamen achieve this truly superb ability to fight? I wish to offer five recommendations based partly on my knowledge of Soviet aims and capabilities and partly on my limited observations of your people at work and in training:
► You must cease to distinguish between peacetime and wartime. The U. S. Navy is in as great danger now as it was in the days before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor. Too often have I heard your men say—even during battle drills—“We would do things differently in wartime.”
- You must be able to defend your ships in port at home and abroad. The Soviet Navy has a history of successfu surprise attacks against enemies in port. The potential for damaging ships in port has been greatly increased by long- range missiles and the underwater weapons readily available to terrorists.
- You must regard all naval ships as warships. I speaK particularly of replenishment and repair ships. Many Pe0" pie in your logistic ships do not think it important to be able to operate effectively in extreme violence.
- You must equip your ships to train themselves to fight-1 has been obvious that the battle skills of your sailors deteriorate rapidly after their ships leave refresher training-
- You must teach your people why expert ability to fight,s important. Many do not understand the threat they tace or the consequences to follow if they fall short of excellence-
Now let me remind you again of America’s critica trade routes and the bordering nations where the Soviets need support for their Endgame. Then observe which ° these nations may be already under a sufficient degree o Soviet influence: Iceland, the Cape Verde Islands, Libya-
“The survival of civilization in our time may rest upon the ability of the people in your fleets to perform magnificently when they and their ships have been sorely hurt.” Damage control teams fight the blazes on the USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) in 1969.
Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Ma agascar, the Seychelles, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghan1 stan, Kampuchea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Cuba, Peru. No ® that the plan has but a short way to go before it can be fu j implemented in a manner deadly to you. When it is imple mented, if it has not been already, the moment will come when great naval forces are posed against each other- I tell you that at that moment the survival of civilizatl0IJ in our time may rest upon the ability of the people in y°u
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fleets to perform magnificently when they and their ships have been sorely hurt.
Thank you for your attention. I have long been your adversary in politics but never in our mutual desire for the World to exist in peace.
Admiral Ulyanov, we are most grateful for your illuminating views and thoughtful recommendations. Let me include this session with two remarks.
The so-called Endgame hypothesis was examined before this presentation by several of our principal naval commanders and maritime experts.2 Their general consensus was the following:
t It is probably true that large-scale disruption of America' s ocean commerce could have many of the impacts visualized. However, the Soviet capability to cause such disruption, along with potential consequences and feasible counteractions, has never been thoroughly examined.
^ It is unlikely that Third World countries could be exploited in the manner conjectured.
^ It is beyond question that the United States would at some point go to war to defend its ocean commerce.
^ As long as we pursue our present goals, the Soviets will not possess the degree of naval superiority Admiral Ulyanov predicts.
These views you must explore further and take fully into Qccount.
There were some gentle smiles in this auditorium today as you listened to our guest’s presentation. Perhaps End- Same came across to you as fantasy. However, I trust you will also recognize that nearly every condition he described reflects either a well-documented professional aPpraisal or a fact demonstrated by recent history. What Admiral Ulyanov has done for us is fit many pieces together. Whether or not these various fragments represent components of a cohesive plan, the picture that emerges is °ne of immense and imminent danger to the Free World.
I note that a high-level Soviet official has taken pains to Point out that the United States imports 69 of the 72 mate- r>als without which its industry and military could not
U. S. NAVY (L T. HENDERSON)
function and that 99% of these materials are transported by sea. That official is Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy for nearly three decades.
Members of the symposium, if you believe that the Soviet Union possesses a realistic capability to disrupt the ocean commerce of the United States, then you must ask why they should not choose to execute that capability ar any moment. If and when they do, there will be little to stop them but our national resolve and our Navy’s ability to fight.3 'The Soviet strategy described is based in part on logic suggested by E. N. Lutt- wak s The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983).
2Although the scenario is fictional and the Soviet plan is hypothetical, the cited consensus of maritime authorities is factual. Those who offered substantive comments included the commanders in chief of the U. S. Atlantic and Pacific commands and of U. S. Naval Forces, Europe; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy (Retired); the intelligence staff of the Chief of Naval Operations; and principal associates of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping, the Transportation Institute, the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the Strategy Department of the U. S. Naval War College, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Shipbuilders Council of America, and National Defense magazine. Advice was received from Rear Admiral E. J. Otth, U. S. Navy (Retired); Captain W. J. Ruhe, U. S. Navy (Retired), publisher of Submarine Review; John M. Rau, former president of the Navy League of the United States; Rear Admiral E. A. Rodgers, U. S. Maritime Service (Retired), former Superintendent of the Maine Maritime Academy; Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired), former commander of the U. S. Second and Sixth fleets; Professor Kenneth E. Boulding; and Professor John L. King. Commander Frederick C. Dyer, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), George H. Conrad, Captain William H. MacFaden of the SS B.T. San Diego, and my wife and sons provided valuable critical reviews.
3An annotated bibliography can be obtained by writing the author in care of U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, MD 21402.
Captain Appleton is a graduate of the Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree in information systems management and a doctorate in administrative management from the University of California. He has served in battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious force ships and has held four sea commands. Captain Appleton was the winner of the Education and Training Minicontest with his article, “Shipboard Training: The Team’s the Thing,’’ published in October 1983.