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In wartime, the United States must supply the arms and logistics support required by NATO to win. To accomplish this mission, the U. S. Navy will have to protect the SLOCs and use convoys, whose advantages again were demonstrated in exercise Mardez. Here, a merchant ship awaits a convoy escort to Europe as a U. S. Coast Guard patrol boat leads the Canadian frigate Nipigon out of Boston Harbor.
During the past decade, U. S. foreign policy has undergone fundamental changes, and the Soviet Union has emerged as a major naval power with a formidable blue-water navy. Is the current naval policy of the United States the best suited to meet the challenges most likely to be encountered in this changed international politico-military milieu?
Peacetime naval policy should be based upon the interaction of at least two major determinants: (1) national strategy and (2) the tactical environment in which the
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Navy will be initially called upon to fight. Let us, therefore, examine these factors in order to determine what our peacetime naval policy should be. We should then compare that policy with actual policy as reflected in the missions, composition, and readiness of the Navy in order to determine what corrective actions are prudent.
National Strategy: The basic peacetime military strategy of the United States is to maintain an armed force of sufficient size and readiness to provide a credible deterrent to aggression against it or its allies. If deterrence fails, the United States is to be ready initially with those forces to engage in nuclear war, conventional general war, or limited war until the country has mobilized as necessary. Also, the United States must be ready to respond rapidly and effectively to international acts of hooliganism or terrorism inimical to its honor or best interests.
Regarding nuclear war, the nuclear standoff that now exists between the superpowers rests on the sobering fact that either side can inflict massive destruction on the other, even after a first strike by one. This mutual deterrence will continue as long as both sides maintain credible strategic nuclear strike forces. Therefore, the maintenance of a viable strategic nuclear deterrent capability must be the linchpin of military policy and readiness.
In the case of a conventional war, the Nixon Doctrine reiterates the historical primacy of unlimited military and logistics support to NATO and, in terms of “no more Vi- etnams,” calls for practically unlimited arms and logistics support to indigenous troops elsewhere to effect local containments. Application of this doctrine depends upon the Navy’s ability to maintain the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between America’s “arsenal of democracy” and its allies overseas, particularly NATO.
The War Powers Act precludes a president from deploying offensive military forces overseas for more than 60 days without the approval of Congress. This congressional control leads to the conclusion that there now exists a diminished probability of any precipitous projection of our military forces overseas in peacetime—even in support of NATO.
Hence, a peacetime investment in the power projection of troops is valid only insofar as is justified by the 60-day constraint. For any situation in the future that might cause Congress to extend or rescind that constraint will most likely also result in the declaration of a national emergency and the calling up of reserves. That is one of the primary politico-military lessons of the Vietnam Conflict: should the United States get involved again in a foreign military venture, it should go into it with the entire moral, political, and material resources of the country united behind the effort, or it should stay out. Thus, the Nixon Doctrine and the War Powers Act, singly or in combination, represent significant changes in national strategy and policy compared to the past when President John F. Kennedy spoke of opposing “any foe.”1
These changes, translated into naval policy, dictate that a primary mission of the Navy in case of a conventional general war must be to maintain the SLOCs with our overseas allies, particularly NATO, until the nation can mobilize. This does not mean that power projection functions should or can be disregarded. On the contrary, such forces, both in terms of carrier-oriented battle groups and amphibious warfare components, must be maintained not only as deterrents, but also as the offensive elements in case of a conventional general war. These forces must be maintained also as quick-reaction forces in case of peacetime crises in areas of vital national interest or honor, such as the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Mayaguez incident. But, again, the size and composition of such forces should be kept in perspective with the contraints imposed by the War Powers Act.
Tactical Environment: Today, the Soviet Navy has more than 300 submarines. Little noticed, but vital to a logistics-dependent national strategy, is the fact that all of the conventionally powered units are equal in performance, or superior, to the formidable Type XXI U-boats that Germany was just starting to deploy toward the end of World War II. The Soviet Union openly admits that a primary mission of its undersea fleet is the same as Germany’s: interdiction of the SLOCs between the United States and its allies.2 Failure to provide against the unrestricted use of that force from the outset of either a limited or general war would be to ignore the decisive results nearly achieved twice thus far this century by the submarine version of the guerre de course. Despite the fact that the submarines involved initially numbered only about one-fifth the current number of conventional units in the Soviet underseas fleet, they were infinitely less capable than the Soviets’ modem units, and were not used in an unrestricted manner until well after hostilities had begun.
Naval policy, in order to conform with present national strategy and the threat, should give top priority to the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent force. It should then maintain conventional forces, which in case of a conventional general war would have as a primary mission the preservation of our SLOCs to ensure the uninterrupted flow of military and logistics support to our overseas allies while the country mobilizes. Finally, the Navy must be ready to deploy forces rapidly in response to international acts of hooliganism or terrorism. Let us compare this model with actual naval policy in terms of the current missions, composition, and readiness of the Navy.
Missions and Composition: The top priority currently assigned to the submarine-launched ballistic missile capability and the unparalleled readiness of those forces prove that, in the nuclear war area, naval policy is in harmony with national strategy to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force.
However, the same cannot be said for the conventional war area. Even a cursory examination of the missions and composition of the conventional forces reveals that the primary mission of sea control has been construed to mean power projection as evidenced by the amount of total resources allocated to carrier strike (i.e., battle groups) and amphibious assault forces. This indicates that the Navy is still structured to fight the battles of yesteryear—carrier air strikes against land targets and massive over-the- beach-type amphibious assaults against heavily defended enemy beaches—rather than to maintain our SLOCs in accordance with current national strategy.
The size of the carrier force is supported by current naval policy that is based partly upon the goal of increasing the existing 13 battle groups to 15 as part of the overall expansion of the Navy under the Reagan administration. The emphasis on power projection by naval air also stems from U. S. naval policy that is based largely on the principle that “the U. S. Navy provides the bulk of offensively
The Navy should assign at least the same priority to the direct protection of the SLOCs as to power projection missions, dedicating aircraft like the Hornet, above, to antiair warfare missions and replacing aircraft currently on our amphibious warfare ships like the Sea Stallion, facing page, with ASW aircraft.
capable forces [battle groups] while the allies complement our effort with forces for convoy escort, mine clearance, and port protection.” Significantly, this policy statement was made in conjunction with the “hope that the capability to control the SLOCs would never have to be demonstrated in combat.”3
This continued fixation on the power projection mission of the carrier Navy is deeply rooted in the past. In the early post-World War II days, the Navy fought for and won a
share of the strategic nuclear deterrent mission for its carriers. In the process, it was forced to adopt, at least partially, a continental strategy of bombing land targets well inland that had no direct relationship to naval operations. Given the high national priority accorded this Navy SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) mission until the mid- 1960s, it is understandable how it became in fact the Navy’s primary mission for two decades.
But, by 1965, the Navy’s share of the SIOP mission had been assumed essentially by the Polaris ballistic missilefiring submarines. Hence, attack carriers were no longer required as the primary naval force to carry out the mission; therefore, their missions and tasks could have reverted to those normally associated with being “basically mobile tactical airfields.”4 But the Vietnam War rationalized keeping the strategic bombing mission for attack carriers long after the mission could, and should, have been carried out exclusively by the Air Force. Since then, the projection of power mission of carriers has been sustained by a naval philosophy that reaches back further and deeper than interservice wrangling between the Navy and the Air Force over missions.
U. S. naval thinking and policy are still greatly influenced by the “principles” enunciated by Alfred Thayer Mahan almost a century ago. This continued influence is reflected in current naval policy and missions as evidenced by such statements as “the prompt destruction of opposing naval forces represents the most economical and effective means to assure control of the sea. . . . Our current offensive naval capabilities, centered on the carrier battle forces, are optimally suited for execution of this strategy.”5 This policy succinctly encompasses Mahan’s principles of the decisiveness of “big battles” and the superiority of “capital ships.” Yet, both of those theories were thoroughly debunked in World Wars I and II. Major actions between opposing battle fleets, such as Jutland and
Midway, were not conclusive; neither Britain nor the United States achieved “command of the sea” as a result of the battles. On the contrary, while allied battle fleets continued to blockade or seek enemy battle fleets, noncapital-type ships—submarines—and a “secondary ... inconclusive” method of naval warfare—the guerre de course—came perilously close to being the deciding factors in both wars. Only after the allies adopted the “ancient practice of convoy,” which inherently encompassed the basic military principle of concentration of force, did they finally meet and defeat the submarine threat to their SLOCs.
Thus, in this century’s two major maritime conflicts, Mahan was proven wrong on three of the four accounts mentioned: the decisiveness of big battles, the superiority of capital ships, and the secondary, inconclusive nature of a war on shipping. But he was right in regarding convoys as being superior to hunting for individual marauders, “a process which, even when most thoroughly planned, still resembles looking for a needle in a haystack.”6 Paradoxically, shapers of naval policy continue to follow Mahan where he was wrong and ignore him where he was right.
Nevertheless, let us assume that our battle groups will be able to achieve “maritime superiority” (i.e., command of the sea) by destroying or holding the surface forces of an enemy at bay. That success still would not guarantee the security of our SLOCs. On the contrary, it would have the opposite effect of increasing the threat. For history instructs that when the naval forces of one nation decisively defeat those of another, the defeated or weaker naval power avoids further fleet engagements and resorts to a concentrated attack on the shipping of the superior naval power.7
For example, it was after the decisive British naval victories at Barfleur and La Hogue in 1692 that Louis XIV abandoned attempts to seize control of the sea from En-
The Soviet Union openly admits that a primary mission of its formidable undersea fleet, which continues to add new classes of submarines like this “Sierra” SSN, is the same as Germany’s during World War II—interdiction of the SLOCs that link the United States and its allies.
gland, tied up the French Navy, and launched one of the most massive antishipping wars in history against British seaborne trade. It was in the ten years (1805-15) after Trafalgar, one of the most decisive naval victories in history, that France inflicted the greatest losses on British seaborne trade during the Napoleonic Wars. It was after Jutland, although not decisive in Mahanian terms, that Germany adopted the submarine version of the guerre de course against allied shipping and nearly won World War I. Despite a preponderance of British and U. S. “maritime superiority” in the Atlantic during World War II, it was the attack by U-boats on the allied SLOCs in the North Atlantic that proved to be “the only thing that ever frightened” Prime Minister Winston Churchill during the war.s
A more prudent, less Mahanian, interpretation of this historical pattern would conclude that although our battle groups might win some stirring victories and even “drive the enemy’s flag from the sea,” we could at the same time dangerously expose our weakly defended merchant shipping to a concerted attack by submarines and aircraft. This could spell defeat, irrespective of any “maritime superiority” achieved by our victorious battle groups elsewhere.
For in a modem, industrialized, logistics-dependent world, the destruction of merchant shipping carrying the astronomical quantities of munitions necessary to feed the appetite of modem war and the vast quantities of raw materials required to support the industrial base has become a primary and potentially decisive method of naval warfare- In short, where the destruction of seaborne trade in terms of economic warfare failed to achieve decisive results in the agrarian past, the destruction of merchant shipping in terms of modem logistics-dependent warfare has proven to be potentially decisive in the industrialized 20th century-
The projection of power emphasis evidenced in our carrier force is reflected also in our current amphibious force- Similarly, this force’s mission appears to be based upon outdated strategy no longer compatible with current national strategy. In view of the War Powers Act alone, there is little probability that a massive over-the-beach or even sizable vertical envelopment amphibious assault under combat conditions will occur without a prior declaration of a national emergency. Far more probable is a repetition of a Mayaguez- or Iranian hostage-type insertion of a limited number of rapid deployment assault troops in response to localized acts of international hooliganism or terrorism- Therefore, the maintenance in peacetime of amphibious assault forces in excess of that needed to meet the 60-day provision of the War Powers Act or the rapid deployment requirement is-highly questionable, particularly if the maintenance of such forces detracts in direct proportion from resources that should be allocated more properly to the primary mission of protecting our SLOCs.
Readiness: The Navy’s readiness to carry out the SLOC mission is unsatisfactory. Speaking on the possibility war in Europe, Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., then-Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, stated that, in the opening days of a war, shipping losses would be “staggering, just staggering,” amounting to as much as two out of three ships being lost. Nevertheless, he stressed that we would
win, although “it’s going to be close.” This remarkable victory would be achieved by sailing merchant vessels “across the ocean at top speed,” some “alone and unescorted, not waiting for convoys to form.” Instead, for protection against submarine attack, two “aircraft carrier striking forces would be dispatched north” to bottle up the Soviet submarines or sink them in transit/
Logistically speaking, to “win” such a battle in spite of a “staggering” loss rate of two-thirds, the United States would have to stockpile three times the amount of modern arms (e.g., tanks, aircraft, missiles, etc.) considered necessary for the resupply of NATO. The Western alliance would have to have three times as many ships as is now considered the minimum to transport that resupply effort across a submarine-infested North Atlantic—to say nothing of the threat of “Backfire” bombers.
Tactically speaking, the concepts of sailing merchant vessels independently instead of convoying and using allegedly offensive hunter-killer operations to neutralize submarines were overwhelmingly discredited, with minor or temporary exceptions, in both World Wars I and II. In the case of independents versus convoys, the loss-rate ratios varied from 2:1 to 10:1. As for hunter-killer operations versus escorting, convoy escorts not only destroyed more U-boats but also provided direct support to shipping. That support is universally acknowledged as having been the linchpin of Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic in both world wars.
To win a war by sailing our merchant ships across the ocean at top speed, some “alone and unescorted, not waiting for convoys to form,” we would have to stockpile three times the amount of equipment and weapons, including tanks, now considered necessary for the resupply of NATO.
Therefore, we could infer, conclude even, that we would lose a future war. That is, our antisubmarine warfare readiness is inadequate to keep open the SLOCs to our NATO allies. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations, agrees that the Soviet Navy now has the capability of “splitting the Atlantic allies right down the [Atlantic] ocean.”10
It is strategically unsound—and potentially disastrous— to concentrate on power projection to the point where our capability to project logistic support over vulnerable SLOCs is marginal at best. For such support, both from the industrial home base to the combat theaters and from the sources of raw materials to the home industrial base, is essential to victory; conversely, failure to maintain such support could spell defeat. In brief, maritime superiority rests on two legs: a strong navy and a well-protected merchant marine. Existence of the former does not necessarily mean achievement of the latter unless there is a balance of missions and forces within a navy that ensures that the direct support of shipping enjoys equal status with power projection missions.
To achieve such a balance within a reasonable time— the sooner the better—the Navy must make substantive changes in its current policy to ensure that the direct support of SLOCs is a primary mission of the fleet, not a secondary mission to be performed largely by our allies after hostilities begin. Such changes will require a critical review of some types of naval warfare and traditional operating tempos. After which, some will have to be modified to remain within funding and force-level limits.
Proposed Changes: An essential element in the protection of shipping is air control—the “black pit” lesson of the Battle of the Atlantic. Fortunately, this is a capability that our Navy has in abundance in its carriers and air-platform amphibious ships. Therefore, the tactical and material core of a very credible protection of shipping force already exists. All that is necessary is to redirect the missions of some of that existing naval air power.
Currently, all of our carriers are configured primarily for strike warfare, and none primarily for the protection of shipping or for antisubmarine or antiair warfare (ASW/ A AW). Some carriers should be configured primarily for these latter missions. Such a scheme is readily adaptable under the existing, but little used, “CV” carrier concept wherein carriers may be configured exclusively for strike warfare, exclusively for ASW/AAW, or a mixture of both.
Similarly, not all of the large air-platform amphibious ships need be committed primarily to amphibious assault. Some of these platforms should be configured primarily as sea control ships, retaining amphibious assault as their
secondary mission. Therefore, we should load out some with vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and light airborne multipurpose (LAMPS) helicopters and assign them sea control as their primary mission.11
As a result of these two actions alone, a naval force structure more fully in conformity with national strategy and policy would almost immediately be established. This would cause little or no impairment of the original primary missions of the ships involved.
A major argument against configuring carriers for the ASW/AAW role is that existing carrier deployment schedules do not permit converting even one from the strike configuration. However, as previously noted, stringent carrier deployment schedules are no longer dictated by a strategic nuclear strike mission; nor are they required by the Nixon Doctrine or the War Powers Act. Therefore, current stringent strike carrier deployment schedules should be reviewed to determine whether such deployments are still required on a continuous basis. The same type of review should be made in the case of amphibious ship deployments. If it is determined that a high level of naval presence is still required, must this presence be effected by a battle group? Could it not be in the form of a force centered on a ship dedicated to the SLOC or surface action mission, for example a multipurpose aircraft carrier (CV[S1), general purpose amphibious assault ship (LHA), helicopter amphibious assault ship (LPH), or battleship?
In a purely politico-military sense, initially exposing fewer strike carriers in forward areas while holding the others in a “ready” status close to home waters offers several advantages over the current forward deployment policy. In a crisis, it would reduce the immediate risk to our total force of carriers, admittedly high-value targets, at the outset of any hostilities. In addition, it would permit the “ready” carrier(s) to deploy with the tactical advantage of sea room and the political advantage of visibly demonstrating our intention to exert our influence in the crisis area. Any slack in the total number of ships to “show the flag” could be taken up by SLOC support groups centered on CV(S)s or large air-platform amphibious ships, or surface action groups centered on battleships. As a bonus, any reduction in carrier deployment tempo should contribute significantly toward alleviating a major cause of poor morale and desertions, which have marked debilitating effects upon combat readiness.12
The credibility of this proposed disposition of strike carriers and its overall effectiveness could be established and retained by conducting emergency deployment exercises each deployment period for the “ready” group. Such exercises would provide realistic operational training of the highest order on a regular basis, would provide visible evidence that we had the capability to defend our SLOCs, and would enhance morale by providing the opportunity “to see the world” without having to endure the rigors of a nine-month deployment.
In summary, to bring naval policy more in line with national strategy and policy, the Navy should make the following, or similar, actions matters of high priority:
► Assign at least the same priority to the direct support of SLOCs as to power projection missions
- Configure some carriers primarily for the direct support of SLOCs
- Reduce strike warfare-configured carrier deployments accordingly; supplement them, if necessary, with emergency deployment exercises for the “ready” carrier battle groups or with alternative groups, such as SLOC support groups or surface action groups
- Configure some of the large air-platform amphibious ships primarily for the direct support of SLOCs
The alternative to making these changes is to continue to build and maintain a Navy with an inadequate emphasis on the mandatory requirement to maintain our vital SLOCs in wartime. In which case, the Soviets, not us, would achieve “maritime superiority.” As a result, Soviet naval power will seal off the United States and force it to return to a Jeffersonian naval policy of coastal defense and commerce raiding.
Such a forced retrenchment would presage the fulfillment of Mahan’s prediction that, unless the sea-power nations of the littoral of Europe and the rest of the world adopted a “common line of action,” the Soviet Union will first dominate the Eurasian landmass, and then build a navy to conquer the sea powers on the littoral, and thence the world.13 We dare not trust to hope that Mahan will be wrong again.
'U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace (Washington,
- C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).
JL. W. Martin. The Sea in Modern Strategy (New York: Praeger. 1967), pp. 39 and 91; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1975-1976, ed. Captain John E. Moore, RN (New York: Key Book Service, 1975), pp. 91 and 93; Robert W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968), p. xxxi, 22 n.9.
3T. B. Hayward, “The Future ofU. S. Sea Power,” Proceedings, May 1979, pp- 67, 68-69; W. S. Lind, Proceedings, July 1979, pp. 23-24; R. A. Bowling. Proceedings, August 1979, pp. 87-89.
“Testimony before congressional committee by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral D. L. McDonald, USN.
5T- B. Hayward, “The Future of U. S. Sea Power,” Proceedings, May 1979, p. 68.
“Alfred T. Mahan. The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1892), Vol. II, p. 217. 7David W. Waters, "Notes on the Convoy System of Naval Warfare, Thirteenth to Twentieth Centuries,” Part I, “Convoy in the Sail Era, 1204-1874,” Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Naval Historical Branch. (Mimeographed).
Winston S. Churchill, Second World War, Vol. V, Closing the Ring (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 6.
“Quoted in “Navy’s Atlantic Fleet,” U. S. News <& World Report, 10 October 1977, pp. 40-41.
10Elmo R. Zumwalt, “Total Force,” Proceedings, May 1979 pp 93 103-4,106, 107.
"G. G. O'Rourke, “Why V/STOL?” Proceedings, January 1976, pp. 39-45;
- R. Callahan, “Sea Control Concept: Down the Drain,” Proceedings. August 1975, p. 91; N. Polmar. “Sea Control Ship and the Navy Mission,” Proceedings. March 1974, pp. 92-93.
12Under Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey interview quoted in Armed Forces Journal, November 1977, p. 35.
‘“Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man And His Letters (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute, 1977), p. 463.
Captain Bowling graduated from the Naval Academy and commanded seven ships. He also held a major command as Commander Service Group One, a flag officer billet afloat. In addition, he served as submarine liaison officer, ASW Group Three; Chief Staff Officer, Submarine Squadron Three; ASW officer, Commander First Fleet; and Head Exercise Branch (J3), Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After his retirement in 1974, Captain Bowling was designated as a convoy commodore. He also became a licensed master mariner and earned a PhD degree in history. Currently, he is self-employed as a lightering/mooring master for offshore tanker cargo operations and as a freelance writer and lecturer.