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1
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Let us hope that the “blackshoe.
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specialist and the prospective executive office USS Germantown (LSD-42). A frequent conti
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ward-basing facilities ashore.
► Airborne Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Protection: The use of helicopters during the Falklands Conflict by the British for ECM seems to have been a key factor in neutralizing the Argentine Exocet. The development of a helo-bome active electronic warfare suite for either LAMPS or the SeaCobra is feasible, with the AH-IT being the prime candidate. Such a capability would be a defensive necessity for the SAG, and enlarging the requirement for jamming enemy sensors and fire control would be a significant contribution to the SAG’s offensive power. The addition of such a long-range jamming capability would significantly enhance the SAG’s chances for success in any hostile encounter.
Why Not DDH?: Previous enthusiasm for the DDH concept waned when its mission was considered. No community within the Navy ever embraced the air- capable destroyer.
Admittedly, there are problems with the DDH proposal. The most obvious is that the Navy has no attack helo capability and its procurement would require a new naval aviation community. Although the “HA” squadron would be something new, the SeaCobra has earned its wings with the Marine Corps. Now we need to convince some aviators in blue to climb in and see what they can do with it on board a small ship. We had to do the same thing with LAMPS more than ten years ago, and the success has been most dramatic.
The surface warfare community also must believe in the DDH concept. The modem surface combatant has become increasingly powerful in both offensive and defensive missions. The capability of our present surface warships (battleship included) will not ensure the SAG success in the independent offensive role we have in mind for it. The SAG needs air support in almost every mission. As much as possible, this support should be sea-based and under the immediate control of the SAG commander.
The DDH would be the ideal “shotgun” for the battleship-centered SAGproviding both offensive and detensive support in the areas our surface combat' ants are weakest. Considering the vita nature of this support and the reasoiiabc price the DDH would offer it tor. DDH is a bargain.
normally distrusts anything that flies, consider the advantages of arming a ut stroyer with helicopters and realize thj* the DDH fills many of the tactical gap*111 our surface task groups.
Commander McKearney is a strategic planning
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to Proceedings, he graduated from the Naval Ac ^ emy in 1973 and received a master’s degree m tional security affairs from the Naval Posi£iat,u School in 1984. He has served in the operation* a engineering departments in the USS Edson I . 946), as operations officer in the USS John 3 Cain (DDG-36) and USS Berkeley (DDG-15) a|,d first lieutenant/operations officer in the USS AW (LSD-33).
Surface Warfare’s Weak Leg
By Lieutenant Commander Mike Adams, U. S. Coast Guard
unde'
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The Commandant and other ranking officers of the Coast Guard are becoming more vocal about the role the Coast Guard will play if large-scale hostilities break out.
Setting aside the service’s obligations for port security, aids to navigation, and other non-combatant missions, one of the roles the sea-going Coast Guard is projected to fill in time of war is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). It appears, however, that the service is both unequipped and poorly trained to handle this and most other surface combatant missions.
Ships lacking the proper gear and crews with neither the training nor experience to carry out such missions leave the U. S. military with a false sense of confidence and a weak leg upon which it is basing, at least in part, a surface warfare strategy.
Should this situation be rectified? If so, how? To answer these questions, we must look at the Coast Guard’s ability, or inability, to carry out its surface war-fighting missions.
Consider the hulls the Coast Guard will bring to bear in antisubmarine warfare. The Coast Guard’s largest ships (apart from icebreakers) are the 378-foot-long, 3,050-ton Hamilton (WHEC-715)-class high endurance cutters. These 12 ships are equipped with a single 5-inch/38 caliber gun forward and some torpedoes. The old hedge-hog mounts have been removed and there are no antisubmarine rockets (ASROC) on any of these vessels, nor are any of them armed with missiles. With the exception of moveable 50 caliber and 40-mm. weapons, there is no defensive weapon system aft.
Next in size are the aging (constructed in 1935-37) “Secretary”-class cutters (327 feet, 2,656 tons). Although these ships acquired an admirable reputation as submarine killers during World War II, that was before their ASW gear was removed and before the balance of the major weapon systems was stripped to a single five-inch gun forward. They are soon to be replaced by the Coast Guard’s new Bear (WMEC-901)-class medium- endurance cutters (more later).
The Coast Guard has one 311-foot, 2,600-ton Barnegat (AVP-lO)-class high endurance cutter—the Unimak (WHEC- 379, ex-AVP-31). Formerly a seaplane tender, the Unimak’s weapon suite is identical to that of the “Secretary’’-class ships: one five-inch gun and several 50- caliber/40-mm. weapons. No missiles, ASROC, or torpedoes are carried on either of these classes.
The newest ships in the fleet are the Bear class (270 feet, 1,820 tons). These vessels are equipped with a three-inch
(76-mm.) Mk-75 gun forward and 1 usual 50-caliber/40-mm. weapons wh‘ can be mounted at various position • These ships are scheduled to be retron ted with the Mk-92 gunfire control tem. Weight and space reservations ha been made for Harpoon missiles ana towed array sonar, though none are c rently fitted or stowed for exclusive C°ae Guard use. Chaff launchers are lil scheduled for retrofit at a time yet termined. The vessels carry no weapons. Jane’s Fighting Ships (page 689) claims that the Bear-class depend on helicopter-launched torped°_ to act as her offensive weapon systc The 16 Reliance (WMEC-6l5)-c|^' medium endurance cutters (210 >e 1,007 tons) have a 3-inch/50-caliber gu|' a manually operated, slow-fire weap (circa 1940). There are no weapons D1- than a 50-caliber/40-mm. gun alt. ^ missiles, no rockets, no torpedoes.. close-in-weapons system (C1WS), and sonar. f
The Coast Guard has a mixed bag ^ other surface ships, including the d'1^ Escape (WMEC-6, ex-ARS-6), ||V|d Cherokee (WMEC-165, ex-ATF-66)- al one Storis (WMEC-38)-ciass nied1^ endurance cutters of various lengths ' tonnages. None of these vessels is be armed than the Reliance class and ah
Pletel
more
y lacking in electronic warfare and, tmportantly, electronic counter-
at least 40 years old.
1 Coast Guard has a collection of (0/ l”an ^ ships which are simply ill- DrnK|Ven Un"-* ecluipped to deal with the ems of surface warfare and ASW.
shi ^r°ni 'ack of weapons, these ■Ps are notoriously thin-skinned, are nerally unable to meet standards of VVa<Uear’ biological, and chemical (NBC) - r are air-tightness, and are almost com- for ^ eclu'Pnlent- (The Reliance class, N'RplnStanCC’ cannot maintain proper an h C'°SUrc ar,d 0Perate for more than all t °Uf W't*10ut substantially exceeding r0()^rrjPerature parameters in the engine-
ther311 a^e e*ectron'cs and missiles, lar °aSt ®uafd *s equipped with binocu- qqa”d World War II-vintage guns. No 0rast Cuard ship has any type of missile to L°C^et' The new Bear-class ships are but th retr°btted with Harpoon missiles, oCcclUest'on remains when that might andUp ^ressure on Defense Department act' (“0ast Cuard budgets renders such ’°n rather less than likely, el e Smatest problem with this lack of
that ' n'CS’ missiles’ and CIWSs is not at) 'j. deprives Coast Guard cutters of 0 tensive capability, rather it leaves
could survive long enough to even begin their ASW role.
Making the hypothetical assumption that some Coast Guard cutters would survive to attack submarines, what then? With mere promises of retrofitted towed array sonar on the Bears and no sonar ever on the Reliances, nearly two thirds of the Coast Guard fleet could not find a submarine, let alone kill it.
The Hamiltons are equipped to find submarines, but again, offensive capability is limited: no ASROC and no missiles. A submarine with stand-off missile capability (and there are many such submarines in the Soviet inventory) could locate, identify, and attack a Coast Guard cutter—if not before the cutter found the sub, then certainly long before the cutter could do anything about it.
The optimist will argue that all Coast Guard ships would be retrofitted with needed gear before they are sent to war. How long would that take, however, and how important would it be to try to shoehorn missiles into a Reliance-class cutter or locate an unused towed-array sonar for a Bear-class ship, especially when the Navy, which would undoubtedly have first priority, would be loading out weapons on all its ships and ensuring that each is equipped with only the best situation is one in which the Coast Guard not only does not have pads, but when the game starts it will be busy trying to wrest some from the players who are already on the field.
Unfortunately, equipment is not the only area in which the Coast Guard has been short-changed by itself and others. Training for war, despite the periodic stroking it gets from various Coast Guard personnel, is simply not a top priority. The service is, admittedly, extremely busy intercepting smugglers, saving lives, cleaning up oil spills, repairing buoys, and the like. What time is left for training is often devoted to training for those skills and such things as damage control, first aid, and seamanship. Consequently there is little time left to train for actual wartime missions. As is true for the equipment, so seems to be the case for the training: “We’ll get it when we need it.” Of course, when we need it, it will be too late to receive it.
There is one bright spot, however: Coast Guard ships are attending Navy refresher training with greater regularity. Though a lot of that training involves law enforcement, damage control, and engineering casualty control, there is some warfare training. (Here again, the lack of equipment makes training difficult and
ceJ1! defenseless. No one can be a suc- canU aggressor unless that individual the ®Ct to the scene and survive. That is QuVery problem faced by most Coast $t a*|d ships. In a modem war, with hig, "°ff weapons delivered at extremely W0rates of speed, Coast Guard ships gets ^ kecome little more than good tar' ft seems likely that few, if any, gear? There would not be enough time and higher priorities will likely prevent the Coast Guard from obtaining the equipment it would need to become a truly combatant force.
The Commandant of the Coast Guard has said, with regards to this problem, “Don’t ask us to play football unless you are going to give us pads.” The current
Sometimes two are no better than one. The Coast Guard’s largest cutters, like the Hamilton-class Munro (WHEC-724) steaming here with the USS Truxtun (CGN-35), have one 5-inch/38 caliber gun and some torpedoes, but no ASROC or missiles.
Proven Coast Guard capabilities like ship-helo operations offer contributions to surface warfare that can be realized only if the Coast Guard receives the proper hardware and training.
unrealistic; no one is fooled by attempting to simulate a missile shoot-down with a slow-firing 3-inch/50-caliber weapon.)
That training is still infrequent and lacks depth. Twenty or 30 days of refresher training every 18-24 months cannot prepare personnel adequately for what will happen to them all too quickly should a war commence. Furthermore, few Coast Guard officers and enlisted personnel have extensive backgrounds or training in warfare missions and capabilities. The Coast Guard sends six or fewer officers to the Naval War College every year and even fewer to the Air Force, Army, and National war colleges. Although there is a Coast Guard exchange program with the Navy for junior officers, that program is equally limited in scope and there are no guarantees that such junior officers—usually lieutenants (junior grade)—will stay in the service.
No Coast Guard officer completes the full Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) course; there is no Coast Guard equivalent to that course. In fact, the Coast Guard cutterman’s insignia, unlike the SWO insignia with which it is often equated, has no significant war-fighting knowledge or skills attached to its acquisition. In short, there are few Coast Guard officers with any type of formal warfare training, and those few do not receive frequent updating.
The Coast Guard does offer some capabilities it can bring to a full-scale or, perhaps even more importantly, limited war.
Coast Guard ships execute, on a daily basis, surveillance, search, and seizure of other ships. Though this activity is against non-combatants, it is focused on ships which are trying not to be found. This skill, which has been honed over the last decade, established an important niche tor the Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, and could very well be repeated in a future war.
Notwithstanding the “shallow-water sailor” jokes Coast Guard personnel are subject to, the service has a good (and justified) international reputation for its seamanship and seagoing skills. Sea warfare requires survival at sea first, then fighting in the hostile marine environment. Much of the Coast Guard has already mastered the first part, and with training could probably master the second in short order.
Most Coast Guard cutters spend most of their time steaming in independent operations. Whereas war conditions will likely involve ships in convoy escort or as battle group participants, the practice in independent operations has given the Coast Guard a sense of initiative and (as already noted) seamanship which will be of value to any seaborne warrior.
Over the last decade, the Coast Guard has begun to make unprecedented use of the ship-helicopter team. Rare would be the experienced search and rescue (SAR) or law enforcement personnel who would not admit that the ship-helo team is the best method for finding vessels. Here again the Coast Guard has generally mastered a rather complex technique— shipboard helo landings and takeoffs, flight-following methods, and aircraft maintenance in the maritime environment—which will be a basic skill re-
quired in any future war. .
Consequently, it is clear that thoug the Coast Guard’s ability to act as an aC five participant in any future war is eX tremely hampered, it is not a lost cause- There are some basic building blue upon which a foundation of surface 'var fare ability could be constructed.
The obvious solution to the most prc!,s ing of the problems is money. f Guard ships and aircraft must no lone retrofit needed warfare equipment- '11 ^ gear must be installed, and the ships an their crews must practice with it. If 111 ’ the ships will be worthless when 1 shooting starts. -s
The drawback is that no one has (°j’ willing to part with) the funds for such ^ program. The Coast Guard's allsK'j budget faces potential immediate an long-range reductions. The Navy cou j perhaps, break loose the money reqU|[L to supply the needed armament, but. a derstandably, Navy self-interest niah that a remote possibility. It therefore ^ comes the responsibility of those furl up the chain of command to make ^ decision and ensure that the Coast Gua gets the gear it needs to be an effectl armed force. ^
Considering the cost to build and e(] a new ship, the required retrofits are P1^ try in comparison. The fact that a c<1llP of dozen truly war-capable ships could added to the U. S. inventory in just a *- months by executing the retrofits has benefit short- and long-term planners-.^ The Coast Guard needs to examine ^ apparent policy of building comproh1 ships. The Scar-class vessels were signed with space and weight reset tions for a variety of weapons. They ^g also designed with a diesel power plafl. 2 give them greater independent stealn ^ ability and range. The diesel plant is a
capable of less than 20 knots maximum •jpeed-—too slow and too noisy to be ef- ective in ASW. Thus, the Coast Guard w'nds up with a ship that does not necessarily d0 coast Guard missions well— sPace and weight reservations for weapon systems prohibit installation of SAR and avv enforcement gear—nor military mis- S1°ns well—none of the weapon systems are ^stalled; the ship is too slow and too "°!sy- If we want warships, then let us u>ld warships. If we want SAR and law Enforcement ships, we should build
em. We cannot have our cake and eat it too.
Training must be addressed in light of °yerall Coast Guard missions. The ser- VlCe has long prided itself on its multi- rt'lssi°n ability: to do SAR, aids to navigation, law enforcement, and maintain a military posture—all at the same time. Historically, the Coast Guard balanced its training for such a capability. We must develop (if we truly want a warfare capability) persons who are warfare experts in more than name only. We must exchange more than low-level officers with the Navy and an occasional mid- to senior-grade officer in joint or major commands. We must send our officers to Navy Surface Warfare Officer School and must demand certain warfare knowledge and expertise for those who are to wear the cutterman’s insignia. We must make war fighting an integral part of all our training programs and stop giving it lip service and assurances of its value.
If we are not ready and willing to do
those things, then we should say so and make it clear that our priorities lie elsewhere. To do otherwise is to fool only ourselves, our fellow naval services, the U. S. command structure, and, ultimately, our nation.
A frequent contributor to Proceedings, Commander Adams is the Coast Guard liaison officer on the staff of Commander, United States Forces, Caribbean. He has served in a variety of shore and afloat assignments, including executive officer of the USCGC Dependable (WMEC-626), operations officer of the USCGC Steadfast (WMEC-623), and deck watch officer of the USCGC Absecon (WHEC-374). He completed the resident course at the Naval War College and was presented the U. S. Naval Institute’s Award of Merit for an author in 1981.
The LHD and Sea
Control
y Commander G. Pat Tierney, U. S.
Navy
CVx 6 ^arge~deek aircraft carrier (CV or ^ N) probably will remain a linchpin of /-• naval strategy for the next 30 years, detailed naval force structure has been veloped to accommodate the carrier uattle group (CVBG). In addition, the ned States has embarked on a drive to Pgrade strategic mobility, with force aann|ng focusing on U. S. Marine Corps sh^Phibious lift capability. Among the *Ps needed to improve strategic mobil- r >s the new Wasp-class amphibious as- Sau>‘ ship (LHD)
ae LHD will have a secondary or lltr\VCrt'ble” sea contr°l mission: The v L) is being built so that she can be con- «« quickly to a vertical/short takeoff nd landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier. u °u8h the first LHD will not deploy l0nt'' about 1990, it is not too early to tL k at alternative force structures. Will j( 1 ^STOL carrier replace the CV? Will CVn 6 tWo or more LHDs to replace one Sq • Can the LHD replace the CV in only t()ttlc missions? Will it be more important s: Use all our LHDs in their primary mis- ^amphibious warfare, or strategic Pility—and not employ any for sea c°ntrol?
Qyr°8rammed and Available Forces: force planning has been evaluated en during the past ten years. The con- nsus js that i7_22 CVs would be re- ^ lred to fight a full-scale war with the (j V|et Union. However, for peacetime ^ Crrence and minor conflicts, 8-13 CVs pl^u'd be satisfactory.1 The United States Ipns to build and maintain 15 carriers.2 CVt> ree state<I primary missions of the “C are: presence; direct, but limited confrontation with the Soviet Union; and Third World contingencies.3
The LHD, similar to the Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious assault ships, is to replace older Iwo Jima (LPH-2)- class amphibious assault ships in the 1990s and to augment Marine amphibious lift capability. Current force planning objectives call for simultaneous support of a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) numbering 15,500, plus a Marine amphibious force (MAF) of about 32,500 troops. Marine units of this size carry tanks, light artillery, and V/STOL aircraft (rotary and fixed wing). The LHD is specifically designed to carry helicopters and air cushion landing craft (LCACs), which transport the Marines and their equipment to the beachhead in a hostile environment. The Navy estimates 10 — 12 LHDs will be needed in the next 20 years to meet these objectives.4
The CVILHD Force Mission Overlap: For the past ten years there has been a strong, but minority, opinion that the Navy should shift to V/STOL air power for flexibility, survivability, and reduced cost. However, in 1982, the Navy and Congress agreed that with 15 CVBGs, the Navy would use the LHDs in their sea control conversion to assess V/STOL technology and determine the best direction for naval air power after the turn of the century.5 The LHD sea control composite V/STOL squadron will have at least 20 AV-8B Harriers and four to six LAMPS III Seahawks.6 This mix offers a thinly spread, but widely diversified capability in both sea control and power projection.
Many studies have been made of the potential missions and strategic alternatives for employing small V/STOL carriers. However, because the LHD’s sea control mission is secondary, the LHD has not suffered the same rigorous mission analysis as the CV. It has been suggested that the LHD and her aircraft can escort convoys, underway replenishment groups, or amphibious task forces (ATFs). Other proposals include an LHD acting with smaller combatants as a minicarrier group in putting out “brush fires,” or joining a CVBG to augment the CV air wing with strike and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. It has also been recommended that the LHD steam with the new battleship surface action groups (SAGs) to give air support.
Assessment: The CV and the LHD convertible mission can be compared in terms of cost as well as mission performance. In 1983, a new nuclear-powered carrier cost about $3.5 billion, while the lead ship in the LHD program will cost an estimated $1.3 billion in 1983 dollars.7 The cost of a new CV air wing, including scheduled improvements, is $5.6 billion.8 Although no figures for the LHD sea control composite squadron are available, a rough estimate can be made by using a ratio of the $5.6 billion and the number of aircraft for each ship—90 for the CV and 26 for the LHD. Using this method, the LHD composite squadron would cost about $1.6 billion. A procurement comparison for the two ships and their aircraft would be, then: 2.9/9.1 = .32, or the cost of one CV is roughly equal to three LHDs. It may be argued