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and use that time to the fullest with shiphandling drills, formation steaming, communications, and combat system exercises.
SWOs on noncombatants have to put in some extra time and effort to achieve a well-rounded view of naval operations. They should not feel, however, that they are on a lesser ship than their SWO counterparts on, say, Aegis cruisers. The standards for SWO knowledge will vary from ship to ship, but a great deal can be done to close the gap for noncombatant surface line officers.
CIC officer requirements, for example, can be enhanced with a reading list that includes fleet operations orders, rate training manuals for radiomen and operations specialists, basic communications publications, search and rescue (SAR) manuals, Allied Tactical Publication 1C volumes one and two, and the variety of intelligence and threat study publications. Before the CIC watch officer boards an auxiliary, a series of in-house open and closed publication tests can be administered covering the NTDS sequence of events for prosecution of subsurface, surface, and air contacts; challenging maneuvering board problems and writing formatted intelligence and emergency action messages, to name a few, can be set up and practiced.
Noncombatant SWOs who feel their
knowledge and experience are inadequate cannot let their concern become a self' fulfilling prophecy. Extra study, imag1' native use of cross-decking opportunities and tours, and qualification boards with some teeth in them can give these officers the breadth and depth of knowledge to become excellent surface warriors.
Lieutenant Scarborough graduated from the Univer sity of Texas, Austin, in May 1983 with a B.A- in History and Sociology. Before being designated Surface Warfare Officer on 15 July 1985, she serve as a communications officer in the USS Jason 8). After completing the engineering officer of 01 watch course at Surface Warfare Officers Sch Command Detachment Coronado, California, s returned to the Jason as electrical officer.
range of about 1,000 miles with a circuit error probable (CEP) of 100 miles (ab°ul
- square miles). No further p°s1' tioning data on target will be available For whatever reasons, which are irrelc vant to the scenario, the TG is instruct*-’ to engage the target as soon as possibly If the engagement can be accomplished a
- miles, by interpolation it can I* accomplished at a much shorter range-
Before continuing the scenario, a fe'v words about the platforms. The 2,000-tod SES (an air cushion vehicle with rj§'<j sidewalls) would normally carry two lig airborne multipurpose system (LAMP'’1 Mk-III helicopters and could maintain 3 speed of 70 knots in sea state three. C°r rent Navy thinking limits SESs to ‘ knots maximum speed. The manned ad craft is a vertical/short take-off and lad ing (V/STOL) AV-8B Harrier with. f0| the sake of this scenario, a ceiling 0
- feet (true ceiling 50,000 feeIj cruise speed of 450 knots (true spet’^ 550), and a maximum endurance of ^ hours. The RPV, weighing less tha^
- pounds (the maximum extend3 load that can be lifted by LAMPS ’ can be designed for a ceiling of 30,0 “ feet, cruise speed of 350 knots, landifc- speed of 40-70 knots, and a nine-h0^ endurance. The Tomahawk’s speed 1 about 500 knots, and although it has d mid-course guidance capability, it wou be technically feasible to incorporate on*-’
Continuing the scenario, when 1 order is received to engage the eneI1$j the TG commander will dispatch an S on the target bearing. The SES cod^ manding officer will order his AS , LAMPS helicopters to detach to one the other TG ships until the OTH miss'0
stroyed or jammed, if they are in the correct position, and a real-time down link is available.
- ‘ ‘Our eyes will be our intercept of their emitter signals.’’ True, if our enemy is cooperative. Given this amenability of the enemy, we still will not know the whereabouts of other shipping or have any damage assessment capability.
- ‘ ‘Our high-speed, long-range manned aircraft will be our eyes." Yes, if the pilot doesn’t object to entering the enemy’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) range, has sufficient fuel, and is in the area.
- ‘‘We don’t need eyes because other shipping shouldn’t be there."
- ‘ ‘Our eyes will be some new black box being devised by our scientists.”
We can solve this problem by using off-the-shelf or state-of-the-art vehicles until the magical black box or other resolution appears. This solution is possible primarily because of the synthesis of the remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) and the surface effect ship (SES). The solution does not include satellites, electronic support measures (ESM), long-range manned aircraft, or black boxes.
As Figure 1 shows, the participants in the scenario are a non-carrier task group (convoy, amphibious, underway replenishment), an enemy 1,000 miles away, SESs providing antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antiair warfare (AAW) protection to the task group (TG), one manned aircraft each from the TG and the SES, an RPV from the TG, and a TG- launched Tomahawk missile.
The scenario unfolds as follows: The TG receives intelligence from outside the force that an enemy ship(s) has been detected on a specified bearing and at a
During World War II, while searching for the survivors of 17 torpedoed convoy ships, the U. S. Coast Guard cutter Northland inadvertently steamed within six miles of the battle between the Royal Navy and the German battleship Bismarck, which was sunk. The Royal Navy’s battleship and cruiser guns were trained on the Northland, having been mistaken for a Bismarck escort. Fortunately, the Northland was identified at the last moment.
More than 40 years have passed since this precarious event took place. The projectiles and sensors were primitive in comparison with current capabilities. But the basic problem still exists, especially when we extrapolate target ranges from line-of-sight to several hundred miles.
Long-range (1,000 miles), over-the- horizon (OTH) targeting is simple to accomplish in an ocean environment. All that is required is a surface-to-surface missile that can travel long distances (deployed), incorporate into the missile one or more homing devices (deployed), launch the missile, and await the kill.
Is this thesis simple or simple-minded? Have we spent millions of dollars on a sophisticated, long-range, surface-to-surface missile—Tomahawk—that we cannot use at sea? Are we not able to use Tomahawk because we cannot “see” the target? Do we know if there is friendly or neutral shipping close to the target? Can we assess what damage the target incurred? And, can we do all this without endangering the life of a pilot and risking an expensive aircraft?
Typical evasive answers include:
► "Our satellites will serve as eyes.’’ Maybe so, provided they are not de
Near the end of the RPV search, the P
'Sure 1 Over-the-Horizon Scenario—General_________________________________
Is ComPletcd. As the SES departs, at 70 otS’ the RPV is launched from the TG °r lifted by the LAMPS to the SES to Uel (if required), and then is deck- Unched on a preprogrammed radar ^arch track to find the target. The search jea consists of a circle, the radius of lch is the initial 100 miles plus the Pr°duct of the estimated speed of the target and the time-late of the RPV. Mean- de, one Harrier launches from one of e TG’s ski-jump configured ships and °wn to the SES to refuel, if required. 0ut 1.5 hours after the scenario be- ®lns> another Harrier would be launched ^0|ti the TG to give the RPV last-minute, ^■d-course guidance to the start point of e search pattern while maintaining line- 'Sight (LOS) range to the RPV.
1 he RPV woui(j turn its radar on for a w sweeps at the beginning of the search /I1 'Htermittently at 17-minute intervals 0 miles of RPV travel), giving about a
95% coverage of the search area, as shown in Figure 2. The reason for the momentary, rather than continuous, actuation of the RPV radar is to minimize its detectability by the enemy. The RPV would save the radar video and link it to the trailing TG Harrier.
During the two-hour search, the TG Harrier would be analyzing the data from the RPV to determine which contact(s) appeared to be the designated target. All the while, the TG Harrier would remain outside SAM range of the target. The need for the TG Harrier, other than the reasons previously mentioned, would be to determine if the RPV was destroyed or neutralized by the target. Assuming the RPV was destroyed, the TG Harrier would know that the target’s position is on a 100-mile line plus or minus the maximum engagement range of the target’s SAM.
SES would launch its Harrier to relieve the TG Harrier and direct the final phases of the targeting. The SES Harrier is presumed, for simplicity, to have the same endurance as the TG Harrier (which is incorrect). The best estimate of endurance with 70 knots of wind-over-the-deck and a modified vertical takeoff is approximately two hours.
At the conclusion of the search, the TG Harrier would transfer to the SES Harrier the summarized radar sequence of the RPV and the most probable location(s) of the designated target. The SES Harrier is allowed an arbitrary 15 minutes for analysis before vector-descending the RPV to do the “visual” search of the most likely candidate(s). The visual search could be conducted by the RPV’s infrared, low- light level television, or some other sensor as yet undefined. When the target is identified, the SES Harrier would relay targeting data to the TG via the SES, and a Tomahawk would be launched from the TG (assuming that there is no capability for the SES or its Harrier to be the Tomahawk’s launching platform).
The Tomahawk would be mid-course guided by the SES, the Harrier, or both, and within two hours arrive at the target. (Current tactical range for Tomahawk is much less than 1,000 miles, but modifications could be incorporated to stretch the range to 1,000 miles.) The RPV would make a visual damage assessment
^gure 2
^auticai
Miles
(nm)
Jask
,?r°u P
Harrier
RPV
Ha^Sr
SES
0 1 | 200 | | 400 | |
| 600 | |
|
6 _ |
|
| 5 |
|
|
.2 |
| .3 |
|
| "5 __ J |
1 + - |
| _4 | 2 ---------- + 5 |
|
|
|
| * 4 T 5 7 |
| 9, |
|
1 | 2 3 | 8 | 9* | *10 | |
|
800
1,000
5Si°n | Flight Time |
u-Oo pa 9 2'17 | 0-00 0-00 |
l'12 4'34 | 0-00 |
Hs 5'49 | 4-06 |
8'00 |
|
a'27 8'57 | 4-15 8-57 |
- Mission starts; SES vectored; RPV launched
- Harrier departs Task Group (TG)
- TG Harrier begins monitoring RPV
- SES Harrier departs SES
- RPV completes radar search, begins "visual" search
- TG Harrier lands TG (flight time: 4.1 hours)
- RPV completes “visual’’ search; Tomahawk launched from TG (assume target at search center)
- Damage assessment sent; SES Harrier and RPV depart for SES
- SES Harrier lands SES (flight time: 4.2 hours)
10. RPV lands SES; SES departs for TG (flight time: 8.9
hours)
Assumptions:
The launch pad is too heavy owing to the steel or concrete required to withstand high temperature Harrier exhaust in VTO.
Recovery aboard the SES is a delicate operation.
No ship in the TG is of sufficient length to ski-jump the aircraft.
Postulated flight endurance is too long.
Unable to launch from TG ship
Table 1 Mission Problems and Solutions
Problem Solution
Remotely piloted vehicles like this L450 high-altitude multipurpose aircraft can provide high-speed over- the-horizon targeting and target damage assessment without risking lives and expensive aircraft.
and then both the RPV and Harrier would return to the SES.
Figure 2 depicts the critical points of the scenario, many of which are a function of the distances necessary to maintain the LOS data link. The parameters used in the scenario are believed to be approximately correct. If they are close, but not exactly precise, the validity of the hypothesis should not suffer.
The bottom line is that OTH targeting and damage assessment can be accomplished using a visual, but pilot-protected method, within a time frame which is not, perhaps, ideal, but is at least feasible. Does this approach work in sea state seven, when the ceiling is zero and the visibility is zero, during heavy thunderstorms with gale force winds, when the search area has 100 targets, when the enemy SAM has a kill probability of .99? No. Does anything?
Platform
Harrier
RPV
SES
Table 1 addresses the recognizable but surmountable problems with combining these vehicles:
The side benefits accruing to the noncarrier TG’s capability to defend itself from each platform include:
SES:_______________
- Increased ASW detection and prosecution ranges from task group center, which is especially critical if the submarine has a subsurface-to-surface missile with ranges over several hundred miles
- Increases the radius of operation of the LAMPS helicopter, RPV, and Harrier by rapidly moving the “landing field” toward the airborne vehicle
- The opportunity for the Navy to have a
Vertical takeoff (VTO), refuel, and launch from the SES, accepting a decreased endurance Carry externally mounted tanks or delay launch time and extend total time of the problem Vertical replenishment on the SES with LAMPS helicopter, which can carry up to 5,000 pounds externally If the RPV or SES is not stable enough at landing speed, recover using a winch similar to the helicopter recovery, assist, securing, traversing system. Replace with Navy-approved FLEXFRAM® modified epoxy reasonably sized, yet recoverable, without using nets, parachute snaring. °r water recovery
AV-8B Harrier:________________
- Combat air patrol
- Long-range early airborne warning capability (ESM, radar, visual)
- Additional layer of defense again5
incoming missiles ,
- Long-range ASW search capability through sonobuoy placement with sono- buoy data-linked to TG
RPV:___________________________ ^
- Long-range early airborne warning system (ESM, radar, “visual” with air" borne link) for air and surface targets
- Long-range ultra high frequency link between dispersed ships
- Long-range/endurance sonobuoy l'n for buoys dropped by the Harrier or other vehicles
Regardless of the validity of the nieth' odology described here, one or more 0 the vehicles used in the OTH problem may never be included in the Navy’s arsenal. But other vehicles can them and still supply the desired result* except for a time penalty owing to t^e lower aircraft/ship performance charge teristics (see Table 2). ^
The potential for success in this O* targeting method is a direct result of ^ unique capabilities of the SES. The Sb has been depicted primarily as an vehicle, perhaps rightly so. But there ^ other roles that it can play—as an und^ way replenishment ship—and, as Pr° posed here, a landing field for certa1 fixed/rotary wing aircraft. Other roles this ship are limited only by the imag*na tion of the innovator.
Table 2 Vehicle Substitution
Vehicle | Substitute | Substitute | Substitute |
2 K SES | BH-157 (Bell Halter) |
|
|
70 knots | 41 knots |
|
|
Harrier | V-22 Osprey (formerly JVX tilt-rotor aircraft) | CH-53 Sea Stallion | LAMPS III |
450 knots | 325 knots | 115 knots | 117 knots |
35,000 feet | 30,000 feet | 25,000 feet | 12,000 feet |
Commander Cuccias is a Research Section in the Systems Management Group of the Sp ^ Corporation, conducting R&D in shipboard system design and analysis. A 1953 graduate o Naval Academy, he received a degree in Opcratl ^ Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School an M.A. in Financial Management from George -n ington University. While on active duty, he serve ^ four air antisubmarine squadrons, two tours as an structor in Naval Science and Mathematics at ^ Academy, and finished as the Assistant Direct^ War Games at the Center for Naval Analysis-