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Standby for Weigh-Off
It is Christmas Day, 1992. Airborne for more than three months, the USS Kosendahl, the largest airship ever built and the first nuclear-powered aircraft, continues to monitor enemy surface, subSUrface, and air movements. The ten-mil- 'on-cubic-foot, 1,000-foot-long Rosen- ™*1> built with super-strong, lightweight Plastics and alloys, cruises at 120 knots.
xe employs state-of-the-art surveillance lechnology, enabling her to track subma- r,nes across oceans, discover and moni- ,or enemy fleet activity, detect hostile fissile launchings, and, thanks to spon- 'aneous data links with Navy ships and aircraft, she can order appropriate tactical responses. Moreover, if she is within range, the Rosendahl can retaliate with Wlssiles, lasers, cannon, and more than a alf-dozen attack aircraft.
A dream machine? Perhaps. But just a ew years ago, anyone mentioning the Use °f lighter-than-air (LTA) ships in conjunction with contemporary naval opera- h°ns would have been considered, at “^t, foolhardy. LTA died a drawn-out, luiet death. The last airships were decommissioned at Naval Air Station Lake- Urst, New Jersey, in 1962. It seemed obvious that modem aircraft were faster, ar|d that technology had obviated the ad-
| - C!^ST GUARD (TOM GILLESPIE) vantages LTA once claimed.
During fiscal year 1984, however, the Navy’s LTA program sprouted. With $5 million in seed money from the Senate Armed Services Committee for development of a prototype LTA ship specifically, a battle surveillance airship for antisubmarine warfare, missile launch detection, and other purposes while serving as fleet escort—the program has gained Navy approval and Navy research and development funds. Moreover, the Navy and Coast Guard are reportedly working jointly, the Coast Guard pursuing its own LTA program which presently includes aviator and crew chief training. All this follows apparently successful operational evaluations conducted in the Caribbean.
LTA vessels could sail the skies for days (compared to hours for helicopters), providing surveillance at minimal cost (compared to any existing alternatives). Yet airship endurance and cost-effectiveness are well known, which leads one to wonder what prompts this sudden, renewed interest by the Navy. As long-time LTA aficionados maintain (happy as they are to see revived interest), spending $5 million to determine the feasibility of LTA aviation is akin to spending $5 million to determine the feasibility of the wheelbarrow. Such a study today, however, might explore the application of new technologies to airships.
Perhaps for the same reason, the Coast Guard sought bids during fiscal year 1984 to lease a blimp and, this year, for the training of Coast Guard LTA pilots and crew chiefs. The goal is to have airships conduct 48-hour patrols as part of the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction program, as well as to aid in search and rescue missions and to enhance military readiness. During 1984, the Coast Guard conducted extensive operational evaluations out of the southern Florida area. The U. S. Air Force is examining the potential of airships to provide reliable transportation for maintenance personnel to remote unmanned stations. Helicopters were first considered by the Air Force, but were tabled owing to fuel costs, high maintenance, and inadequate range. Like helicopters, airships could be susceptible to icing at remote Air Force surveillance posts in the far north, but they are still the best suited candidates.
The renewed interest in LTA was prompted by the Falklands Conflict in 1982, during which the $50-million, 3,500-ton British destroyer Sheffield (D 80) was sunk by a lone Super Eten- dard pilot firing a $200,000 Exocet missile from approximately 25 miles. The threat was made painfully obvious: Relatively inexpensive equipment can wipe out billions of dollars worth of ships, with little damage or cost to the aggressor. The Exocet skimmed along only six feet above the water’s surface, traveling near the speed of sound, and smashed unscathed into the Sheffield's hull, creating a fire with heat so intense the hull
One of the Coast Guard’s two tethered aerostats hovers over a support vessel in Key West. This radar detection platform concentrates on law enforcement missions now, but new designs and expanded roles are in the works.
One of the few airborne aircraft carriers in history, the Macon could carry F9C-2 Sparrowhawks, which landed on and launched from trapezes. Modern VTOLs could be adapted to airship carriers.
glowed red. It was reported after the sinking that the Sheffield’s defenses were not 100% at the time of the attack. Her guard was down during those crucial moments, a fact that serves only to demonstrate that warships cannot afford, in an age of relatively inexpensive, extremely accurate antiship weapons, ever to drop their guard. The event elevated to the political arena the question of how naval forces can defend against these “hi-tech” upstarts, especially when air- to-surface and cruise missiles can be targeted at ships 200 miles away. Why not, then, employ a proven ally that could extend the fleet’s eyes for hundreds of miles on a 24-hour-a-day basis, providing as much as four times the flight time obtainable from available aircraft today?
The logistics of airship operations would be simple—even convenient— and have been proven. Refueling, resupply, and crew transfer would be routine. For example, blimps and rigid airships have moored to or landed on Navy ships: the rigid airship USS Los Angeles (ZR-3) moored to the USS Patoka (AO-9), an oil tanker with a mooring mast mounted on the stern, at Panama in March 1931 and landed on the carrier Saratoga (CV-3) in 1928. Blimps landed on carriers during the 1940s, shifting crews and conducting in-flight refueling. Such landings could be made easier and more secure today by adapting systems used for helicopter landings at sea. If such landings proved impractical or undesirable, airship crews and supplies could be transferred in a cage which would be lowered to a ship’s deck. Refueling could be accomplished by rendezvousing with the refueling vessel, picking up a hose, filling her tanks, then returning the hose to fly another 70 to 80 hours or, in the case of a rigid airship, days. Obviously, the nuclear-powered dream ship, the Rosendahl, could cruise, theoretically at least, for years.
Logistics, though, are not a problem. Even weather, once the nemesis of lighter-than-air, would not present a major challenge because vastly improved weather forecasting techniques and the modem airsnips’ greater speeds would help these vehicles avoid heavy weather. Airships capable of making 150 knots are feasible.
Cost, while always a consideration, is not a debilitating factor in lighter-than- air’s reemergence, since one of the major reasons for reconsideration of this form of flying machine is its economy of operation. Airship start-up and construction costs would probably parallel those of commercial jet aircraft. However, maintenance costs for airships should be substantially less. And of no small import would be the convenience of on-board maintenance for virtually all of the airship. A rigid airship’s engines, mounted to the frame but within the envelope, are readily accessible. Crew members also have access to the airship’s “skin” and her fins. When cruising, rigid airships are capable of running on one or two of her four engines, if using conventional reciprocal motors. Maintenance costs for blimps would be, of course, minimal.
LTA opponents bemoan the vulnerability of airships; advocates maintain vulnerability is relative. Aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, and helicopters are all vulnerable. Airships could have a far greater tolerance to direct hits than any of the above: Rounds could pass right through the ship. Combustion would not represent a hazard, since helium would be used exclusively. Holes in the bottom or sides result in no loss of helium, because helium gathers at the top of the bag, or envelope. Moreover, any loss of helium, and therefore lift, could be compensated for by dropping ballast—water or fuel—until repairs could be made. Repairs could easily be made in flight, as nearly all of the ship’s helium cells are accessible from within the ship. In a rigid airship, and to a lesser degree in a nonrigid, many large helium chambers would help ensure that adequate amounts of helium were available to provide lift, just as compartmentalization of ships helps keep them afloat. By using cryogenics (refrigerants), helium could be liquified and stored in flasks for emergencies. One cubic foot of liquid helium weighing 7.6 pounds equals 682 cubic feet of vaporized helium. With existing technology, enough liquified helium could be carried on board for virtually any emergency. A modern airship could carry her own defenses: missiles, lasers, cannon, and, in the case of rigids, attack aircraft.
The crucial argument challenging LTA’s return to active duty, however, has to do with the vehicle’s mission, or the perception by naval leaders of what that mission should be. In the past, misguided or misinformed leaders often assigned airships tactical responsibilities. Sending an airship to drop bombs on surfaced submarines or other armed surface vessels makes about as much sense as sending a sailboat with a five-inch cannon after a battleship. The leverage an airship can provide naval forces is strategic: serving as eyes for the fleet 24 hours a day and extending the fleet’s vision hundreds and perhaps thousands of miles. No other aircraft can come close to the airship in providing the U. S. military with such an effective surveillance platform, because of her unequaled endurance.
A rigid airship’s range could be extended considerably by carrying her own aircraft. F9C-2 Sparrowhawk airplanes made “landings” regularly on the airships Los Angeles, Akron (ZR-4), and Macon (ZRS-5), attaching in mid-air to suspended trapezes. Some planes could stand ready on perches at the ship’s bottom, while others could be stored in the airship’s hangar. Vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, with their ability to hover in mid-air, would be particularly well-suited for docking with an airship. Although offensive missions are not the bailiwick of airships, it is appropriate for reconnaissance and offensive/defen- sive aircraft to be attached to airships.
Of all the factors determining the fate of naval airships, none are more important than funding. During the economically hard-pressed 1930s, top-level military debate concerning the merits of LTA hurt airship production. Money was so tight that despite Rear Admiral William A. Moffett’s best efforts, the Akron and Macon were built without receiving radios. Today’s tight defense budgets will make the rebirth of LTA no less difficult, at least on the scale being discussed here.
To build and service a few blimps would not- 'n the grand scheme of things, place an undue burden on the military budget, Particularly in light of the benefits.
This is not to say, however, that LTA w°uld not have antagonists. In the past, antagonists among the naval leadership ave, during fleet exercises, sent the participating airships to attack the enemy *eet- Inevitably, the airships were “shot own,” only to be “reborn” and sent on the attack again, only to be “shot down” a§ain, and so on.
Fortunately, examples of innovative Use of the airship abound. One of the best occurred in July 1934, when Lieutenant onimander Herbert V. Wiley delivered Newspapers and magazines in the Macon ying from Naval Air Station Sunnyvale, alifornia (now Moffett Field), to Presi- ent Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was sailing on board the USS Houston (CA- 0), bound for Hawaii. The Macon inter- ce.Pted the Houston approximately 1,500 Julies off the California coast. No aircraft ac* ever made such an intercept—a r°und trip of 3,000 miles. Despite the mission’s success, Wiley’s venture was n°t received with much enthusiasm.
here are those who believe Vice Hdmiral Chuichi Nagumo’s Japanese strike force might have been discovered ln late 1941 had the Macon been flying rec°nnaissance from Pearl Harbor. It is reasonable to assume that the Macon might have prevented the Pearl Harbor attack. Military intelligence knew the Japanese fleet was lurking about, it just did not know where. Had the Macon come across the Japanese fleet she probably would have been shot down, but not before she relayed her contact message to Pearl Harbor. Saving the U. S. fleet would have been worth the loss of one rigid airship. There is little doubt that the Rosendahl would have sighted and reported the Japanese fleet, and probably would even have survived to tell about it, considering she could have made the sighting from beyond the Japanese fleet’s effective combat range.
It is one of the great claims of airships that no World War II convoy ship was lost to enemy submarines while being escorted by airships. Light airborne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) helicopters perform this role today. But could not airships perform a role in this mission? Remember that in World War II German U-boats were not beaten by any one combatant, but by a coordinated effort by airships, aircraft, and surface vessels. The Navy has teamed the LAMPS antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopter with electronic data processing and the endurance of surface ships to create a highly effective ASW force. Imagine how much greater the sphere of influence might be with the added capabilities and range of airships.
Commander Wiley, the Macon “paperboy,” wrote an article, “The Value of Airships,” addressing this issue, which was published in the May 1934 Proceedings. The following excerpt is as true today as it was then: “Now is the time to have a demonstration at small cost. The dividends may be very great and give our Navy a tremendous advantage! If we were to embark on a naval war today we would order more airships and start feverishly to train crews. We would use every arrow in our quiver, and here is one that flies far and true.”
It has all been said before. The airship offers strategic advantages that have not changed despite decades of neglect and technological change. Perhaps airships will return with technological improvements providing economical, effective surveillance to help the Navy meet its global challenge.
Mr. Montarelli is currently deputy public affairs officer at the Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, New Jersey. After earning a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Colorado at Boulder in 1976, he worked as a reporter and editor for newspapers in Colorado and New Jersey, and as a freelance writer. During his four years of military duty, Montarelli served as part of a reconnaissance flight crew on board U. S. Air Force EC-121s in Southeast Asia.
Ship-Based Tactical Weather Forecasting
Lieutenant David W. Jones, U. S. Navy
Water and weather. As the Navy’s tendency on increasingly sophisticated eaPon systems grows, so too does the aeed for a better understanding of the Vlronment’s effects on these systems. 1° April 1984, Chief of Naval Opera- ions (CNO) James D. Watkins said,
■mpact of the ocean environment
their
operations and system performance
The
most important tool for under-
A cruise missile skimming over the PCean, an air search radar scanning the 0riz°n, a sonar monitoring the dark blue ^ater> and a ship caught in a typhoon all ave something in common—their effec- Veness is dependent on the environ- mcnt. For as long as men have gone to s®a> their fate has been determined by ^e’r exploitation of the conditions of
The
IJPon tactical and strategic forces and
be understood and accounted for, to ^1 effectively employ our Navy.
anding and exploiting the ocean envi- llJf,ITICnt’s *^e computer. Since the early os, the Navy has used these machines
to numerically analyze and forecast environmental conditions. Yet if this information is to be of tactical, real-time value, computers programmed to handle this data must be deployed on board ships. There is no single, solely dedicated machine for processing on-scene data, analyzing surroundings, and predicting environmental effects on weapon systems.
In the late 1950s the Navy’s weather community recognized the tremendous improvement computers could make in weather forecasting. Operation NAN- WEP (NAvy Numerical WEather Prediction) was established in Suitland, Maryland, in 1958. NANWEP moved to Monterey, California, in 1959 and shared the Navy Postgraduate School’s computers. From these meager origins, NANWEP became the Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center (FNOC), today the heart of an extensive computer and telecommunications network.
By-products of FNOC’s numerical forecasting include radar coverage diagrams, passive sound propagation loss predictions, and drift plots for search and rescue operations. Ship requests for computer-generated environmental products have risen every year.
However, these shore-based data messages are carried on a tenuous satellite communications line. When these messages are derived accurately, transmitted expeditiously, and used wisely, they greatly improve ships’ tactics. But satisfying these criteria is not always possible, because of the following:
- Field gaps: FNOC analyzes and forecasts the environment for the entire globe. The complexity of environmental models requiring extensive computer capacity and covering very large areas admits the possibility of missing local, small-scale phenomena pertinent to shipboard weapon systems.
- Message broadcast competition: Environmental data products (which can be very long and contain multiple sections) bound for ships must compete with other
Centralized analysis and forecasting are needed to exploit data like this satellite photo of a rare winter hurricane in 1984, and to avoid mishaps like HMAS Arrow's sinking during Cyclone Tracy, facing page.
important messages and successively negotiate the funnel-like satellite communication system that collects messages from shore and transmits them to the fleet. Although delays are normal, in times of heavy broadcast loads, such as fleet exercises or hostilities, many data messages do not arrive when they are needed. As a result, the fleet has relegated these products, generally, to planning instead of real-time tactics.
► Complexity of products: Interpreting the complex data requires expertise and experience. Though training is available from various fleet input schools, the vicissitudes of shipboard life, with constantly rotating officers, make the goal of maintaining a tactically acute wardroom difficult, especially regarding such complicated concerns as environmental effects on weapon systems.
Environmental predictions are impeded by regional gaps, time delay, and unfathomable output, posing a major challenge to the many internal Navy research and development (R&D) organizations. The computer revolution of the 1960s provided these groups with the opportunity to place in ships minicomputers with the same brain capacity as mainframes, but much smaller in size.
One of the first forecasting packages that deployed with the fleet was the Antisubmarine Warfare Environmental Prediction System (ASWEPS). This later evolved into the integrated command ASW prediction system (ICAPS). The Naval Oceanographic Office (NavOceanO) designed ICAPS for all aircraft carriers with an ASW mission. It runs on a hard-wired, non-dedicated computer, and is still in use.
The acoustic models used by ICAPS are derived from Navy standard acoustic models obtained from FNOC. ICAPS was designed to work in conjunction with the message products received and act as sole source for acoustic predictions in case of a break in communications.
ICAPS includes a historical data file with the acoustic properties of the ocean separated into various zones. It has the ability to input in situ environmental data readings, bathythermographs (BTs) for example, and blend historical and in situ data to provide the best estimate of acoustic sound path. ICAPS products can predict the location of the sonic layer depth, passive propagation loss, the possibility of convergence zones, and active sonar ranges.
This revolutionary technology provides the carrier environmentalist with the unique ability to instantaneously— relative to shore provided data—forecast the reaction of sound in the immediate ocean surroundings. Environmental acoustic predictions can now be real-time.
A relative of ICAPS was developed for smaller combatants. The Naval Underwater Systems Center (NUSC) program, the sonar in situ mode assessment system (SIMAS), is designed to be hard-wired into the sonar spaces, and provides many ICAPS capabilities in addition to tactical aids and recommendations for optimum equipment settings.
The older ASW surface platforms do not have SIMAS. But miniaturization, the wonder of the 1970s, offered a solution—the microcomputer. NUSC designed a SIMAS-like program called the acoustic prediction performance and element location (APPEL) for the Hewlett- Packard HP9845 computer. With desktop portability and hard-wired-like power, APPEL improved the platforms’ ASW capability.
The Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), another Navy R&D organization, wrote a program called the integrated refractive effects prediction system (IREPS). Not only can this software package provide a spatial analysis of radar coverage, it can be used to assess and exploit the effects the lower atmosphere has on the performance of electromagnetic systems operating between 100 megahertz and 20 gigahertz. Upper air radiosondes (testing devices) and surface observations provide the source data for the software program designed to run on the Hewlett-Packard HP9845 (same as APPEL). IREPS products range from optimum flight profile for attack aircraft avoidance of radar detection, to flight altitudes for the most effective VHF communications.
The prospects of hi-tech weapon systems, such as Tomahawk and Harpoon cruise missiles, plus the need for further exploitation of small-scale environmental phenomenon, such as a fog forecast for infrared detection evasion, demonstrate the need for further sophistication. The fact that most of today’s environmental systems have different sponsors and/or developers explains why there is no central control of environmental data on board ships. There is no single authority controlling system developments and training ashore.
Clearly, what is called for is a centralized network serving as the sole conduit for environmental input and sole source of forecasted output. Products should be put into a tactical aid format and sent to the individual weapon station and to a
tactical action officer display terminal, ‘he tactical environmental support system (TESS) is an attempt to fill this need. As a CNO-sponsored program managed y Naval Air Systems Command, TESS mcludes off-the-shelf military specification (MilSpec) hardware to run state-of- the-art software packages. Two UYK-20 computers are the focal point of all incoming environmental data and outgoing Products, for example satellite pictures, sonobuoy readings, and tailored shore- ased command and control graphics.
The TESS centralized data control and Powerful computer capacity offers new enefits to the shipboard tactician, principally its ability to analyze and forecast he total environment. Fog probability, areas of contrail avoidance, and calcula- hons for chaff dispersal are some of the numerous products available in addition t0 those from ICAPS.
Ambitiously conceived in 1979, the Prospect of TESS maintaining its objec- tlves by the 1991 deployment deadline appears to be in jeopardy. The main cul- Pnt is MilSpec equipment requirements. Captain William G. Schramm, U. S.
!^avy > former commanding officer of the aval Environmental Prediction Re- j^arch Facility (NEPRF), wrote in the EPRp Meteoreport, “We are told that ESS hardware has to be Navy supported ''Spec. Translated that means we are ®0lng to have to use equipment that is lnferior (because it will be outdated) to CUrrent industry state-of-the-art, equip- r,,Cnt that costs far more (up to 10 times as much) as commercial equipment that Probably won’t be able to do all we want to do, (and will have little or no growth Potential).”2 MilSpec does ensure equip- mcnt with extensive part support and the . dity to withstand rough treatment, but ls jhis price worth the cost?
There are better ways. The goal is to ®el environmental prediction capabilities available ashore to the ships as soon as Possible. The IREPS and APPEL are successful not only because they improved a ship’s tactical capability, but because they were deployed quickly and inexpensively. The commercial desk-top computer was the key.
One experimental system is the scaled- down integrated tactical decision aid (JOTS), which uses a HP9020 minicomputer to produce weapon assessment aids designed for the tactical commander— plans for ASW search, command air patrol (CAP) stationing, and satellite vulnerability reports. JOTS proved very useful during the recent Caribbean and Middle East hostilities.
The state-of-the-art environmental products needed at sea cannot be chained to MilSpec. Computer technology, developing so rapidly, will far out-distance any hardware finally MilSpec approved. The Navy’s environmental R&D community is moving in the right direction, but a more radical departure is needed. It must get out of the hardware business altogether.
An example now with the fleet that points to the feasibility of this concept is the shipboard numerical aid program (SNAP) packaged by NEPRF for the HP9845. A precursor of TESS, SNAP is a set of software programs that can compute D-values, forecast high winds near tropical cyclones, develop sound velocity profiles, and more.
If the premise that commercial microcomputers and packaged Navy software provide the best solution to the shipboard environmental problem, then the ultimate solution is IBM compatibility. This free market standardization means that soon a majority of micros will be linguistically equivalent.
When all these computers talk the same language, software development is simplified drastically. R&D people could then provide ships with plug-in hard-disc drives with all the environmental prediction routines available.
All surface combatants need environmental exploitation capability. Previously, the high cost of computer systems excluded many ships. Since the price of microcomputers is continually decreasing, they are now within the price range of most ships’ internal budgets. Allowing each ship to purchase her own computer systems frees the environmental R&D community from the MilSpec mess, gets the hardware on board, and lets the ship tailor the hardware. A focus on software allows for faster improvement to the system because the long MilSpec approval process is eliminated.
Shore-based mainframe computers provided the first step toward improving environmental prediction but there are inherent problems in this system. State- of-the-art microcomputers can overcome the shore-based computer limitations by:
- Reducing field gaps: The inputs of onscene observations of air and ocean from the ship and, when available, ships in company, provide the most accurate assessments. When wide-range analysis is needed, specifically tailored fields can be transmitted from FNOC.
- Elimination of time delay: Shipboard environmental computers diminish the satellite communications dependency. Computer products become real-time and tactically useful.
- Product accessibility: Once these computer systems are deployed they become part of the ship. After repeated use, feedback to the programmers will produce an understandable, tactically useful system.
In May 1984, Commodore J. R. Seesholtz, Oceanographer of the Navy, wrote: “I am convinced, along with many other students of naval history, that in a stand-off of nearly equal naval technology, the naval force which most successfully employs excellent knowledge of the nature and behavior of the operational environment will most certainly have an advantage in meeting challenges at sea.”3 Ships armed with their own microcomputers capable of exploiting the environment are platforms provided with this tactical advantage.
'Admiral James D. Watkins. USN, “CNO Oceanography Policy Statement,” 19 April 1984.
2Captain William G. Schramm. USN, “Challenge for TESS . . . NEPRF Meteoreport, July 1981,
p. 2.
3Commodore J. R. Seesholtz, USN, “Naval Oceanography . . . Naval Oceanography Command News (Sea Technology reprint). May 1984, p. 5.
Lieutenant Jones has been Quality Control Division Officer at the Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center in Monterey, California, since September 1983. He received a B.S. in Oceanography from the State University of New York (SUNY) Maritime College in 1979 and served in the USS Oldendorf (DD-972).
a
• • •
And Never the Twain Shall Meet”
By Lieutenant Christopher C. Staszak, U. S. Naval Reserve
Rudyard Kipling’s famous opening line from his 1889 poem “The Ballad of East and West,” “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,” suggests the disparity that exists between the Navy’s combatants and its noncombatant auxiliary and amphibious ships. Combatants are well armed and able to protect themselves, while others must muddle through with inadequate defenses or hope a combatant is near.
Anything beyond point defense for auxiliary and amphibious ships is considered unrealistic. But today basic changes in the nature of naval weapons allow auxiliaries and amphibious ships to assume larger shares of their own defense and in some cases to take the offensive. The same microchips that give advanced capabilities to these new weapons can provide simple, economical means to command and control armed auxiliary and amphibious formations.
We do, of course, have escorts: the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates were designed for the escort mission. But do we have enough? According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, Navy Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, speaking in Bonn, West Germany, “insisted he needs more convoy escorts. In a war, he said, he may not be able to fulfil all his commitments simultaneously, and NATO maritime forces, heavily engaged on the northern flank and in the Norwegian Sea, would find it difficult to protect reinforcement convoys bound for Europe as well. In this case, he said, he would be forced to set priorities.”1
The last two world wars proved escorts are invaluable and always in short supply. Cruiser and destroyer shortfalls have pressed ships intended for escort duties into service with battle groups and surface action groups. While auxiliary/am- phibious formations are not likely to sail unescorted, demands elsewhere may result in less than adequate protection.
Since battle group and surface action group combatants with empty magazines and empty fuel tanks are of little use, the auxiliaries must be well protected. Amphibious warfare ships and their embarked Marines are the only means the Navy has of accomplishing one of its four primary missions—power projection ashore—and thus deserve protection.
Escort requirements for auxiliary/am- phibious formations cannot be eliminated, but if adequately armed, these ships can assume greater shares of their own defense without compromising their primary mission. Formations previously requiring three to four escorts could then safely operate with one or two. Just four such formations with reduced escort requirements can free approximately eight escorts for duty elsewhere—virtually an entire destroyer squadron.
This solution would involve a reexamination of several current and proposed naval weapon systems. Many are entirely self-contained, bolt-on systems able to perform internally the control (unctions that previously required shipboard directors and associated systems. In effect, these new weapons have transformed the ships they are mounted on into weapon platforms.
Antisurface Warfare: A good example is the Harpoon surface-to-surface missile (RGM-84). To date, the Harpoon has been considered a very-long-range replacement for the torpedo. As such it has been deployed only on the traditional torpedo launchers—battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, aircraft, and submarines. But why only these platforms? No longer are the speed and agility of a destroyer necessary to close to launching range. A 600+-knot Harpoon will perform equally well whether it is launched from an oiler’s deck at 15 knots or from the deck of a destroyer at 30 knots.
Armed auxiliary and amphibious ships are not new. What is new is the nature of weapons. Previously, if an auxiliary deployed a five-inch gun, it sacrificed fire control, speed, or agility. The Harpoon is an entire weapon system; its guidance (inertial with active terminal homing) assumes the ship’s fire control functions, so no direction is needed other than initial range and bearing to the target, or simply a bearing. Harpoon canisters are easily “bolted on” and occupy minimal deck space. There is no comparison between an auxiliary armed with 60+-mile-range Harpoons and the current 14,000-yard- range 3750 guns, which have been described as having “limited effectiveness.”2 (LHAs mount 5754 guns.)
Antiair Warfare: Approximately 83% of auxiliary and amphibious ships each rely on a pair of 3750 guns for antiair warfare, most without fire control. The remaining 17%, mostly I wo Jima (LPH)- and Tarawa (LHA)-cIass amphibious assault ships depend on the first-generation Mark 25 base point missile defense system (BPMDS) using a rudimentary Mark 115 fire control system. A few Sacramento (AOE-l)-class fast combat support ships and Wichita (AOR-l)-class replenishment oilers have now received the follow-on Mark 29 NATO Sea Sparrow with the more effective Mark 91 fire control system. The Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS), which has a 1,625-yard range, is being installed as systems become available.3
The Sparrow follow-on, the AM- RAAM (advanced medium range air-to- air missile) has been proposed as a Sea Sparrow replacement. A state of the art weapon, AMRAAM utilizes inertial midcourse guidance with an active terminal homer.4 Like Harpoon, AMRAAM’s internal system handles the intercept. Since no shipboard guidance is required other than initial targeting data, the AMRAAM can engage multiple targets, including threats not directly headed toward the launching ship, thus assisting in the defense of accompanying ships.
Providing a closer, secondary line of defense is possible with the General Dynamics RAM (rolling airframe missile), the R1M-116A, available in the same launcher. Two cells of any eight-cell box launcher can each hold five RAMs for a total of ten missiles. An alternate mode is the EX-31 stand-alone system, using a modified Phalanx mounting and holding 21 missiles.5 There are two guidance systems within the RAM. The first uses the incoming missile’s radiation. Since 75% of Soviet cruise missiles emit radiation either from active homers or radio altimeters, the RAM was designed with a passive radio frequency guidance which acquires the target and guides the missile until the second guidance system, an infrared sensor, acquires the target/’ If necessary, the infrared guidance can be used alone. Like the Harpoon, the Sea-AMRAAM and RAM launchers occupy min-
” dynamos
lrr|al deck area while the self-guiding fea- 117res of both missiles obviate complex shipboard guidance.
Augmented with such electronic desses as the SLQ-32 countermeasures system and chaff, several such ships in Ormation will present a formidable, layered defense, which would be greatly et'hanced by escorts.
Antisubmarine Warfare: Powerful sonars cannot be duplicated in auxiliary or amphibious ships. As the design of the ^G-7 class demonstrates and current antisubmarine warfare (ASW) doctrine Preaches, submarines are to be countered w,th air assets while the ship stands off.
Virtually all auxiliary and amphibious sh,Ps possess varying degrees of helicop- !®r capability and can land either of the ^avy’s light ASW helicopters. Both the p-60B LAMPS III and SH-2F LAMPS can search for and prosecute ASW con- acts without assistance from the mother” ship.
Target data will come from the same purees that key combatants: SOSUS Sound Surveillance System), P-3 Ori- °ns> electronic intelligence (ELINT), ra<iar, SURTASS (SURveillance Towed Array Sensor System), and TACTAS (TACtical Towed Array Sonar) message reports, etc.7
Seismic Engineering Company, which produces the AN/SQR-18A tactical towed array, has proposed a towed acoustic tactical underwater warning system (TATUWS) as a means of adding towed array sonar to any ship with sufficient deck space.8 TATUWS could be mounted on a Powhattan (T-ATF-166)- class tug, an Edenton (ATS-l)-class salvage and rescue ship, or an ARS-class salvage ship.
Deck space and support varies from well-equipped LHAs and LPHs to austere helipads on smaller ships. While the LHA/LPH types could embark a relatively large number of helicopters, space and capabilities would be constrained. However, their maintenance facilities and trained personnel would support helicopters on accompanying ships. Unutilized hangar space on fast combat support ships (AOEs), replenishment oilers (AORs), ammunition ships (AEs), and submarine tenders (ASs) could be implemented. Telescoping hangars could be installed on Cimarron (AO-177)-class fleet oilers and tank landing ships (LSTs) and the telescoping hangars on dock
“Bolt-on” weapon systems like the Mark 25 box launcher, firing a Sea Sparrow III, facing page, and the Phalanx close-in weapon system’s 20-mm. Gatling gun, left, can make contenders of also-rans like our auxiliaries and amphibious ships and free frigates from escort duty.
landing ships (LSDs) and LPHs could be augmented. Judiciously placed containers or ship modifications would provide the support facilities. Finally, all auxiliary and amphibious ships should have torpedo decoys installed: If a maneuverable, high-speed destroyer has a torpedo decoy, why not a much slower, more vulnerable unit?
Command and Control: Just as combatants share the sensor information of all ships in the formation, so must the auxil- iary/amphibious formation. Each ship can provide surface search radar and visual information, and in most cases electronic support measures (ESM) data. Larger amphibious ships (LHAs, LPHs, LSDs) and AOEs mount air search radars. In fact their sensor suite is not very different from the average frigate’s. Helicopters, both ASW and transport, can provide search and over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting. A three-dimensional data source could be provided by a fully equipped, data-linked escort, her combat information center (CIC) ideal for evaluating all the sensor data.
Developing a means to exchange all the data in an orderly, understandable, and rapid fashion is a crucial step. The average personal computer (PC) is an excellent starting point. It has impressive capacities and is relatively easy to use. A few simple modifications can adapt these PCs for naval use. A link with the ship’s navigation satellite (NAVSAT) could incorporate a data link reference point (DLRP). NAVSAT has a dead reckoning mode so the PC can continue to operate if the satellite is lost. A “mouse” balltab can be used to rapidly position targets. If a simple means is available to digitalize the ship’s own radar input, it too can be linked to the PC. Otherwise targets would be manually entered using the “mouse” balltab and the keyboard. The system must be kept as simple as possible.
Data sharing between ships can be made via a line-of-sight microwave. Once the data has been entered onto the screen, it is then transmitted to the ship exercising tactical command. There, a slightly more sophisticated computer receives the data and compares it to referenced targets positioned in relation to DLRP, canceling out dual designated targets. The data is then disseminated to the formation. Backup “net control” capable ships would be available in the formation. Each ship will have a number of PCs appropriate to her weapons and sensor capacity. Undoubtedly this command and control scenario is a gross simplification; technical problems will arise. It would be desirable to have some provision to encrypt the data and to allow for growth. Nevertheless, in view of the hardware and software available in the average computer store today, it is difficult to believe the technology and expertise does not exist to develop a simple, economical, and workable system.
Force composition: The baseline armament configuration for an average size ship is proposed as follows: four Harpoons; one Sea-AMRAAM/RAM, eightcell box launcher; two Phalanxes, an SLQ-32 electronic countermeasures system with associated Chaffroc/Super RBOC (rapid blooming offboard chaff); and one helicopter.
Armament may vary from ship to ship. Larger ships would receive additional weapons and embark more than one helo. A TATUWS-equipped ship in the formation would be desirable.
A typical four-ship amphibious group would include:
- One LPH—four Harpoons, two Sea- AMRAAM/RAM boxes (12 Sea-AM- RAAMs/20 RAMs), two Phalanxes, one LAMPS
- One LPD—four Harpoons, one Sea- AMRAAM/RAM box (six Sea-AM- RAAMs/ten RAMs), two Phalanxes, one to two LAMPS
- One LSD—four Harpoons, one Sea- AMRAAM/RAM box (six Sea-AM- RAAMs/ten RAMs), two Phalanxes, one LAMPS
- One LST—four Harpoons, one Sea- AMRAAM box (six Sea-AMRAAMs/ten RAMs), two Phalanxes, one LAMPS
- Total Assets—16 Harpoons, 30 Sea- AMRAAMs, 50 RAMs, eight Phalanxes, and four to five LAMPS
All of these are in addition to the combat capabilities of any escorts.
Employment: The tactical implications are enormous. An immediate benefit is the complication such a formation causes to the enemy. A previously vulnerable formation now requires a much greater share of his offensive assets. His flexibility is decreased while ours is increased. He cannot ignore the offensive potential of Harpoon and LAMPS. Attacks may come from totally unexpected quarters and resources must be diverted to cover these possibilities.
Some potential benefits of arming auxiliaries are listed below, grouped under modes of employment.
- Independent Formation Operations:
Increased self-defense ability, reducing escort requirements
Enhanced sea control with wider deployment of Harpoon
Targets of opportunity can be engaged much more readily. Previously, if the formation encountered an enemy merchant vessel well outside of the escort’s gun range but in surface-to-surface missile (SSM) range, the commander had four options: (1) use the escort’s scarce Harpoons and chance not having them when an enemy combatant arrives; (2) request an air strike from a probably very busy carrier; (3) chase the enemy with an escort, leaving the formation exposed; and (4) let the enemy escape.
The extra weapons allow engagement with SSMs.
Ability to immediately respond to unexpected events, such as the appearance of a fast patrol boat from a nearby coast
LAMPS will be distributed over a wider area, allowing better coverage of ASW contacts.
An ability to better protect unarmed ships accompanying the armed auxiliary/ amphibious formation
- Independent Ship Operations:
An unescorted unit can defend herself against an unexpected attack. For example, during a limited conflict, a patrol boat or aircraft from a country sympathetic to our foe attacks. Such an attack can be countered
During peacetime a terrorist attack by a small craft or aircraft can be countered.
- Battle Group Operations:
Additional platforms for SSMs and
LAMPS, increasing their survivability through dispersion
An option to fire SSMs on some ships, keeping the remainder in reserve
Combatants can devote more time to destroying the long-range threats as the additional defense in depth provides a better means of dealing with “leakers.”
- Amphibious Operations:
Defense of the amphibious assault is much better if defensive weapons accompany the assault force into the beach.
Unexpected arrivals of enemy forces can be dealt with using the forces at hand without waiting for support.
Additional defense against any “leakers” which slip through the outer screens
Embarked surface-to-air missiles can protect helicopter movement to and from the beach.
Future: This concept has much potential for expansion. Bolt-on weapons requiring minimal support have a wide range of applications. Most promising is a modern version of the World War II naval detachments on merchant ships: an entire bolt-on weapon system, consisting of the weapon and a container providing support (with a data receiving system), and manned by a small team. The entire system could be transported rapidly to a port for embarkation on one of the convoy’s ships. Just one Harpoon and a few Sea-AMRAAM systems spread throughout the convoy would help.
Such a role is ideally suited for the Navy’s Selected Reserve units, which would have the opportunity to train and maintain the actual weapons and systems they would use in combat.
Similar, but more difficult would be to provide certain naval air reserve units with the aircraft to form a small carrier wing of AV-8s and ASW helicopters. The unit would be supported by an Arap- aho system, embarked on a suitable merchant, and configured similar to the British Atlantic Conveyor. Bolt-on systems such as Sea-AMRAAM and Phalanx should also be installed to avoid the fate of the Atlantic Conveyor. Containers will carry the maintenance gear. Included with the reserve unit should be a containerized radar facility to provide limited air control. Potential ships can be selected in advance and modified.
Cost: Opponents will argue that we cannot afford weapons for all these ships. Can the Navy afford not to adequately defend its ships? The amount of money necessary to arm these ships is very small compared to the cost of the ship. The number of escorts could be stretched and the missions of power projection ashore and fleet substainability will have a much better chance of success.
'“U. S. Admiral Calls for More Escorts, 18 Carrier Force,’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 August 1984, p. 223.
-Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet, Eleventh Edition, (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 132. y!bid„ p. 302.
J"Hughes Plans AMRAAM Derivatives," International Defense Review, No. 7, 1983, p. 915.
?Bill Sweetman, "General Dynamics RAM, The First Fire and Forget Anti-Missile Missile,” International Defense Review, No. 2, 1984, p. 173.
6Ibid„ p. 175.
7Colonel William V. Kennedy, Intelligence Warfare, (New York: Crescent Books, 1983), p. 190.
8"The 1984 U. S. Navy League Show,” International Defense Review, No. 7, 1984, p. 951.
Lieutenant Staszak left active duty in 1984 to pursue a Masters of Business Administration at Boston University, which he received in August, and is drilling in the Naval Reserve with Fleet Intelligence Rapid Support Team at NAS South Weymouth, MA. Previously he was Executive Officer of the USS Constitution and Operations Officer in the USS Glover (FF- 1098). He now works for M/A-COM.
c3s2c*____________________
Lieutenant Commander T. J. McKeamey, U. S. Navy
Although command and control systems have been intensely debated for some time, upgrades to on-board command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems have been incon- ststent and somewhat unfocused. The shortage of automated command support systems in our modem surface combatants is particularly disappointing. Today’s surface warfare forces are facing new offensive and defensive tactical r°les, making expanded C3I support a v'tal necessity.
Ironically, much of this support is well within the capabilities of existing tech- nol°gy. Hindering the implementation of new C3I systems is the lack of firm conCePts for these systems based on funda- teental mission requirements. Instead, current tactical C3I systems are either too broad-based or too sparsely allocated to Provide uniform support to all missions.
Our fleet C3I systems need a reorienta- h°n toward decision support instead of the current focus on expanded information sharing. Three requirements emerge:
. ^formation and intelligence processes: Fleet units need the capability to rap- 'dly assimilate vital information and share this information with supporting units of the task group.
' Decision support: The complexities of modern naval warfare demand that key decisions be made rapidly and correctly. ' Employment and targeting orders for sPeeific units: The modern naval force’s Potential is spread throughout the force and must be employed with maximum efficiency by the force commander.
As simple and obvious as these needs may seem, there are subtle problems in finding systems to address them. Current mformation processing systems may w°rk too well. The Navy tactical data system (NTDS) shows the entire tactical Pteture to a relatively few units of the force while the tactical decision-making Process in today’s surface combatant is largely supported by mechanical or manual means. Although the resources for modeling, simulation, artificial intelligence, and similar modem techniques are available, such concepts are foreign to °ur seagoing forces. The ability to support specific units with information and guidance optimizing capabilities is simi- arly within the limits of our technical capability, yet individual ships are usually fed a glut of tactical data and left to
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelli- 8ence Systems for Surface Combatants sort key information. Ironically, the vital elements of information needed for targeting our longer range weapons are often missing from the vast quantity of details passed via existing NTDS links.
An examination of NTDS highlights the shortfalls in our tactical C3I posture. Developed in the early 1960s, NTDS remains the backbone of our automated task force command and control. While NTDS has the capability to present a thorough tactical picture, the details are sparsely shared. Since only the newer and larger combatants are equipped with the extensive NTDS hardware suite, only about half of the average task group shares the NTDS picture. In the conduct of amphibious warfare operations this fundamental support is even rarer, as only a handful of amphibious warfare ships have been built with NTDS.
Beyond the scarcity of NTDS assets lies the larger question of the system’s continued viability. Although conceived to deal with air defense, modifications have squeezed virtually all warfare missions into the same NTDS information network: antiair warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASuW), electronic warfare (EW), miscellaneous intelligence, and force employment orders are all handled via the NTDS Link 11 data net. As a means of passing air defense information and engagement orders NTDS is unsurpassed. In other missions, however, keeping the link up does not ensure operational success. NTDS capabilities do not extend to the automated storage and evaluation of tactical data. Warfare areas requiring detailed and methodical information collection and correlation are supported only in passing by current NTDS capabilities.
Time has become the naval commander’s scarcest, but most vital, resource. In no aspect of naval operations has this become as evident as within the missions of our surface forces. The multi-dimensional face of surface warfare demands a new direction in C3I design.
The following illustrations, hypothetical but feasible, underscore the needs tactical commanders lack in our present C3I structures:
Case I: The frigate’s commanding officer felt lonely indeed. In the four minutes since his Knox (FF-/052)-class frigate was detached from the carrier’s screen, he had maneuvered his ship onto a suitable course for launching his light air-
Case I: This Knox-class frigate and her SH-2 LAMPS helicopter search for a reported submarine without the Navy tactical data system.
borne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) ASW helicopter and, as the SH-2 cleared the fantail, he pondered his problem.
A returning combat air patrol from the carrier caught a brief glimpse of a periscope some 20 miles from the battle group. The frigate had been detached to investigate with her long-range sonar systems and the LAMPS. P-3 Orion and S-3 Viking flights had discovered hints of this possibly hostile submarine, but the details available to the frigate skipper were sketchy—overheard on tactical voice radio circuits. Details of prior contact known to the force ASW commander were available only in the carrier’s ASW center and sparingly shared via NTDS among the ships of the battle group.
‘ 'Murphy'' had intervened, however, and the frigate, closest to the potential threat and the only ASW unit with an operating
LAMPS, was now faced with an expanding haystack and little information on the needle.
The frigate captain in the above situation may well have developed an undeserved inferiority complex after considering his job and the resources available to him. The non-NTDS-equipped frigate is hampered by a shortage of adequate tactical data, data that may be available to other members of the battle group.
The irony of this scenario underscores the principal flaw in our tactical C3I structure. NTDS ensures that some units get complete information while others go without. Adding more NTDS consoles to the fleet fails to address the key issue of adequate tactical information support.
There is a definite limit to the data a unit needs to complete its mission effectively, yet the existing NTDS structure emphasizes an all-or-nothing approach which ignores the smaller but still capable surface combatant.
Tactical information and intelligence systems must be designed to provide tailored, mission-related data that can be of immediate value to the ship’s commanding officer. Our efforts to refine NTDS’s capability to store information have evolved into massive amounts of data being processed, yet not effectively evaluated and distributed to the subordinate commanders who share the burden of the mission success. With a minimum of equipment, the frigate could be equipped
Case II: With the landing scheduled to begin at dawn, the afternoon briefing was to be the last chance for the task force commander and the landing force commander to review the operation. The plan their staffs had been developing for several weeks seemed complete, based on reasonably confident intelligence and solid previous experience. The commodore' s question, however, was reasonable: “N3, suppose that enemy armored column isn’t where we believe, but 25 or so kilometers southward down that highway nearer that other village. Should we rethink the objectives of our vertical assault, keeping in mind the narrow tide window we have for landing the forces across the beach?”
Case III: The New Jersey's SAG commander has fired a Tomahawk cruise missile with conventional warhead at rebels threatening U. S. assets in a Third World country. But are the available data sufficient to guide the missile to target?
with an automated display system capable of accumulating the tactical data already held on the submarine contact. Another system, geared toward antiair defense, should be considered for the guided missile destroyer, steaming next to the frigate, whose missile battery is degraded by a minimal flow of information on the air situation.
The briefer cleared his throat and knowingly stepped back for another thoughtful glance at the wall-sized chart. “Well, sir,” he began, launching into an answer that may have sounded like it addressed the question, but could more accurately be interpreted as “Commodore, / can’t really answer that question in time. ...”
The plight of the “N3” results from the commander’s time-honored right to play “what-if.” Since amphibious war- tare operations are a complex series of 'ntertwined misfortunes waiting to occur, the commodore’s doubt will go untested until the actual operation. A traditional function of C3I has been the reduction of uncertainty. Regrettably, our systems do not match the advanced analytical tech- utques currently available.
The process of simulating fleet operations is certainly not foreign to the U. S. hlavy; Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s well-worn quote on the interwar gaming °f the Pacific campaign attests to our historic leadership in this area.* The Navy’s Practical use of war gaming remains the Centerpiece of our tactical development and training efforts. Ironically, however, we have failed to adopt our own sophisti- eated methods in operations analysis and simulation into the daily planning of op- cations. Today’s seagoing staff is not equipped to analyze its own plans, al- nough the methods of such analysis are "tghly developed and available to compact state-of-the-art computing systems. *ne commodore’s question should be unalyzed with an appropriately detailed model using techniques such as simula- !'°n, sensitivity analysis, and artificial mtelligence. Instead, it will receive a staff member’s off-the-cuff hunches, the s°rt that should be strictly reserved to the c°mmander himself.
Simulations and models cannot com- Ptetely mirror reality, and no amount of analysis will eliminate the uncertainty of War. Suggesting that our operational c°rnmanders be given the capability to conduct real-time analysis in no way unplies that it does. Offering such deci- S1°n support is merely the application of modern techniques to the problems of attle management. We have openly acknowledged the value of these techniques ln training with a program now under Way to install automated wargames via microcomputers on board ships. Just as "e Wall Street businessman would no more make a major decision without the distance of computer-based data and models, the naval commander should ave similar resources supporting his
Planning.
Phe enemy of our games was always—Japan— the courses were so thorough that after the start WWlI.—nothing that happened in the Pacific was fange or unexpected. Each student was required to " an logistic support for an advance across the Pa- lc and we were well prepared for the fantastic gistic efforts required to support the operations of sc War- ... I credit the Naval War College for such ccess (as) 1 achieved in strategy & tactics both in & war
^dmiral Nimitz quoted in E. B. Potter, Nimitz (An- aPolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 136.
Case III: The surface action group (SAG) commander reread the message, attempting to probe its implications beyond the instructions and authority it granted him. While his force of surface combatants—an assortment of frigates and destroyers led by a venerable Iowa (BB-6I)-class battleship—had been sent to these troubled waters to hold a crisis in check, it was obvious that presence had failed. American forces and civilians in the revolution-torn country over the horizon were in immediate danger, and the SAG commander had been authorized to strike rebel forces massing for a final assault on the besieged capital. To be effective, the attack must be carried out within 12 hours. The rebel bases were well inland, beyond the range of the battleship' s 16-inch guns. The use of land attack Tomahawk cruise missiles with conventional warheads (TLAM-C) was authorized, but the sophistication of these weapons seems a hollow promise of success: The targets are merely coordinates on a map. The Tomahawk’s terrain contour mapping (TERCOM) system is precise to a fault, but the SAG commander is unsure that the available data are sufficient to guide the TLAM-Cs to the bases he is authorized to destroy.
The roots of the SAG commander’s problem lie in the simple assumptions about our emerging surface warfare capabilities. First, our surface forces will find an expanding role in the fleet’s power projection mission and second, this role will be largely realized in the Third World. The development of the TLAM-C makes the first assumption possible; the increasing threat presented by smaller, radical nations makes the second assumption virtually certain. The deployment of the USS New Jersey (BB-62) to the coasts of Central America and Lebanon is a paradigm for modern U. S. naval power, a model not far from our traditional response to crises. What is new is the reliance on surface forces to fill a power projection role heretofore reserved for the carrier’s air wing. The linchpin of the concept is the ability of the TLAM-C to present a credible threat.
The accuracy of the TLAM-C’s sophisticated guidance system relies on the input of a series of navigational way points. With established, well-known targets, the information necessary for these inputs is assumed. Viable targeting on short notice, as would be required in a crisis situation, presents a more serious problem to the commander relying on the TLAM. Given the nature of insurgent warfare, threats ashore may be moving targets—here one day, there another. Moreover, the political nature of modern crisis response requires military potential to be flexible and measured. The rapid but constrained use of force would seem to be a natural role for the TLAM-C, yet the forces carrying the weapon are among the least equipped to rapidly sort and process the detailed type of information needed to generate a targeting solution for the missile.
The SAG commander’s mission will require the integration of a variety of intelligence sources: satellites, air reconnaissance, signal exploitation, and forward ground observers to develop and refine the inputs. We have the resources capable of such an effort, however, the ability to distill the resulting data into a form usable by the Tomahawk firing ship has yet to be demonstrated. Such an effort must be coordinated and supported at a level above the on-scene commander, yet obviously responsive to his demands.
Arguing that the Tomahawk is a weapon inappropriate to the scenario or that the type of C3I support called for by the task is not feasible ignores both today’s headlines and technical capabilities. Tomahawk platforms are already being assigned a major role in naval diplomacy. For the TLAM-equipped surface combatant to be effective in this new role, it must be supported by a unique targeting system addressing the particular C3I needs of this mission.
Driving the unique C3I requirements in each of the above scenarios are the fundamental mission requirements with which each commander must contend. Each has different tactical needs: more information, tailored intelligence, assistance in making complex decisions. These needs should form the guidelines for C3I system designs. The need to equip our ships with better C31 systems is critical: The complexities of modem naval warfare are rapidly making present systems outdated and inadequate. The starting point for their replacement should be the realization that contribution to mission success is the sole criterion for C3I success. The first questions to be asked in building C31 structures should be the same as those asked by the tactical commander.
Commander McKeamey is a strategic planning subspecialist and the prospective executive officer of the CSS Germantown (LSD-42). A frequent contributor to Proceedings, he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1973 and received a master’s degree in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1984. He has served in the operations and engineering departments in the USS Edson (DD- 946), as operations officer in the USS John S. McCain (DDG-36) and USS Berkeley (DDG-15), and as first lieutenant/operations officer in the USS Alamo (LSD-33).
The Rounds of An Ancient Mariner
By Senior Chief Quartermaster (SS) John B. Gordon, U. S. Navy
I hope the old saying, “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks,” does not apply to this ancient mariner.
When I received orders to report to the USS Trepang (SSN-674), many people were surprised because I was pushing 50 and it had been a long time since I served full-time on a submarine. But they needed senior quartermasters (QMs) so badly that even a diesel-tough grandfather was a welcome sight. Well, almost welcome.
It was obvious from the first day that this old salt would need some specialized training to get back up to speed. I knew there had been many changes, but I didn’t comprehend their magnitude until I began.
Qualifying for sub duty today is much the same as in the past, except the nuclear mentality has taken over. People do not qualify or requalify with one qual card. Now there is a booklet. And if a qualified person commits a sin, he must requalify. There is little margin for error.
In the past, it was not unusual to have two first class petty officers and two seconds in the QM gang. And while the allowance list calls for a chief; first, second, and third class petty officers; and a seaman striker, it is not unheard of for a modern submarine to operate with a junior first and two seamen.
Today the commanding officer (CO) is a commander, and the executive officer (XO) is a lieutenant commander. My first boat had a lieutenant commander as skipper, and the XO was a lieutenant senior grade. The diving officer used to be an officer; now he is probably a chief. And the chief of the watch could easily be a petty officer first class.
The difference in boats is not simply a matter of diesel versus nuclear power or cost. Basically, the biggest difference is a widening of the gulf between the engineering department—the “Nukes”— and the folks forward of frame 57. Despite nuclear power, submarines still snorkel, but nuclear submarine crew members rarely experience the discomfort of a closed head valve while four 1,600-horse diesel engines are sucking
Catching up with nuclear submarine technology would seem to be daunting for an old fossil fuel hand. Senior Chief Gordon adapted easily to life on board the USS Trepang (SSN- 674), right, what with frequent showers and constant navigational fixes.
nearly every breath of air from within the vessel.
Navigation has also changed. Piloting, like the compass rose, will always be piloting. QMs take bearings on navigational aids and plot the lines of position to obtain a fix. Dead reckoning (DR) is about the same: it is not the most reliable means of determining a position. High speeds and three-dimensional maneuvers can wreak havoc on a DR plot.
Celestial navigation is basically the same, but opportunities for using it have been reduced. Whereas old boats spent a great deal of time on the surface, modem submersibles seldom surface during an ocean transit. Even when they come to periscope depth, there is no reason to break out the Rude Star Finder.
Yet the demand for pinpoint position accuracy is far greater than 30 years ago. “Two fleet boats could be within hailing distance of each other while making a run across the Atlantic, but find that their respective celestial fixes put them 30 miles apart. It was no big deal, though, because they knew they were in the middle of the puddle and by the time they were close to landfall, they would have their positions established more accurately,” a QM instructor said.
The days of plotting a position triangle large enough to contain the entire Sixth Fleet are gone. No more throwing darts for the noon position. It’s pinpoint accuracy, or else.
The reasons are obvious. The increase in the number of operating submarines calls for a system almost as complex as that used by air traffic controllers to pre-
vent planes from colliding. Submarines are assigned an area or a transit lane and must stay in it. Straying outside can be very embarrassing for any CO.
The progress in the past two or three decades in electronic navigation has been Phenomenal. A quarter century ago, radar was the main source, not only for contacts, but for electronic navigation. It Was not very accurate, but it was nice to Pave as a backup. Long range navigation (Loran) came in handy in the middle of dre Atlantic Ocean under heavy cloud cover. But again, its accuracy often left something to be desired, even when QMs converted the readings and, using tables, Plotted lines of position on a plotting sheet.
Radar is still used, of course, but only 'n piloting situations. It is a tremendous Pelp when a submarine tries to navigate UP the Thames River in New London when a heavy fog has reduced visibility to almost nothing. Even then, it is like shooting bearings on buoys—shaky.
Loran “Charlie” is a considerable 'Piprovement over the old sets, and computers have shortened considerably the Pme between a reading and a fix. One of 'he drawbacks with some makes and models, though, is that a person must have a pretty good idea of where the ship Js before the instrument will blink out a latitude and longitude. Thus, a QM may near the computer operator’s lament: garbage in means garbage out. Even with some decent inputs, it may be a while before Charlie finds himself.
Three relatively new navigation aids jPc the ship’s internal navigation system, ^mega, an(j Navsat (navigational satel- lte). Imagine my amazement, for example, when I first viewed an IBM typeWriter in a comer of the control room Pounding out the ship’s latitude and lon- 8>tude every six minutes, 24 hours a day.
Submarines used to enjoy daily operations out of Key West, and therefore got under way more times in one week than a fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) might manage in one year. Instead of making an occasional one-bell landing at Key West’s Pier One (north side), it takes one and sometimes two tugs to jockey a nuclear vessel with a single screw into New London’s Pier 33.
Old sub sailors used to kid colleagues on submarine tenders about having “getting underway drills” because it was quite a project for one of the mother ships to leave a pier or quay, and not because they were grounded on coffee grounds. Now they call these drills “fast cruises,” and submarines have them too.
Submariners used to count the number of dives like paratroopers count their jumps. And if they slept through some, they would consult the QM notebook— another page out of the past—and keep a tally. Even today’s fast attack submarine, which is more operational than an SSBN, may spend weeks at sea and dive only once or twice. An old New London fleet boat, providing services to basic submarine school students, probably dived and surfaced more times in one day than some fully operational modem ships do in six months.
The watch system has changed too. Like surface craft personnel, sub sailors used to stand four-hour watches and have eight hours off. Thus, if a person stood watch from 0800 to 1200, he could expect to be on watch again from 2000 to 2400 if he were in a three-section watch rotation.
Not today. The crew works an 18-hour day, featuring six-hour watches and 12 hours of whatever. Much of that time is spent working on qualification or repairing some malfunction. Many people become involved with the “3M system meals, mattress, and movies.
Today it is difficult to set up a routine because a man might have the afternoon watch one day and the morning session the next. On the third day he might have two watches. Throw in a few drills like battle stations or fire and add a field day or two, and the body becomes confused. Some go for days without any sleep and then sleep ten hours.
Showers are not as rare under way as they used to be, thanks to nuclear power. Fresh water down the drain in a World War II-era submarine drained the batteries that powered the distillers. Water was often rationed and water hours were enforced. Now, the “tea kettle”—as some crewmen irreverently refer to the nuclear reactor—makes it possible for shipmates to endure each other and even wash their clothes. A sailor can take more showers in one week than he could in a month before nuclear power.
Submariners still have a keen sense of humor. For a couple of days, battle stations was scheduled for the same time each day, and crewmen started drifting up to their posts before the appointed time in an effort to cut down the time it took to have battle stations manned. But when word leaked out that the time was going to be changed, one of the chiefs commented, “Well, we’re never going to get it under four minutes if they keep changing the time on us.”
Researchers say you can teach an old dog new tricks, and studies say old people can learn a great deal, though not as quickly as young people. Another old saying goes, “You’re never too old to learn.” That has been my experience.
Senior Chief Gordon is currently first lieutenant in the USS Trepang (SSN-674), home-ported in New London, Connecticut. A graduate of the University of Florida, he has served in aircraft carriers as well as submarines.
FCDSSA: Fleet Support That Gets with the Program
% Lieutenant Commander Jonathan T. Hine, Jr., U. S. Navy
The Navy tactical data system (NTDS) nas been with us for almost a quarter cen- 'UrV. It was developed in the late 1950s to ne‘P the new Terrier missile ships manage *arget information and make targeting ectsions for engaging enemy air raids. It 'Vas strictly antiair warfare (AAW) and Relatively simple by today’s standards.
he need to share target information with °lher units was recognized early, thus htetical data nets, Links 11 and 14, were °rn. NTDS grew steadily as the need for
computer assistance in other warfare areas was recognized and the number of ships with NTDS increased. Manual techniques simply cannot keep up with the number of targets expected to approach the battle group. NTDS has replaced writing backwards with a grease pencil, which will someday be only a memory of the “good old days” for senior combat information center (CIC) personnel in surface combatants.
NTDS is computer-assisted warfare.
The computer complex, its associated displays (hardware) and the operational program that makes it all run together, are what distinguish an NTDS ship. The incredible speed and accuracy with which the NTDS ships can detect tracks, disseminate and exchange battle information, and get weapons on target can compensate for any perceived “lightness” of their weapon suites.
Once a computer is turned on and is ready to receive more detailed instructions, application programs can be loaded. At this point the computer system’s identity is determined. In NTDS ships, it is the combat direction system (CDS) program that makes the system operate NTDS.
Programming a computer can be relatively simple or quite complex. It depends on how much data you want the machine to handle, how fast the response is needed, and whether a life depends on the accuracy and speed of the system. “User-friendly” microcomputers seem pretty fast compared to the “stubby pencil” techniques of the past. Yet those microcomputers often go blank and pause while performing complex computations or writing a long file onto the magnetic disk. Office systems can handle multiple terminals (timesharing), but the programs are expensive because program writing is still basically done by people. Imagine a central processing unit (CPU) with two dozen terminals plus inputs from a halfdozen sensors and data from other computers in the force, all in an NTDS ship’s CIC. What would it be like if the main computer blanked out all the display terminals for five seconds or so in the middle of a coordinated surface and air missile attack? Unlike the average office system, or even a relatively complex banking system, programs for tactical computers have to be perfectly accurate, virtually unlimited in handling multiple sources of data, and as fast as the state of the art will make them.
The need for many real-time inputs is one of the things that sets tactical programs apart from business and accounting systems we are accustomed to using ashore. A large proportion of the inputs in a CDS operational program must be dealt with by the computer ahead of any routine processing. These are called “interrupts.” For example, recognizing a new air track and notifying the tracking personnel should preempt the routine update of internal status or configuration information. There are so many of these real-time interrupts that they must be prioritized because they can keep the routine updating work of the computer from taking place at all. The program must be sophisticated enough to monitor this problem and correct it.
Tactical programs also differ from their commercial and nontactical cousins in the proportion of the program devoted to processing compared to that needed for data storage (data base). The data and routine on-call processes can be stored “off-line” on a disk drive or other stored memory device. The part of the program that executes processing on the data is kept in the computer’s memory (core).
The need for timeliness in analyzing data (e.g., recognizing threat tracks) is one of the considerations in deciding whether a routine in the program must reside in the core or can be stored “off-line” until needed.
Non-tactical systems like accounting programs have a few, comparatively simple routines to execute (often in "batches” while the humans are busy doing something else). They retrieve their data from a few large databases stored on disk. Tactical programming, on the other hand, involves many small data bases and a lot of complex, urgent processing, most of which resides in core. This is one of the reasons military tactical computers need so much resident memory and high-speed processing capacity.
Producing the program itself and putting it on the tapes or other media as machine code for the host computer seem agonizingly slow. First, operational requirements for the CDS program are determined. This means deciding what capability the program is supposed to give the ship, given the equipment installed on board, her mission, and the requirements of the data links in which she will participate. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) decides the desired operational capabilities of the ship classes receiving a new CDS program in overhaul.
Eventually, top level requirements (TLRs) are drafted and sent to the Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support Activities (FCDSSA) by way of the Naval Sea Systems Command. TLRs are too general to be used by programmers to code the program, so more detailed documents are prepared. The program performance specification (PPS) describes what the CDS is supposed to be able to do. The program description specification (PDS) evolves from the PPS and describes the tasks within the operational program in sufficient detail to allow the programmers to produce coding for the computer.
Since the CDS must “talk” to a number of other digital computer systems, it is very important to know exactly what data the CDS is expected to transmit and what data the other systems expect to receive. Documents called interface design specifications (IDS) are drawn up and signed by the project managers for the systems on either side of each CDS interface. For example, there would be an IDS for the CDS and the electronic warfare system, and another for the CDS and the weapons direction system (WDS). These serve as agreements which will allow the programmers serving each project to code programs which will work properly when loaded into the ship along with the rest of the combat system suite.
It is a sad fact of life that operational requirements never stop changing. Every change in the combat system or navigation suite of a ship changes the CDS program. Changing the mark and mod of the WDS, for example, changes the interface and a new IDS may have to be negotiated. Similarly, including new technology in the combat system after development of the operational program has begun causes delays and added costs.
When the PPS and PDS are written, systems engineers and analysts perform pre-code analysis (PCA) and set up the work load for the programmers. The systems engineering associated with the PPS, PDS, and PCA is all front-end work done by humans before any program coding can begin. It is time-consuming and often frustrating, but vitally important. A good job done by the project personnel and managers at this stage can save millions of dollars in changes later.
Next, the program is “written” by programmers, and development tapes of the program are produced. The programmers may be civil servants at FCDSSA, but most of the major programming is done by contractor personnel. While manual techniques are still important, most modern programmers sit at terminals where they can write the programs, check their work, and deliver it to a central file for use by others in the production cycle.
The programmers are supported by commercial computer complexes at the contractor sites and by the SHARE/7 system at the FCDSSA. SHARE/7 is a timesharing computer system designed to support program generation of NTDS programs. Four AN/UYK-7 computers are the heart of the system. SHARE/7 not only drives the programmers’ terminals, but also compiles the programs into tapes that can be run in the CIC mockups or delivered to the ships.
Important to the coding effort is producing the supporting documentation, including the operators’ manuals for the ship and detailed descriptions of the programming process. It is unlikely that the person who programmed a particular task will be the same one who is asked to change it years later. Having good documentation of what happened during the programming makes life cycle maintenance (LCM) easier.
The program is tested extensively before being delivered to the ships. The contractor tests developmental tapes before delivering them to FCDSSA. Then FCDSSA builds tape from the supporting “hard copy” documentation. The operational program is then given a performance acceptance test in the mock-ups at jhe Dam Neck complex in Virginia Beach, Virginia, before the program is accepted by the Navy. The project manager at the systems command may order a separate systems acceptance test, using simulators to ensure the CDS performs as specified. A new program, or one con- taming major new interfaces, will also be tested at the Integrated Combat Systems Jest Facility (ICSTF) in San Diego, California, before delivery. The final and m°st important test is the systems integration test (SIT), which is performed on ooard the ship when the program is delivered. The SIT checks out all the tasks in the program against the hardware in the ship. This process is essentially the same 0r a small enhancement, fixing a trouble report in an existing program, or developing a whole new program for delivery during overhaul.
Configuration management (CM) heeps track of the many programs in development at FCDSSA or in service in me fleet. The CM group also prints, ma'ls, and tracks all the documentation accompanying the program, for example, ttser’s guides, operator’s manuals, description documents, and the many levels °f specifications. Quality assurance in Programming means the development and enforcement of standards so that programs will be as error-free as humanly Possible and that the procedures followed and records kept during the development of the program will enable people who *d not write the program to troubleshoot and repair it.
The mission of FCDSSA, Dam Neck, ls "to plan, formulate, construct, revise, test, accept, distribute and maintain com- Pnter programs for combat direction sys- pms and navigational systems.” CDSSA, Dam Neck, was established on 1 March 1963 as the Fleet Computer nogramming Center, Atlantic (FCPCLANT). Even today, FCDSSA Pcsonnel often refer to the command as the Center.” In 1969, Commander, S. Atlantic Fleet, assumed responsi- bllity for FCPCLANT. Three years later, ‘n July 1972, the name of the center was changed to FCDSSA, and management transferred to the CNO. When the C-NO reorganized the naval districts, an ‘tort was made to move the smaller ac- jlvities reporting directly to CNO to eche- on two and three commanders. On 1 ctober 1976, FCDSSA was transferred o the Commander Naval Sea Systems
Command.
FCDSSA, Dam Neck, has an allowance 0f 53 officers, 76 enlisted, and 188 Clvd service personnel. Most of the officers are surface warfare officers, reflect- lrig the command’s responsibility for the 133 NTDS cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. The enlisted personnel are mostly data processing technicians working in the computer complex. The program generation center, as the computer floor is called, is in full operation around the clock, seven days a week. The civil service computer system specialists produce
Microchips store in a battle group’s Navy tactical data system (NTDS) all the information on the group’s sensors and weapon systems. FCDSSA makes sure the NTDS computers disseminate this information quickly and efficiently in combat.
programs, perform research and development (R&D) work, and oversee the 500- plus contractor personnel supporting FCDSSA’s programming effort. They also ride the ships of the fleet, troubleshoot problems, deliver and test new programs, and represent the technical community at fleet and shore conferences.
There are upwards of 55 R&D and life cycle maintenance (LCM) projects working at the same time. R&D projects involve new programming; LCM fixes or changes programs already delivered to the fleet. Projects range from cassette programs for the AN/WRN-5 navigation system to the cruiser/destroyer CDS upgrade, which will affect every operational program produced for NTDS ships.
The complexity and size of NTDS programs require considerable funding, ranging from $33 million in fiscal year 1984 to $61 million in fiscal year 1990. About one third is direct funding for the center’s mission and the rest pays for reimbursable work performed for other sponsors.
The words “Fleet . . . Support Activity” take on special meaning when the NTDS goes “down” on a ship. The commanding officer (CO) and his crew often do not know whether a machine is broken or the program is at fault. The CO calls for FCDSSA. If it is a new problem that FCDSSA cannot reproduce in the mock- up of the ship’s CIC at Dam Neck, then a computer specialist is soon en route to the ship. The FCDSSA team on board and back in the mockups will either patch the program or determine what hardware activity is needed.
There is another FCDSSA in San Diego, California. Certain support functions are assumed by one center for the whole Navy. For example, FCDSSA, San Diego, writes the programs for the computers in both FCDSSAs themselves (system support programs). Dam Neck produces navigation programs (e.g., AN/WRN-5, AN/SRN-19) for the entire fleet, including submarines.
Although they are not research laboratories, the FCDSSAs have been on the cutting edge of Navy computer programming. When NTDS ships became too numerous and application requirements too large for the CP-642 computer, FCDSSA developed the modular concept that set the pace for today’s large scale tactical programming.
The total operational program is broken up into modules. Each module is a mini-program for executing a particular function, for example, electronic warfare or AAW tracking. Given the limit on computer core size, modular programming allows the ship to decide which functions will be loaded and which will be foregone. Before modular programming, a de facto decision was made: the FCDSSA programmers had to squeeze everything into the core limits of the computer. Modular programming also allowed NTDS ships more capability by integrating new weapons and sensors with the CDS.
Today the cost of maintaining opera-
All operational navigation programs for the fleet are produced at FCDSSA Dam Neck, Virginia. FCDSSA’s Navy-civilian team is like a lifetime warranty for NTDS ships. It researches, tests, and upgrades the programs, and even makes housecalls to the ships.
tional programs and the vast proliferation of ship types, missions, and hardware and weapons configurations is forcing us to take another look at how these programs are produced. When a task in a modular program contains an error or needs changing, it must be changed in several places in each operational program of the different classes of ship whose programs used that machine coding. The FCDSSAs are developing a new computer program architecture called Restructured NTDS (RNTDS), which is expected to simplify the programming and configuration management work load. It will make upgrades and corrections easier and faster to do. RNTDS features reusable tasks to eliminate duplicate coding. In RNTDS, each task is coded only once and then is placed on a librarian data base. Unique automated support software will build and change individual ships’ operational programs with a minimum of costly manual effort.
The FCDSSAs are among the most cost-effective programming facilities in the Navy. Computers may be very expensive and highly capable and the display systems may be dazzling and impressive, but they are all just ballast until they are programmed. The Navy is fortunate to
Commander Hine graduated from the Naval Academy and has a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Oklahoma. He served in four different classes of cruisers and in destroyers. His NTDS experience includes operations and weapons in two NTDS cruisers, duty with Commander Middle East Force and the U. S. Air Force 552nd AWACS Wing. He is currently the comptroller at FCDSSA, Dam Neck.
Improving Legal Assistance
By Commander Robert G. Fuller, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve
A second class petty officer buys a used car from one of the dealers on the highway adjoining the base. When he attempts to register the vehicle, he finds that it will not pass state inspection. The dealer points to language in the sales contract indicating that the car was sold “as is” without any warranties.
The sailor, having heard something about free legal advice available at the Naval Legal Service Office (NLSO) on the base, calls for help. The receptionist tells him that he will have to wait almost a week for an appointment. He finally gets to see a Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC) lieutenant who is on his first tour of duty after justice school. The lieutenant is not a member of the bar of the state in which the base is located and is unfamiliar with local consumer protection laws and the state agencies enforcing them. The lieutenant is sympathetic and tells the sailor that he will look into the problem and get back to him. Because of the legal assistance caseload in the NLSO, the lieutenant cannot devote immediate attention to the problem.
When it finally surfaces on his desk a week or so later, he checks the local statutes and seeks assistance from the officer down the hall who had the legal assistance billet before he did. The lieutenant then calls the dealer to remind him of a newly enacted state law requiring used cars to pass state inspection. If they fail, the dealer must pay for work necessary for the car to meet inspection standards. Threatened with losing his license, the dealer backs down. The problem is solved, but the sailor has been without transportation for nearly a month.
The scenario above is all too familiar to anyone who has used Navy legal assistance or stood the legal assistance watch in a NLSO. The JAGC officers in the legal assistance branches are, generally, bright and dedicated, but they are overwhelmed by the demands on their time. Slightly more than 1,000 active duty Navy judge advocates (augmented by about 900 in the Naval Reserve) serve about 500,000 active duty sailors. Dependents and retired personnel are also eligible for legal assistance. Many active duty judge advocates are in judicial or administrative billets and not dealing with clients on a daily basis; most deal with military justice matters.
The U. S. Constitution and the U. S. Court of Military Appeals unequivocally require speedy trials for persons accused of criminal offenses. There are also time constraints on administrative discharge proceedings. In addition, NLSOs are tasked with many of the claims for and against the Navy.
Legal assistance is subordinated to speedy trial requirements and to the necessity for prompt processing of administrative discharges and claims. That is as it should be. However, there are other, more subtle, reasons why legal assistance does not receive more attention.
A fledgling judge advocate, when assigned to a NLSO, soon learns that peer approval, recognition by superiors, and promotion requires the development of trial skills and a reputation as an effective, resourceful trial or defense counsel. A superior is more likely to be aware of the percentage of drug offenders successfully convicted by a trial counsel or a creative bit of motion practice by a defense counsel than the successful resolution of a legal assistance problem. That superior officer hears from line commanders who are pleased with the results obtained by trial counsel or from military judges who are impressed by a courtroom performance. He seldom hears from a dependent spouse who began receiving her allotment check again after the legal assistance officer wrote her husband’s commanding officer a persuasive letter.
. r does he hear from the sailor who, instructed in small claims court proce- oure, successfully recouped his security deposit from a recalcitrant landlord.
Without such input, the legal assistance officer’s fitness report is likely to Pale in comparison to that of his coleagues in military justice. Because our younger judge advocates do not perceive egal assistance tours to be helpful to their careers, they are seldom motivated to develop the skills to perform effectively. Nor do NLSOs generally make any real effort to teach those skills. As a result, egal assistance tends to degenerate into a 0rm of crisis management.
How can we improve matters? At the outset, NLSO commanding officers must upgrade the perception of legal assistance uty- A properly managed, effective egal assistance program is one of the best m°rale builders in the Navy. A sailor receiving prompt, sound legal advice on a Personal matter has one less problem on ls mind, and thus is likely to perform his ^signed tasks better and be more inclined to reenlist.
There are several ways to make legal assistance duty more attractive, the most tective of which is to make the same oort to identify and reward the superior Performers as we do their counterparts in e trial and defense areas. A NLSO commanding officer could periodically request his legal assistance officers to urnish a statistical summary of the types 01 Problems they have handled, the average Waiting time for an appointment, and mer information which could be used to Measure productivity without violating attorney-client confidences. Further- m°re, the commanding officer should Illicit feedback from client commands on ueir perceptions of how well his legal assistance program is working.
To enable a legal assistance officer to Perform effectively, each NLSO should evelop an in-house training program for neWcomers to legal assistance duty, in- uding the preparation of a turnover
manual with references to the local statutes the officer is most likely to use— landlord-tenant, consumer protection, domestic relations, small claims—and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of useful state officials—local court clerks, the district attorney, the state attorney general. This manual can save a lot of time and eliminate the new legal assistance officer’s reliance on his predecessor.
Another useful and readily available, but woefully underused, source of help is the local reserve JAGC unit or individual reserve judge advocate. A directory of drilling Naval Reserve judge advocates is available from OJAG (Code 62). Reservists are, generally, seasoned local lawyers with expertise in many areas. They can assist in preparing the turn-over manual, give lectures on local law and practice to NLSO lawyers during drill weekends, and are particularly useful to contact after a legislative session is over to find out what amendments have been made to state statutes. A reserve judge advocate who, for geographical reasons, is unable to affiliate with a law program unit and drills with a line unit, is a possible source of Saturday morning legal assistance on a drill weekend—truly a useful service for those unable to get in during the week. Finally, the reserve lawyer who has been practicing for a number of years can help in training the inexperienced legal assistance officer in the mechanics of interviewing clients and extracting the information needed to properly advise a client. The JAGC reservist on an active duty training tour should not be overlooked. Although these officers are frequently thrown into legal assistance and left to fend for themselves, a thoughtful commanding officer will ascertain the type of practice in which the reservist specializes and find a way for some of that expertise to rub off on the active duty legal assistance officers.
The legal assistance officer should do more than just see clients in the office. It is important that the officer has sufficient time to follow through on legal assistance problems, do the necessary research, write letters, and make phone calls.
When a ship is deploying, the alert NLSO skipper will contact his counterpart on that ship and arrange for a “house call” by one of his legal assistance officers to take care of that last-minute will or power of attorney.
Also, a legal assistance officer should, when time and travel funds permit, call on the public officials who can be helpful to clients. A visit to the consumer protection division of a state attorney general’s office, for example, will develop relationships that are difficult to make in telephone conversation. It is much easier for the legal assistance officer to ask for assistance from a public official he has met. These officials are often glad to visit an NLSO to learn about the Navy legal assistance program and explain how their office can be helpful.
To improve the delivery of legal assistance, the JAGC must first recognize that providing assistance in a timely and professional fashion contributes to the morale and readiness of the line community. We must give young legal assistance officers the sense that, rather than languishing in an unimportant backwater of their profession, they are contributing equally with trial and defense counsel to the overall mission of the JAGC. We must identify good legal assistance officers and reward them with recognition and promotion. Finally, we must develop appropriate training programs within our NLSOs to give inexperienced lawyers the skills to serve clients, and to use the resources of our reserve lawyers and the public sector to create such programs. An imaginative NLSO skipper who invests some time in his legal assistance operations and follows the suggestions set out in this article will find that his standing, and that of his command, will increase in the eyes of his line clientele.
Commander Fuller is Commanding Officer, GEN VTU 0101, of Augusta, Maine, and has been practicing law for 20 years. He has worked in legal assistance during many of his active duty for training tours and currently provides legal assistance to the personnel at Naval Air Station Brunswick, Maine, as part of his normal drill routine.
___________________________ “One Admiral Too Many”----------------------------
A Navy admiral was attending a social function in full dress uniform when he was approached by a stranger who had had several cocktails too many. The man draped his arm around the admiral’s shoulder and began explaining that he, too, had been in the Navy when his eyes happened to fall upon the admiral’s sleeve and gradually focused on the mass of gold braid. He stopped in the middle of his sentence and exclaimed, “Gad! You’re in this thing pretty deep, aren’t you?”
Thomas Lamance