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tion
not unfamiliar to the United States. The battle be-
Growing world tension in the early 1900s caused U. S. leaders to feel an urgent need to upgrade the • national defense posture while strong pacifist and .Zionist public sentiment largely prevented it—a situa
Ween these conflicting forces found its focus in the naval PPropriations acts prior to World War I.
'he Navy, rather than the Army, became the storm cen- r for a number of reasons. In the popular mind, the Navy Presented the new forces that had led to the acquisition an empire in 1898 and its retention thereafter. The long- n§e commitments required by this empire were not fa- li°red by tbe public—notoriously unwilling to sacrifice Qj'es’ money, or even much thought to anything outside j.. Its immediate environment. Also contributing to the j^lct'°n was the traditional, popular identification of the avy with aristocratic and conservative forces. This view, aceable to the days of Thomas Jefferson, had much to do I *m the fact that the navalist-pacifist debate occurred rgely along party lines. The heirs of Jefferson, the Dem- C/atic Party, remained the small-Navy party until 1916, an party lines, never perfect, were shattered by the on, Sa °f war. Another factor working to the Navy’s disad- ^ ntage in the congressional wars was the relatively high 1 of modem naval vessels compared to the modest, and °'*y inadequate, Army appropriations.
1 he need for larger naval forces was obvious to the PPorters of enlarged appropriations—“navalists,” as ®lr °PPonents called them. Along with its insular real [j ate> the United States acquired worldwide responsibili- 'n its outward movement of the 1890s, particularly in l Caribbean and the Far East, where U. S. power ran ead on into German and Japanese expansionism. Suspi- ^ n °f German intentions grew out of the incident in ^aaila Bay in 1898 that convinced Admiral George eWey and others of Teutonic aggressiveness. This dis- (] st to some extent permeated the Navy and strongly in- ^(,enced Theodore Roosevelt. Apprehensions hardened as miral Alfred von Tirpitz’s huge naval building program Sed an ever-increasing threat to American interests. In e Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-03, German intervention ^firmed popular suspicions of their intent. In this inci- at> however, the Germans were forced to abandon their forgreS,siVe t*es'8ns 'n the Caribbean by a superior naval . he Japanese threat was slower to emerge. Until 1905, sst Americans viewed Japan as the quaint and exotic p tlng for Madame Butterfly or as the source of silks and j Per lanterns. Those who thought more deeply regarded as an American protege and a useful counterweight ^ an expansionist Russia. The Russo-Japanese War anged all that and proved Japan to be a major power
with a first-class fighting navy.
Japan emerged as the leading aspirant to the hegemony of the Far East and began the process of encroachment on China that ended only with World War II. The United States as the traditional supporter of Chinese integrity soon found itself in opposition to Japan’s ambitions.2 Jap- anese-American relations were exacerbated almost to the breaking point in 1906 and 1907 by a series of incidents in the Pacific states. A flagrant example was the exclusion of Japanese students from the public schools in San Francisco—riots and boycotts of Japanese merchants and laborers were common in all the western slope states. The Japanese-Americans protested their treatment to the Japanese Government. Japan, in turn, demanded protection of its citizens’ rights. President Theodore Roosevelt walked a thin line, caught between the West Coast demands for total Japanese exclusion and Japanese insistence upon fair treatment for their countrymen. Judiciously blending threats to use the “big stick” with heavy doses of calming salve, he avoided a major confrontation.3
Roosevelt eventually managed to overcome the immediate crises by negotiating the Gentleman’s Agreement, which regulated Japanese immigration to the United States, and the Root-Takahira Agreement, which temporarily resolved the Far Eastern problem. During the period of prolonged tension, however, war between the United States and Japan often seemed an immediate possibility.
War fears in America were furthered by vociferous “alarmists,” who pointed to the imminence of the “yellow peril,” which they saw poised to sweep over the world. The oft-repeated warnings were spread by the newspaper empire of William Randolph Hearst and acquired a new currency and a new credibility during the American-Japanese crises of 1906-08. One of the most strident voices warning of yellow peril was that of Alabama Congressman Richmond P. Hobson—a naval hero of the Spanish-American War who had been warning of the Japanese threat for years.4 An extremely effective speaker, Hobson reached numerous influential Americans through the Chautauqua circuits where he was one of the most popular and highest paid attractions. Those out of reach of his voice could read his words on the pages of Hearst’s newspapers and magazines.5
Using his war-won fame as a springboard into politics, Hobson entered Congress in 1906 with the primary purpose of increasing America’s naval strength in what he saw as an increasingly dangerous international environment. In his four-term congressional career, he never wavered from this goal and soon emerged as the Navy’s leading spokesman on Capitol Hill. In fact, Hobson, a southern Democrat, became Republican Roosevelt’s spokesman on naval matters in his first term in office, an
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lngs / Supplement 1985
Caught between the growing war clouds in Europe and increasing Japanese nav strength, President Theodore Rooseve wanted a recalcitrant Congress to authorit construction of 48 battleships and, as he saj goodbye to Admiral Robley Evans when t'ie “Great White Fleet” departed on its circuffl navigation of the world, it looked like * “big stick” policy might prevcu ■
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almost unprecedented occurrence.6
The crisis with Japan made the defenseless state of the nation critically dangerous. Roosevelt and his naval leaders, particularly the Navy’s General Board, headed by Admiral Dewey, warned Congress repeatedly of the need for an enlarged, balanced Navy. Without it, the United States was incapable of maintaining even modestly defined international obligations.7
The troubles with Japan, furthermore, came iq the midst of an armaments race ushered in by Great Britain’s secret construction of a superbattleship. The launching of the high-speed, all-big-gun Dreadnought made every other capital ship in the world obsolete. To protect their international positions, the world’s great powers were forced to
build their own Dreadnoughts or suffer eclipses as powers. ,
The American Congress, however, was uninteres ^ Before 1908, Roosevelt consistently had been una^£.,\e. obtain authorization from Congress for the one new ba ship he regarded as being needed each year to rep obsolescent units. p.
Congress habitually authorized ships one year an ^ propriated funds for construction at the next sesst j which resulted in an average building time of five ye There were shortages of men as well as ships—even a^ munition was scarce. There were no emergency st0.Qll piles, and Congress did not provide enough animun' for adequate training.9 However stingily Congress P vided the essentials of national defense, it was 0 j( wildly extravagant in maintaining useless naval station also insisted upon the retention of an archaic and cun1 ^ some bureaucracy whose primary virtue was that 1 lowed for political meddling in the procurement of ed ment and supplies.10 tj,e
Congress, furthermore, had a tendency to ign°re j recommendations of the professional military leaders instead wrote military appropriations the way dotfie0. legislation was written. This unwieldy system of c0l^glc mise and logrolling led to naval forces that were too j to uphold national commitments and that were unbala as weapon systems. Little attention was paid by to the real world conditions in which the fleet would
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Proceedings / Supplenl
ent
°Perate and conditions which should have determined e optimum strength of the Navy."
, Pacifist strength also grew in the United States in the ecade after the Spanish-American War. Believing firmly at world government was an immediate, practical possi- "'ty and that armaments were a direct cause of war, the acifists were a major obstacle to naval appropriations. In K°ngress, the pacifist forces were ably led by Richard artholdt of Missouri and James Tawney of Minnesota. In t-e Senate, the extremely capable and powerful senators, ru§ene Hale of Maine and Theodore Burton of Ohio, repented the antinaval forces. Besides their own vote, the | Qacifists could usually count on support from other econ- ^y-minded congressmen, particularly southern Demo- | The House Minority Leader, John Sharp Williams Mississippi, was usually aligned with this group." i Caught between the growing war clouds in Europe and cCreasing Japanese naval strength, Roosevelt began a refully orchestrated campaign aimed at the 60th Con- t,ress- The President hoped for major naval increases from 1908 Congress. Specifically, he asked Congress to andon the annual political wheeling and dealing that trap lQnally characterized naval appropriation acts. Instead, [)0°sevelt asked for the adoption of a long-range plan of I aval building. He wanted Congress to endorse the pro- I ofSals Navy’s General Board that called for creation ^ a fleet of 48 battleships, which would be the largest 6et in the world. The board’s plan required the building
of four battleships a year until completion. Roosevelt then asked for two things: a congressional commitment to a long-range building program and the authorization for four new battleships in 1908.13
The President’s first step in his campaign was to order the Atlantic Fleet to circumnavigate the world. Although
pro-
ivjue‘11 ,,a,u ,v” 1 — nared
posal and stubbornly refused to compromise. He pre" ^ a minority report pleading for four battleships but was^ only one to sign it. He carried his fight to the fl°° „f Congress, but despite what was described as • • °ng ■’ the most impassioned speeches ever heard in the Hons ^ his minority report was overwhelmingly rejected. Str® ^ ous efforts by Hobson to amend the appropriations hi■ g the floor of the House to allow for either four or even new battleships also failed.16 . ... jte
“Yesterday the House seemed to possess an >n
was doubled. Hobson fought hard for the President s
also aimed at impressing the world—particularly Japan— with American naval might, Roosevelt’s primary motive was to shift domestic and congressional opinion in favor of naval expansion. The cruise of the Great White Fleet succeeded in monopolizing headline space during the entire congressional naval battle of 1908.14 The second step was made by Congressman Hobson, who mailed circular letters to the mayors and editors of local papers in each of the towns where he had lectured. Copies of the letters, which were propaganda for naval increases, were also sent to each member of Congress. Admiral Dewey also entered the fray with a series of public statements urging naval increases and warning that war might come if the United
States did not arm.15
The fireworks began in the House Naval Affairs C° mittee, which first considered the administration’s for four new battleships and equivalent auxiliaries- opposition was fierce because the President was try'11® a get Congress to tie its annual naval appropriations ^ long-range program of matching German and Japatl naval increases. After bitter debate, the committee jected the President’s program and recommended the c ^ struction of only two battleships. The number of su ^ rines requested by the President, of very limited range,< effectiveness and labeled “coast defense submarine ’
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36
Proceedings / SuppI®1*1®**
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opposed extensive American involvement in mtema-
moti
a large Navy and also seemed to distrust Roosevelt’s
^aPacity to go wrong,” Roosevelt sadly wrote to Hobson. ut in the Senate, the navalists fared no better. Adminis- ration forces led by Senator Albert J. Beveridge won a ^oral victory over the conservatives but were unable to more than the two battleships approved by the House. 116 Senate vote was also decisive.17 The navalist forces failed despite extreme efforts. In the midst of the congressional struggle, Hobson embarked *jP°n a nationwide speaking tour. Roosevelt used extraor- 'nary pressure on individual congressmen, issued a dra- niatic public appeal for support, and even threatened to 7eto pork-barrel legislation in his effort to obtain four bat- ®ships. But Congress was not moved. Ironically, a poll ? newspapcr editors seemed to indicate that the navalists ad better luck reaching the public than they did reaching ^•°ngress.18
There were many factors involved in the defeat of RooSevelt’s naval program. Some of them were sectional. The Wrongest congressional opposition came from the Mid- 'Vest> while public opposition was greatest in the East intellectual, business, and pacifist groups. The °uston Post and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat pointed °ut that the defeat of the large-Navy bill was in part due 0 c°ngressional fear that enlarged naval appropriations °uld force a curtailment in pork-barrel spending. Roose- e * s threat to veto pork-barrel legislation in an election j!ear was simply not credible. Other congressmen opposed e increased appropriations because of the high costs in- olved. Many of these congressmen were also pacifists lQnal affairs.19
s "^Te year 1908 was also an election year and the con- ^ervative Republicans were both weary of the “big stick” y rebellious. As a lame-duck President, Roosevelt was ,.nable to crack the party whip hard enough to ensure pas- g*§e of his measures. The Democrats, led by John Sharp . Plains, expressed the traditional Democratic aversion
ves for wanting more warships.20 The basic cause of the defeat of the Naval Bill of 1908 tas lhe failure of Hobson, Roosevelt, and other navalists
- convince Congress that a real emergency existed in re- ard to Japan. If Congress had been convinced that war
eas imminent, it would have given the President the neccSsary arms; any other course of action could have been Hstrued as unpatriotic and hence political suicide. There is no doubt that Roosevelt seriously feared that s-ar Was imminent. The President confided his apprehen- c'°n to Hobson, who promptly blurted it out at the Demonic Platform Committee meeting in Denver. An imme- national uproar ensued. Privately furious, Roosevelt Hied the statement and broke off personal relations with Q°bson.21 But they both had failed to transfer their sense Spending doom to Congress.
' he optimists among the navalists later pointed out that ^ e entire battle had not been lost. By demanding four Qattleships, they received funds for two and defeated the ve~a-year replacement policy Congress traditionally fa-
- °red. The Army and Navy Register stated that the Navy ad obtained a “reasonable increase” and pointed out that the authorization for two battleships created no precedent in the face of congressional failure to adopt a definite long range program.22
Despite major efforts by navalist leaders, Congress stubbornly supported two battleships a year until the sudden emergency of World War I found the United States unprepared.
‘Seward W. Livermore, “Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902-1903,” American Historical Review, LXIII, July 1958, p. 452.
2Outten J. Clinard, Japan’s Influence on American Naval Power 1897-1917 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), pp. 47-51.
3Jackson (Mississippi) Clarion Ledger, 26 May 1907, 30 May 1907; Raymond L. Buell, “The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly, XXXVII, December 1922, pp. 605-622.
4New York Herald, 29 April 1906; Washington Times Magazine, 27 October 1907, 3 November 1907; Richmond P. Hobson, “If War Should Come,” Cosmopolitan, XLV, June 1908, p. 34.
5M. L. Williamson to R. K. Johnson, 2 May 1935, Richmond P. Hobson Papers, Library of Congress; North Vernon (Indiana) Sun, 6 October 1911; Lonville (New York) Herald, 17 February 1916.
6Jackson (Mississippi) Clarion Ledger, 13 March 1908; U. S. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1908, XL, Part 1, p. 450; Ibid., 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1914, LI, Part 1, pp. 87, 89-91, Part 7, pp. 7148, 7151-7152. President of the General Board to the Secretary of thp Navy, 20 December 1907, 3 October 1908, Records of the General Board, Naval History Division, U. S. Navy Department.
8U. S. Congress, Navy Yearbook, 1909, Senate Documents, V, 61st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 647-650.
9Army and Navy Register, XXXIX, 26 May 1906, p. 6.
I0C. W. Stockton to Stephen B. Luce, 21 March 1907, Stephen B. Luce Papers, Library of Congress; Stephen B. Luce to William Sims, 28 August 1908, Ibid.; Stephen B. Luce to Theodore Roosevelt, 14 July 1908, Ibid.
"President of the General Board to the Secretary of the Navy, 3 October 1907, 20 December 1907, General Board Records; C. W. Stockton to Stephen B. Luce, 21 March 1907, Luce Papers.
"Hayne Davis, “The Man and the Movement,” Independent, LVIII 16 March 1905, pp. 589-594; “The Menace of the Navy,” Advocate of Peace, LXVI, May 1904, pp. 77-78.
nU. S. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, XL, Part 1, p. 81. 14Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Cabot Mills Lodge, 20 September 1907, in Elting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, p. 801; Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, 27 November 1907, Ibid., V, pp. 858-859; Theodore Roosevelt to William Bayard Hale, 3 December 1908, Ibid., VI, p. 1408.
15Circular letter in the Hobson Papers; New York Times, 15 March 1908.
16U. S. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1908, XLIII, Part 5, pp. 4574-4582, 4607, 4611, 4612-4777, 4807.
"Theodore Roosevelt to Richmond P. Hobson, 16 April 1908, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; U. S. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1908, XLII, Part 6, p. 5291.
18Spokane Daily Chronicle, 27 April 1908; Los Angeles Express, 8 May 1908, 10 May 1908; Jackson (Mississippi) Clarion Ledger, 15 April 1908; Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1939),
p. 266.
l9“Two Battleships or Four?” Literary Digest, XXXVI, 2 May 1908, pp. 631 — 632; Sprouts, The Rise of American Naval Power, pp. 267-268.
“°U- S. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Session, 1908, XLII, Part 6, pp. 4789-4794.
2lBoston American, 10 July 1908; Press Release, 9 July 1908, Roosevelt Papers; Theodore Roosevelt to Richmond P. Hobson, 9 July 1908; Richmond P. Hobson to Theodore Roosevelt, 1 August 1908, 9 August 1908, Hobson Papers. ““Congress and the Services,” Army and Navy Register, XLIV, 6 June 1908, p. 6; Army and Navy Register, XLIV, 9 May 1908, p. 7.
Dr. Pittman earned his BA and MA from Mississippi State University and his PhD from the University of Georgia. He has been a professor of history at the Mississippi University for Women since 1973. He specializes in the history of science and technology, military history, and U. S. history from 1876-1920. Dr. Pittman has published numerous historical articles and a book entitled Richmond P. Hobson, Progressive Crusader. Not only a historian, he is also a reservist, currently serving the U. S. Air Force Reserve as a lieutenant colonel.
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°Ccc<tingS / Supplement 1985