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>n fact, a measure of economy. In context, the 67 British Royal Marines
The 14 weeks of Britain’s most unex- P^cted war in 1982 transformed the status the Falkland Islands from unconi red colony to heavily defended for- ^ss- Before 2 April 1982, when the rgentines invaded the longed-for prize (hey call “Las Islas Malvinas,” the terri- ry had extremely low priority in British tense plans. This scant regard was °thing new. Even in their imperial hey- aA the British never spent much thought r money on policing remote posses- ^°ns- The famous gunboat diplomacy
•his
^n<t one ice patrol ship (3,600-ton HMS "durance) present when the Argentines frrived were typically minimal defenses. The 67 marines were, in fact, some 'c above normal strength, since the garrison’s relief had arrived before their Predecessors left. As for the Endurance, Pc had long been under threat of with- rawal and was due to go after the 1981. tour of duty as part of the Conserva- 1Ve government’s crusade of spending cuts. The 42 who comprised the normal Marine garrison were “sufficient determent” even without the Endurance, as r>me Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote 0 a Conservative Party worker in a letter ated 3 February 1982. Two months ater> this claim turned into utter fallacy as the greatly outnumbered marines succumbed to the Argentines after a spirited ut futile three-hour resistance.
With this action, the Falklands surged r°m obscurity into the full glare of international publicity. Once the British South Atlantic Task Force, in a widely admired campaign, had recaptured them in June y82, the status of the islands was stud- ed with all sorts of new imperatives.
Emotionally, “Falklands” had been added to the long list of battlegrounds where British blood spilled could not afterwards be betrayed. Morally, the stubbornly British Falklanders, who had for years stood foursquare against any handover of their islands’ sovereignty, could not be allowed to fall victim a second time to Argentine ambitions. Diplomatically, the revived respect for Britain as a tough and combative nation not to be messed about by thug dictators was an international asset not to be wasted. Politically, the Falklands War had been a godsend to Prime Minister Thatcher, converting her overnight from Britain’s most unpopular premier to guardian of the national honor—a resolute leader who, having masterminded a dazzling victory, was rewarded with more personal regard than any British leader since Winston Churchill.
At the same time, the Argentines had made it clear they were not going to give up their longstanding claim to the Falklands, and persistently refused to declare hostilities over. To this day, no formal armistice or peace treaty is in prospect, and the fight has been diligently pursued by Argentina through the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other diplomatic channels.
Out of this came the policy known as “Fortress Falklands,” which involves retaining a considerable British armed presence on and around the islands in what is effectively an indefinite state of war. The fortress idea was already emerging in the last days before the Argentine surrender of 14 June 1982. Suggestions then of a negotiated settlement, a magnanimous attitude on the part of the victor for the vanquished, or Argentine participation in the future running of the Falklands were all treated as “sell outs” or “tradings in” of a dedicated military achievement.
As later developments have proven, this attitude had little to do with emotions of the moment. None of the voices raised against Fortress Falklands, whether inside the British Cabinet, or Parliament, or the South Atlantic Committee (formed late in 1983 to campaign for a peaceful alternative) has roused any appreciable popular echo. Several times, Mrs. Thatcher has been able categorically to reaffirm her government’s fortress commitment. For instance, on 24 October 1983, when an Argentine resolution calling for sovereignty negotiations was three weeks from debate in the United Nations, the British Ministry of Defence announced that “Until such time as Argentina renounces the use of force in pursuit of its claim to the Falkland Islands and is seen genuinely to have done so, it will be necessary to maintain an appropriate garrison to defend the islands against the military threat posed by Argentina.”
In practical terms, these pronouncements perpetuate several conditions which prevailed in the Falklands during the fighting of 1982. As in the war, the British forces in the islands—precise numbers are kept secret for the sake of security, but they exceed 3,000—outnumber the 1,800 native Falklanders. As in the war, the supply lifeline from Brit-
Postwar Falklands birdwatchers still study the seagulls and storm petrels; but there’s a new species down there now—the RAF F-4 Phantom.
ain via Ascension Island still operates over a distance of more than 8,000 miles. As in the war, the Falklands receive the close attention of all three armed services, and is succored by a fleet of 32 merchant ships specially chartered by the Ministry of Defence. At the start of this defensive buildup, Mrs. Thatcher declared that freedom required “quite considerable expenditures.” Fifteen months later, in September 1983, this forecast was more than confirmed in Ministry of Defence budget figures. Fortress Falklands would cost $1.4 billion in 1982-83 ($370 million more than the war itself), $627.5 million for 1983-84, $494.3 million for 1984-85, and $343 million for 1985-86.
In return for this mammoth outlay, the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and the British Army lavish the full gamut of land, air, and sea defense on guarding the
Falklands from Argentine attack. The Royal Air Force stations a squadron of F-4 Phantom all-weather supersonic fighters and a complement of Harrier jump jets on the islands for surveillance and defense of the 150-mile exclusion zone around the Falklands. Alerts have been frequent, as Argentine aircraft regularly approach the perimeter in what appear to be tests of British resolve. The Royal Air Force also provides Fortress Falklands with the numerous helicopters and units of the Royal Air Force regiment tasked with defending radar and airfield installations, the air-sea rescue service provided by Sea King helicopters, and Nimrod maritime control aircraft operating over the South Atlantic—armed with Harpoon antiship missiles that are able to strike at 60 miles’ range. From beyond the fortress, C-130 Hercules freighters and tankers, and Victor jet tankers operate the extraordinarily long 8,000-nj1 air bridge to the Falklands via Ascensi® Island, which daily involves four aircra • five air crews, and three aerial refueling
The British Army keeps a strong t°tC in the Falklands, made up of an infanW battalion and artillery and air defcnS^ forces equipped with missiles, numero Royal Signallers, an Army Air CorP squadron, and support units for supp™' port operating, transport, ammuniti°n' bakery, and other roles. Most of the arny units are based in Port Stanley and su rounding areas, with others strategic2 J located throughout East and West Fa ' lands and South Georgia. Their task B ^ be operationally ready at all times to de with all forms of land-, sea-, or air-dehv ered incursions by the Argentines.
The Royal Navy’s share of Fortrey Falklands, which includes a complete of four to five patrolling frigates, 2
Royal Marines and the “Corporate” Expert
Slowly but surely, the Royal Marines got back into a peacetime pace of operations after the Falklands fight. But in the days that followed, many of us questioned what we had actually learned from our experiences. Of course we had gained tremendous esprit de corps, and in a single six-week operation, had brought joint warfare back onto the map. No longer was this aspect of warfare about to fall into the “too expensive and won’t be required” drawer. Copious reports, follow-on reports, and books were written, and many presentations and meetings were attended. Naively, we all hoped that a recommendation, as a result of Operation Corporate, would be sufficient to gain the improvements required. But with nearly two years of hindsight, it was foolish to have thought that way, as making good on the equipment that had been lost frigates, aircraft, helicopters, or rifles—had to take top priority. It is all very well to say simply that we need more air defense assets, or more helicopters, or that we require heavier artillery support. But it is not just the hardware, back-up support, manpower, and training that must be examined; it is also the movement assets both to the operational area and within the operational area that have to be realistically identified. Unfortunately, the majority of proposed improvements all hinge on increased financial allocation, hence justification and rejustification—the whole peacetime procurement gambit is required once again.
What have we achieved therefore? Well, we have undoubtedly made some progress in several areas—even if some of it appears to be in a negative form.
► Training: In principle, we have concluded that there was not much wrong with our training system. Basic recruit training attempts to bring out the most in the young man— fit, tough, professional, capable of looking after himself. We are not out to change personalities or make supermen. Our training for operations in northern Norway prepared us for an even harsher climate than we faced in the Falklands, albeit many in 42 Commando would say perhaps only just. What did come out, and has been progressed upon since the fighting, has been the importance of engi' neer reconnaissance with each unit, the need for total confidence in and close integration with the artillery, the requirement for an increased weight of firepower at section, troop, or company level, and the importance of night operations. As a result, we have grown even closer to our affiliated artillery and engineer units, we have looked at ways of obtaining two machine guns per section, and we have sought in every way to ensure that our exercises concentrate on night operations.
► Mobility: Our mobility during the campaign stemmed from our use of helicopters, landing craft, the oversnow vehicles and, above all, from the use of the LPC (leather personnel carrier—the boot!). Certainly, we had problems coordinating helicopters in order to maximize their use, and at times we overloaded our marines. Although we had performed some loading trials for units within the brigade during the preceding couple of years, the full enormity of carrying one’s personal kit and first-line ammunition had not really hit home to most people. During the previous two years in Norwegian exercises, we had been looking at ways to reduce the individual’s load—the old adage of “never be separated from one’s kit” is all very well, but it does not take into account the realities of the weight of ammunition and additional appendages of war. Clearly, sufficient kit to survive for 24 hours is a must, but we are convinced that the remainder must be brought forward as required or as the tactical situation permits, be it by vehicle or helicopter. Although our support helicopters worked miracles during the campaign when sheer tonnage moved is considered, we did have some command and control problems. These are unique to the United Kingdom’s landing force, and current reorganization will solve them.
► Equipment: We are fortunate that the majority of the brigade is equipped for operating in the Arctic. Over the years, we have built up a standard of personal equipment
at ,^ers’ and submarines, began immedi- A y after the fighting ended when Rear rciiral Derek Reffell took over com- task force from Rear Admiral n Sandy” Woodward, the wartime s ”?niander. The dust of war had barely ed before Reffell and his squadron ,ere at sea “somewhere in the South At'an'»c” on patrol.
the ear,y slage> the Royal Navy in Pin °Uth /'lt'ant'c was still feeling the Well 1,°^ years °i defense cuts, and it is arj "nown that had the Falklands Crisis ten years *ater’ llle Royal Navy d not have mounted Operation Cor- enrate; even in 1982, there were just ships and men for the venture. ls close shave, which could easily have n Britain as the victim of faraway ag- toSlon with no ready military response Counter it, obliged the British Govem- ent to look again—and hard—at further
aJor M. j Samuelson, Royal Mar
cuts planned for the Royal Navy. Results of this reappraisal began to show in December 1982 when replacements were announced for the five ships lost in the Falklands War. At the same time, the sale or scrapping of nine Royal Navy vessels was rescinded. Planned manpower reductions of 20,000 personnel also had to be reviewed, all the more so because, as late as last November, the Royal Navy was still short of trained sailors.
The policy rethink was especially vital because the watch on the Falklands has political and emotional significance all its own. For example, the Argentines have a fervent attachment to important anniversaries. The Second of April, which an Argentine stamp issued in 1983 commemorated cryptically as “The First Recovery of Las Malvinas,” is likely to be a day of extra alertness on the Falklands for some time to come. Even more significant is 25 May, Argentina's National Day which, in 1982, saw the British task force then pouring men and supplies ashore at San Carlos receive greatly increased attention from the Argentine Air Force.
A year later, the chance of a National Day raid was thought to be large enough for the Royal Navy to assemble an extrasized force in the South Atlantic. The ships, most of them armed with air defense missiles, included the destroyers Birmingham and Southampton, the frigates Broadsword and Brilliant, and the antisubmarine frigate Falmouth, and supporting auxiliary tankers and store ships. A nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine is also thought to have been included in the force.
Earlier the same month, when this large force was on its way south from Britain, there had been a special alert as
that
of
course refinements to be made, and recent civilian 8 tpment that has appeared (perhaps as a result of our ^ Periences) has taken the art to even greater heights. As ^ things, you “pay your money and take your 0l°ICe’’’ and we have been encouraged to see a number new items of personal kit coming into service—of pari u ar note is the Royal Marines’ high combat boot, j °hing farther afield, various improvements and upscal- § °f other equipment have taken place. I have already
menti< to
O' fuses, proposals for improvements in our air defense talfSS'*eS’ ^etter radio fits in our oversnow vehicles, and lng delivery of our new Lynx /Tow helicopters, to but a few.
. Uctics: All in all, we are happy with our basic infantry ctl«. What we learned was that, over the years, our aX®rcises had taught us false lessons with regard to light ^ a support helicopter operations. Within the first few °Urs of daylight on D-day, we had lost two Gazelle light
to L*Ioned small arms ammunition and machine guns, but aese must be included additional scales of various artil-
opters as a result of enemy small arms fire. From
we believe is some of the best in the world. There are
helic,
?en or>, we realized that operating helicopters forward of e forward line of own troops by day was courting disas- r- We quickly learned that low flying and high speed as°vided the best forms of defense. Traditional tasks such c°mmunication platforms, air observation posts, and 0rnmand posts are invalid at 100 knots, four feet off the ^r°Und. We felt that the same held true for support heli- pters—helicopter coup de main operations in enemy ter- l °ry are fun on exercises, but of dubious value in com- y l> especially against a sophisticated enemy.
..fanning: Unlike NATO or many national exercises, we k a not have a three-year lead-in to Corporate. As has en well documented, most of the brigade staff members ere in Denmark on an exercise when the summons came; °m the moment we reached England, through the mounting out period, the trip south, the restow at Ascension, the landing, and the subsequent operations ashore, “hot planning” was the name of the game. Some would say that this was really only an excuse for poor preparation. 1 would maintain that one of the reasons for our success was the ability to plan in an ever-changing situation; flexibility became a key word in our vocabulary. Although we would like to see more of our exercises based on a reduced planning cycle, we realize the constraints and requirements for our NATO allies to tie up everything as early as possible. Even our national large-scale field training exercises require training areas to be booked up to a year ahead, thereby allowing other users to dovetail their plans. Alas, the closest we have gotten to a practice for “hot planning” has been a paper exercise. Still, it is a start.
► Logistics and Administration: Indeed, Corporate proved the importance of having our unique logistic organization (the Commando Logistic Regiment, Royal Marines). Corporate highlighted the need to complete various ongoing studies into the provision of bulk fuel and medical support, both of which had been nearly finished at the time of the conflict. On the administrative side, we had been unprepared for the scale of the prisoner of war problem and—although we are confident that we kept on the right side of the Geneva Convention—a general teach-in on the laws of armed conflict has been well received. Clearly, large-scale prisoner-of-war and casualty play is difficult to achieve on a major NATO exercise; however, both areas must not be forgotten.
I have addressed only a few of the important lessons that we learned during Operation Corporate. My view is strictly parochial. I have not included any maritime or fixed-wing air aspects; both played key parts in the operations jigsaw. Let us hope that joint warfare remains at the top of the list for many years to come.
the 8,500-ton Argentine cargo ship Lago Lucar brought bereaved relatives to the spot outside the exclusion zone where the cruiser General Belgrano was sunk by the Royal Navy submarine Conqueror on 2 May 1982. The whole episode of the Lago Lucar had been so controversial that threats to sink the ship had been issued should she contravene the exclusion zone.
HMS Reliant (er-Astronomer) is a former containership that was converted to a helicopter transport and support ship during the /• alklands Conflict. She has been retained by the Royal Navy as a helicopter base ship for duty in the South Atlantic.
The Lago Lucar came and went without serious incident, as did National Day, but just in case of further trouble, the Royal Navy frigates Active, Achilles, and Penelope remained on station for some time after 25 May. Some two months later, an Argentine intrusion did take place, when two fishing boats were intercepted by a Royal Navy frigate inside the exclusion zone at a point ten miles southwest of the Falklands; the Argentines withdrew quietly. Buenos Aires furiously labelled the Royal Navy’s action as an example of “Britain’s provocative conduct” that would be duly denounced at the United Nations.
ains* rid a
ually
e are linen'
the U. S. Rapid Deployment Joint Force, which was announced in late vember 1983. The brigade is capable reaching quickly any trouble spot in world. Up to 1,000 brigade paratrooper could be airlifted to the Falklands wit 1 hours to land at the new two-runway stra tegic airport being built 28 miles fro' Port Stanley, capable of handling w> bodied jets. The new airport is due come into use in April 1985, and ft®*, troops can be called to it on 36 hour- notice. When this facility becomes ava1 able, it is planned to reduce the perm^ nent Falklands garrison and cut costs to point where future governments will n easily be tempted to abandon the islan s defense. e.
Mrs. Thatcher’s resolute pronount ^ ments and defiance by Britain of sevCl^. United Nations resolutions in favor negotiations with Argentina suggest i" creasingly firmer foundations for Fortre ■ Falklands and, possibly, a permanent ro for the Royal Navy in the South Atlant|C'
tltf
The following month, on 1 August, two Royal Air Force Phantoms intercepted a four-engined Argentine Electra patrol plane as it pierced the western edge of the exclusion zone. On that day and the next, more fishing vessels were “buzzed.”
The Falklands Conflict created many incidents that revealed significant defects and shortcomings on board Royal Navy ships involved in the war. As a result, more than 200 modifications have been earmarked for warships, and new insights have been gained in the areas of armament and construction. For instance, in early September it was announced that within weeks the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force would adopt the Stingray lightweight antisubmarine torpedo. This is one of a new generation of computer- controlled “smart” weapons, which can search out and navigate its way to a target once launched in the general vicinity. On 21 October, two specially converted Royal Navy ships, the Protector and Guardian, were commissioned at Rosyth dockyard in the Firth of Forth, Scotland, to act as part of a new Falklands patrol force which would later be joined—after sea trials—by a similar vessel, HMS Sentinel. Formerly 802 gross registered ton- oil rig supply ships, the Protector, Guardian, and Sentinel carry high-speed raiding craft for use by the marine detachments they carry on board.
Future equipment ordered or an-
nounced in late 1983 also included a se skimming missile for the Royal NayJ missile tracking radar defense aga' ^ sea-skimmers such as Exocet, an steam-powered torpedo with unusi silent qualities. Also in the pipeline a weather satellite-monitoring equip1 for ships, a new generation of antisuu rine frigates (“Type-23s”), and t0* j array sonar. The latter will be caPa jqo detecting enemy submarines up '° miles away. The Royal Navy is a ^ scheduled to acquire some 111 Searchwater radars to provide H King helicopters with early warning cilities, and has converted a contain ship, HMS Reliant, to act as a helic°PL base ship in the South Atlantic. , The capability of the Royal Navy a^_ the other two services guarding the ra lands is a constantly evolving >aC ^ which goes beyond the acquisition of n equipment and weaponry. In Aug 1983, for example, a joint services rec® naissance team considered the possio ties of constructing an airfield and "U tary port on South Georgia, some miles from the Falklands. This would ^ a considerable strategic advance for o ain’s naval, military, and air presence the South Atlantic. ,s
There were more Fortress FalkDU connotations in the reequipped 5 A borne Brigade, the British equivalent
IT C IVnlminunl Inint TU*
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of
Ms. Lewis has wriiten on military subjects f°r past 20 years, contributing to various publications Great Britain and the United States. She also written more than 40 books, dealing with historic subjects.