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If NATO is to control the choke points of Gibraltar and the Turkish Straits, the Sixth Fleet and the Southern Region NATO navies—top to bottom, Turkish, U. S., Italian, British, and Greek warships—must participate in more multinational operations such as last year’s Deterrent Force.
The U. S. Sixth Fleet’s role and responsibility in U. S. and Allied defense strategy must be reappraised. Why? Because of the increasingly divergent security interests of NATO-Europe and the United States, and because of the U. S. Navy’s dilemma of filling a three-ocean commitment with insufficient forces to do the job.
Before World War II, the United States had few interests in the Mediterranean region it asserted as vital or national security related. Responding to inquiries from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote that there was neither an understanding or agreement for the “use of the navy of the United States in conjunction with any other nation” nor any similar understanding that the Navy “should police or patrol or be transferred to any particular waters or any particular ocean-.”1
Two wars in Europe in one generation, however, convinced policymakers the United States did have a vital interest in the security of Europe. Beginning in 1945, the U. S. Eighth Fleet was deployed to the Mediterranean with two destroyer squadrons, an amphibious warfare force, and several support ships. Soviet designs on Greece, the Turkish Straits, and Middle East oil in 19461947 transformed this small and transient force into the most formidable naval force to enter the Mediterranean since the war. In August 1946, the Soviets unilaterally demanded that Turkey revise the 1936 Montreux Convention governing passage through the Turkish Straits and allow Soviet participation in the defense of those straits. The Turks, aided by a substantial show of U. S. naval force, resisted Soviet pressures. The success of U. S. support exhibited by the Missouri (BB-63), the Franklin D- Roosevelt (CVB-42), and their escorts, along with the withdrawal of British forces from the eastern Mediterranean, prompted the United States to establish the Sixth Task Force as a permanent and separate command. By June 1948, the Sixth Task Force, soon to become the Sixth Fleet, consisted of two aircraft carriers, a cruiser division, at least nine destroyers, and 1,000 marines embarked in attack transports.
The contribution of the Sixth Fleet to Western security since then is beyond dispute. Its presence and participation in crises at Suez (1956), Lebanon (1958), Jordan (1970). the Arab-Israeli wars (1967, 1973), and, most recently. Lebanon again attest to the vital role of the fleet in supporting U. S. interests in the area. With respect to NATO interests, the Sixth Fleet has been a key component ot NATO’s flexible response strategy to deter or defend against a Soviet move threatening Western Europe.
Nevertheless, changes in the strategic environment in and around Europe have eclipsed the traditional requirements demanding a year-round 30- to 50-ship U. S. naval presence in the Mediterranean. Most obvious and salient to Atlantic Fleet deployment practice is the growth of the Soviet maritime threat. Through the 1960s, most Soviet naval out-of-area deployments were in the Mediterranean- The absence of credible non-U. S. NATO naval forces and the volatile nature of the Arab-Israeli situation with EgyP1 as a pro-Soviet client state tied the Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean at that time.
Today, however, the heart of Soviet Atlantic naval strength lies in its Northern Fleet, which includes more than 300 submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliaries.
Considering the most likely avenue of Soviet ground attack is the North German plains and the presence of a Soviet ballistic missile submarine “bastion” in the North and Norwegian seas, the Northern Fleet assumes special significance for NATO. Soviet control of the North Sea, particularly the area around the ports of Bremerhaven and Wilhelmshaven, could facilitate rapid resupply for advancing Warsaw Pact forces while cutting an essential logistic route for NATO. The inability of Western antisubmarine forces, naval and air, to challenge the Soviets’ sea-based strategic nuclear deterrent could give the Soviets a substantial intra-war bargaining advantage in any negotiations to terminate hostilities in Europe. The northern NATO navies alone are no match for the Soviet fleet. They will require the assistance of U. S. naval forces to generate a credible northern flank defense.
A second important change in the European strategic environment is reflected in the Sixth Fleet’s nuclear strike role. The need for a carrier-based nuclear strike capability, irreplaceable in the 1950s, was offset with the advent of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and Polaris submarines in the 1960s. The deployment in the mid- 1980s of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles on board attack submarines and surface ships, and land-based Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile theater nuclear systems will virtually eliminate the carriers’ nuclear strike mission, even in the Soviets’ eyes. “To present the Soviets with a nuclear force, albeit a secondary one,” is no longer the burden of the Sixth Fleet.2
Finally, the requirement for a U. S. naval presence in critical areas other than the Mediterranean has necessitated the redirection of Atlantic Fleet resources away from the Mediterranean. Recent events in the Caribbean basin and the continuing need for an Indian Ocean contingent attest to the Atlantic Fleet’s other maritime commitments.
These changes in the strategic environment do not slight the value of the Sixth Fleet’s contribution to crisis deterrence and crisis stability in the Mediterranean region. Much like the U. S. nuclear forces in Europe, the Sixth Fleet is another link in NATO’s flexible response chain, which visibly couples U. S. and European security interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Its withdrawal would spark European cries of decoupling similar to those which accompany the perennial congressional discussions advocating U. S. troop reductions in Europe.
How can NATO accommodate these strategic changes, which directly affect the Sixth Fleet, without dramatically blunting its deterrent and defense capabilities in the Mediterranean? How can NATO maintain a naval position of strength in the Mediterranean while U. S. units attempt to cover geographically diverse commitments?
The answer lies in the development of an operationally integrated maritime strategy for NATO’s southern flank. The existing military infrastructure, under the auspices of Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, provides for rapid and comprehensive administration but not for operational integration of U. S. and non-U. S. NATO forces in response to crises. During the first few weeks of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, the Sixth Fleet would carry the burden of Mediterranean defense as non-U. S. NATO units merged into U. S.-dominated battle groups. Operational integration would facilitate the combined employment of NATO’s Mediterranean assets, both sea- and land-based, from the inception of hostilities.
The strategy would entail a 20-40% reduction of U. S- forces deployed in the Mediterranean proper with a concomitant reassignment of responsibilities to non-U. S. NATO units. Although remaining available for any Atlantic Fleet missions, U. S. ships freed by the reduction would augment NATO’s northern flank defense forces. Our European allies’ assumption of a greater role in Mediterranean defense would lessen the impact of a time-urgent requirement to divert Sixth Fleet ships to support purely U. S. non-Mediterranean related interests.
Soviet naval strategy in the Mediterranean is predicated on the need to defend the southwest approaches to the Soviet Union. Hampered by restricted access, lack of major support facilities, and the absence of long-range tactical air cover, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron is confined to wartime operations in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, at least until a major buildup can be effected. Operational integration of NATO forces must capitalize on these weaknesses, emphasizing sea control and sea denial missions. NATO must control the choke points of Gibraltar and the Turkish Straits to prevent the Soviets from reinforcing their Mediterranean squadron. Similarly, NATO’s vital sea lines of communication originating in the east Mediterranean, particularly Suez, must remain open.
Implementation of operational integration will take time, probably two to four years, and must be conducted in concert with allied naval modernization programs. Throughout the phase-in period, a number of prerequisites must be met.
► The current decision-making autonomy among the allies must be maintained.
► Operational integration must provide greater assurance
of success against the Soviets than the current mode of operations. ,
► Sufficient U. S. forces must be maintained in the Med to fulfill naval presence and crisis response missions. .
► Operational integration must work within the existing inventory of naval and land-based air forces.
► Operational integration must strive to maximize the advantages of cooperative efforts among those forces-in- being at the onset of hostilities.
What must be done to implement such a strategy? First, we need more effective intra-allied training. The Sixth Fleet and the southern NATO navies must increase multinational operations and exercises. The combined resources of all allied navies are required to neutralize the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and Northern Fleet. Present exercise schedules fall short of providing the necessary training for such a cooperative venture as operational integration. Joint naval exercises are conducted once or twice each year, usually for two to four weeks. Between January 1978 and January 1982, only five major multinational exercises were conducted in the Mediterranean. Italy was the only southern NATO ally to participate in all five exercises. The southern NATO navies should exercise with the
Sixth Fleet six to nine months every year. Cooperative Gaining focusing on operational integration will enhance the ability of NATO naval officers and crews to operate in the increasingly complex threat environment. It will encourage fleet and exercise commanders to use these assets t° their full capabilities. The nature of the Soviet threat and the complications of shifting into a wartime NATO command structure require the transition to be rapid. With fewer U. S. ships assigned directly to the Mediterranean, employment of each individual unit must be optimized.
Primary missions for the major surface combatants of 'he non-U. S. NATO navies include close-in antisubma- r,ne screening, gunfire support, thereby relieving more Versatile units for other missions, and surveillance. In his September 1982 Proceedings article, “Requiem for the S'xth Fleet?” Commander P.T. Deutermann states that the ^00-ship European naval inventory could be substituted ;0r the Sixth Fleet. This statement is somewhat mislead- lng- Table 1 indicates major and minor NATO combatants available for employment in the Med. Of the 123 major surface combatants, 43% are more than 25 years old.
Second, employment of fast attack missile boats must °e incorporated into a strategy of operational integration, ine potential contribution of these boats to Mediterranean defense is a much neglected aspect of NATO’s southern *ank defense effort. Usually equipped with two to eight harpoon or Exocet surface-to-surface missiles, these vessels are ideal for area sea denial and choke point defense. Their small size, shallow draft, and high speed enable them to replace some of the larger, more vulnerable ships slated for these duties.
“By increasing an enemy’s tracking problem and concurrently using high speed and great maneuverability, a ship becomes less vulnerable to attack. Stealth allows a small ship with a shallow draft to hug or hide in friendly coastlines, making radar detection from a ship farther at sea more difficult. Small size would enhance stealth because it would make a ship almost indistinguishable from fishing or other commercial ships, especially at night.”3
The NATO nations of the Mediterranean littoral collectively possess about 40 fast attack missile boats. These boats should participate in major multinational exercises. They are apparently viewed primarily as coastal defense forces. The United States has even phased out forward- deployed missile boats, once homeported in the Med.
Table 1 NATO Southern Flank Combatants Major Combatants1 Minor Combatants
| Attack Submarines | Frigates | Destroyers | Cruisers | Mine Warfare | Fast Attack MissilelTorpedo |
GreeceA | 10(2) | 7(4) | 14(14) | — | 20 | 27 |
ItalyA | 10(2) | 13(1) | 4 | 3 | 33 | 11 |
Spain8 | 8(4) | 10 | 13(11) | — | 9 | 12 |
Turkey8 | 15(11) | 2 | 14(14) | — | 47 | 48 |
FranceA | 25(4) | 24 | 18(8) | KD | 22 | 18 |
Total | 68(23) | 56(5) | 63(47) | 4(1) | 131 | 116 |
SSM/SAM capable2 | NA3 | 29 | 22 | 4 | NA | 44 |
'Number in parenthesis indicates ships more than 25 years old Source: Combat Fleets of the World A1983-84 B1982-83
2SSM—surface-to-surface missile; SAM—surface-to-air missile 3Not applicable
Although limitations in operating range (400-500 miles) and crew endurance (four to six days under way) preclude extended underway operations, with a 60% operational availability, eight to ten boats could be employed repetitively in three consecutive cycles of five days each. With the entry of the Tomahawk cruise missile into the U. S. Navy arsenal, the missile loadout of these boats could be modified to accommodate a mix of long-range Tomahawks and short-range Harpoons and Exocets. Working in conjunction with an airborne targeting platform or properly equipped surface ship or submarine, the missile boats, remaining “stealthy” and survivable, would present the Soviets with an effective, over-the-horizon threat.
Third, offensive mining operations must be planned. New and improved mines, such as Captor, the submarine-launched mobile mine, and Quickstrike, will allow NATO to exploit the geographical constraints facing Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. Fortunately, these constraints are most evident in the Soviets’ primary Mediterranean operating areas, the eastern Mediterranean and northern Aegean. Well-placed mine barriers could restrict the movement of units already in the eastern Mediterranean, easing the missile targeting problem for NATO naval and air forces. A similar strategy could be devised to protect our vital sea lines of communication originating in the eastern Mediterranean. Offensive mining operations will also allow naval and air forces to undertake different missions.
Minelaying operations are seldom a part of NATO exercises. Obstacles for allied forces that arise from specific minefield placement and its effectiveness against “orange” (exercise enemy) forces can only be discovered if minelaying is physically incorporated into the exercise structure and subsequent training.
Finally, operational integration requires that NATO land-based air forces participate in tactical air and maritime strike roles. U. S./NATO naval battle groups operating in the eastern Mediterranean are especially vulnerable to long-range Soviet naval aircraft carrying conventional and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Moreover, the threat posed by Soviet naval aviation is not limited to naval forces but extends to vital Western sea lines of communication. According to one Soviet writer, “Missile-carrying naval aircraft are capable of launching powerful nuclear- missile strikes against highly maneuverable formations of
L & L VAN Gl NOE REN
surface combat ships and enemy convoys. . . . ”4
Land-based tactical air forces can alleviate these vulnerabilities. To minimize the requirement for multiple aircraft carrier air wings devoted exclusively to battle group protection, Greece, Turkey, and Italy should assign fighter/ 'nterceptor aircraft solely to a maritime intercept mission. Lacking sea-based tactical air support, attacking Soviet naval aircraft become susceptible to early intercept upon leaving the confines of the Black Sea. Airborne and ground early detection and warning systems are sufficient f° scramble existing aircraft. However, a strict maritime intercept mission will reduce the problems arising from conflicts between national mission priorities and asset availability and thus effect a much earlier intercept. A carrier could therefore operate at greater distances from Soviet aircraft bases, facing fewer “engagable” targets with increased warning time. As a result, only one carrier, father than two or more, would be needed in the eastern Mediterranean.
The antiship strike mission for land-based air is a recent Olitgrowth of advances in cruise missile technology. Current Department of Defense plans include the assignment °f a maritime strike/support role to the U. S. Air Force’s L-52G, and later B-52H, coincident with the deployment °f the new B-1B bomber in 1985. Long-range bombers carrying cruise missiles provide a cost-effective and less vulnerable alternative to risking surface combatants in early engagements with the Soviet Navy. The B-52G/H is reportedly able to carry 18 to 20 Harpoon missiles—more than twice the standard loadout of a major surface combatant. Combined with long on-station time and unrestricted Mobility, the cruise missile-equipped B-52 will be able to c«ver several geographically dispersed attack missions in a relatively short time.
When integrating land-based air and naval forces, practice and familiarization with interservice operations are requirements for success. Working without a B-52 during a NATO naval exercise should be the exception rather than the rule. The complexities of coordinating a two-ship Harpoon strike should be sufficient evidence that coordinating a two-service, air and sea missile attack will be no easy task and will require extensive and frequent practice.
All these recommendations must be conducted in tandem with NATO’s military modernization programs. Notable progress has been made in naval standardization and interoperability. The Dutch-designed “NATO Standard Frigate” and the NATO Sea Sparrow missile illustrate the success of these efforts. In addition to the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, and Portugal have purchased or modified the basic “Standard Frigate” design for use as oceangoing escorts. Seven NATO countries now outfit at least one class of ship with the Sea Sparrow point defense missile system.
Nevertheless, equipment standardization and interoperability do not, unto themselves, portend a successful defense against the Soviet Navy. Where equipment, weapon systems, and defense expenditures are concerned, attention often concentrates on acquisition processes and questions of equitable burden sharing. While these aspects of defense planning are important, they tend to become the focus of defense debate and obscure critical issues of strategy and employment.
The strategy of operational integration seeks to remedy this situation. One potential forum for introducing this strategy would be a liaison between the U. S. interservice “Interdiction Executive Board,” chaired by the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and NATO’s “Defense Planning Committee.” Ongoing defense acquisition and development programs could be linked to NATO force planning. Operational integration requires no additional defense expenditures and no new weapon systems. It works with on-line or already programmed assets. At most, a slight shift of budget priorities within existing naval budgets may be required. Finalized plans would eventually be incorporated into NATO’s five-year defense plan.
Obstacles to the acceptance and implementation of operational integration can be expected. Since NATO’s inception, Europeans have feared being drawn unwillingly into a conflict foreign to either their national commitments or vital interests. The specter of military integration with U. S. naval forces may heighten these fears, especially in the wake of recent discussions by key U. S. defense officials, who introduced the idea of combating Soviet aggression in one location by attacking Soviet weaknesses in another, geographically unrelated area.5 However, to date, these fears have been unfounded. The U. S. Sixth Fleet has responded to numerous Middle East crises in the Mediterranean with and without the European allies. At no time were any of the allies unwittingly drawn into the crisis. Moreover, in the process of operational integration, additional U. S. naval assets are freed for assignment to strictly U. S. missions, reducing any potential requirement for allied assistance.
Individually, the ever-present Greek-Turkish animosity over Cyprus and the Aegean may prevent these countries’ cooperation in a strategy that requires at least periodic redeployment of ships away from the Aegean. For the time being, it seems that Spain will remain aloof from NATO, maintaining only the minimum of active military participation in the alliance. And France will probably seek to maintain its present “classical alliance” relationship and forego attempts at integration, although the Mitterrand Government has expressed a commitment to a policy of closer cooperation with the allies.6 These are indeed formidable obstacles, but they are not insurmountable.
Our allies can be assigned a larger role in the planning and conduct of NATO naval exercises and operations. This would ensure that exercise scenarios are more closely tailored to the needs and capabilities of non-U.S. NATO navies, increasing allied incentive for regular participation. This measure would be self-reinforcing since the trend away from U. S. carrier-dominated battle groups would necessitate increased inter-allied cooperation. In addition, although a politically sensitive issue, pressure could be applied and linkages established that tie operational integration with arms sales and military assistance. Finally, underway operations could be preceded or followed by multinational port visits, carefully planned to maximize domestic impact. The development of a positive public attitude about combined allied operations would contribute to removing psychological obstacles to operational integration.
Currently, non-U. S. NATO units are treated as supplements to Sixth Fleet forces. Operational integration will require fleet and task force commanders to employ them as primary participants in the defense of the Mediterranean. The outcome can only be a more robust naval defense along NATO’s southern flank, more capable of exploiting Soviet weaknesses at much less risk to NATO forces than existing employment plans.
'Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), P573.
2Joseph G. Procopio, “Comment and Discussion," Proceedings, March 1983, p12.
'Miles Libbey III, “Counter Thrust,” Naval Forces, May-June 1981, p. 32.
4V. F. Zemskov, quoted in Paul Murphy, ed., Naval Power in Soviet Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 185 (emphasis added). 5Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, “Strategy for Survival,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1983, pp. 24-25.
6Francoise de Rose, “Inflexible Response," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982, p. 137.
Lieutenant Maiorano graduated from Wake Forest University in 1977. After receiving his commission from Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island, he was assigned to the USS Dewey (DDG-45) as damage control assistant. He completed his division officer sea tour on board the USS Nicholson (DD-982) as antisubmarine warfare officer and nuclear weapons officer. Lieutenant Maiorano has recently earned a master’s degree in national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
_________________________________________________ Java High ____________________________________
In 1943, many draftees tried various means to flunk their induction physicals. A friend of mine tried to raise his blood pressure by drinking cup after cup of black coffee. But, much to his chagrin, he passed his physical without a hitch, and he soon found himself on the other side of the water in the thick of a war.
Months later, he turned into sick bay with a minor ailment. The examining corpsman cocked a mildly interested eye and asked, “Where’d you join, Mac?”
“San Francisco,” he replied. “Why?”
“Just curious,” the corpsman said, tucking away his stethoscope. “Wondered who let you in with blood pressure as low as yours.”
Thomas LaMance