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Leadership Forum: Lucy and Linus in the Wardroom

By Lieutenant Christopher I. Xenakis, Chaplain Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve
December 1984
Proceedings
Vol. 110/12/982
Article
View Issue
Comments

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

 

 

 

nipuiLu...                                                                         ,un­

importance increases with eVe5/undef; tion. Naval leadership require- standing and skill at working' ctlire-

this informal communication s pa11

Sadly, few naval service women jo of this informal network, and s

This cartoon of frostbitten children and melting snow has little to do with bud­gets, billets, and battleships. However, the issues it raises, of clashing egos and of compromises, are vital to naval leader­ship, to the career concepts of naval offi­cers, and to man-woman working rela­tionships in the U. S. Navy. They are important to both the grown-up Lucys and Linuses in the wardroom, a team of women and men who should strive to be united in spirit, mission, and force.

In spite of many noteworthy advances since 1811 when Navy doctors recom­mended that nurses be assigned to hospi­tal ships, there is growing concern among many naval service women that these gains may not be maintained. Several well-publicized factors define this con­cern, including the rash of male com­plaints about pregnancy and maternity leaves, inadequate berthing and hygienic facilities, and an array of questions about combat: Are women strong enough? Are women smart enough? Are women ma­ture enough emotionally? Is it morally right?

Of more serious concern than mater­nity leaves and muscular strength are the career attitudes and self-concepts which women bring from civilian life into naval service officer ranks. Perhaps more than any other factor (including intellectual competence), these attitudes and percep­tions determine officers’ admission into the community of naval leadership and whether they will be accepted, tolerated, or rejected once there.1 For women, these personal attitudes and beliefs are more important than equal opportunity enact­ments.

In 1981, the Navy instituted a vigorous affirmative action plan and set forth in­structions prohibiting sexual discrimina­tion against women.2 Praiseworthy as these regulations are, they cannot change hidden prejudices and assumptions which people hold about themselves and others, and they cannot make people willing to accept one another. It is one thing to

promise equal opportunity, but it ^ another to ensure equal access opportunity. Thus, saying a worn3 ^gVy not be legally excluded from the ^ does not guarantee she will get in’ less stay in.  for-

The problem here is recognition ^c. mal and informal communication 0[1. tures. While regulations and P°*icl tati011 trol formal structures, the implerne of these regulations and P°^cieSjcatioi' place through informal commun ^ networks, water-cooler politicS et$r “scuttlebutting”), and casual co ^g(, tions held over coffee and donuts- ^ mal communication structures ar® ar>d laxed they may seem intang1 ^0tti unimportant, but in reality, they a>! tangible and vitally important

career ’'head start” on °fte direct|y fostering a first (and the0 lastlnS) impression with which C °ff'cers are perceived by their se- tiyrs' in the naval services, career tenta- eness does not work to women’s best v3ntage.

%Career Passivity[1]: Both men and Pas 6n Can suffer gmntly from career

swiiy, a sense 0f waiting t0 be ch0-

va. , or naval officers, this trait is aggra- , by talk of “selection boards” iiorr convene 'n “absolute secrecy.” flc 0r stories abound of passed-over of- C wh° attest, “I wasn’t picked. I Hv .,*Cnow why, and I’ll never know bl0g. This sense of passivity effectively Creat s tbe ability to move freely and one’s own opportunities.

Pass,rUer Col,ette Dowling calls career the “Cinderella Complex” of

n°t even recognize its existence.[2]

The reason many women are oblivi- °Us to this informal structure has to do "'ith differing attitudes among men and *°nien toward career and self. Manage­ment consultants and industrial psycholo- Sists have isolated several distinct career and personality traits among college-age men and women beginning their manage- nal careers in civilian corporations. Some 0 these traits are also shared by the men and women who become naval service ? ticers directly out of college or upon eaying civilian employment. These are ^numerated below, not as rigid stereo- jpes but as general observable patterns.

( Career Tentativeness4: Women seem

0     delay making key decisions about their Professional goals early in their careers.

ncertainty about marriage and having ■Idren (“After all, I may not even be r 0fking when I’m 30”) and possible ca- ^eer changes (“Do I really want to be .ere 'n ten years?”) creates an emotional

1    ntat|veness which may contribute to entative job performance. “How badly ° I want that fourth stripe?” “Do I j % have the desire to command some-

y- “Have I counted the physical, tychological, and social costs?” Until questions are answered, both °men and men may find themselves j0kCentrating on immediate day-to-day f functions and giving little foresight to Ure career planning.

l n contrast, most men have little option H t0. Wor^ until they are 65. They are inherently more decisive than q 11160. but their choices are simpler. 6nsequently, they “make the most” of the!r opportunities for advancement, and and*r Career decisions tend to be firmer less tentative than those of many n?en- This pattern seems to give men a sHtficant career “head start” w°nien

“[It is] a network of largely repressed attitudes and fears that keeps women in a kind of half-light, retreating from the full use of their minds and creativ­ity. Like Cinderella, women today are still waiting for something external to transform their lives.”[3]

Dowling argues that passivity and the related wish to be taken care of by others are the chief forces holding women down today. This argument is weakened, how­ever, when Dowling insists repeatedly that “virtually all women” are crippled totally by passivity and dependent behav­iors, a grossly untrue generalization. However, passivity can and does dimin­ish career advancement for some women in the naval services.

Confusion Between Formal and Infor­mal Communication Structures[4]: Many women entering civilian management and naval officer ranks seem to believe in the effectiveness of formal structure, defini­tions, job descriptions, policies, and the way things should be. Conversely, they ignore the informal system of relation­ships and information-sharing, ties of loyalty and of dependence, of favors granted or owed, of mutual benefit, and of protection—things men usually take into account to however great or small a degree. This informal system makes the naval service a “fraternity” and a “so­cial club” with rules and customs all its own. Unfortunately, many women per­ceive this system to be an exception, an aberration, or a wrong to be righted rather then as part of the organizational process.

Career and Goal Fragmentation[5]: Tra­ditionally, men have tended to consoli­date personal and career goals. In the naval services it is always difficult to sep­arate the two; therefore, many men set one group of goals as dependent upon the other. When conflict threatens the bal­ance, they negotiate and “trade off” be­tween each set of goals. Women, on the other hand, traditionally have been con­cerned with raising a family and main­taining a household as well as possibly pursuing a career. Consequently, they found themselves living two or more lives, switching personas at work, at home, and with their children. As a re­sult, many women officers feel they must constantly “prove” themselves to dem­onstrate that they are committed to their careers, a burden of proof to which men are rarely asked to submit.

Similarly, many men relate the indi­vidual jobs they do to their careers and to advancement. For men, a job is part of a career. Some women, however, tend to separate jobs and careers. They view a job in terms of the present, while a career is seen as an intensely personal goal which only she—and not her boss—can properly evaluate. This is not a “bad” or “wrong” attitude, but such a perception may not understandably be shared by her senior officers.

Overspecialization9: For many wom­en, success comes through technical mas­tery of a skill or a particular specializa­tion. Conversely, most men have to mas­ter a particular technical area, but their involvement within that area is rarely as deep. For the woman, overinvestment gives her legitimacy and security in her own eyes and in the eyes of others. The man, however, creates his own legiti­macy and finds security in being seen as having potential by senior officers who “matter.”

For women, overspecialization is a mixed blessing. It may result in good job performance, but its physical and emo­tional demands may lead to bitterness, exhaustion, or burnout. It may also “typecast” the woman officer into a technical or supervisory position in which she is regarded as indispensable and to which she eventually becomes en­trenched. This, in turn, reduces her abil­ity to advance.

Leadership Roles and Behavioral Styles10: A naval officer deals with supe­riors, peers, junior officers, enlisted per­sonnel, and civilians, each interaction requiring a different leadership role and style. How does one determine the appro­priate style for a given situation?

Men’s decisions usually center on their bosses’ expectations of them. Women’s decisions usually focus on their own con­cept of themselves. For men, the “bot­tom line” is usually, “What does the commanding officer or senior officer who writes my fitness report want?” Women place less weight on others’ expectations (“This is who I am; like it or leave it!”). While such a stance is inherently honest, it may be perceived as inflexible, setting the female officer apart from her col­leagues, her senior officer, and her job. With no sense of a personal strategy being played out, she has failed to tempo­rarily adopt a different style for the com­mon good of the mission (and for reasons of self-interest).

Men routinely judge one another based on their perceptions of themselves, about naval careers in general, and about the particular corps or division in which they work. Women’s perceptions tend to be different from those of men on every level, but this is rarely an issue with which men or women consciously deal. Indeed, even the man who prides himself on his fairness inevitably applies the same standards he uses to evaluate him-

NOMEX^ARAMID IS A TRADEMARK OF DUPONT

235 WEST INDUSTRY COURT DEER PARK, NEW YORK 11729 (516) 667-5000

JOINER DOORS

THE NAVY'S LIGHTEST AND STRONGEST JOINER DOORS - IN STOCK AND AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY I

solve problems for themselves rather

relying on others. Fathers should

attemP1

children, sharing interests and activ

ities

re­

ah°

The challenge today for men ^ (o women in naval service leadership

is1 tribm

9Jo Jones, “Women of Annapolis,” PP; j^atv 10Margaret Hennig and Anne Jardim, rial Woman, pp. 30-32.

self and other men to the evaluation of women. As a result, when he looks at a navy woman, he may see someone who seems more ambivalent about “getting ahead,” who appears less motivated, who is “intolerant” or “overreactive,” and who seems to ignore the informal side of naval leadership.

Collectively, these traits serve to por­tray women officers in a harsh light. Worse, they may feed some male preju­dices against sea service women. Firm and decisive action is required to mini­mize the adverse effects of these per­ceived differences between men and women. The following steps are pre­scribed, not dogmatically, but as a possi­bly helpful beginning:

►  The naval services must continue to vigorously enforce all anti-discrimina­tion, sexual harassment, and affirmative action policies.

►  Congress should lift some combat re­strictions imposed on women, thereby making women’s opportunities “more equal” in a career sense.

►  Women naval officers should partici­pate actively in women officers’ associa­tions (such as the Northern California Women Officers Professional Associa­tion). Such participation is valuable in promoting career programs and profes­sional expertise among women officers and providing role models for younger officers to emulate and follow.

►  As a general principle, men and women officer candidates should develop a career strategy as early as possible. Some men and women do not become officers until their early 30s because they switch careers several times or because they may have no specific idea of what they want to do. Instead, they “put in” two years as ensigns and two as lieutenants (junior grade), and so on until suddenly finding themselves as commanders with 17 years in the sea service. Much time could have been saved if they had mapped out an early and carefully formu­lated career plan.

This will necessitate answering several difficult questions. What are the personal costs and rewards of a naval career? Is the balance positive? What do you want to achieve? Where do you want to be in five, ten, and 15 years?

There is one potential pitfall to be avoided, however. Too much questioning can immobilize; the officer candidate should avoid analyzing himself or herself into inaction.

►  Young officers should adopt explicit strategies to learn everything they can about their service, its mission, and its people. They should devote as much time as is necessary to establish solid working relationships with the people around them. Women who seriously undertake such strategies may easily find them­selves becoming more competent at their current job and those of their immediate seniors than any man available.

►  To avoid stagnation, naval service women should actively anticipate change and seek to create it. Dependence, pas­sivity, and clinging to familiarity are the kiss of death for those pursuing a naval career. Women officers will gain leader­ship points only by managing increas­ingly complex areas of responsibility. They should develop at least one sub-spe­cialty in order to gain experience in shore management assignments and prepare for their next job or rank through private and formal evening study. Thus, when an opening comes up, they will be the most qualified to fill it.

►  Naval service men and women should reconsider their own ideas of what is “masculine” and “feminine.” The ideal Navy man is not John Wayne, and the ideal Navy women is not an imitation man or an angry Gloria Steinem. The “ideal” leadership model for men and women alike may be a combination of a very direct, competitive, “masculine” achievement style with softer “femi­nine” qualities emphasizing loyalty, ex­pressiveness, and care for others.

►  Naval service men should not v'eW

women as “problems.” Such a percep tion will create problems that do n exist. The services are populated W1 Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, Caucasian^ and an array of other subcultures, there is the fundamental unity of 1 U. S. naval services. No subculture is problem of itself.     {0

►  Naval service women may have f learn to accept and cope with the di e ences and difficulties they face. K 111 always be a struggle to initiate, to be a gressive, or to plan career strategi Similarly, a great deal of mental a emotional energy can be wasted £et!jr furious over inequities and slights, re ^ perceived. This does not mean that na service women should give up on ba that can and should be won. should assess the difficulties before the change what they can, and learn to c with what they cannot change. . ^

►  Writer Colette Dowling suggests c 1 hood training as a root of differences ^ tween men’s and women’s percept) Accordingly, parents should avoi culcating dependent behaviors and ^ tudes in their children. Girls shou ^ encouraged to assume the initiative, ^ take responsibility for themselves,

to develop close relationships with th c

it

with daughters that are traditionally served for fathers and sons.

form a team that esteems the con ^ tions of women and on which men ^ women work together without p - sexual role games. [6] [7] 3 [8] 5 6 7 8



[1]Carole Hyatt, Women & Work: Honest _ jnc-’ Real Questions (New York: M. Evans an 1980), pp. 170-171.          .                       0*1'

[2]Betty Lehan Harrigan, Games Mother ^e'e (N'rvv’ You: Corporate Gamesmanship for YYotn ^77)- York: Rawson Associates Publishers, Inc”

PP- 11-1?-

[3]Colette Dowling, The Cinderella C°mP ^ $tf#« en’s Hidden Fear of Independence (New mit Books, 1981), pp. 30-31.

[4]Margaret Hennig and Anne Jardim, The Woman (New York: Anchor Press/Double a ’

pp. 12-14.

[5]Ibid., pp. 16-17.                                                       33^'

‘Jo Jones, “Women of Annapolis,” All 1983, pp. 32-33.              , .,

[7]“Navy Policy on Sexual Harassment, A March 1983, p. 36.        .fa^'

[8]Helen Rogan, Mixed Company: Women ^\), em Army (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Son *

PP- «-74.                                                                         „erS <°

 

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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