Escalation and Naval Strategy

ture of a conflict, a clear instance of escalation. These boundaries are, therefore, appropriate ones at which to evaluate existing strategies against the escalation criteria.

A second factor hampering the evaluation of strategies is the possibility that the first escalation criterion—no unwanted escalation—is irrelevant to naval forces, or per­haps to U. S. forces. Can escalation be controlled in a war with the Soviet Union? Many would argue that it cannot. They espouse one or more of the following arguments:

► The Soviets will not enter a war unless they plan to use nuclear weapons. The question for the Soviets is not if the war becomes nuclear, but when. Escalation is inevitable, and the prime purpose of the conventional phase is to plan for the nuclear battle. The distinguished French strategist General Pierre Gallois even suggests the war will begin with a Soviet “. . . attack with highly accurate low-yield nuclear weapons against all the military targets in Western Europe.” (John Train, “The Soviet Wedge in Geneva,” Wall Street Journal, 28 September 1983, p. 74.)

►  Even if the Soviets honor their pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, escalation is still inevitable. The conventional force imbalance in Europe will force the United States to escalate. In the September 1983 Armed Forces Journal, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, said that if NATO is attacked, “. . .we can only sustain ourselves conventionally for a relatively short time. I will then be forced to . . . ask for the authorization ... to use nuclear weapons.”

► Even if neither the United States nor the Soviet Union escalates, escalation still cannot be controlled. Other nu­clear powers, the United Kingdom and, especially, France, reserve the right to make their own nuclear deci­sions based on their assessment. Given Soviet tendencies to view the West as a single entity and Soviet emphasis on mass and preemption, small-scale French or British use will lead to large-scale Soviet response and, in turn, to U. S. retaliation. Thus the French and British not only have the ability to make their own nuclear decision, but also have de facto decision-making power over the two superpowers as well.

The final factor complicating the analysis is the doubt that once the nuclear threshold has been crossed, further escalation control is meaningful. The second escalation criterion—strategies should not fail catastrophically should escalation occur—is meaningless if escalation to general nuclear exchange is the inevitable result of any nuclear employment. It is difficult to predict the course of a war once nuclear weapons have been used. The destruc­tiveness of a theater-level exchange may force both sides to reconsider their war aims and seek an end to hostilities. On the other hand, escalation to a massive, homeland-to- homeland strategic exchange is also possible. After all. one purpose of U. S. theater nuclear weapons is to link NATO’s conventional defense and the strategic arsenal of the United States.

These complicating factors are inherent to the nuclear age. The uncertainty over whether escalation will occur, and whether it can be controlled if it does, is an important

component of deterrence. The United States rejects a Pledge of “no first use” of nuclear weapons because this Uncertainty helps keep a conventionally more powerful Soviet Union in check. Such uncertainty may appear to Hake examination of the naval contribution to escalation control trivial or irrelevant. Such an attitude is understand­^able and common. It is also wrong.

Although we cannot guarantee that escalation will not °ccur for reasons unrelated to the Navy, neither can we be certain that it will. Soviet leaders who have spent their lives speaking and hearing of the immense dangers of nu­clear war will not make the nuclear decision lightly, no Matter what their peacetime doctrine may suggest. The ^rapid collapse of NATO, forcing a U. S. nuclear decision, ^a*so may not come to pass; history is replete with “short ^ar” predictions that proved to be wrong.

Even if nuclear weapons are used, further escalation ^need not be automatic. Despite their civil defenses and iheir growing ability to threaten U. S. intercontinental bal­listic missiles, Soviet leaders must realize that a retaliatory strike by the United States would effectively destroy their country. That the United States will suffer similar or peater destruction will be of little consolation. Thus, as long as NATO’s war aims do not extend to the political Instruction of the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders are un- 'kely to take those steps that could lead to its physical destruction.

In this confusing world of escalation control, nothing is ^assured; thus, nothing, including the impact of naval °^rces, can be ignored. Since it cannot be certain that es-

The decision to go nuclear is not only a U. S. or Soviet prerogative. Britain and France—with such nuclear-pow­ered ballistic missile submarines as HMS Resolution, oppo­site page, and Le Redoutable, left—have de facto nuclear war-making power over both superpowers.

calation considerations are irrelevant, and since, if they are relevant, ignoring them could lead to disaster, U. S. naval strategy must be evaluated against the two escalation criteria.

In the strict sense, there can be no such thing as a mari­time or naval strategy in today’s world, any more than can there be separate land strategies or nuclear strategies. The emergence of air power and joint operations in World War II doomed separate land and sea strategies; the concept of escalation control has doomed separate conventional and nuclear ones. Still, it is useful to examine the components of national strategy separately. This article focuses on the naval component.

Modem naval strategy is not manifested neatly in a sin­gle document. It exists in war plans and exercises and is articulated in the speeches of naval leaders and the discus­sions and deliberations of their staffs. Yet, the outlines of U. S. maritime strategy for a war with the Soviet Union are well known. Our strategy is a strategy of global, con­ventional war, fought in concert with both our Atlantic and our Pacific allies. It is a forward strategy, seeking to keep the battle in the opponent’s backyard. It is an offen­sive strategy, seeking out the enemy rather than waiting for him to seek us out. And it is a strategy dominated by the aircraft carrier.

Although there are main offensive arms of the Navy— carrier battle groups, attack submarines, and amphibious forces our strategic discussions revolve around the car­riers. The carriers are sent to provide peacetime signals of U. S. concern, a modem form of traditional gunboat di­plomacy. The carriers support forces ashore in limited war. And, should general war come, the carriers are ex­pected to attack and destroy the Soviet Navy, including, when required, Soviet Naval Aviation at bases within the Soviet Union.

In a crisis not directly involving the Soviet Union, U. S. plans are clear. Aircraft carriers will be sent to the scene of the crisis, ideally to demonstrate concern and resolve, but implicitly to apply force if needed. Since no ground forces are involved and carriers at sea are relatively invulnerable, such crisis deployments do not induce escalation. The United States may choose to escalate as a matter of policy; U. S. principle only requires that a given strategy not lead to undesired escalation.

Should escalation to actual hostilities occur, the strategy of using carriers as the primary means of displaying U. S. power will not fail catastrophically. The presence of a carrier battle group allows the United States to conduct combat operations, but does not oblige it to do so. Be­cause sea-based forces are inherently mobile, they can withdraw; because they are highly survivable against Third World threats, this withdrawal is a matter of choice, not necessity. Thus, if the strategy fails, it will not do so

catastrophically. Both escalation control requirements are met.

Contrast this strategy with one employing amphibious forces, the other applicable offensive force. Should this strategy fail, the failure is more likely to be catastrophic since either withdrawal or high combat losses will be viewed as a humiliating U. S. defeat.

Current naval strategy is thus consistent with the dic­tates of escalation control at the low end of the spectrum of violence—possible hostilities during conventional crisis with third powers. Obviously, the extent to which escala­tion control principles are followed at the high end of the scale in a war with the Soviet Union is far more important.

In considering higher order escalation, one must vie''' U. S. aircraft carriers through Soviet eyes. U. S. Nav> officers speaking of carrier battle groups might stress fl^eX' ibility, mobility, or endurance. But the Soviets stress the carrier’s nuclear capability. In his book Sea Power oj lj^u State, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, Commander in Chief ⁰ the Soviet Navy, speaks of the carriers’ . . intensi^ve training to deliver nuclear weapons on land targets,” ^re ferring to them as a “. . . highly-trained reserve of strate gic strike forces in a global nuclear war.” With this imaS¹- of aircraft carriers and the apparent Soviet assumption tha the West will be forced to use nuclear weapons first if NATO-Warsaw Pact war, carriers approaching with¹¹¹ strike range of the Soviet Union may be perceived as p^re^ paring to launch nuclear strikes. The Soviets, who str^eS- preemption, may elect to beat us to the draw. Thus, f° ^ ward operation of carrier battle groups seems inconsist^e with the first criterion of not inducing escalation. .

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Forward operations are inconsistent with the second ^c terion as well. Should escalation occur, the strategy '^v_ indeed fail catastrophically. U. S. carriers will be exc^e"

tionally vulnerable, subject to attack from multiple azimuths where anything less than a leak-proof defense results in failure. The situation is exacerbated today be­cause many important programmed improvements in fleet air defense are still in the future.

Although a strategy based on forward operations of car­rier battle groups violates both escalation control criteria, this does not necessarily imply that such a strategy should never be implemented. War is a matter of risk. No strategy is perfect. None will ever have all the characteristics we might desire. But in light of escalation control considera­tions, a forward strategy should be followed only if the benefits clearly outweigh the risks or if there is no other alternative.

This does not suggest that the aircraft carrier should be eliminated. If the carrier did not exist, she would have to be invented. The question is how the carrier’s flexibility and capability should be employed in a war with the So­viet Union. Some possibilities are obvious. Should Cuba opt for belligerency, carrier assets would be needed to neutralize the Cuban military. Carrier operations in the Mediterranean Sea directly threaten the Soviet Union far less than operations in northern seas and thus are less likely to contribute to escalation. Should escalation occur, carriers are at least as survivable in the Mediterranean as anywhere else, given the prospect of mutual support from the shore and the limited strength of Soviet Mediterranean forces compared to those in the Norwegian Sea or North­ern Pacific. Finally, although the Indian Ocean will proba­bly not be a decisive theater of war, a battle group happen- 'ng to be present at the onset of hostilities could eliminate whatever Soviet maritime threat existed in the area.

Beyond these uses, however, the principal mission of carriers in the early stages of a major war is survival. They form an irreplaceable strategic reserve, whether the war remains conventional or escalates. An extended conven- honal war will lead to rapid and severe attrition of tactical air power in Europe, thus the limited attack capability of the carriers (limited in relation to the total air power ini­tially available in theater) will become decisive. Should escalation occur, in-theater nuclear assets will be de­stroyed. The carrier may again prove decisive, both be­cause of her nuclear delivery capability and because that capability, residing in manned aircraft, can be effective against movable or emerging targets. But, in either case, the carrier can perform her decisive role later in the war °nly if she has not been squandered earlier.

The notion of using the Navy’s most visible force as a strategic reserve, whose initial function is to remain out of harm’s way, is foreign to the aggressive attitude of suc­cessful naval commanders. In addition, gaining congres­sional support for complex and capable ships that will be employed in a reserve role will be difficult. These draw­backs, however, argue for deeper study and better articu­lation of the concept, not its rejection.

Despite the value of employing carriers as a strategic ^reserve, operation of carrier battle groups in close proxim- ^uy to the Soviet homeland may indeed prove essential early in the war. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, for example, has noted in the November 1983 Armed Forces

Journal that . . the law of the land . . . includes as binding law Article V of the NATO Treaty, which requires . . . [the United States] to treat an attack on Norway as if it's an attack on Long Island . . . If there is sufficient strategic warning to put Marine reinforcements in place before hostilities and if sufficient land-based air power can be allocated to Norway, this obligation need not involve carriers. If not, battle group operations will be necessary to defend northern Norway, thus risking escalation. Therefore, to ensure the second escalation criterion— strategy should not fail catastrophically—is met, the abil­ity of carrier battle groups to survive, operate, and fight in a nuclear environment must be improved.

Improved training, tactics, survivability, hardening, and capabilities against nuclear-armed cruise missiles pro­vided by nuclear SM-2 surface-to-air missiles are essen­tial. (Survivability refers to protection from multiple kills, from destruction by near misses, and from the long-range effects of some nuclear weapons; it does not imply a futile attempt to make ships impervious to direct nuclear hits.) All these programs are more or less ongoing; they should be supported and, where possible, accelerated. Since hardening improvements will be slow in coming, the Navy should consider grouping those ships that have had surviv­ability improvements into nuclear-capable battle groups. Initially, it may prove wise to have all such battle groups positioned in the Atlantic Ocean where there is the least choice about forward operations.

The U. S. Navy’s declaratory policy need not avoid a proclaimed willingness to operate in Soviet waters. It is both wrong and dangerous to give the Soviets the impres­sion that we will cede any area of the world to them by default. The danger, however, is that the U. S. Navy will become a victim of its own rhetoric. Since naval leaders are uncomfortable with the concepts of escalation and of nuclear war, they may find themselves accepting a high probability of escalation, not as a conscious, calculated risk, but because they have failed to think through the problem. Although they may—and should—declare in public that “the Navy will go anywhere to do its job,” in professional deliberations they must add “so long as a careful calculation of the military benefits and the risks, including the risk of escalation, shows the decision to be a wise one.”

Nuclear weapons present difficult questions of escala­tion control, questions for which no answers are fully sat­isfactory. They seem to confer benefits on our adversary and none on us. Yet, nuclear weapons must be considered and be a part of U. S. planning. The challenge of devising a credible strategy that will uphold the two escalation cri­teria is immense. The consequences of not doing so, how­ever, are simply too great.

Captain Brooks has spent the bulk of his career in billets associated with the submarine force. Ashore, he has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. His writ­ings have previously been published in Proceedings and the Naval War College Review. Captain Brooks is currently Deputy Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.