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Until very recently, when someone said Naval Reserve surface forces, one could assume that he was talking about minesweepers and the like. But not anymore—the FFG-7s are joining the reserves.
When Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov goes to bed at night, he’s not lying awake counting Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. He must be concerned with thoughts of our aircraft carriers and submarines—but FFG-7s? Nyet.
One wonders whether a few U. S. Navy admirals sleep any better, knowing the limited dimensions which the FFG-7 class brings to the fleet. This ship does not perform as well as other fleet units in a variety of missions because of her deficiencies in major warfare areas.
Antisubmarine Warfare:
► No shipboard standoff antisubmarine weapon ► Inadequate hull-mounted sonar ► No current towed array sonar
► Current limitations in operating the SH-60B helicopter (LAMPS-III)
Antiair Warfare:
► No current Link-11 Navy tactical data system ► Poor and degradable performance of fire control radar ► Poor air intercept control capability (no three-dimensional radar)
► Single launcher limitations ► No current electronic countermeasure capability Antisurface Warfare:
► Poor shipboard sensors for over-the-horizon targeting ► No long-range attack weapons (e.g., Tomahawk missile)
► No credible naval gunfire support capability The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate’s inadequate command, control, and communication facilities prevent her from becoming a flagship, or operating in a high-threat environment. The ship’s relatively short “legs” also make her quite dependent upon refueling assets. Despite all these deficiencies, the FFG-7-class ships are “ton for ton, the most expensive ships built for the Navy at this time.”1
For all we know, Admiral Gorshkov may even take some delight in this latter fact: that the U. S. Navy is squandering scarce shipbuilding resources on constructing ‘-‘non-threats” like the FFG-7s. If so, Gorshkov is thinking the same thoughts as some influential U. S. critics of the frigate program.2
It is not so much the cost of the FFG-7, for she is relatively inexpensive compared to the $4 billion cost of the carrier battle group or the $1 billion cost of the Ohio-dass submarine. What inspires the critics of the FFG-7 is the fact that the frigate is not capable enough to contribute significantly toward Navy superiority in any warfare area. In the meantime, aviators want more F-14s, F/A-18s, and A-6s; submariners want a new super-attack submarine to counter the “Alfa” and “Oscar” subs in the Soviet Navy. The battle group proponents are quite pleased with four battleships, Aegis cruisers, and the promise of DDG-51s. Each warfare community believes that it has a “war winner”—any detour of funding for the FFG-7 hurts the “war winners.”
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U. S. Navy (Retired), stated that “All weapons of war are expensive. Cheap weapons will not win us a war. And if we cannot win a war, there is no sense in spending money on weapons at all.”3 Hence, one of the FFG-7’s biggest problems seems to be a diminishing constituency within circles of the Navy’s philosophical and political leadership.4 The Oliver Hazard Perry frigate is not going to win wars; it should also be pointed out that she will not lose them, either. She is not a high-capability ship, but not every mission in the Navy requires a carrier battle group. It would seem that before the last of the FFG-7s gets a shakedown cruise, critics are ready to scuttle the whole class because it draws Navy funding away from the “war winner” projects.
We cannot afford to give up on the FFG-7 just because she is not a major combatant—she is still a versatile and necessary platform. It may even be possible to find in the frigate a springboard for imaginative uses that cannot be assigned to dedicated battle group escorts. Some of these creative approaches involve new strategic deployments with the ship configured as she is, as well as variations in tactical employments which are based upon weapon and sensor upgrades.
First and foremost, the FFG-7 is best suited to the requirements she was built for. The frigate was originally designed to escort underway replenishment groups, amphibious forces, and merchant convoys. These duties are barely noticed in peacetime, but will be of critical importance in a conflict of any duration against the Soviets and their allies. The results of a naval conflict with the Soviets will be largely dependent upon our “forces in being.” Because most scenarios presume that the Navy is required to project force into contested choke points and throughout the Free World’s sea lines of communication, the convoying of replenishment groups, amphibious forces, and reinforcements can also be presumed to be contested by the Soviets. To assume that the carrier battle group is going to sweep the seas clean in decisive battles is unrealistic. The opposing forces are potentially so numerous, and the tools with which to strike so diversified among the platforms, that a decisive battle for a sea line of communication, region, or ocean is increasingly unlikely. What might evolve in a war-at-sea scenario is attrition between several opposing and scattered forces. In conditions such as these, getting the convoyed forces through can be a very tough job.
The conditions which allowed us to overcome the U-boat threat to our World War II convoys, namely the security of our naval installations and the lead time to create battle-proven designs for escorts in large numbers, are not at all assured to the Western alliance in a future conflict. Further, the importance of the materiel and forces being escorted is far greater today than in the past. Any casual observer of the Royal Navy’s campaign in the Falklands can appreciate how important the logistic tail for a fighting fleet and projection forces can be. Against a better armed and trained adversary, the Royal Navy escort forces likely would have failed.
Therefore, above all other missions, the FFG-7 must be prepared to assume the escort duties she is designed for. Integrating the frigate into the battle group escort missions should be a secondary consideration. In fact, making frigates fully battle group- capable may be deleterious to the convoy escort mission. A frigate that practices protecting the battle group in a high-threat environment (one that is equipped to cope with that environment) is a frigate that will most likely be assigned to a high-threat environment when she is most needed for convoy escort.
It may be possible to make better use of the FFG-7s by developing a new set of directions in her strategic deployments. None of these should be dependent upon significant upgrades in the frigate’s war-fighting capabilities.
Forward Deployed: Admiral Elmo Zumwalt stressed that the FFG-7 and proposed sea control ship could be forward-deployed to areas of potential conflict. This would allow the “Navy’s most important ships . . . (to) withdraw from the front lines and deploy out of reach of an enemy (conventional) first strike, thus putting themselves in a favorable position to respond to such a strike—and therefore deter it.”5 Forward deployment of the FFG-7s (even without a sea control ship) makes sense because they can contribute a permanent presence in the deployed area, with capabilities against air, surface, and submarine threats. The presence of an Oliver Hazard Perry frigate is less politically sensitive to the host country, and not significant enough to provoke expanded Soviet naval deployments. Frigates are less expensive to maintain and operate than a battle or surface action group, yet are still capable of destroying enemy forces.
A frigate force permanently deployed in forward areas can enhance the presence mission, allowing a battle group to remain in more secure rear areas. The deployment of battle groups serves both military and political purposes: the first, in peacetime as a contingency force; the latter, always proof of U. S. commitment to a foreign policy objective. Battle group presence translates into a threat to use force. But as a deployment wears on, the meaningfulness and notoriety of that threat subsides. If the deployment of a full battle group to crisis areas was reserved to emphasize specific commitments—and frigates took over the role of permanent presence—the military contingency could be met, in many circumstances, with less risk. The flag would fly higher each time a full battle group was deployed because of the specific message it would send in a crisis.
A concomitant result of these deployments may pressure the Soviets to reduce the size and capabilities of their forward deployments, so that they would also keep their strike forces in more secure rear areas. Because of the Soviet Union’s natural geographic disadvantages, such a trend might give the West real military and political advantages.
In terms of fighting capabilities, the forward-deployed frigate force can exact its share of damage upon an adversary. The frigate force would augment rather than supplant the indigenous forces of allies, and it could promote real standardization of naval operations.
Rear Area/Naval Reserve Force, Escort Squadron Deployment: The convoy escort duties for which the frigate was designed begin as rear-area deployments. Transferring some FFG- 7s to the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) is a step in the right direction. NRF escorts may make up an important share of convoy escorts for any war lasting beyond two weeks. Once assigned as NRF ships, the FFG-7s no longer would be “forces in being.” But, if reserve mobilization is to mean anything, its contribution
to the fleet in wartime must be significant. Detailing newer ships like FFG-7s will add greater weight to NRF assets.
Active fleet units could also be formed into tactical escort squadrons. One or two of the FFG-7s could be manned as regular fleet assets, and the remainder of the escort squadron as NRF ships. In this way, the active-duty frigates could serve as “frigate leaders”—the administrative, training, and tactical center for the escort squadron. The deployment of the FFG-7 in this way takes on even more meaning if the FFX or FFGX concept materializes in a future Navy budget.
Each analyst of naval affairs seems to have a favorite platform for future introduction into the fleet. The FFX was a Navy concept for a lower “low” mix in the “high/low” construction. It was to be about one-half the FFG-7’s cost with the same antisubmarine capability, but only minimal assets in antisurface and antiair warfare. The purpose in building the FFX is to modernize the escort forces, replacing older Brooke (FFG-1)- and Knox (FF-1052)-class ships in the active and NRF inventories. ‘FFGX, on the other hand, was to be a higher “low” in the “high/low” mix; its design has been envisioned at 8,500 tons, with advanced propulsion and antisurface/antisubmarine weapons.7 Regardless of preference, the Navy needs a follow-on frigate program. Such a program could take advantage of the FFG-7 production investment, resulting in more economical production. The Navy could also save big operating costs once it retires ships of the Knox, Charles F. Adams (DDG-2), and Leahy (CG-16) classes. The
When the Duncan was being built in the late 1970s at Todd Shipyards, few would have guessed that she was destined to become the first FFG-7 to join the Naval Reserve Force in the early 1980s. But Rear Admiral Cecil J. Kempf, Commander, Naval Reserve Force (above), who spoke at the January 1984 turnover, was delighted to welcome a frontline, modern combatant to his forces.
FFX/FFGX would be cheaper to operate and could pick up many of the missions of these ships. In addition, the Navy will still be about 20 frigates short of its requirements when all the FFG-7s are built.
These proposals are important to the FFG-7 in that they set the parameters for future requirements of the Oliver Hazard Perry class. If the FFX were to be built, the FFG-7 (as a more capable unit) would seem to be a natural for the frigate leader role in an escort squadron. If the FFGX were built, the FFG-7 would have little need to integrate herself with a battle group. The FFGX would be fully battle group-capable and the FFG-7 could be dedicated to her designed escort duties.
While neither the FFX nor the FFGX concepts are in vogue with Navy and congressional leadership today, they seem destined to reemerge. The impetus for this rebirth will be the tremendous pressures that the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided missile destroyer and new attack submarine construction programs place on the Navy’s ship construction budget. It appears likely that the “highs” in the shipbuilding budget will end up being too costly, and the “lows” will provide the only means of meeting the administration’s goals in modernizing and expanding surface forces. '
Because of the dynamics and dilemmas of Navy shipbuilding and budgeting, dedicating the FFG-7 as the backbone of the NRF and convoy escort forces deployed in rear areas may be its most crucial role.
Nontraditional Deployments: U. S. attention has been increasingly directed toward areas of the world where the Navy does not traditionally deploy in strength; Latin America is the best example. We have witnessed a major naval confrontation in the South Atlantic, an amphibious landing on the Falklands, and controversial deployments of Navy battle groups off the coasts of Central America. But, with the exception of these unusual events and the annual UNITAS cruises, the Navy does not regularly deploy to these areas. Permanent deployment of a frigate force to Latin
America could counter Soviet naval deployments to Cuba without provoking escalation in forces. It would also pose a threat to seaborne arms shipments from the Soviet bloc into the region. As most of its presence mission, the deployment of a frigate force also could encourage greater cooperation with South American navies.
Other regions for nontraditional deployment of frigates are evident, such as off the east and west coasts of Africa. The Navy would acquire a real and continuing ability to deal with Soviet deployments in these regions. The political harvest from such deployments is likely to be much greater over the years than our current method of awaiting a crisis and responding with a carrier battle group.
The problem with the FFG-7 employment in the battle group is that the ship does not advance any single warfare capability—she merely adds depth. The Oliver Hazard Perry class seems best suited tactically for the teamwork role in the outer edges of the antisubmarine screen. Her LAMPS helicopters and SQR-19 tactical towed array sonar (TACTAS) are key assets in this role. Of course, the inner screen requirements can also be met with the FFG-7. Her medium-range missile defense system and helicopter qualify the FFG-7 for escort closer to the high-value units. Working outside the battle group in surface action groups or choke-point operations, the frigate contributes the same key elements: TACTAS and LAMPS, plus Harpoon. At best, the frigate plays a supporting role for more capable units, but this does not lessen her value in independent actions.
Future tactical employment seems inexorably tied to proposals which would significantly enhance and specialize the ship’s weapons and sensors. The upgrades currently planned make the FFG-7 a good antisubmarine platform, the SH-60B Seahawk and TACTAS again being the pivotal systems in this regard. The upgrade being given to the fire control radar only provides the frigate with the capability she was always supposed to have in antiair warfare. Some options which would significantly enhance the ship’s warfare areas include the installation of a phased-array radar and Link-11 suite so that the ship can perform in high air threat areas. For antisubmarine warfare, the frigates need a standoff weapon and the most up-to-date towed array system (both active and passive). New sensor packages also need to be added, as well as Tomahawk missiles.
Despite the engineering problems, a phased-array radar on board the frigate would be a significant contribution to battle group defense. This would also make the frigate a viable and survivable unit in high-threat areas. However, equipped with a phased-array radar, the frigate might intrude on the DDG-51’s budget turf. If less than the 63 DDG-51s the Navy desires are funded, the FFG-7 may emerge as a candidate to pick up some of the air defense slack.
The installation of a standoff antisubmarine weapon would give the frigate a submarine kill potential that could take advantage of her sensor ranges. If the standoff weapon were installed in canisters, the launcher and magazine capacity for Harpoon and Standard missiles would not be reduced. The standoff weapon gives the ship a better chance of survival in “hot” areas—even one-on-one situations. The frigate’s subsurface sensors should be kept at the leading edge of technology as new towed arrays are devised. Active low-frequency arrays may someday provide detection ranges now only achieved at the second and third convergence zones. The FFG-7 towed array program should represent the standardized baseline for the fleet. At the same time, the frigate should be used as a testbed for new arrays. To further enhance her antisubmarine warfare specialization, the FFG-7 could be assigned primary direct support duties and tactics with attack submarines.
To become more effective with surface action groups, the frigate could be the platform for specialized sensors such as remotely piloted vehicles, advanced electronic support measures, and even lighter-than-air surveillance craft. To take advantage of this longer-range detection ability, the ship could also be equipped with Tomahawk or a strike version of future vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft.
To round out this enticing list of possible improvements on the FFG-7 platform, the frigate and her helicopter could be equipped for mine warfare. Both could lay mines, but mine clearance could only be accomplished if a lightweight sled for the helicopter were devised. Mine warfare operations would be restricted to shallow waters and inshore areas. This capability changes the tactical presence of the ship dramatically in choke- point operations.
It is exciting and self-indulgent to dream up the reequipping of the FFG-7 so that she stands out in one or more warfare areas. The congressional track record would seem to bear out that not all the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates will be modernized in the same manner. But the lack of class standardization should not inhibit the Navy from tailoring the FFG-7’s weapons and sensors in smaller numbers to meet specific requirements over their 40- year service lives. For years, the Navy has bemoaned the fact that the Soviets deploy new technology systems in the fleet at a faster rate. Creative upgrading of the Oliver Hazard Perry class can present an opportunity to change the lengthy development- to-deployment cycle. Some of this may amount to technical risktaking, but the overall impact should not cause any detriment to battle group operations; the payoffs could be great.
The FFG-7 is fine for what she was meant to be—convoy escort. Not every Navy combat ship has to be battle group-capable. The concentration of forces into battle groups need not become naval theology for fighting the next war.
If the past decade is representative of the future, the Navy s commitments will continue to expand. The most important response to this is a healthy, if not vigorous, ship construction program. Because of our inefficient political and fiscal allocations process and our limited resources, the Navy must depend upon ships like the FFG-7 to overcome force competition and strategic deployment problems that they were not really intended to solve. The challenge is to be creative—not conventional—in the employment of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate.
'Jean Labayle Couhat, Ed. (English Ed., A. D. Baker III), Combat Fleets of the World 1982-83, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 754.
2F. J. West, Jr., “A Fleet for the Year 2000: Future Force Structure,” Proceedings, May 1980, p. 66.
3H. G. Rickover, “Nuclear Warships and the Navy’s Future,” Proceedings, January 1975, p. 24.
■Testimony of VAdm. Robert L. Walters before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (on the FY 83 DoD authorization) clearly states the Navy's priority: CG-47 is “our highest priority surface combatant,” p. 129, HASC No. 97-33. The testimony of VAdm. C. A. H. Trost before the same subcommittee: ‘ ‘The strength of this SCN plan lies not just in the number of platforms to be procured, but more importantly in the broad qualitative improvements provided . . . p. 31. The point here is to identify clearly the surface warfare community’s dedication to high-capability platforms like CG-47 and DDG-51. “Low- mix” components like the FFG-7 have only secondary attention when vital programs like CG-47 and DDG-51 are on the table.
5Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch (New York Times Book Co. 1976), p. 76. Testimony of VAdm. William Rowden before the Senate Armed Services Committee (on the FY 82 DoD authorization). See pp. 2026-2027 regarding the FFX, Part 4: Seapower and Force Projection.
’Walter "R” Thomas, “Fast and Furious,” Sea Power, September 1982, p. 34. 36.
Lieutenant Orchard earned a B.A. in Japanese and foreign affairs from the University of Virginia and an M. A. in national security affairs from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. In the regular Navy, he served as a fire control officer on board the USS Kinkaid (DD-965). He left active duty in 1981, and currently is involved with international business liaison for a major U. S. defense contractor.