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for the Bear
the Soviets place more of their nuclear as$ets in submarines, guaranteeing the sur- Vlvul of their SSBNs becomes a high-priority task for them. They appear intent on turning Waters adjacent to their landmass into basins where their submarines would be prodded by the Soviet Navy and by land-based air power. But, if war erupts, we can permit n° such sanctuaries. Wherever the bear is, there we must be prepared to conduct offen- SlVe naval operations.
Amidst the battles over the fiscal year 1985 defense budget, the ongoing U. S. naval buildup has evoked considerable opposition. Commentators fleery the high cost of a 600-ship navy*. Plans to deploy 15 ^rrier battle groups and four Iowa-class battleships have ^een criticized. Large surface combatants are claimed to °e expensive as well as dangerously vulnerable to smart Munitions. Citing the Falklands Conflict as the most recent example of the deadly efficiency of smart weapons, s°me defense analysts suggest buying austere and less c°stly naval platforms, which can be procured in greater Ambers.
The opposition to naval shipbuilding has surfaced even ^>thin the Pentagon. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense aul Thayer reportedly argued that the Navy’s share of the defense Department’s budget for fiscal years 1985-89 ^as too large. As part of a dispute with Secretary of the ^avy John Lehman over the Navy’s shipbuilding program, Thayer, in several meetings of the Defense Resources Board in the fall of 1983, challenged the wisdom Procuring 15 carrier battle groups which, in addition to carriers, require expensive escort ships. To buttress his Position, Thayer and Under Secretary of Defense Richard Uelauer argued that the future of large ships is bleak, SWen the Soviet deployment of highly accurate antiship Missiles on bombers, submarines, and surface combat- ai«s. Although Secretary Lehman has been able to avoid nuval cuts in the fiscal year 1985 budget, the dispute over oefense priorities will be undoubtedly refueled in the outyears of the current five-year defense plan as the pressUre to reduce the budget deficit intensifies.
Budgetary considerations, important as they may be, should not obscure the crucial question in determining the
composition of our armed forces—whether the 600-ship navy, built around 15 carrier battle groups, is really needed. Indeed, the current expansion of U. S. naval power and the strategy enunciated by Secretary Lehman that provides its rationale are not castigated solely on budgetary grounds.
Many critics claim that waging offensive operations in Soviet home waters, as envisioned by new U. S. plans, is both reckless and unnecessary. Even Chief of Naval Operations James D. Watkins has expressed doubt as to the desirability of this “forward strategy.” The projected U. S. naval expansion and associated forward strategy seem to be opposed by an unlikely coalition of the Reagan Administration’s liberal critics, defense reformers, and certain elements within the Pentagon hierarchy.
Most of the critics, however, are heedless of the emerging revolutionary changes in Soviet naval posture that make Lehman’s strategy not only justified, but imperative Essentially, the Soviet Navy plans to expand the current role of its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in nuclear warfighting and alter naval operations to immunize its submarine force from Western attack. A close reading of Soviet military literature reveals that a debate on strategic nuclear issues has ensued for some time. It was triggered by two related developments: a budding U. S. determination to restore its nuclear strength and technological advancements that are transforming the existing strategic environment.
In the past U. S. actions and technological developments have shaped many Soviet force requirements.1 In the late 1960s, Soviet planners felt optimistic, despite the early U S lead in missile quality and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). They could foresee converting their vast advantage in throw-weight of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into large numbers of accurate warheads, thus placing at risk U. S. ICBMs, nonalert bombers, and SSBNs not on patrol. Since the United States decided in the early 1970s to forego deploying enough highly accurate warheads to threaten Soviet missiles in their silos, the Soviets were not unduly concerned about the survivability of their own forces. In a future crisis, the Soviet General Staff could foresee presenting the Politburo with a theoretically plausible option of victory through nuclear preemption.
However, recent Soviet writings suggest that this optimism has waned considerably. The shift in the Soviets’ threat assessment could affect their strategic forces and, in particular, the Soviet Navy. Soviet military leaders are acutely concerned about the prospect of thousands of U. S. cruise missiles, deployed on a variety of air, land,
and sea carriers; a new generation of accurate submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs—Trident-II); and a new penetrating bomber. They are alarmed about the deployment of MX missiles, the development of small mobile ICBMs, and the basing of Pershing-IIs in Europe. Against this diverse and geographically dispersed U. S. strategic posture, the former Soviet military option—to limit damage and win by striking first—appears much less credible.
As a result, the Soviets appear to assume that nuclear war, if it occurs, could be a protracted conflict, requiring strategic systems that can endure nuclear combat for some period of time. In response to this emerging strategic environment, the Soviet military will likely favor investing in mobile ICBMs, akin to the theater-based SS-20, and bolstering the long-range bomber force. In fact, the Soviets recently commenced testing a small, solid-fuel ICBM; and a new strategic bomber, “Blackjack,” is about to enter production. However, even mobile land-based missiles may not survive a protracted conflict, and the Soviets are unlikely to place all their hopes in a manned bomber. Therefore, they are reconsidering the strategic advantages of sea-based missiles and the role the Soviet Navy would have in offensive nuclear operations.
Ever since the Soviets deployed nuclear-armed missiles on submarines, the evolution of their operational concepts has not followed the path of U. S. strategic thought and sea-based nuclear forces. Immediately following World War II, the Soviet Navy exhibited an interest in the strategic strike role. In September 1955, the Soviets demonstrated an SLBM launch from a modified “Zulu”-class boat and deployed several of these platforms in 1958. The strong Soviet interest in developing a seaborne strategy strike force was largely attributable to a lack of other means of delivering nuclear weapons over intercontinenW distances. The Soviet Navy welcomed the strategic strike mission. Naval leaders knew that unless they could deni' onstrate convincingly the navy’s use in a nuclear environ' ment, its role and claim to resources would precipitously decline. As progress was made in the development 0 land-based missiles, Soviet interest in the naval strategy strike fell dramatically.
The Soviets decided to get the navy out of a strategic strike mission in 1959-60, coinciding with the formation the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. This halted the construction of the first generation of Soviet SSBNs, the HoteT’class, after only eight units were built. The primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the 1960s was to destroy U. S. naval assets—aircraft carriers and strategic [trssile submarines. From 1964 on, as the strategic role of S. carriers declined and the U. S. SSBN force grew, anti-SSBN operations were emphasized.
By 1967, the Soviets began deploying “Yankee”-class SSBNs armed with the SS-N-6 missile. This development led Western analysts to conclude that strategic strike was a§ain gaining in preeminence among Soviet naval mis- Sl°ns. Yet, numerous anomalies in the “Yankee” design ?uggest that, in wartime, it would have been used primar- "y to attack naval targets.
“The nuclear-powered ‘Yankee’ class has a high- Power, high-speed, relatively noisy dual-shaft/screw propulsion system—not really required for a submarine on a typical slow-moving, covert, deterrent patrol mission. The ‘Yankee,’ about 30% faster than our comparable SSBNs (at more than double the shaft horsepower), is probably fast enough to pace some of our earlier nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and our aircraft carriers. If the ‘Yankee’ is dedicated purely to a strategic strike role, this added power, whicji is very noisy and requires significantly greater amounts of scarce nuclear fuel, is a prime example of misapplied technology. Dedication to a tactical warfighting role, on the other hand, would call for high speed and probably the deliberate sacrifice of more silent operation.”2
The impression that the “Yankee” was not primarily designed to partake in offensive strategic operations was J'einforced by her operational patterns. As the “Yankee” ouildup commenced, we feared that the Soviet SSBNs stained off U. S. coasts could destroy the bulk of U. S. b°mber force and crucial command, control, communica- J'°ns, and intelligence assets in a surprise attack. Yet, S. intelligence later learned that the Soviets never deployed these submarines forward in sufficient numbers to Implement such an attack, and they had not tested their ‘H-BMs in a depressed trajectory mode, which would have Minimized U. S. warning time. Thus, the Soviet Navy’s e*pected contribution to strategic nuclear attacks against lbe U. S. homeland was minor.
Moreover, the extent to which the “Yankee” force was Cridowed with some residual land-attack capability was Primarily attributable to an unexpected failure of the ^S-13 ICBM program, which was to comprise the bulk of 'be Soviet land-based missile force.3 The resulting serious s'rategic shortfall prompted Moscow to reorient several Pr°grams, including the “Yankee” project.
By 1973, the Soviets succeeded in deploying their first long-range SLBM, the SS-N-8. Yet, the navy was still expected to function as a strategic reserve in a nuclear c°nflict, with the main bulk of offensive operations carried out by Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. In fact, the Soviets were highly confident that the massive deployment of their fourth-generation ICBMs (SS-17, -18, and -19) in hardened silos would provide them with a robust strategic posture. The recent abrupt change in Soviet threat assessment is about to bring another shift in Soviet naval priorities.
The Soviet Navy is being assigned a more ambitious role in nuclear war—primary participation in offensive nuclear operations. Hard-target-capable SLBMs and high- quality submarines will be entering the Soviet inventory in the next few years. Already, the first “Typhoon”-class boat, featuring a titanium double hull and carrying 20 MIRV SS-NX-20 SLBMs, has entered service with the Northern Fleet; a second is under construction. In addition, the Soviets are likely to retrofit their large “Delta” force with a new and more capable MIRVed SLBM. As the Soviets place more of their nuclear assets in submarines, guaranteeing their survival becomes a high-priority task. In contrast to the United States, the Soviets have never relied heavily on stealth and oceanic expanses to shield their submarines. Reviewing the experience of World War II, Soviet writers claim that the main reason the German U-boat campaign did not succeed was Germany’s failure to protect its own submarines.4 Instead of sending their own boats on far-reaching patrols similar to those of the German wolfpacks, the Soviets originally hoped to keep the submarines out of harm’s way by having them patrol in Soviet home waters (sanctuaries)—the Barents and Norwegian seas on the Atlantic side and the Sea of Okhotsk on the Pacific—away from Western ASW forces. The Soviets also have always envisioned that their sanctuary-based SSBNs would be protected by a portion of their general-purpose naval and land-based air forces. However, the realization of the growing importance of naval strategic assets and concern about the budding U. S. determination to wage offensive operations in Soviet home waters have prompted Soviet military planners to opt for an even more rigorous and systematic pro-SSBN
strategy. . , , .
The force array consisting of general-purpose naval forces (nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, surface escorts, nuclear attack submarines, and nuclear-powered guided missile submarines) would provide the Soviets with a multilayered and synergistic defense for the SSBNs. The undersea defense aspect will be reinforced by Soviet attack submarines and a range of underwater surveillance devices On the surface, Soviet ships will conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations against U. S. attack submarines and engage vessels attempting to penetrate the bastions. In the future, surface vessels will be provided cover by high-performance aircraft from Soviet carriers, very likely operating as the core of a carrier task force. Carrier-based aviation will also attack U. S. ASW aircraft. From the Soviet mainland, long-range aviation will extend an air umbrella for surface naval assets. A portion of the northern ice pack probably will supplement air cover for SSBN protection as well.
The trends in Soviet naval construction enable the Soviets to create a versatile naval mix. In the last several years, the Soviets concentrated on qualitative improvement of naval vessels, building up their endurance and increasing
If U. S. forces try to penetrate the SSBN bastions, they will first have to take on Udaloys conducting ASW operations and Sovremennyys, opposite page, in the ASUW role. The Soviets will protect their destroyers with aircraft from land bases and carriers, such as the Soviets’ newest Kie\-class Novorossiysk, above.
the number of weapons per hull. Another salient feature of such new Soviet warships as the AT/rov-class cruiser and both the Udaloy-class and Sovremennyy-dass destroyers is the renewed emphasis on antisurface warfare (ASUW). Instead of their earlier undifferentiated platforms, the Soviets are investing in more specialized ships, which can operate together as a task force in the bastions. Of the two new classes of Soviet destroyers, one of them, the Udaloy, functions as a close-in air-defense and ASW platform. The other, the Sovremennyy, is optimized for ASUW and medium-range air defense. The Kirov is well suited to operate in a picket duty for the Soviet carrier battle group and can provide long-range air-defense and ASUW functions.
Adoption of the SSBN sanctuary strategy would not weaken the Soviet interest in acquiring large-deck carriers. In fact, since the 1970s, the Soviet writings about carriers have become much more positive.5 This departs from the earlier critical stance on the use of carriers in wartime strategic operations. Soviet naval leaders do not wish to forego an additional means of providing high- quality air defense for the sanctuaries, especially since land-based assets, including the naval aviation bases, would be destroyed in a protracted nuclear conflict. According to the testimony of Rear Admiral Butts, Director of Naval Intelligence, the Soviets are building a 50,00060,000-ton carrier, which would be capable of high-performance aircraft operations. Potential candidates for the Soviet carrier air wing include modified Su-24 “Fencers” or MiG-27 “Floggers.”6 This would represent a quantum’ improvement over the current /f/cv-class carriers, which carry less capable vertical takeoff and landing aircraft-
In peacetime, a potential Soviet carrier task force offefS a unique opportunity to bolster Soviet ability to influence the outcome of regional crises. Thus, the Soviets woul probably operate one or two of their future carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean, Northwestern Pacific, or At' lantic. Yet, if a superpower confrontation occurs while a Soviet carrier task force is forward based, it will likely be recalled. Given the emphasis on the pro-SSBN mission- Soviet naval commanders would be reluctant to risk losing a carrier in distant waters. In fact, in a crisis, the recall °f a Soviet carrier task force to a bastion may provide us with some strategic warning of how serious the Soviets consider a particular situation.
By concentrating on SSBN defense, the Soviet ability t° attack Western sea lines of communication would decline- This mission was never highlighted in Soviet writings as a crucial one in the context of a general war. This is not surprising, since the Soviets believe that the outcome ot the European land battle probably would be decided long before the arrival of sizable U. S. reinforcements. More' over, the Soviets would also try to impede the flow 0 U. S. reinforcements by attacking ports and disembarka' tion facilities. Although the Soviet submarine threat to Western sea lines of communication would not disappear’ a much smaller number of Soviet attack boats and cruise missile-carrying submarines would be assigned this mis" sion. A larger share of the Soviet undersea fleet would be deployed in the sanctuaries, providing an additional layer of protection for the SSBNs.
Included in the SSBN bastion strategy is the need to seize and control portions of Norwegian and Japanese tef' ritory or at least deny their use to U. S. forces. Recent
COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD
Soviet activities seem to validate this theory. According to ae Swedish commission formed to investigate numerous 0viet submarine incursions into Swedish territorial wafers, “The main impression ... is that the submarine activities represent preparatory phases in military opera- tl0nal planning.” The Swedes believe that, in wartime, °viet submarines would be used to land Soviet commando troops, who would attack and destroy key Swedish jmiitary facilities. Similar patterns of Soviet activities I1,ave been observed in Norwegian territorial waters. The evel of submarine incidents was dramatically intensified ln the past two years, notwithstanding heavy political e°sts the Soviets must pay.7 The introduction of U. S. Metical air assets into Norway and Japan would severely c°niplicate the sanctuary defense. From bases in these two c°untries, U. S. forces could strip away Soviet naval and air cover for the bastions 4
. The impending shift of Soviet naval resources to protec- t'on of Soviet SSBNs has fostered an unusually acrimoni- °Us debate between Admiral K. Stalbo, close associate a°d frequent spokesman for Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, and the second in ^onimand, Chief of the Main Naval Staff Admiral V. N. ^nernavin.8 Admiral Gorshkov believes that the Soviet Navy should be tasked with both contributing to the strate- &lc attack mission and defending the Soviet Union against enemy’s sea-based forces. At the same time, according to Gorshkov, the navy cannot afford to relinquish its more traditional roles of sea lines of communication interdic- tl0r>, power projection, and peacetime presence.
No Soviet naval writer is likely to disagree that it would Pp desirable if all these missions could be accomplished.
he real question, however, is whether this is feasible, antT if not, how to prioritize these missions. Gorshkov has avoided the difficult issue of mission tradeoffs by develop- lng certain favorable operational assumptions. First, he assurnes that naval warfare would be intense and short. Second and most critical, he assumes that victory could be achieved by a surprise nuclear strike even though one’s °verall naval assets might be inferior to those of the enemy. The battle for the first salvo implies that massing °f forces and combined operations are actually CounterProductive because of time delays.
During the 1960s, the Soviets believed that given the tremendous destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, CVen a single platform armed with nuclear-tipped missiles c°uld severely damage the enemy’s fleet. By the mid- *970s, they believed a massing of firepower from numer- °Us widely dispersed platforms was necessary to over- c°nie the enemy’s defenses. Yet, the concept of strike warfare as the preferred method of naval combat, the conviction that any conflict at sea would be short, and the de-emphasis of combined operations still remained.9 The current debate revolves largely around these operational assumptions by Gorshkov.
Several writers, including Admiral Chemavin, have criticized the current state of Soviet naval affairs and noted that deficiencies in naval thought have created serious practical problems. Chemavin argued that massing of forces, as opposed to solely massing firepower, is essential and that combined operations remain important even in a nuclear age. The debate about operational assumptions underlying Soviet naval tactics has important ramifications for Soviet mission priorities. If the massing of forces and combined actions of diverse naval assets are essential for success in a naval engagement, the Soviets, even with heavy investment in shipbuilding, cannot hope to field enough platforms to overwhelm Western navies on the high seas. The best future Soviet task forces can aspire to establish is a “favorable operational regime” in the adjacent seas, which comprise the SSBN bastions.
In addition to alleging that Gorshkov’s operational assumptions are of dubious value, Stalbo s critics claimed that he had underestimated the role of overall Soviet military science in shaping the development of naval theory, shipbuilding, and operations. To emphasize this point, one of Stalbo’s most virulent critics, Captain First Rank V. Schlomin, claimed that in the past the lack of reliable communications and the semiautonomous nature of naval operations led to a somewhat independent role for the navy In his opinion, the future calls for an ever-growing integration and coordination of all branches of armed forces including the navy. The clear implication of this view is the need for the Soviet Navy to conform to overall Soviet military climates, even if it interferes with the more traditional and attractive naval role of operating on the high seas. Although the debate was officially closed by Gorshkov, who wrote an article purporting to summarize the results of the discussion carried out in the pages of Morskoy Sbornik for more than two years, his contribution failed to address any of the specific operational issues raised in the course of the debate. An overall impression generated by Gorshkov’s article is one of indecisive truce.
Recent Soviet naval writings were also noticeably less exuberant in describing the global operations of the Soviet Navy. It is significant that Chemavin was promoted to the Chief of Main Naval Staff in November 1982—several months after he launched an attack on Gorshkov.10 Cher- navin has also been receiving an unusual amount of publicity in the Soviet press and recently received the second highest naval rank—Admiral of the Fleet. Given the importance the Soviets attach to maintaining a robust nuclear warfighting posture, Gorshkov, who prefers to place lesser emphasis on pro-SSBN operations, is likely to follow the fate of former Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, who was fired by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 for failing to conform to overall Soviet military requirements.
The implications of this shift in Soviet naval priorities are significant. The formation of Soviet submarine sanctu-
aries makes U. S. offensive naval operations in Soviet home waters imperative. In the event of general war, the United States cannot allow a large portion of Soviet strategic forces to enjoy immunity from attack. Moreover, in nongeneral war scenarios, by peeling away SSBN defenses, the United States can exert strong counterescalatory pressure on Soviet decision makers. In a theater conflict, if the Soviet SSBN covering forces have been degraded, but the SSBNs themselves are left unharmed, the Soviets would be presented with the unattractive dilemma of either beginning a general war with a critical component of their forces exposed, or immediately escalating to an all-out nuclear exchange—an action certain to invite U. S. retribution in kind. The realization of this unpalatable choice may provide a powerful incentive to negotiate a termination of hostilities.
Yet, are such ASW operations feasible? It has been argued that attempts to inject U. S. naval forces in heavily defended Soviet home waters would be a dangerous folly. However, contrary to numerous “critiques” by defense pundits, the U. S. Navy does not intend to “take out Petropavlovsk and the Kola Peninsula single-handedly- An attack on these key targets would most likely be under' taken in the context of a general war. In this case, Soviet military forces, including naval aviation, would probably be degraded by ICBM strikes. The U. S. Navy might be called to engage the Soviet SSBN covering force in a re' gional crisis that has not yet escalated to a nuclear exchange. This scenario would be the most challenging, be' cause the U. S. Navy would have to operate against Sovjet forces in a non-nuclear environment and with Sovie shore-based assets intact.
But even in a general war situation in which the “Back' fire” bases and other Soviet land-based assets have beeI1
atWted by ICBM and bomber attacks, the sanctuaries 'J'ould still be defended by a panoply of naval forces. Al- b°ugh Soviet ASW capabilities continue to lag behind n°se of the United States, significant Soviet break- roughs in ASW could be made at any time. Thus, al- "0ugh U. S. Los-Angeles-class attack submarines may c°nceivably operate by themselves in Soviet home waters today, their future ability to penetrate the sanctuaries un- jMk listed is uncertain. The Soviets will likely field a formid- ; able array of acoustic and nonacoustic detection devices ! around the choke points to detect and engage U. S. attack | Submarines as soon as they enter the sanctuaries. In addi- P b°n, the Soviet SSBNs will likely patrol together with Soviet attack submarines and can request assistance from jjto Soviet surface forces. The U. S. ASW task would be Urther complicated by the need to acquire, track, and disseminate among a variety of moving targets, some r'endly and some hostile. *
The current NATO ASW strategy depends on stationary Meeting barriers, which Soviet submarines must transit to §ain access to the open sea. The ASW campaign in the ^SBN bastions would require a different approach. To farry out successful ASW against Soviet SSBNs, the correlation of forces” within the sanctuaries would have to be altered in favor of the United States. First, we would aave to destroy the Soviet carriers. Next, we would attack Jhe remaining Soviet surface warships. These tasks might b£ accomplished partially by long-range aircraft (B-52/ .IB) carrying suitable standoff weapons. If we succeed ln maintaining sustained air operations from Norway and topan, tactical planes carrying gravity bombs, modified harpoons, and antisubmarine munitions could comple- toent the operation of long-range aircraft. In fact, it is essential that the Soviet sanctuary defense be adequately jtoftened before the U. S. strike fleet makes its threat. However, despite the assistance from long-range land- based aircraft and tactical air squadrons, the U. S. Navy '''mild still require carrier-based assets to conduct the air battle over the sanctuaries. For this reason, the U. S. Navy needs more carrier task groups, featuring high-quality at- tock and electronic warfare aircraft, and an increased number of attack submarines. To enhance the offensive punch U. S. carrier battle groups, we might consider attaching an fovva-class battleship to a strike fleet.
feedings / April 1984
Those critics who allege that naval shipbuilding is costly are right. They are dead wrong, however, in asserting that the projected 600-ship navy and the Lehman strategy are infeasible and unnecessary. If the United States is to maintain credible deterrence, it must account for changes in Soviet strategic doctrine in the course of U. S. defense planning. *        
■See Robert P Berman and John C. Baker. Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982).
“ctl H Cbwson, Jr., •'The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs-Round Two,” Proceedings, March 1980, p. 68.
’Berman, pp. 120-121.
"Sereei Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State (New York: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1979), p. 118; Sergei Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Tncfitutp Press 1974), pp. 100-103.
See, for example, Sergei Gorshkov, “American Aircraft Carriers-Weapon of Expansionism,” Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 October 1983.
See T. J. McKeamey, "Their Carrier Battle Group, Proceedings, December
’See Walter^Mossberg, “Sweden Says It Believes That Soviet Sub Visits Reflect War Planning ” Wall Street Journal, 23 June 1983.
«Th- visible part of the current debate goes back to Spring 1981 when Admiral K. Stalbo, who is viewed as Gorshkov’s spokesman, published a two-part article in Ihe Apri 1-May issues of Morskoy Shornik entitled, “Certain Questions on the Theory of Development and Utilization of the Fleet." For critical responses, see C. Kos- tev, “On the Foundation of Naval Theory," Morskoy Shorn,k .November 1981; V. Chemavin “On Naval Theory,” Morskoy Sbormk, January 1982; 1. Kapitanents, “L nks ofa Chain " Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 March 1982; B. Makeyev, “Some Views on the Theory of Naval Armaments,” Morskoy Shornik. April 1982. V. Ponikarovskiy. "On Theory of Control and History of die Fleets m Naval Art Morskoy Shornik, March 1983; V. Seldom,n "Milnary Science and the Navy Morskoy Shornik, April 1983; Sergei Gorshkov, Questions of Naval Theory. Morskoy Shornik. July 1983. The harshest criticism of Stalbo, who is accused o committing “ideological errors,” a far worse sin than making a mere professional mistake if contained in V. Gulin and Yu Borisov, “Concerning Methodological Problems of the Theory of Combat Application and Structure of the Navy,”
Morskoy Shornik, July 1982. .
For an excellent overview of an earlier Soviet debate concerning the concepts of massing combined action, and engagement, see Charles C. Peterson, Soviet Tacticsfor Warfare at Sea: Two Decades of Upheaval, CNA Professional Paper, N367,
'“See'mfber^Suggs, “The Soviet Navy: Changing of the Guard?” Proceedings, April 1983, pp. 36-^2.
Mr Rivkin is a research associate specializing in Soviet politico-military affairs at Leon Sloss Associates, Inc., a Washington, D.C., defense consulting firm. Prior to this, he was a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, American Enterprise Institute, and Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. He received his BS degree from Georgetown School of Foreign Service and his MS in Soviet affairs from Georgetown University. Mr. Rivkin is currently a law degree candidate at Columbia University School of Law, New York. He has published articles and book reviews in the Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, Comparative Strategy, Military Review, Parameters, and The New York Times.