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bility that could yield fruitful results. Consider an FFG-7 squadron on a mission with a nuclear-powered attack submarine. Such a mission would be worked out for a limited time frame and a specific geographic locale as a consequence of the FFG-7 being a limited-range conventionally fueled vessel. A possible submarine- FFG-7 squadron mission would be an attack on an enemy convoy. Prior to the main attack, the squadron could maintain a covering fire. This cover would assist the submarine in her maneuvers and tactics to execute an attack pattern with a minimum of interference. During and after the attack, the squadron and the submarine could render mutual protection such that the probability of both the submarine and the squadron escaping unscathed from the field of combat would be greater than the probability would be if they were operating independently of each other.
A frigate squadron could also serve in association with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Possibly, in this case, a full division of frigates would be more suitable. For long-duration patrols, provisions would have to be made for refueling at sea. The frigates could provide a widespread network of antisubmarine and antiaircraft capability, so that the carrier could concentrate more of her attention and resources on her primary objective of projecting strategic air power onto the enemy’s fleet and territory. If it is not desired to use the FFG-7 squadron with the carrier over an extended period of time, then the refueling capability can be eliminated and the division-carrier combination can be used for a specific limited duration mission.
An intriguing concept is to use the FFG-7s as a strategic strike force in the same sense as land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers. An FFG-7 flotilla equipped with nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles could launch a devastating attack against the military installations and cities along an enemy coast and deep into that territory. This option would put both a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and a nuclear-powered attack submarine in supporting role for the frigate strike force by providing a protective umbrella.
It is thus seen that by using the FFG-7s under the fundamental organization of strategic principles and by the application of appropriate and innovative tactics, this class of vessel should occupy an important role in the defense structure of the United States for the remainder of the 20th century and into the early years of the next century.
Dr. Friedman earned his Ph.D. in physics at Syracuse University in New York. Currently, he works at the David W Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center in Annapolis, Maryland.
Battle Frigate
By Captain Robert C. Powers, U. S. Navy
Is the Oliver Hazard Perry a capable ship? Potentially, yes. With LAMPS and a towed passive array, she is a very useful multipurpose ship that nicely complements the capabilities of the Knox (FF- 1052)-class frigate. Together, the two make a “battle group-capable” ship that has the advantage of being able to be in two places at once.
Is the Oliver Hazard Perry a good ship? Yes, she is proving to be a reliable ship with good speed and flexibility from her gas turbine engines. The Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class has no more problems than any other new class of ships. She is a seaworthy ship; but stabilizer fins would improve her LAMPS helicopter capability greatly.
How is she best used as she exists right now?
► Asa missile “shotgun” for an aircraft carrier or battleship
► Asa missile “shotgun” for a non-missile passive towed array sonar ship ► As a local antiair ship in a close-in antisubmarine screen
► As a primary, Harpoon-firing unit in a surface attack group
► As a means to “herd” a submarine into a passive sonar trap using active sonar (since the Oliver Hazard Perry- class frigate currently has no passive sonar capability)
► As an antisubmarine assist ship to a Knox-class frigate (high-powered sonar and passive sonar), using the higher frequency sonar of the Oliver Hazard Perry class for classification and close-in holddown tactics
► As a primary LAMPS helicopter platform for antisubmarine operations and antisurface over-the-horizon targeting
► As an antiair picket ship However, frigates need the protection
and support of the aircraft carrier. Now there’s a twist! Since frigates are less capable and less redundant than destroyers, they need to operate under the umbrella of the carrier’s air superiority, and to have the advantage of repair support available from the carrier and parts support available via the carrier’s flight deck. Neither the Knox class nor the Oliver Hazard Perry class alone would be enough escort strength for the battle group. But together, they are a matched pair, and the carrier needs their capabilities. Together, you have two screws, a large and small sonar, a medium and a small caliber gun, four sets of torpedo tubes, an ASROC missile system, a basic point defense Sea Sparrow missile system, a Standard missile system, a Phalanx close-in weapon system, and space for three helicopters. Both ships are designated to receive passive towed array sonar systems. Three pairs of these ships, plus one or two guided missile cruisers for long-range antiair missilery, would make a formidable battle group escort.
If employed in this manner, the frigates become “battle frigates.” An official declaration along these lines reversing existing policy makes sense when one then considers what can be done with the destroyers that are freed from battle group escort duty.
Destroyers should operate in squadrons that take the offensive against the enemy. independent of carriers and their cruiser/ frigate escorts. There are many reasons for doing this. First, the U. S. Navy has an insufficient number of offensively capable ship groups that are organized and trained to fight together. (Today, only the 12 carrier battle groups fit that description.)
Second, destroyers were originally designed to be operated in squadrons to provide an offensive capability independent of the “heavies” that could strike rapidly on the flanks of enemy groups, and later to carry out independent offen-
sive actions against submarines. The original destroyer squadron weapon was the coordinated torpedo attack. The modern equivalent of that, requiring the same degree of team training and coordination, is the coordinated Harpoon strike (later to include the longer-range Tomahawk cruise missile strike).
Third, with the many new systems being introduced for antisubmarine warfare (high-powered sonars, passive towed array, LAMPS-III), a destroyer squadron, operating as a team with a maritime Patrol squadron, can achieve or exceed the effectiveness of the antisubmarine Warfare support aircraft carrier-centered, hunter-killer group as it was constituted in the 1960s and early 1970s. Operating such a group offensively, independent but in support of carrier and battleship groups, would get us out of the “circle of wagons” mentality and back to true offensive maneuver operations.
Fourth, the missions of the U. S. Navy are changing toward offensive strikes against land targets. Sea control is becoming a means to that end, and less an end in itself. The F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft for carriers and the Tomahawk land attack missile are both indicators of that change in direction. Soon, the primary ship class that will mount the Tomahawk missile is the destroyer-type ship (the Spruance [DD-963] class backfitted for Tomahawk, and the new Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] class). Cruisers, such as the Virginia (CGN-38) and Ticonderoga (CG-47) classes, will also mount Tomahawks, as will the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships. While the cruisers will operate with the carrier groups and battleship groups, squadrons of destroyers packing Tomahawk land attack missiles and operating independently will provide the U. S. Navy with an increased number of ship groups that are offensively capable and are organized and trained to fight together.
Picture a combatant surface ship navy organized as follows:
► Fifteen aircraft carrier battle groups, each escorted by three /fnax-class frigates, three Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, and one or two antiaircraft cruisers (including the new, highly capable 77- conderoga-class cruiser with Aegis weapon system)
► Four battleship groups, each escorted by three or four destroyers or guided missile destroyers, an antiaircraft cruiser, and a new amphibious assault ship of the LHD-1 class in the sea control role for providing airborne surveillance, targeting, and some light fighter support to the battleship
► Fifteen attack destroyer squadrons,
each consisting of five to six destroyers (Of those destroyers, at least one should be a guided missile destroyer for antiaircraft protection. Initially, the others would be Spruance-class destroyers with the Tomahawk weapon, and later the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with the Tomahawk weapon would phase in. Of course, the Arleigh Burke class will have a significant antiaircraft capability itself with its Aegis system. For some operations requiring additional antiaircraft support, a cruiser could operate with this force. Such destroyer squadrons would be able to conduct independent attack, antisubmarine, and antisurface naval operations.)
Thirty-four offensively capable groups form a much sounder base for naval strategy than 15. Such a strategy also provides for different types of groups, such
that the high-value groups can be withheld when it makes sense to do so, without giving up the offensive.
It is time that we break away from the “carrier group only” mentality and realize that diverse offense is the way to go.
So let the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates do what they were designed to do—escort. Assign them to escort duty, along with Knox-class frigates, for aircraft carriers (and, when appropriate, for
amphibious groups, logistic groups, and convoys). Form “escort squadrons” made up of frigates that train and work together to do this job.
The mission of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate is clear. This ship is a fine escort—a “battle frigate.” Defining her officially as such may serve as the necessary catalyst to free destroyers and destroyer squadrons to become the means for a much-needed diversified offense.
Captain Powers, who has earned degrees from the U. S. Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, George Washington University, and Catholic University, is currently the commanding officer of Destroyer Squadron 17 in San Diego, California. His essay, “The Return of Tactical Thought” (published in the June 1983 Proceedings), won First Honorable Mention in the U. S. Naval Institute’s 1982 General Prize Essay Contest.
I
One plus one equals one: an Oliver Hazard Perry frigate plus a Knox- class frigate gives the Navy one “battle frigate.” Forming escort squadrons of such tactical teams would free our destroyers for offensive missions.