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Lieutenant Smith has just received her fitness report—the last one before lng considered by the lieutenant com- ander selection board. She is pleased 'th the report, especially the narrative Portion which is positive. But should she Pleased? Probably not. Navy research °ws that the narrative portion of her Port is probably shorter, is not as rr°ngly worded, and lacks the kind of commendations she needs for promo- °n when competing with male officers.
n late 1980, the passage of the Dense Personnel Management Act th resulted in a major change in
e promotion selection process for °men officers. Previously, women ttpeted only among themselves for Promotion, with a few exceptions. Under CIPMA, all separate selection proce- tres were eliminated, and women began s° be considered for promotion by the laT boards as male officers. While the t 'v s stated purpose was to equalize the cement of female and male officers, aPMA did not remove the restriction 8amst assigning women to ships and air- ^. with a combat mission. Therefore, lr> the past, women’s career paths, es- dally in the line communities, would be the same as men’s. This caused ^ at concern because it was believed that career differences would make it Uch more difficult for women to comte successfully.
m order to alleviate the concern, sev- ai measures were undertaken to safe- ^ard equal promotion opportunities for tj men- Currently, instructions to selec- boards indicate that in evaluating t|j rrien’s records, emphasis is placed on rat/r actual performance in assignments ^ er than on their pattern of assign- f0nts as compared to male officers. In- the^ation is also provided to boards on tio Spec*Lic impact of the legal restric- (;ons °n career paths for women. In addi- a general unrestricted line (110X) lj ’Cer> usually a woman, sits on most e selection boards. As a result of these
actions, selection rates for women considered by post-DOPMA boards generally have been comparable to male selection rates.
While women have achieved general parity in selection so far, they are also apprehensive that in the future the pressure to keep women’s selection rates equitable will decline, resulting in fewer promotions for women. Some of the fear is because of the career pattern differences, but it also stems from a perception that women’s fitness reports are written differently than men’s and that these differences could have an adverse effect on selection rates.
The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) undertook a study to determine whether the narrative portion of men’s and women’s fitness reports differ and, if they do, what impact they could have on selection board decisions.1 The researchers analyzed the narrative portion of the fitness reports of 120 women officers and 119 male officers. All were unrestricted line lieutenants being considered by the fiscal year 1982 lieutenant commander selection board.
The study showed that fitness report write-ups for men and women differed substantially. Men’s narratives contained more information than women’s; women’s reports used 15 descriptive words or phrases, compared to 20 for men. Men
Even though Captain Wylie, far right, recently relieved Captain Miniter, far left, as Commander, Military Sealift Command, Atlantic Area, the chances are that these officers’ fitreps read much differently because one is a male and the other isn’t.
u. S. maw ir.Hi mu i At
pseudo-fitness report narratives-
ant
was‘
good “team leader.” Also, the e dynab1^
im-
tha11
bright, personable, and (Smith’s). Finally, Brown’s report
itk
r°v^' hal°.
WordsIPhrases Used About Men
► Carries out duties effectively
► Handles job with skill and technical know-how
► Directs subordinates
► Provides information on EO
► A true leader
► Displays common sense
► Physically fit
► Dynamic
► Forceful
► Assertive
► Aggressive
► Mature
► Reliable
► Logical
► Motivated
► Perceptive
► Self-starter had significantly more information in their reports about anticipated performance in combat and the impact of their effort on their command. The lack of comment on combat potential in women’s reports is understandable, given current legal restrictions. The paucity of comments on the impact women officers have on the command may be a function of the jobs they hold; women’s duties tend to be more general and administrative compared to the more specific, technical duties of male warfare officers. In addition, a greater number of recommendations were made in men’s narratives than women’s, especially concerning command and specific assignments. The lesser number of recommendations for women probably reflects poor knowledge of women line officer career patterns by those preparing the reports.
The study also revealed differences in the words used to evaluate male and female officers. Men’s fitness reports were more action-oriented and specific. Men were more likely to be described as competent and knowledgeable in the performance of their jobs, the report using phrases such as “carries out duties effectively” and “handles jobs with skill and technical know-how.” A woman’s repprt often indicated that she had dealt with most situations “with the utmost of tact and professionalism.”
A direct, positive impact on the officer’s command, especially in the areas of unit readiness, material facilities, and safety was more likely to be attributed to a male officer than to a female. A male officer’s report might state that he “took the initiative to upgrade the working environment of the division” and “as a result of his hard work, the command’s standing and readiness improved consid
Words/Phrases Used About Women
► Gets job done in timely manner
► Instrumental in aiding division efforts
► Has positive impact on unit
► Supports EO
► Good manager/administrator
► Displays concern
► Well-groomed
► Receptive
► Bright
► Valuable asset
► Personable
► Outgoing
► Sociable
► Tactful
► Impeccable appearance
► Articulate manner
erably.” A woman’s reports tended to highlight aspects of performance which might be considered less important (“She gets the job done in a timely manner”), and actions were portrayed in a manner which reflected less of a direct impact and specific result (“She has been instrumental in aiding the division’s efforts”).
In the area of relations with others, men were depicted in a more active manner than women. Men were instructive and achieved specific results (“Always sensitive to the needs of others, he provided information necessary to teach others about opportunities available in the Navy and to direct them towards higher productivity”). Women, on the other hand, were described as “truly receptive to others, displaying a genuine concern for their welfare.”
Regarding other variables important to the Navy, significantly more male officers than female were credited with displaying Navy characteristics (“well- suited in character and temperament to naval life”), having a supportive spouse, and keeping physically fit. Significantly more women than men were described as supporting equal opportunity principles, being well-groomed, and being a valuable asset to the command. In terms of personality traits, men were characterized as dynamic, aggressive, mature, reliable, logical, and displaying common sense; women were bright, personable, outgoing, sociable, and tactful. Men’s descriptors were “active/competitive” in nature, while women’s were “thinking/ feeling.”
Finally, leadership skills were mentioned more frequently in men’s narratives than in women’s. A man’s report was more likely to include a comment that “Under his leadership and direction the division showed a notable improvement in the condition of material facil1' ties.” On the other hand, women’s man agement/administrative skills were mentioned more frequently, but not sig nificantly so.
The researchers did not think the com ments appearing in women’s fitness m ports were necessarily evidence of biaS on the part of those preparing the reports- Instead, the researchers stated that:
“It appears that male evaluators think of women as coming from a trao tional mold and have difficulty vie"" ing them in active, competitive rotes- They use ‘generic, canned’ adjectives and phrases, as one officer describe^ the comments on the woman ^ FitRep, because they are not sure what to say. While such words woU , be written to damn male officers wl faint praise, it is believed that no ma ice toward female officers is in tended.”2
Given that the narratives of men’s and women’s fitness reports are different, this going to have an impact on whom promotion board selects for advance ment? The NPRDC study indicated that ^
could. The researchers developed 1
-one typifying a female officer (Lieuten'^ Smith) and the other a male officer (Lie tenant Brown), without using any Pr nouns denoting gender. These narratt were given to a group of lieutenant co manders and above attending a ProSP. e
tive commanding officer/prospec ^ executive officer course and to students the Naval Postgraduate School to detc^ mine whether one narrative eI1hanC^c promotional opportunities more than other. The results showed that 87 ^ these experienced officers would h selected Brown, whose narrative usedaellt male descriptors. Some of the cog comments from those evaluating the ^ ness reports pointed out that Smith good “team player,” while Brown mature, aggressive, and (Brown’s) were cited as being more portant in leadership positions ' ^
oUtg dc"
scribed an apparent push to get ^ done, while the information on Smb riot suggest personal effort for imp1 ment; Smith’s success might be a h--. of subordinate personnel doing a ^v, job. Smith’s report was also cited as . ing left out the specifics of “how a J was done” and the results. As the r points out, “The most frequently c reasons for judging the male’s naira
to
make no difference in the selection
superior to the female’s was the presence . Phrases describing the impact of individual effort on the command and of spe- c'fic recommendations. ”3 „ One last question NPRDC studied was, a woman’s fitness report were written Using male descriptors, would it in fact J'Jhance her chances for promotion”?4 he question arises because some research on civilian women has shown that hs'ng male descriptors for women can be e°unterproductive. To determine if n°wing the gender of the officer being Shaded made a difference, the researchers Prepared two sets of the pseudo-fitness rePorts. In one set, the male active/com- Petitive descriptors were used with male Pronouns while the thinking/feeling female descriptors were used with female Pronouns. In the second set, the situation "'as reversed: male descriptors were used 'Vlth female pronouns and female deScriptors with male pronouns. The fitness rePorts were given to two groups of offiCers to evaluate, with each group review- jhg one of the two sets. Gender appeared
Process. The officers overwhelmingly Elected the officer with the male descriptors, regardless of the pronouns used. The male descriptors did increase a woman’s chance for selection.
In the view of the researchers, “Officers were selected on the basis of specific information provided in the fitness report narrative about the individual’s abilities and accomplishments” and, therefore, “Officers are rewarded, regardless of their gender, for doing their jobs exceptionally well.”5 Thus, the study concluded: “It is clear that action verbs describing specific accomplishments, recommendations for increased responsibility, and statements of leadership abilities have more strength in a narrative than general (though strongly positive) statements of unspecified praise.”6
To enhance a woman officer’s chances for promotion, her fitness report should be written in the same manner as a man’s. It should:
► Be action-oriented and specific
► Link effort with results
► Indicate direct, positive impact on command
► Describe characteristics which are considered an asset by the Navy
► Make recommendations with regard to promotion, command, and to specific assignments.
'Patricia J. Thomas, Brenda L. Holmes, and Laura L. Carroll, Gender Differences in the Evaluations of Narratives in Officer Performance Ratings, NPRDC TR 83-14 (San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1983).
2Ibid., p. 14.
3Ibid., p. 13.
4Patricia M. Spishock and Carmen C. Scheifers, The Effects of Performance Evaluation Narratives on the Promotion of Male and Female Unrestricted Line (URL) Officers, NPRDC Technical Note 83-6 (San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1983).
5Ibid., p. 5.
6Ibid., p. 6.
Captain Sadler was graduated from Drury College in 1962. She also holds an M.P.A. in foreign policy formulation from the University of Washington. As a junior officer, she served in a variety of administrative billets. She specialized in joint intelligence and politico-military planning with assignments to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Staff. She was assigned as Head, Women’s Program Section in OpNav. She was graduated from the Command and Staff Course, Naval War College Off-Campus Program, and from the National War College. She is currently assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. She is the author of “Women in the Sea Services, 1972-1982” which was published in the May 1983 Proceedings.
The ABCs of Montijo
y Commander Ralph Oman, U. S. Naval Reserve
*1,
f,elds
e the P-3s to fly out of countless air-
f'ght or ten fully supported overseas
b:
The Advanced Base Capability (ABC) pOgram is intended to enable Navy pa- or°l aircraft (P-3 Orion subhunters) to fly Irrational missions from remote air- elds for short periods of time. These air- rids would have at least 7,000 feet of nway, a water supply, and fuel, but aey would not necessarily have berthing J forking spaces or messing facilities. 0r would they have stockpiles of sup- les, equipment, or weapons.
Tirst, the ABC program would permit e dispersal and thereby ensure the sur- Qlvability of the P-3 aircraft and its weap- ns in case of major attack; second, it °uld give greater flexibility to the P-3 in frying out its many tactical missions, "ts dual objective explains why the De- ,ehse Nuclear Agency and the Navy have .°'ntly funded the project. When it is .Implemented, the ABC program will en- all over the globe, in addition to the 'ases now in use. This added mobility jjfi give the P-3 forces the versatility for ttyard power projection that character- ,e the aircraft carrier and that formerly ‘Jfacterized the seaplane/tender team. n operations out of Montijo, Portugal, during Exercise Ocean Safari ’83, several Naval Reserve P-3 squadrons tested the feasibility of the ABC concept.
When Captain Earl R. Riffle, Commander Reserve Patrol Wing Atlantic, landed at Portuguese Air Base #6 at Montijo and taxied to the NATO side of the field, he found tall grass and empty buildings. Four days later, he and his staff were running an around-the-clock antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operation with seven P-3s. As an integral part of Ocean Safari ’83, the largest NATO naval exercise since the Falldands Conflict, the patrol wing provided maintenance, ground transportation, fuel, briefing and debriefing services, communications, and administrative support. They also set up berthing and messing for more than 200 men.
Ocean Safari showed that NATO could defend the North Atlantic sea-lanes, and it proved once again that the Naval Reserve P-3 force could fulfill its mobilization role—to deploy to an unsupported remote site, launch operational sorties within 72 hours, and find and track submarines. The Montijo operation also underscored the importance of implementing the ABC program.
Even though the decision to use Montijo, rather than Rota, Spain, or the Azores was not made until three weeks before the exercise was scheduled to begin, a great deal of advance planning had taken place in anticipation of that possibility. At Captain Riffle’s request, his reserve augment staff (RPWL-0165) studied the Ocean Safari operation order and briefed him on its contents. After the brief, the augment staff conducted a two- day war game based on the operations order. The game simulated the anticipated pace of operations and helped the patrol wing determine the number of flight crews and aircraft it would need to perform its mission. At this preliminary stage, the wing also identified personnel and material support needs and noted some of the likely problem areas if the order came to go to Montijo.
Upon receipt of the order to go to Montijo, Riffle dispatched a survey team to the base, which is situated on the south shore of the estuary of the Tagus River, two miles east of Lisbon. The initial studies and recommendations proved useful to the survey team. After negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Air Force aircraft, C-141 right, airlifted in support personnel and equipment, below, prior to the arrival of the P-3s at Montijo and the successful completion of the three-day trial of the Advanced Base Capability program.
Portuguese Air Force, the patrol wing drew up the final detailed list of requirements and coordinated the airlifts that would bring the aircraft, flight crews, support personnel, support equipment, and supplies to Montijo. Without an implemented ABC program, this ad hoc effort had to be improvised. As it turned out, the anticipated needs were right on target. The list of requirements had included everything from beds and spare parts to toilet paper and sonobuoys.
The wing staff landed at Montijo on 1 June 1983 and immediately began to prepare for the arrival of the P-3s and flight crews four days later. During this preparatory period, the airlifts flew in the support personnel and equipment on board C-141s and C-130s, and the staff set up the berthing spaces, galley, chow hall, and maintenance shops in the empty NATO buildings. They also hired a Portuguese cleaning crew and rented nine vehicles, including a minibus. At the same time, the operations officers met at length with their counterparts at NATO headquarters at Oeiras, about an hour west of Montijo by car. They prepared their operational briefs, charts, and overlays and set up a makeshift, but functional, command center for briefing and debriefing the flight crews.
By the time the flight crews arrived on 5-6 June, the Montijo detachment was ready for continuous ASW operations. The Willow Grove squadrons, VP-64 and VP-66, each provided two aircraft and two flight crews, and the Moffett Field squadron, VP-91, provided three of each. Within 24 hours of their arrival, each of the crews had been settled in their berthing spaces, briefed on the details of the
exercise, and given a welcome aboard packet and a crew van for exclusive use on base for the duration of the exercise. Continuous flight operations began the next day.
The P-3s flew antisubmarine and ocean surveillance missions under the operational control of Portuguese Vice Admiral Elias da Costa, Commander in Chief of NATO’s Iberian Atlantic area; the patrol wing’s maintenance department, duty office, and operations center were manned 24 hours a day. The minibus provided transportation between the galley, maintenance spaces, and operations, all a considerable distance from one another.
Early in the exercise, Deputy Commander in Chief, Iberian Atlantic, Rear Admiral Louis A. Williams, U. S. Navy, toured the detachment’s facilities at Montijo and observed spartan living conditions. It was not tents and cots, but it was not much better than that. Hot water was limited, air-conditioning and window screens nonexistent, and mosquitoes plentiful. Conversely, the galley was a great hit as it produced splendid chow.
Operationally, the Montijo detachment was particularly satisfying to both the wing staff and the flight crews. The seven aircraft logged 271.4 hours with 32 operational sorties, and the crews enjoyed the rare opportunity to prosecute diesel targets. They also gained valuable experience in NATO procedures and allied coordinated operations. Flights ranged in duration from eight to ten hours, with six hour on-station periods. The flight crews and support personnel saw themselves as participants in the first large-scale attempt to test the advanced base capability of Montijo. As a result, morale was high,
hardship cheerfully endured, and team work and cooperation the order of m6 day.
Despite the success of the Montijo de tachment, the experience taught son*6 useful lessons that have a bearing on implementation of the ABC program-
The program contemplates sustain6 operations for a period of only three days' If the ABC operation is engaged in actbc patrol area coverage longer than that, m sonobuoy supply would require rep|ej’ ishment. It is also likely that some big*1 fail, mission-essential spare parts won be required after three days of operation^ After ten days in the austere environin'- , of an ABC operation, crew fatigue won require that operations either terming' or that major upgrading of the site beg11*’ If the operation extended beyond te
days, more ambitious plans under
Advanced Base Functional Compon
,efl<
(ABFC) system would be triggered. Tj>a( program envisions a limited airlift m would provide intermediate-level mainie nance support for 60% of the missiolj
essential avionics equipment. The
ance of the maintenance and weap01
support would follow by surface lift;
The ABC program is far less ambit*1
iflS
o*>s
than the ABFC system and requires
independent Military Airlift Coinma|V support. A three plane detachment, ^ ^
the help of one additional logistics j that would not remain at the advaflc
base, would take all of the equipm1
i efl1.
tltf
supplies, and personnel needed f°r ten-day operation. The ABC kits vV°u
contain the following items:
► Weapons and a few sonobuoys ^
► Equipment to handle the weapons sonobuoys
Communications, command, and con- ‘r°‘ equipment ^ Security equipment
Tools and consumable maintenance ‘terns
^ Bare minimum spare parts Personal comfort items such as tents, °°d> and pots and pans d :f the Montijo detachment had a major e 'ciency, it was in the communications, enimand, and control area. It lacked an atisubmarine warfare operations center
A°C>' At fully suPPorted bases, the WOC is housed in high-security, air- d Jtditioned vans in which they brief and ®brief the air crews, store the intelli- nce data, and communicate with and a,yze the acoustical data and photo- Jjaphs brought back by the aircraft. At to°ntij°, t*le ^SWOC specialists resorted table tops, pencils, and dividers rather an state-of-the-art computers and cath-
ABC program. Montijo enjoyed support from many quarters—the C-141 and C-130 airlifts, the Air Force air traffic controllers, and the Portuguese hosts. But, at a time of heightened tension or war, those C-141s might have higher priorities than a Navy ASW operation at a non-threatened remote site. With the Soviet Army pouring across the Oder River, would the Air Force send its C- 141s to Montijo with beds, typewriters, and sonobuoys; would Commander, Fleet Air Mediterranean fly in ground support equipment, or would Naval Station Rota part with its 5,000-gallon fuel truck? Probably not.
Congress has made a multibillion dollar investment in aircraft, weapons, equipment, and personnel which could wind up wasted money if the planes and their expert crews fly to Montijo without the support required to bring their fire advance planning and airlift support. Once the program is implemented, P-3s could operate out of Montijo routinely, effectively, and on short notice.
As soon as the ABC kits are available in the fleet, the P-3s should test the advanced base concept at every opportunity. The reserve P-3 squadrons will have a special responsibility in this area, since in wartime they will most likely deploy to remote sites for ASW operations. A series of ten-day active duty periods out of Montijo or unsupported islands in the Atlantic would demonstrate in practice
what Montijo demonstrated in theory____
that the ABC concept is sound.
The program will ensure that the P-3s will survive a sneak attack as an effective fighting force. It could reduce the P-3’s time-late on top of submarines and will increase the P-3’s versatility. It will greatly expand the geographic reach of
of' 9nce these become a standard part cree 'nventory, the P-3s’ value will in- of Se dramatically, and the effectiveness Wjnrerriote-site operations like Montijo take a quantum leap forward. tqQn°ther lesson learned indirectly at ancntlJ° is the importance of self-relie> one of the greatest virtues of the
a ray tube displays.
dn,° Correct this shortcoming, plans are
“loh i Way t0 bu'ld 3 PrototyPe miniature (vjQp operational control center (Mini- ea that will consist of five modules, k the size of a suitcase and weighing on ^een 100 and 150 pounds. It would fit by C,ard the P-3 and use power generated rea '^weight portable generator. Cur- littii IanS ca" f°r tbe procurement of a C*ed number of Mini-MOCCs by power on line. Similarly, if the planes have to sit around bases in the United States for six months waiting for the front to stabilize in Europe, they will not have justified the tremendous investment in time and money expended to make them combat ready. The next war we fight would be over before the P-3s became a factor in the outcome, especially if the well-known, fully supported P-3 bases overseas were destroyed in a preemptive strike. The ABC program, which gives the P-3 unprecedented independence of outside support, would maximize its value to operational commanders as both a peacetime deterrent and as a wartime asset.
Without the ABC program, the Montijo detachment required a great deal of
the P-3 weapon system, while avoiding the political and tactical disadvantages of reliance on fully supported, hard-site bases on foreign soil.
The ABC program will give the Navy a solid return on its modest investment.
Commander Oman was graduated from Hamilton College in 1962. He entered the U. S. Foreign Service and served as Vice Consul at the Consulate General at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and as Third Secretary of Embassy at Jidda, Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, he was commissioned through Officer Candidate School and completed flight training. As a naval flight officer, he served in the Philippines and Vietnam. After completing active duty, he entered Georgetown Law School. Currently, he is operations officer of Reserve Patrol Wing Atlantic 0165. In his civilian job, he is Chief Counsel of the U. S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks.
The Soviet Merchant Navy—A Two-Pronged Force
By Irwin M. Heine
of
Soviet shipping is a major force in international maritime affairs. It is the product of a strong national policy dedicated to serving the Soviet Union’s military, political, and economic interests. Some may question—with validity—the order of precedence between the military and economic interests, considering the merchant navy’s contribution of an estimated $2 billion in annual gross earnings to the Soviet Union’s need for hard currency. Nonetheless, the military aspects of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets are of major strategic importance to the Soviet Navy.
In 1959, when the Soviet Merchant
The Soviet Union is replacing its smaller, less productive merchant ships with more efficient, larger ships, such as this Roll-on/Roll-off ship, and has expanded its range to about 1,300 ports in 124 countries.
Marine began its surge to achieve international power, its maritime activities were primarily parochial. Its fleet of relatively small ships was old, poorly maintained, and used principally in the Soviet Union’s coastal European and Far East trades. Cargoes transported in foreign trade were mainly confined to nearby sea routes and to client countries overseas.
Today, the Soviet Merchant Marine is the antithesis of its 1959 predecessor. According to U. S. Navy sources, the Soviet Merchant Marine’s 1,732 oceangoing ships totaling 20.3 million deadweight tons (merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons and more), placed the fleet fifth in number in mid-1983 and eighth in tonnage among the 119 maritime nations of the world. It continues to grow, although at a slower pace under the 1981— 85 five-year plan than under previous plans. If the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet projects a slower net growth, however, it is because the Soviets are disposing of smaller, less productive ships, replacing them with more efficient, larger
Roll-On/Roll-Off (Ro/Ro) ships, contain- erships, multipurpose ships, and bu< types, with both commercial and milita^ significance. Soviet ships which once moved cargoes primarily in Soviet bacK waters now serve about 1,300 ports in 124 countries, according to Timofei GuZ' henko, Minister of the Soviet Mercian Fleet, in a speech at the Supreme Sovt® Session as reported in Vodny Transp0' on 25 November 1982. Their reach lS global in a military, political, and ec° nomic sense.
The Soviet fishing fleet is another that country’s formidable maritime as sets. It is the world’s largest with 6.7tnt lion gross tons and is almost double t combined fishing fleet tonnage of all1 23 nations comprising the Organizab0 For Economic Cooperation And DeVL opment (OECD) and three-and-a-h^ times larger than the total fishing fleets all NATO nations. .
Both Soviet cargo ships and fish1*? vessels are equipped with more soph1®,, cated electronic equipment, having 1
nate
tank
the
'er> or passenger ocean trades yet. But
U1'!r impact has been substantial, and arou cut'rate fright practices
doIl
0 ^s annually from Soviet shipping ■ rations can go a long way toward buy- Ple ®fa'n frorn the West. This grain sup- atents deficient production of the So-
V.
f0fhnol°gy h does not or cannot develop its *tS ‘adustrial-military complex and for overseas political purposes, especially Soil developing countries of Africa,
^ '^plications, than the ships of the economy nati°ns. Operators of ce West’s privately owned vessels see no 0rnmercial need for such excess equip- ent which would add to the capital costs a tae*r ships. Cost is not a problem for t,e s°viet Ministries of the Merchant s.eet (MORFLOT) and the fishing fleet nee the state assumes all costs.
(joviet Commercial Maritime Activi- es- Soviet merchant ships do not domi- any sector of the world’s dry cargo,
_ _ have
du “T lhe international shipping in- asstfy s protests. Soviet policy is to earn , n'Uch hard currency from its shipping !ij rati°ns as possible. MORFLOT be- itsVes that how the currency is earned is are°'Vn business. Although its officials fa tfaick to counter such protests as non- „ tfal or prejudiced, Soviet actions do test ^ un*ess steps taken by a prop’s g°vernment work to a loss of URFLOT’s advantage. Two billion
ftQ1 ^n'on s agricultural sector. Earnings m shipping also can be used to buy the
'd ;:erseas P°htical purposes, especially 5()ae developing countries of Ar' atheast Asia, and Latin America q0s an authoritarian state, the Soviet fl V.®rnment formulates and executes a o0 'hie national maritime policy that is Q( dueivc to achieving its objectives. No c major maritime nation has such a ex hdled and effective policy, with the ^,ePtion of the People’s Republic of tfjena- Other countries’ maritime indus- S are plagued by their liner operators’ ^ °chialism versus non-liner interests; Hjli h® beggar-thy-neighbor attitude of a ers.°n s shipowners versus its shipbuild- tj0 ’ and by national budgetary considera- s *n granting financial assistance, if wto their maritime industries.
6 wor’d seaborne trade has experi- tf,e0ne °f the severest depressions in , P-t 40 years, Soviet ocean-borne and import tonnages combined 42 . y 12.5% in 1982 over 1980, and by tyav ° °Ver 1975’ according to Vnesh- dataa Torgovlya V 1982g. Comparable 'vho]aVailable for wor*d ocean trades as a op!. e declined by 12% and increased by during the same two periods *Vi ’ Maritime Transport Committee,
P /o’ Prance, Maritime Transport 1982, ■28).
^ cutting freight rates in selected liner
trades by as much as 40% under shipping conference rates and quoting rates lower than those of independent operators on specific trade routes, Soviet ships can destabilize trading patterns and cause shipping lines either to meet Soviet rates or leave the service. Few, if any, shipping companies have the resources to match those of the state-funded Soviet shipping lines. When shipping companies of major maritime nations are forced to cut their freight rates to match their Soviet competitors, the result is lower profits or, at worst, losses. In either case, those companies cannot augment their capital reserves to sustain their operations should depressed shipping continue. Maritime Transport 1982 notes that: “The prospect of austere trading conditions and too many orders for all kinds of ships suggest continued difficulties for shipowners.” National flag lines in a number of countries are selling off some ships from their overtonnaged fleets to cover their deficits. An increasing number are being forced into bankruptcy. Under these conditions, Soviet shipping authorities can influence world shipping policies to their advantage.
Aided by shippers in the Free World who are more interested in obtaining low freight rates even though the rates may be of short-term duration than in helping to maintain their national shipping lines, Soviet shipping is able to increase its competitive position as the Soviets’ ability to win over customers improves. Soviet shipping authorities are quick to counter their competitors’ protests of unfair competition by claiming that Soviet shipping companies are financially selfsupporting and commercially independent (V. Dyrchenko, President, Association of Soviet Shipowners, “Against Protectionism in Shipping,” Soviet Shipping, January 1983). Are they? Unlike shipping lines operating under market economies, the Soviet State Bank supplies capital for building new ships and replacing inefficient older ships. Soviet shipping lines do not have to make any provision for depreciation or replacement of their ships. Fuel costs, a major segment of operating expenses since the tenfold rise in bunker prices in the past decade, are subsidized by the state at a level estimated to be about a quarter below world market prices. Charges at Soviet ports are said to favor their own flag ships. Also, as a state enterprise, Soviet lines do not pay hull and marine insurance, although they do enter Western Protection and Indemnity Clubs. G. Smalley, a shipping specialist on Soviet shipping, notes in The Soviet Merchant Fleets Role in the USSR’s Global Strat
egy (London: Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 1983) that “The cash wage paid to Soviet seamen directly by the Soviet operator is extremely low in hard currency terms, being below even the International Labor Organization minimum wage for seamen.”
Soviet Shipping Between Foreign Ports (the Cross Trades): The cross-trades are a lucrative source of net hard currency eamings for Soviet cargo and cruise ships. Guzhenko noted that about 10% of the Soviet Union’s fleet capacity is devoted to cross-trading. It is estimated that these ships earn an average of about $1 billion annually from trading between foreign countries. Operations from the U. S. cross-trades were especially profitable, yielding approximately $200 million annually until 1981 when the imposition of martial law in Poland and other political and commercial factors affecting U. S. relations with the Soviets resulted in suspending negotiations for an indefinite period on renewal of the U. S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement. Because of this, MORFLOT’s efficient and productive Ro/Ro ships, containerships, and its best cruise ships could no longer operate in the U. S. cross-trades. It was not a total loss for MORFLOT, however, since by placing these ships in other crosstrades, it widened the global reach of MORFLOT’s activities.
Two examples are illustrative of Soviet aggressiveness in the cross-trades. MORFLOT’s Far East Steamship Company (FESCO) was playing havoc in the Japan-Australia-Hong Kong cross-trade by quoting rates as much as 40% below those of the Far East Australia Conference serving that trade. Despite protests from Japanese and Australian members and several meetings to solve the dispute, no agreement could be reached on reducing Soviet rates to the accepted “tolerated outsider’s” 10% lower rate. In the meantime, FESCO continued to gain highly profitable container cargoes from its aggressive rate-cutting. Finally, at a meeting in Tokyo in June 1983, FESCO agreed to charge no more than 10% below the Conference’s rates. The warning by the Australian Council of Trade Unions to change the situation or face the self-regulations by the Council itself probably made FESCO see the light.
The result of FESCO’s rate-cutting strategy was that its hard currency eamings were enhanced by the drawn out delays. One of the shipping lines involved could not keep matching FESCO’s rates and was forced out of the trade. Those that remained were said to have been hurt financially. Not only are the Soviets adept at the waiting game, but they read-
ily absorb operating losses if it means obtaining their shipping objectives. Their losses (in rubles) are taken up by the state, while their ships continue to earn useful and needed foreign exchange.
Soviet encroachment into a cruise cross-trade is exemplified by its operations from British ports. Its passenger ships there undercut British cruise ships’ fares by as much as 27%. When the British passenger ships Queen Elizabeth 2 and Canberra were withdrawn from British cruise trades to transport troops during the Falklands Conflict, the Soviets seized the opportunity to increase their share of the British market from 10% in 1980 to the current 42%. Sailings advanced to 50 with the employment of nine passenger ships. The British see this not only as financially harmful to their cruise trade but as a strategic threat as well. With new passenger ships coming into operation under the Soviet 1981-85 plan, it could mean additional pressure on British cruise operators to provide much lower cruise prices they cannot afford to meet. If, as a result, one or more of the British passenger ships had to be laid up, it would lessen the chances of their quick availability as troop ships should another crisis arise.
Soviet cruise ships rank about third place in cruise ship tonnage. Five of their largest passenger ships have side loading equipment for passenger cars, whose use on cruise travel would be rather remote. Kenneth A. Moore, former Assistant Manager of the General Council of British Shipping, asks, “How many troops could be carried in space stripped down
from accommodating 700 cabin passengers? What else could be side-loaded/dis- charged into and from holds capable of holding 250 cars?” There is an added concern from a competitive angle. With an additional ten passenger ships scheduled under the 1981-85 five-year plan, how much additional hard currency will be added to Soviet reserves at the expense of the West’s cruise operators? To what extent could European and Mediterranean cruise trades be destabilized by Soviet pricing policies and increased sailing schedules?
The Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR): Smalley estimated that one million tons of foreign containerized cargoes are transported annually over the TSR, to and from Soviet ports on the Pacific Ocean and the Baltic Sea. The TSR is a land bridge that is considered to be an extension of the Soviet Merchant Navy, competing with member shipping lines of the Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) for cargoes from Western Europe eastbound and westbound from Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Continued improvements to the TSR and connecting lines under construction raises the potential of the TSR’s ramifications for European-Far East container shipping.
Political and Military Aspects of the Soviet Merchant Navy: While Soviet merchant ships are important economically, political considerations can and do take precedence over commercial activities. These ships are used to transport military and other cargoes to aid developing countries whom they wish to embrace and maintain as clients. Such transactions are hardly financially “profitable” as a hard currency earner given the unstable conditions of the recipients’ economies. But political considerations that help extend Soviet influence in any way will be given primacy.
Every ship in the Soviet Merchant Navy is owned and controlled by the state, its operations conforming with the state’s directives. The merchant fleet is always available to cooperate and operate
with the Soviet Navy in an emergency 0 time of crisis because of the fleet’s effc^ tive association with naval operations peacetime. The militarily adaptable cats
erful
ships, the huge ubiquitous fishing Aeet!
numerous survey ships with power) electronic systems, and the array of SPC cial purpose vessels are viewed by na analysts as an auxiliary navy. ComprlS1J about 7,900 ships (100 gross tons more), the foregoing fleets consistei work closely with the Soviet Navy
;val
titty
serV'
ex-
to
and
ing naval requirements to the fullest tent, yet giving considerable attention commercial operations. Soviet tanker an^ other merchant ships regularly refuel a give logistic support to naval sun ships in both coastal and remote oce areas, according to Norman Polmar, » ^ tor, Understanding Soviet Naval De] opments (Nautical and Aviation Pub11 ing Co., 1984). 20
Soviet mariners are educated at merchant marine and fisheries c0*y ^ and undergo training on some 30 mod state-maintained training ships. Mar1^ > participate in training exercises with u ^ naval counterparts so that each Sr'
becomes acquainted with the proce1
and programs of the two services, ners become the eyes and ears far navy in ports throughout the world
open to naval vessels. It is no secret
pda0'
th«
not
0
dan1’
spe*
naval officers are posted in mere fishing, and survey ships to obtain cific information on port infrastruct and other matters of naval intelligen^of Soviet ships are designed not only^y commercial operations but are rea ^ adaptable for military purposes as we ■ number of Soviet cargo ships have called long hatches suitable for carr^,j|' artillery, aircraft, missiles, and °ther
' ' - - -i jyi1
itary equipment. During the Cuban
were f u-andh1
sile Crisis in 1962, such ships were 3 to transport undetected medium- aJJ1 aS
termediate-range missiles as well bomber aircraft to Cuba. Their 40 °°cy
ships, with an annual cargo-carrying, pacity of about 2.1 million tons, great military usefulness. Unlike the
ve
'nerships used by most of the world’s ^rchant fleets that cannot self-load and Unload, Ro/Ros do not require huge uranes at ports to load and discharge confers. Vehicles with container trailers Un be driven directly on and off the ves- e|- The decks and ramps of Soviet Ro/ 0s are constructed to support the weight heavy tanks, armored personnel careers> heavy artillery, and other rolling jlnipment. Such ships were used to sup- ^ tanks and other military equipment to ®viet clients in Angola, Syria, and other '^eastern areas. Where port facilities e not available or have been destroyed, °ntainerships that cannot self-load and lar°ad w°uld be virtually useless. The l ®e> strengthened ramps of the Ro/Ros, owever, can be extended with on-board "toon bridge sections so that military , y support cargoes can quickly be driven ashore.
Activities of the Soviet Fishing Fleet: d e Ministry of Fisheries controls a huge eet of about 3,200 fishing vessels of all
((Pes, ^ carg0 shjpS) anc[ tanker jt
fish- Serves a two-pronged purpose. The lng fleet operates worldwide with
about 500 trawlers and other types working off Canadian and U. S. eastern coasts. Some 50 to 75 of such ships have been identified as surveillance vessels whose mission is to monitor radio communications of a military nature between U. S. and NATO ships operating in the Atlantic area. In addition, there are a large number of intelligence gathering ships (AGI) equipped with the most modem, powerful electronic systems, manned by naval officers, which operate in the international waters off the U. S. coastline. Many have the configuration of trawlers from which they were converted. Others are specially built to look like cargo ships to lessen detection as surveillance ships. Their mission is to gather technical data on U. S. and NATO radar weapons systems, observe missile test launchings, seek information on U. S. antisubmarine defenses, and sonar capabilities for detecting Soviet submarines operating off U. S. coastal waters. As recently as 2 November 1983, U. S. patrol planes sighted a disabled Soviet nuclear submarine about 400 miles off the South Carolina coast. They also observed the speed with which an AGI joined the surfaced submarine and stood by to assist her until a support ship could tow the submarine to a Soviet base in Cuba.
Soviet naval planners have integrated all aspects of their maritime resources with their naval forces on a continuing basis. These resources will be a military as well as an economic force during a time of uncertainty throughout the world. The Soviets seem to understand only too well Sir Walter Raleigh’s observations:
“Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.”
Mr. Heine was graduated with honors from the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, from which he also received an M.B.A. He served as a Naval Reserve officer in World War II. He was Chief Economist and Statistician of the Maritime Administration (MarAd) from 1953 to 1965, after which he became MarAd’s Chief for International Maritime Affairs. Since his retirement from government service, Mr. Heine is a consultant and writer on maritime and international trade matters to government agencies and private organizations.
JJSCG: The Right Staff?
By I ;
leutenant Norman W. Williams, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve
)°w tn the chain of command. A supe- c°mmander tasks a subordinate com- s"der- and the mission becomes the senate commander’s. He calls his
fio;
Oer’s estimate, a concept of opera d0S’ and to carry out his mission. The
l‘°ns
O^ithin the Department of Defense •tie°r ’ t*le ^an<^ t^le G-4, as well as staff G-5, and any additional
^1 dements, are identified as resources ■^0r|ging to the battalion commander. ,,^y serve under his direction, writing <Jmates’ giving briefings, and preparing rat>°ns plan (OPLAN) annexes. f0j.e^e staff officers are also responsible tj0oth obtaining and passing informa- 1^. from staff equivalents above and hi,cto8ether and issues planning guid- Hjate' The staff sets out to prepare esti- n]jse.s’ generating questions about the 5p Sl0n- These they can transmit to the q^Priate superior staff element for X^'^ation. These staff officers, rnu . er in intelligence or logistics, compelniCate effectively because their princi- it|f ®°a* is to give their commander th~ f^J^ation he needs to prepare a com
9Crs° hy communicating horizontally We„Ss *heir own staff organization as It as vertically within their specialties. °uld be self-defeating for a commander to have his G-5 write all of the annexes to an OPLAN without consulting closely with the other staff components. Yet, this is how the Coast Guard conducts its military planning.
The Coast Guard peacetime planning system is part of a workable planning, programming, and budgeting cycle because the military readiness planning system assumes it to be a separate entity. This disconnection causes inherent problems and confusions of its own, particularly from the budgeting standpoint, but these are not the immediate issues. What is at issue is the Coast Guard’s adoption of the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS) modified for Coast Guard use. A major difficulty is that the modification excluded the special staff the DoD has. Instead, it was assumed that the existing peacetime staff organization could carry out these functions. Not so.
JOPS is both a procedure and a process used to write OPLANs for potential or actual joint service military operations in a hostile environment. Being geographically specific, plans written in JOPS format require highly detailed information on the subjects contained in the various OPLAN annexes. This makes the JOPS format different from other capabilities
plans which are designed to delineate current military capabilities. It would be an arduous task to write a capabilities plan in JOPS format because such a plan is not intended for use in a hostile, combat environment.
It is the duty of the commander’s special staff to prepare the plans. JOPS assumes this special staff exists and that it operates under the control of a single commander. By opting not to establish these staffs and by assuming the peacetime staff organization would suffice, the Coast Guard created two serious and formidable obstacles: it increased the difficulty of vertical external coordination with DoD and, concomitantly, decreased the likelihood of horizontal internal staff cooperation.
The peacetime staff elements are not dedicated resources under “the same roof.” Coast Guard Headquarters is basically organized into offices, divisions, and branches. Within the Office of Operations, there is a Military Readiness Division with a Military Readiness Planning Branch (G-5). Also within the Office of Operations is an Intelligence and Security Division with an Operational Intelligence Branch (G-2). Thus, while both the G-2 and the G-5 are in the same office, they
suicide results. Forces are comma1
itted
fied and budgeted for. The alternate ^ to guess the threat, enemy and fr,eI'nlS capabilities, and the other specific ' found in JOPS OPLAN annex fornl]esS The greater the guess factor, thebu(q- likely an OPLAN is to survive the getary process.
One purpose of Coast Guard-m00 JOPS is to determine the size and c0j?gy. sition of the Coast Guard Reserve. ^ ever, at this time, few people can ^ with confidence what this should ' major objective of the special mi staffs is to prepare estimates and an ^ that reduce guesswork and eliminate knowns, reducing the commander s ^ and increasing the probability tn -nt mission will be successful. The J pg planning system is JOPS. Modified will not do. ^
operate in separate divisions, each with its own list of deadlines and priorities. To obtain G-2 input for a specific OPLAN, the responsible G-5 planning officer must forward his request via the chain of command. It must go through his branch chief, his division chief, the G-2 division chief, and the G-2 branch chief before arriving on the desk of the intelligence officer assigned to respond. This cumbersome process becomes even more complex when information must be passed among several office levels. Logistics
How the Coast Guard and the Defense Department will conduct future military planning is as murky as the Coast Guardsmen reflected in this officer’s glasses. It can’t work without the right staff.
support, for instance, is a branch in the Logistics and Property Division of the comptroller’s office.
Given this time-consuming, ineffective process, it is little wonder the G-5 shop has found ways to circumvent this bureaucratic labyrinth. One solution is for the planning officer to meet informally with the intelligence officer to acquire whatever information he can about requirements for the OPLAN in question. The planner then writes the intelligence annex and, when completed, routes it via the chain of command with a cover letter to the G-2 explaining what he has to do. After the G-2 looks at the annex and makes his comments, the annex is returned via the chain of command for the G-5 to accept or reject as he can best determine. Therefore, the Readiness Planning Branch—a G-5 shop, or at best an anemic J-5 shop—ends up preparing entire OPLANs, sending annexes to th® other staff elements for “clearance- This is monumentally inefficient but no as much as simply “laying a requite ment” on them by memorandum.
Externally, coordination is no better- internal priority conflicts are at least Par_ tially to blame because it is the G-5 sh°P that makes most of the contacts and co lects most of the information for in° sion in Coast Guard-modified JO OPLANs. The inevitable administrate
without adequate intelligence informal'0 or logistics planning factors are genera by the G-5 shop. Lacking special120 staffs parallel to those in DoD, the C°a Guard has found it difficult to acqul materials it desperately needs.
If the Coast Guard intends to m° aggressively closer to DoD in mm planning, it must implement a staff or» nization capable of vertical and hot'2 tal cooperation. This staff must also dinate with the components of . peacetime staff organization within t respective branches and divisions. * should be formed at Coast Guard H°a.^ quarters, both Coast Guard areas, an all Coast Guard districts. If regular ^ sources cannot be dedicated to this t tion, the job should be assigned to Coast Guard Reserve. £.
Valid OPLANs are produced by SP cial staff officers. The annexes they drive personnel and equipment req ments necessary to accomplish the sion of the OPLAN, which can be Ju .„
JheJJ. S. Navy SES Program: An Update
Lieutenant Andrew W. LeBoeuf, U. S. Navy
LI. S. Navy has not abandoned the ’Lace effect ship (SES) program. The rr°gram has had to maintain a low profile cently compared to earlier years, !*Jy because of funding limitations, he Navy’s only oceangoing surface ect ship, SES-200, has operated from j, Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent ^’Ver> Maryland, since 1982. SES-200 as built as a demonstrator and lead ship N 'he SES-110BH class by Bell-Halter of ^evv Orleans, Louisiana, in 1978. The purchased this ship in 1980 and (j ’’h'fied her from a passenger configura- ^°n to one designed to support a 14-man avy crew, a data acquisition system, and additional test equipment.
Under a memorandum of understanding between the Navy and U. S. Coast Guard, SES-200 served six months as a commissioned cutter, the USCG Dorado (WSES-1), with a combined Coast Guard and Navy crew. These successful joint operations influenced the Coast Guard to purchase and commission the three SESs of the Sea Hawk (WSES-2) class, currently operating from Key West, Florida. The ship was returned to the Navy in 1981. SES-200 was subsequently lengthened 50 feet at her midsection, providing additional fuel capacity and tripling her operational range. Upon completion of acceptance trials, SES-200 transited 1,662 nautical miles nonstop, unreplenished, from New Orleans to Patuxent River, establishing the world endurance record for advanced hull form ships.
The Navy’s Surface Effect Ship Test Facility at Patuxent River recently completed a comprehensive technical evaluation of the SES-200, from calm seas to sea state five. The ship is now being used to test further a supplemental lift system and new seal design, as well as being evaluated for operational applications in the fleet for ships of the same, or greater, tonnage.
8000
6000 -
6 4000
8000
52
c
545'
46
4,000
B-105'
41 C
2,000
^7 B-39'
345'
i
430' B-85'
—I—
40 50 60
Operating Envelope-Knots
-t— 70
80
90 100
erating principle to the high-tech, 80-knot SES-100A and B test craft but was designed with emphasis on cost, ease of maintenance, and conventional operating speeds. SES-200 is constructed of off- the-shelf equipment and material. SES- 200 is powered by diesel engines rather than gas turbines because of the original need to have the ship easily serviced by commercial Gulf Coast marine dealers as well as economic considerations. The use of diesel engines proved beneficial because of their reliability and ease of
SES-200 is similar in concept and op-
maintainability during SES-200’s techn> cal evaluation.
SES-200 logged more than 500 under way hours during the three-month techoj cal evaluations; in comparison, Sfc 100A logged slightly under 600 hoiirs W her five years of operation. SES-? made port visits to New York City; N°r folk, Virginia; and Charleston, Sou Carolina, demonstrating the ability operate from her home port for extent* periods. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the re suits of the SES-200 technical evaluate and the “scaling up” of the ship and expected results. These findings illustra the outstanding capabilities of these snip in overall speed (Figure 1), speed in state (Figure 2), and seakeeping abih; for helicopter operations (Figure 3)- 1 large SES data were determined by esta lished scaling laws. , (
The SES hull form is currently **n ^ consideration in the mine hunter ship a the new patrol boat (PBM) design Pr° posals, and design studies are under for possible use of large SESs. The S ^ 200’s technical evaluation has adde ^ great deal of credibility to the deslStlj[j since an SES has successfully operate ^ the open ocean and proven that the signer’s ideas are sound and workable- the surface Navy is to survive in *u , hostilities, the speed, versatility, good seakeeping abilities of these sn F will be required. The surface effect s ^ is no longer a manned model or a desig er’s dream; it is a reality.
Lieutenant LeBoeuf was graduated from the ^ Academy in 1976. He has served in the USS ^,aS (AOE-2) and the USS Long Beach (CGN-9)- W jn. ship commander of the SES, XR-1E, and oflC -cal charge (afloat) of SES-200 during the ship’s evaluation. He was officer-in-charge of the Effect Ship Test Facility at NAS Patuxent ^^ 43). is currently serving in the USS Coral Sea (
Why Take a Flier?
By Captain Mathew J. Whelan, U. S. Navy (Retired)
that time, Dr. A. M. Turing, w^’ been called the “father of Artificial j
ligence,” developed a model that
leal. colfl
putation. This was a necessary f*rst ’
hum311
What does the title of this professional note mean? Does it refer to a “pilot” or “taking a gamble”? What is this piece going to be about?
We are talking about flying—but not the kind restricted to aircraft and flight decks. We are talking about launching into a new computer technology. This professional note examines the science of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and what it can mean for the military.
There are several definitions of Artificial Intelligence. A scientist or research specialist would start with the idea that “Artificial Intelligence is the study of ideas which enable computers to do the things that make people seem intelligent.” A more goal-oriented definition would be, “Making machines smart in order to make them more useful and to understand the principles which make intelligence possible.” An applications definition of AI would be, “The field of computer problem solving.” A more useful definition of AI for military purposes would be that AI is an effort to develop
computer systems that can appr°xl .ic_ the human’s ability to reason and de ^ Although AI is a new acronym ^ science dates from the early l95y*
1 Intel" used
symbolic, as opposed to numerical,
y firSgSS a
in developing the ability to ham computational machine to the thought process. • n
In 1956, a young mathematic*2
n expert system is a computer-based Sl)Stem that can act on an input; the user Pplies facts or queries, using rules and ProMdUreS’ and thc facts of a particular Proh' m ^oma'n t0 solve an analytical
clo:
ablem. The “action” of the system is a ISe approximation
of the reasoning in a given field
■>se and a narrowly defined subject expert system has four basic com-
Dartmouth College, John McCarthy, Pplied for a grant to conduct a summer pfkshop on “Artificial Intelligence.” ls request contains the first known apPearance of the term in print.
Since the 1950s, however, the practi- '°ners of this fledgling art have been c°ping the problem. Despite the plethora activity and promise, AI is in its for- cat*Ve stages. Yet, despite claims to the Ontrary, some of AI’s tools are now en- ^,ln8 the realm of the practical. Dr. Pat 'nston of the Massachusetts Institute of sinology (MIT) best describes AI’s igk-of-the-art through analogy: prior to s60 was the prehistoric period of the Clence; its dawn and dark ages encom- assed the 1960s; AI’s renaissance oc- rred in the 1970s, and, today, we are at e beginning of a new era. We are in a suion to begin applying some of its
Artificial Intelligence is a multidis- Phnary approach to the use of com- non-numeric, symbolic problem ftj v'ng- Natural language, pattern recog- '°n> simulation, cognition, probability j decision theory, information process- 11®’ and several other techniques from fields of psychology, philosophy, athernatics, and linguistics are into yed. Since we do not know all there is know about how the human brain A°rlcs, it is reasonable to conclude that [, ls still in a developmental phase and, tioeref°re, is not ready for full exploita- li n’ Nonetheless, significant strides l^Ve been made; at least one area of AI tUsS achieved a limited applications sta- . ""expert systems and knowledge entering.
sVsti
Plpceco ..
% l an exPert in a given Held sto*1 d ^°**ow- There is a growing success f j; starting in about 1965 with Stan- ^ a University’s DENDRAL and MIT’s USYMA systems, concerning the use c^Pcrt systems in such fields as medi- fajj 1agnosis and prescription, equipment sisUre diagnosis, electronic circuit analy- int’ m>neral exploration, chemical data fetation, robotics, and computer stat configuration. However, the stj^'oUthe-art is such that in each inti^ C,C °( expert system use and success niq u0rt to apply Problem-solving tech- is within a small range of human
*6a.'
An ponents: a “language processor” which allows a user to interface with the system to enter or retrieve data; an “inference engine” which operates procedurally on the problem using input data and expert- supplied facts and problem-solving rules; a “blackboard” or “work space” which is a portion of the system’s working memory designed to communicate the status of the various hypotheses and provides a breakdown of those hypotheses into various levels at which knowledge sources would play.
The “blackboard” serves as a status board for determining the scheduling, in priority order, of the system’s resources against the more promising avenues leading to problem resolution. The fourth component is a “knowledge base” which contains the conventional knowledge about a specific and carefully delineated problem domain. The facts in the knowledge base consist not only of pure data relevant to the problem but also relationships among the data, analytical procedures, and “rules of thumb.”
The knowledge base also includes part of the system’s programs. These programs manipulate the symbols representing the facts and rules of the particular knowledge domain. The computer follows a few simple procedures, such as searching, matching, joining, separating, substituting, and deleting when processing the data or symbols in its attempt to find problem solutions. Thus, AI programming is different from the conventional program approach of following specific step-by-step procedures. The difference lies chiefly in the fact that the distinction between the facts (data) and the program is blurred.
Early recognition of this new relationship between data and program resulted in the development of what is now one of the oldest surviving high-level computer languages, LISP, which is a symbolic programming language.
The system essentially attempts to solve a problem by the user input triggering the program procedures which interpret the knowledge base in light of existing relationships and the new inputs.
Knowledge engineering is the technique by which the elements of the expert system are constructed and integrated. It is the process by which a knowledge engineer attempts to elicit and formalize problem domain information from the human experts in the field. Through interviews and analyses of test cases, the engineer would become acquainted with the facts, identify the concepts, and develop and codify the heuristics that the expert steps through in normal problem resolution.
After gathering and assimilating the data, the knowledge engineer must choose from among several methods how best to represent the expert’s knowledge in a system. Knowledge representation is usually defined as a formalism for representing the facts and rules about a knowledge domain. There are various approaches to knowledge representation, but the three most commonly used are: Semantic Networks, Frames, and Production Rules.
Semantic Networks were originally proposed in 1966 as a model, although crude, of the human memory. They were devised to represent relationships or associations among the various data elements that are found in memory or, in the case of AI, in the knowledge base. A common representation scheme consists of a taxonomic (or tree-like) structure of nodes which represent concepts and a set of specialized reference procedures expressing “inheritance” links or branches between the nodes. A concept is an aggregate of the simpler, related concepts; by being linked, their attributes can be “inherited down the link. The most prevalent characterization of these links is the “is-a” statement. For example, a robin is-ct bird, a bird is-a mammal. This type of structure leaves room for expansion of various attributes or inheritance characteristics at each node.
The links containing the attributes are slightly different from the parent is-a link and are called by a variety of names such as has-a, part-of, and has-part. Attributes about data can be inferred from the nodes to which they are linked (e.g., a bird has-a wing, a robin is-a bird, therefore, a robin has-a wing).
The Frames technique is essentially a data structure similar to a template with “slots” reserved for different fields or attributes, and the frame description contains all the basic information including relationships. A “dog” frame could include a description of status (pet), name ( Whiskers”), breed (miniature schnauser), and color (salt-pepper). My brother-in-law’s dog would have his own frame containing the same generic information. Both frames would be linked to the conceptual “dog” frame which could look like; status (pet, wild), name (various), breed (collie, bassett, etc.). Within the frame such variable attributes as the name, breed, and physical attributes are contained in the “slots,” each slot specifying a value or range of values for each attribute. The Frame technique represents objects by standard attributes and relationships to other Frames.
The Production Rules system was developed in 1972 as a model for human
cognition. The knowledge base in this case consists of logic or production rules, generally in two parts. The antecedent or condition part, represented by an if clause, usually spells out a pattern or condition, and the consequence or action part designated by a then clause elaborates an action to be taken or a consequence once the condition has been satisfied. For example, if the cruise control is disengaged, then the motor will slow. In this example, we have the opportunity to further refine the condition by adding more qualifications to the conditional clause: if the cruise control is disengaged anchor the accelerator is released, then the motor will slow. This aspect of the Production Rule system makes it particularly attractive for use in a military expert system because the rules can be made very explicit.
The larger expert systems use combinations of all three representation techniques. The advantage of a Semantic Network lies in its excellent ability to portray relationships; Frames’ advantage is in the amount of knowledge that can be stored about the attributes and relationships of the object in question; and the advantage of the Production Rules system is its ability to represent procedural knowledge.
Although the knowledge representation techniques that I have described seem straightforward, the whole subject of representation is, in fact, one of the most active areas of AI research.
The field of AI is attempting the most elusive quest of all—to capture the human thought process. One of the major problems with the greatest impact on any proposed military system is the question of how to represent degrees of certainty. For example, there is certain knowledge (Bob is six feet four inches tall), vagueness (Bob is tall), randomness (Bob is taller than Debbie), partial knowledge (Bob is tall and thin), and ignorance (Bob plays basketball). The fact that Bob is tall can be inferred from each of these statements. The human mind can understand each of the statements and appropriately weigh or associate the incoming information with past experience. But how do you program this into a computer?
One of the methods devised to express or weigh confidence levels in expert system assumptions is the assignment of confidence factors. They are usually at-
Artificial Intelligence promises to approximate the human’s ability to reason and decide—but it will always need a boss to build a knowledge base and keep this new computer technology on track.
tached to the rules. However, a capability has yet to be devised which reflects com- monsense judgments.
Based on the knowledge representation technique that a knowledge engineer selects, a choice is made of the reasoning mechanism to be used in the inference engine. Generally, it is one of two kinds: forward chaining or backward chaining. Forward chaining is said to be data driven—it attempts to achieve a goal given an initial state. Backward chaining, on the other hand, is said to be goal driven and works backward from a hypothesis to seek the evidence that will support it. In this case, the system searches the knowledge base for the antecedent of a rule whose action (or consequence) is the desired state, or goal.
Natural language processing has given rise to a technique that can be applied to the inference process of the expert system. The inference process derives logical conclusions or implicit facts from an initial premise or set of explicit facts. As a result of the need to structure common- sense inference techniques based on real world data, “scripts” was developed. “Scripts” is designed not only for making inferences but also to act as a technique to control the inference process. The most famous “script” is the restaurant scenario. If a person goes into a restaurant, the following events will proba' bly occur:
► Hang up coat ► Order
► Meet maitre d’hotel ► Eat
► Go to a table ► Pay
► Meet waiter ► Retrieve coa
► Get menu
With an “input” into the expert sys tern of observables two, four, six, seven, and nine, the system could infer that restaurant scenario did occur with a con fidence factor, of, say, .7. What we have done with this type of goal-oriented hen ristics is to set up an expected sequence of events that defines a situation. ™ approach allows the user, once input da has triggered a “script,” to predict wha^ should come next in the sequence or wn else should have occurred. The exp system would search the knowledge ba for the facts or alert an analyst as to w a is expected in order to complete script. In order to highlight the different between the “scripts” approach to inference process and others, let uS e. amine the following technique vvht could be fit into either a Frame or Serna
data
and heuristics developed through
and
------------------------------------- ‘ UIUVIU11V
|Sultants? Education of the consumer a forthright approach on the part of
|ic Network:
^ Domain: common cold Facts of Domain: runny nose, fever, | 'Us, headache, respiratory congestion, aryngitis, sore throat, coughing, and Sl>eezing.
Heuristic “Knowledge”: The associa- (°n °f two or more of the facts (symp- ®tns) in the domain would lead you to Clevc that a common cold exists, with a c°nfidence factor of .4. j. formalized Process: If Cheryl has a fVer °nd a runny nose and a sore throat, en Cheryl has a cold (confidence
'actor = .4).
Porward chaining would be repre- ented by the input of the three symptoms ^ acts) and a search of the knowledge ase for a match. Then the match acting s the condition would point to or trigger e rule to be applied, and the conse- ^nce would be the diagnosis of a cold. s “ackward chaining could be represented by the data input finding a “slot” p a Frame through a “matching.” The (j.ante would specify the goal state or ^agnosis of a cold, and the system would ^en look for other facts relative to beryl’s condition to “prove” that a jnmon cold exists.
sl be possible use of expert systems ev°u,d be encouraged and explored wher- j(ser we are using scarce expertise (with jj. attendant cost) to monitor routine situ- e'°ns within which a convergence of le6nts could create a problem. The prob- which do arise must be amenable to solution by decision. The decision- ofkln8 process must be based on the use a combination of the domain’s facts, j*« knowledge of the domain, and gment. There are several criteria ay!? must be met- expert must be ^ 1 able, which implies a well-defined o^owledge domain, indicating that meth- 5gS an<^ possible solutions are available. C'sions are based on a combination of
Perience, both of which can be migra- jnto a system of rules.
Hie i6re 216 several problems, both tech- ^ a> and non-technical, associated with theebng these criteria. The first hurdle is acceptance” problem. How many Syes have we seen expected information orems fail to materialize for one reason lessan°ther? How often have we seen a tij0rtban enthusiastic acceptance by se- inr managers of recommendations lead- uf tp? computer-based systems? In spite to , 's.mmd-set and some dismal failures and rin8'in” exPected systems on time ni0r31 cost' are we going to ask that se- consi.uecis'on"makers accePt machine
the developer are fundamental to the understanding and acceptance of the limitations and the capabilities of expert system technology.
A second problem is ensuring knowledge sufficiency for the planned system. Unquestionably, the real power of expert systems lies in their knowledge base. Rapid changes, fragmentation, and diversity in or of the knowledge in the knowledge base can wreak havoc with the system’s capabilities. At the same time, expert systems do not know their own limitations nor can they handle novel situations. One leading proponent of expert system technology believes that knowledge acquisition is the bottleneck in expert system development and evolution. Painstaking and lengthy effort is now required to build a knowledge base, and until we can automate the process, there will not be extensive adaptation of expert systems to problem resolution processes.
A third problem is finding an expert or experts who would have the time to commit to the rather formidable effort required to build a knowledge base. Knowledge gained from experience is usually not well formed, and trial and error is a fact of life. This leads to a fourth major problem.
Expert systems are a result of iterative activity. They evolve from the simple to the more complex. The final copy will approximate the human decision-maker. The first step then is a prototype which can be used to run against the simpler problems associated with the particular knowledge domain. Step two is a fine- tuning effort and so on until a final copy goes on line. But, we are well aware that refinement of knowledge is a never-ending process: new data become available, procedures become antiquated, tasks are reoriented, and the domain undergoes change.
If we accept the evolutionary view of knowledge and, concomitantly, the need to evolve a given expert system, then we must accept the fact that military procurement practices may have to undergo modification. This is necessary to accommodate the dynamic environment created by advances in knowledge and its applications. Design to cost becomes meaningless, prototyping takes on a new meaning, and the definition of life cycle support must be changed. If we expect to implement expert system technology and maintain pace with knowledge developments—with AI and Computer Science advances—we must be prepared to accept a new way of doing business. Incremental implementation or evolutionary acquisition which emphasizes tight user- developer interaction commencing with
prototype development will be the key to bringing a successful system on line and keeping it up-to-date.
Given that we overcome these problems, are there expert system applications that fit military needs? The Defense Science Board thinks so; it named Artificial Intelligence as one of the technology areas with the greatest potential for the Defense Department. In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of Naval Research, Research and Development Center, and the Naval Research Laboratory are leading the way in defense-centered AI research. Industry, including defense contractors, is pursuing expert system technology’ and several demonstration models are available.
A cursory look at DoD activities supports this heightened interest; the criteria fit a wide spectrum of defense activities. For example, efforts involving the integration of information in operations, intelligence, command and control, and electronic warfare fit neatly as potential areas for expert system application. Other activities, such as planning and control, resource allocation, and the use of autonomous vehicles are also excellent candidates for exploiting AI.
Such applications, if their domain fits the mold of a “typical” expert system of today, would contain upward of 500 knowledge chunks, take at least one calendar year in prototype development, and cost in the neighborhood of $1.5 million. The development of a typical system carries some risk, but the AI academics would assess the venture as probably within the realm of the achievable. Unquestionably, the “probably achievable” implies that a strong sense of caution must be used by the manager in approaching the go/no-go decision. At the same time, we should not be frightened away.
The investment in expert system applications is miniscule compared to the awesome benefits that can be gained. But the benefits can only be achieved by a patient, evolutionary approach to system development. This type of approach is alien to the DoD modus operandi but who would “take a real flier”—meaning a gamble if the life of their project depended on it?
Captain Whelan received a bachelor of arts degree from Harvard University and a master’s degree from Georgetown University, both in Russian Studies. He has served in various intelligence and cryptologic operational and staff billets, including tours in UpNav and as executive assistant to the Director, ational Security Agency. Prior to his retirement in a y of this year and his joining Westinghouse Corporation, he served as project manager of the Joint National Intelligence Dissemination System.
The U. S. Navy and Nuclear ASW Weapons
By Joel J. Sokolsky
waf'
■edto
torpedo, carrying a W34 low kiloton head, entered service. It was deploy) attack submarines and ballistic mis- submarines as well as land- and earn based aircraft and was said to be ‘ aV able” to NATO navies although ne^
deployed in their forces. It has been
; of on
sile
counted in a nuclear mode because <
far
and reenters the water to attack sUj,S(j0p per unit—in ROC was s>gnlt ^e-
more expensive than conventional^ a„
It is not surprising that nuclear weapons have long been a part of the U. S. Navy’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) arsenal. They have a large lethal radius. Because localization does not need to be as exact as it needs to be in the case of a conventional torpedo or depth charge, using nuclear weapons against submerged submarines would allow for “successful engagement.” Nuclear ASW weapons even have advantages over homing torpedos because the radius of the blast effects would nullify countermeasures undertaken by the target submarine. These weapons are also viewed as hedges against “hardening” of submarines and technological advances which allow for operation at greater depths.1
For all the advantages of nuclear ASW weapons, a number of technical, tactical, and political difficulties have restricted U. S. reliance upon them. Today, conventional ASW weapons remain crucial to the undersea warfare postures of the U. S. Navy and other allied navies. Nuclear ASW weapons are one further example of a prevalent phenomenon in the atomic age. Like their nuclear land- and air-based counterparts, tactical nuclear weapons used for ASW have not displaced conventional weapons designed to accomplish similar tasks.
The Development of Nuclear ASW Weapons: Interest in using atomic weapons in an ASW capacity coincided with the early postwar development of the U. S. nuclear weapons capability. During the Baker nuclear tests near Bikini Island in 1946, the impact of underwater detonation of atomic weapons was analyzed. While there were no submarines involved, some 70 surface ships were placed near the point of detonation to ascertain the impact of a shallow (200-feet deep) detonation. At this depth, a 30-kilo- ton explosion caused a column of radioactive water and spray to rise several hundred feet above the point of detonation; waves of 94-feet height maximum to move out from ground zero, damaging ships and shore installations; a “base surge” of water and radioactive spray to extend to a diameter of 3.5 miles in four minutes accompanied by winds which put personnel for several miles in serious danger because of radioactive particles. Thermal radiation was absorbed in the water, and, therefore, it was determined that “. . . in an underwater nuclear explosion the thermal radiation can be ignored, as far as its effects on personnel and as a source of fire are concerned.”2 Subsequent tests and studies indicated that the greater the depth of a nuclear detonation, the less effect on the surface and in the air.
One of the first major studies to support the use of atomic weapons in an ASW capacity was the Navy-sponsored Project Hartwell: A Report on the Security of Overseas Transport, conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1950.3 Project Hartwell was a wide-ranging analysis of U. S. and allied ability to defend against what was even then perceived to be a major Soviet capability to disrupt ocean transport in the event of war. Although far behind the United States in the quality of its submarines, the number of the Soviet Union’s subsurface forces posed a significant threat. Moreover, the Soviets were expected to seek ways to use nuclear weapons against U. S. and allied surface forces and merchant ships.
Atomic weapons of that time were large and their numbers limited. However, the technology was available to reduce sizes and increase stockpiles. Although the cost of building a nuclear depth weapon far exceeded that of a conventional charge ($1 to $5 million), “ . . . atomic weapons are cheap in comparison with the damage that a submarine can do” to a convoy or carrier task force. “A sure kill” could save a task force or “a large part of a convoy.”4
Project Hartwell suggested that nuclear weapons could be employed effectively and safely in an ASW capacity with the development of lower kilotonnage depth weapons used at depths in excess of 1,000 feet. These weapons could not be used in shallow waters because of the effect of the ocean bottom in magnifying shock waves. The depth weapons would be delivered by aircraft with preset charges which would allow them to explode at a time and depth that would do no damage to the airplane. Project Hartwell concluded that “deep explosions (if correctly planned) may be used against submarines, even in the presence of surface vessels of our own fleet. It may be possible to sink a submarine in a radius of over a mile while leaving surface vessels at a radius of a half a mile unaffected.”5
The U. S. Navy had already begun to develop depth weapon variants of aerial- dropped nuclear bombs in the late 1940s. The first such weapon was the 1,700-
pound “Betty,” a Navy variant of t e Mk-7 bomb, which entered the U. • nuclear stockpile in 1952 and was retire in 1967. This was followed by a smaUer bomb, the “Lulu,” which entered set vice in 1958, and the “Little Lulu, ® depth bomb variant of the Mk-57 bon) (hotpoint), which entered the stockpd® 1 1958.6 .
In 1956, the Chief of Naval Operations requested that the National Academy 0 Science’s Committee on Undersea war fare look into the “growing Russian su^ marine menace.” A study group met , the summer of 1957. The so-call®f Nobska project is best known as one the early steps in the development of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic mj® sile. But it also gave impetus to the velopment of a nuclear-armed ASW t0 pedo. In 1963, the ASTOR
Acuities in getting the firing platform enough away to avoid being damage0 the blast. g
In the 1960s, the Navy deployed t ^ rocket-assisted weapons which com 1 fitted with a conventional homing . pedo or a nuclear depth bomb. The: a submarine rocket (ASROC) entered s vice in 1961. It carries a W44 one-kilo ,
warhead on a Mk-17 nuclear dep^
does. Yet the Navy pointed out
charge with a maximum range of six tical miles. The ASROC system, whi®^ ^ still in production, can be used w1 conventional warhead; more than 20, ^ missiles have been produced. It is °n ^ frigates, 78 destroyers, and 27 crU1^!p0 the U. S. Navy and on various N ships in a conventional mode. . ,jy In 1965, a short-range, inert|.0n- guided, submarine-launched, ranSe’rt,a- trolled nuclear depth charge antisu ^ rine rocket (SUBROC) was deploy6^, carried a W55 one- to five-kiloton ^ head with a rocket range of 20 to 35 ,a tical miles. The SUBROC is fired out ^ submarine’s torpedo tube, breaks th® ^ face of the water, travels through th®
enemy submarine comes pretty high,” ^ that with its nuclear warhead, the URROC could destroy the largest submarine even without a homing capability °'1Ce 't reentered the water.7 Production ? ^ SUBROC was discontinued in • but the line was reopened between 972 and 1974. Some 224 SUBROC m°tors were refurbished between 1977 5lJd 1981, extending the life of the mis* e another 15 years. In fiscal year 1983, e Navy began a service life extension Ptogram (SLEP) covering other parts of ,e SUBROC (i.e., guidance sections, aption kits, and ignitors) for approxi- JMy 76% of the inventory. Currently, uBR0Cs are deployed on 73 of the avy’s 93 attack submarines.8 In 1963, the Navy began to deploy a ew air-delivered ASW depth bomb, the 5'- There are roughly 1,000 B57s for Se by the P-3 Orion land-based maritime
patrol aircraft, the S-3 Viking carrier- based patrol aircraft, and the carrier- based SH-3 Sea King helicopter. Nearly 200 B57s are believed to be stored in Europe. While no other NATO navy officially includes them in its inventory, some NATO naval air components (Netherlands, the United States, and West Germany) are nuclear capable and are trained to use this nuclear depth bomb. As with other tactical nuclear weapons, allied use of the B57 in the event of war would fall under a program of cooperation (POC). A POC is a bilateral agreement between the United States and another country “involving the transfer of nuclear capable delivery vehicles or the deployment of nuclear warheads for support of allied countries.” Even under POC arrangements, the B57s would remain in U. S. custody “until released by the President for use.”9
Thus, there are currently three nuclear ASW weapons: ASROC, SUBROC, and the B57 aerial depth bomb (See Table 1). Each of the three systems will be replaced with newer delivery vehicles and warheads in the 1980s.
In fiscal year 1984, the Navy began a program to convert the ASROC for launch from a new vertical-launch mechanism with faster reaction, greater range, and increased kill probability. Also under development is a new nuclear warhead to replace both the ASROC’s W44 and the
The impact of this blast from an antisubmarine rocket with a nuclear warhead in 1962 is still reverberating today, with nuclear weapons carried by 65 frigates, 78 destroyers, and 27 cruisers of the U. S. Navy.
♦Warheads believed to be normally carried on vessels.
♦♦This number only refers to B57s known to be stockpiled in Europe. Under the NATO infrastructure program, the U. S. Navy created various special weapons sites around the Atlantic and it is possible that warheads for ASROC and SUBROC officially designed in the United States or at sea are at those sites.
Sources: Thomas B. Cochran et.al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. I, U. S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984); Richard Halloran, “Report to Congress Provides Figures for Nuclear Arsenal,” New York Times, 15 November 1983, p. A-15.
Table 1 The Three Nuclear ASW Weapons
Type U. S. At Sea* Europe** Pacific
B57 Depth Bomb 665 45 190 100
ASROC
(W44 Warheads) 600 250**
SUBROC
(W55 Warheads) 255 175
sed
conventional homing torpedoes.
The importance of ASW has increai in terms of NATO’s strategic Postu^c With the evolution of a rough strategy nuclear parity between the United States
leased by a subcommittee of the Atlantic Assembly pointed out, stocks of military equipment in Eur could be drawn down in as little as two
of
chief threat to sealift would come
to
secure the sea lines of communicate00 against the submarine threat would na^ to begin during a prehostilities Perl° NATO and U. S. navies are working^ develop newer generations of conv tional ASW weapons. The enhanced curacy of these weapons, combined V improved underwater sensing and s
environment in which the — damage to civilian populations al1 js, frastructures would be almost n0ll .ng tent. When used against deep-01aC, subs, there would be little or no ra ^ tive fallout carried in the atmosphercj, Theoretically, these aspects make
B57 aerial depth bomb. The Navy has asked for 1,250 of these new warheads. To replace the SUBROC, an ASW standoff weapon (ASWSOW), with a new warhead to replace the W55, will be deployed in the early 1990s. It has been developed to counter the new threat posed by hardened, deep-diving Soviet attack submarines. With its all-digital quick-reaction capabilities and extended range, it will allow for engagement of enemy submarines at or near the maximum range of future sensors, including the over-the-horizon sensors. The ASWSOW may be deployed on surface ships as well as submarines, although some of the Navy’s submarines now carrying SUBROCs will be altered to carry the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). As with the SUBROC, the unit cost of the new ASWSOW will be significantly higher than for conventional torpedos. For example, the unit cost of the Mk-46 (Neartip) surfaced-launched torpedo is currently $163,578, while the Mk-48 submarine-launched torpedo costs $886,805 per unit. The estimated per unit cost for development and deployment of 1,000 submarine-launched ASWSOWs is $2.6 million per unit.10
Nuclear ASW Weapons and Deterrence: Like all nuclear weapons, tactical and strategic, the Navy’s nuclear ASW weapons cannot be used except with presidential authorization. There is almost no public information, either in official Navy statements or in the secondary literature, on the steps needed to release nuclear ASW weapons. U. S. and allied naval officers are given extensive training in nuclear ASW release procedures and the strict rules which govern their handling and use. Unauthorized use by a single individual seems extremely unlikely because of the number of personnel that are involved in handling these weapons.
Generally, task force commanders have the authority to use all means at their disposal to defend their forces. This, however, would not include “first use” of nuclear weapons at sea. It might allow them to respond with nuclear ASW weapons, and other tactical nuclear weapons, without receiving higher authority, if such weapons were used against them first. Under the NATO doctrine of flexible response, the alliance’s political leadership could authorize use of tactical nuclear ASW weapons without prior Soviet use if the conventional war at sea threatened to turn against NATO, say, by threatening to cut the sea lines of communication. Yet, as in the case of land- and air-delivered nuclear weapons, Washington and its allies would have to weigh the escalatory impact of a first use of nuclear weapons even, as in the case of ASW weapons, if it were restricted to the sea solely against military targets. U. S. use of nuclear ASW weapons could elicit a Soviet attack with surface-to-surface or air-to-surface nuclear armed missiles against such high-valued targets as carrier battle groups.
In the event of a failure of deterrence and the initiation of nuclear exchanges either on land or at sea, or both, then nuclear ASW weapons could well be widely employed by the Navy and released for use to other allies. They would not only be employed against Soviet attack submarines, but, in the context of a strategic nuclear war, against the Soviet nuclear- powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as part of a “damage limitation” effort. Although the U. S. policy is not to seek a first strike strategic ASW capability against the Soviet SSBN, a damage-limiting strategic ASW campaign has never been disavowed and is becoming more possible with advances in U. S. ASW technology. At the same time, the wide use of nuclear ASW weapons would still be restricted by concerns over surface and aerial impact. For exam- pie, they could not safely be used in the vicinity of friendly shipping or in shall0" waters near friendly territory. Thus, eyen in the context of a nuclear war at sea. conventional ASW weapons would sti be necessary. The threat of an attack by nuclear depth weapon could force enemy submarines to stay at relatively shall0 depths so as to maintain a substantia margin between water pressure and the hull limits. This, in turn, could “increase the chance of detection and attack j
and the Soviet Union and consequ®^ emphasis upon conventional land ana defense in Europe, the alliance has come more concerned about the secu J of the trans-Atlantic sea lines of cornmu nication as well as of the Europe® coastal waters. As a report recently
three days. While the growing reaC^1[lC Soviet naval aviation, especially “Backfire” bomber, poses a menace. ^
Soviet attack submarines. Measures veillance technologies, will allow more exact location of enemy subma and, therefore, a greater likelihoo successful engagement. Further deve ^ ment in these areas would curtail the ne to resort to nuclear ASW weap0 ^ ^ which, in turn, would, on a smaller SL reduce NATO reliance upon all nl®c ,a. weapons. The same process and cal tions underlie the current interest 1,1 j veloping more accurate conventional weapons for the Central Front.
Limited Nuclear “War-at-Sea ■^n°o(ls important respect, nuclear ASW wca? ny differ from other tactical and esPeC')n[y strategic nuclear weapons. They can an be used against military targets and 1 ,
. . ... . collaie
V -\
\ \
\
/
/
/
/
/
/
J Boost
I
\ Rocket Motor Separation
\
Target detection classification and localization
|. ®Pons perfectly suited to some kind of ^ 'ted nuclear engagement restricted to j.e high seas. In the event that the Soviets th^'iUSe nuc*ear weapons solely at sea,
, e United States and its allies would still nv® to weigh the escalatory effects of a jUear response. As Admiral Gerald E. toM F’ 3 ^ormer Sixth Fleet commander, d a congressional hearing:
They fire a series of weapons, aiaybe three or four nuclear warheads. *hoy do a certain amount of damage to us, maybe they sink a couple of ships. Are we going to respond right uien with nuclear weapons? I think we ^'11 swallow a lot, as national policy, before we take that initial nuclear Weapon step.”12
f.^bicd use of nuclear ASW weapons in P°nse to initial Soviet use of nuclear couT°nS aS.ainst ^TO surface vessels tjyd constitute a controlled, yet effec- gg6 resP°nse. While not without its dan- 0[)rs> particularly if nuclear ASW weap- st/ Were usecl in the vicinity of Soviet ij! te§lc missile submarines, employ- p"' °P nuclear ASW weapons would rgsab*y constitute less of an escalatory ticij°nse than even the limited use of tac- 1 nuclear weapons on land.
^ther scenario in which nuclear li^. Weapons might be employed in a 1 ed nuclear war at sea would be if the
United States, perhaps without allied support, elected deliberately to escalate with nuclear weapons at sea in response to Soviet action or threats elsewhere. In the early 1960s, the Navy began to consider the possibility of a limited tactical nuclear war, at least initially restricted to the seas, as a plausible and safer alternative to escalation on land. The War at Sea studies initiated by then-Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze examined the implications of a solely maritime war “where the objective is to coerce the antagonist solely by maritime pressures . . . land, overland airspace and inland waters are, in general, taken as sanctuaries. In such a war, without concurrent land combat, “the political objectives of the contestants are to be reasonably well defined and do not encroach upon the vital interests of any nuclear power. This is recognized by all of the major contestants.”13 By the late 1960s, various War at Sea Operations Plans (OPLANS) were being drawn up by the Navy. The Atlantic Fleet’s OPLAN 2300 provided for fleet operations in contingencies involving the Soviet Union in which, among other cases, the United States wanted to implement “a controlled response to Soviet military aggression short of strategic nuclear attack.” The plan called for a gradual escalation of naval actions toward the “highest intensity of operation” which would entail “the entire Atlantic Fleet in a complete confrontation with Soviet forces at sea in warfare short of the strategic use of nuclear weapons.” Any steps taken by the fleet would be controlled by “rules of conduct and engagement reflecting national policy objectives.”14
The current Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, has pointed to the growing Soviet fleet as necessitating greater naval capabilities for the conduct of nuclear war on, over, and under the seas. This is part of the Navy’s new “flexible options” approach which foresees the oceans as the initial battleground in any major U. S./Soviet confrontation, including a nuclear exchange. The augmented capability of even conventional weapons, including surface-to-surface missiles and attack submarines, may require the use of nuclear weapons such as nuclear ASW weapons to protect the surface forces. The renewed interest in the nuclear capable replacements for the ASROC and SUBROC are in line with this approach to future naval requirements.
While it is possible to imagine a tactical nuclear war confined to the high seas, it does not seem plausible. Even Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has warned that: “It will be U. S. policy that a nuclear war beginning with Soviet nuclear attacks at sea will not necessarily remain limited to sea.”15 Nuclear ASW
Naval Nuclear Weapon Selection
There is a curious dichotomy in the Navy’s handling of tactical nuclear weapons. There are historical justifications for the way things have been done in the past, but the time has come for a complete inversion.
Operationally, naval tactical nuclear weapons are regarded as special weapons with major liabilities. One of the chief liabilities is the requirement of presidential approval for their use. Many naval officers believe that such authorization would be late in coming compared to their needs in the rush of battle, or that it might never come, either owing to the breakdown of communications or to the reluctance of a president to make the admittedly difficult decision to go nuclear, even tactically.
On the other hand, for procurement purposes, nuclear weapons are treated more or less as competitors in the systems analyses done for weapon selection. In a typical selection process, an effectiveness measure is defined for a certain mission or scenario, and both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons of the same type are evaluated in terms of it. As an example, in surface antisubmarine warfare, an effectiveness measure might be the number of enemy submarines which are able to penetrate a screen of destroyers. Hypothetically if the destroyers were able to stop 90% of all submarine penetrations while using conventional weapons and to stop 95% with nuclear weapons, a cost comparison of the two weapons could be done.
If the nuclear weapons were, say, 50% more costly than the conventional, it might be dispensed with, and the money saved could be used toward one more conventionally armed destroyer.
This terse summary of systems analysis drastically oversimplifies a sophisticated process in which many man- years were spent devising sets of scenarios believed to be representative of future conflicts, evaluating different tactics of offense and defense, and analyzing and simulating the outcomes. But it does make the point that, for procurement purposes, nuclear weapons are not treated so much as special weapons but as alternative possibilities for accomplishing the same tasks.
The case can be made that we would be better off treating naval tactical nuclear weapons as special weapons for procurement but as alternative possibilities operationally- The value of having nuclear weapons available tactically rs not the sum of the value of individual nuclear weapons but much more.
Consider air defense. If we do not have nuclear antiair weapons, an enemy attack could succeed by flying a number of aircraft close together, so that they all appeared as one blip on radar. This tactic adds to the element of surprise in the air attack, as the number of defensive aircraft needed is not known until late in the approach. If the defense has nuclear weapons, one shot at the cluster could eliminate the entire cluster, as opposed to only one aircrat downed per conventional shot. The clustering attack tactic is a good one only for a defender without nuclear antiair weapons. For one with nuclear defenses, a better attack strategy might be to approach sufficiently spread out so that a single nuclear weapon could only take out one aircraft at the most.
With the dispersed formation, both conventional and nuclear weapons might have the same effectiveness. But we should not conclude from this that we might as well
from
front
degree
1,11. VJVZIVV/liJIVjr U UUVIlblUl V* — p
the University of Toronto and a master’s deg* . jgjit
weapons, although suited to a tactical nuclear confrontation restricted to the sea, carry with them all the encumbrances associated with the threat of uncontrolled escalation that other nuclear weapons do.
Like their land and air counterparts, tactical nuclear ASW weapons are likely to remain within the U. S. Navy’s and NATO’s arsenal. Despite the technological and political constraints on their use, these weapons afford NATO the option of conducting, if necessary, a devastating campaign against Soviet submarines in the event a war goes nuclear and conventional ASW methods prove ineffective. Nuclear antisubmarine weapons bolster the West’s collective deterrent posture.
'U. S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Development Use and Control of Nuclear Energy for the Common Defense and Security and for Peaceful Purposes, Committee Print, Second Annual Report, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 148. 2U. S. Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Samuel
Glasston, Editor (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 55-59.
3Project Hartwell—A Report on Security of Overseas Transport, 21 September 1950. (Contract No. N5 or 07846). The study was done at the request of the Office of the U. S. Chief of Naval Operations. 4Ibid., Vol. I, p. A-10.
5Ibid., Vol. I, p. A-19.
6Norman Friedman, U. S. Naval Weapons (London: Donway Maritime Press, 1983), p. 130; Thomas B. Cochran, et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook,\ol. I, U. S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 8-9.
7U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966, Hearings, Part 4, “Procurement,” 89th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 254.
8Cochran, et al., p. 269.
9U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, Hearings, Part 6, “Research and Development,” 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 3, 426.
10U. S. Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs By Weapons Systems, Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1984), pp. 144-145.
1‘Leonard Beaton, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” New Scientist (No. 288, 24 May 1962), p. 393. 12Admiral Miller, U. S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Hearings,
First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving ^S^jng- ble Control, 94th Congress, 2nd Session ( a ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 197 ^ \,
13U. S. Department of the Navy, War At Sea, .flS p. 2, Appendix IV, p. IV-10. The full study * ^ classified, these quotations are from a sanitiz ^0Ce of extracts made available to the author by tl* wi of the Chief of Naval Operations under the r of Information Act.
14Operational Archives of the U. S. Navy, Co ^ File Post, 1 January 1946, U. S. Department^ Navy, Annual Report of the Commander ,n Atlantic Fleet, 1 July 1966-17 June 1967, PP‘ 150. gea,’
15William M. Arkin, “Nuclear Weapons g qc- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 39, N°- tober 1983), pp. 6-7.
Mr. Sokolsky received a bachelor of arts
—------------ j - - ----------------- eCipie>
Johns Hopkins University. He has been the ,gnse of the Canadian Department of National ^ Scholarship and is a NATO Fellow. He j0iins faculty of the Center of Canadian Studies, Hopkins School of Advanced Internationa of of Washington, D.C. He is now Assistant jjgs at Research at the Centre for Foreign Policy is
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Sco completing his doctorate in government at fe ifl University. He is the author of “Canada s NATO,” Proceedings, January 1980.
replace the nuclear weapons with cheaper, easier to handle conventional ones. The value of nuclear weapons in this scenario is not the sum of the effectiveness of the surface vessel’s magazine of nuclear weapons but the value of forcing a dispersion of enemy aircraft. Strangely enough, the advantage of nuclear antiair weapons does not even depend on how many of them are on board, so long as they exist.
Consider submarine antisubmarine warfare as another '•lustration. If the commander of a latest generation Soviet submarine were to hear the launch of a standoff weapon in the vicinity, he might be wise to take the evasive action °f diving to maximum depth and accelerating, provided that he knew there was a homing torpedo used as the payload of the standoff weapon. If the sub’s depth capability exceeds the torpedo’s capability, if the torpedo operates Poorly at these depths, or if the torpedo takes time to search to depth, the sub benefits from this evasion. Alternatively, if the commander knows the standoff weapon has a nuclear payload, he should take the sub to a near surface depth, where the presence of the free surface and the lessening of the overpressure reduce the likelihood of damage.
Is it a good decision to have a submarine loadout of cheaper, and more individually effective conventional standoff weapons only, even if the nuclear payload had a lower probability of damaging the target submarine? The value of having nuclear capability is not only in its effec- dveness but also comes from the confusion the enemy would have as to the proper response. We can also note foat the same argument stands against having a solely nuclear capability, even if the nuclear weapon is much more capable and cheaper. There is a synergism between nuclear and conventional weapons to be exploited.
A full suite of nuclear capability, paralleling that of conventional weaponry, is desirable, not from the simplistic systems analysis value of their individual effectiveness, but from the fact that our enemy’s options are constrained more by their existence, and our own options are increased. Procurement decisions should treat nuclear and conventional weapons separately and not as competitors.
We want to make sure that nuclear weapons, especially defensive ones, can be used when needed operationally, and that an enemy attack cannot force us to remain using conventional weapons only by disrupting the communications channels needed for nuclear release authorization.
We want to have tactics available with a good understanding of how to mix nuclear and conventional weapons to obtain maximum benefit from their synergism.
Finally, the United States and its Navy must realize that we no longer will be the only ones who will decide if a battle will involve conventional or nuclear weapons. Our procurement procedures and operational planning should reflect that fact.
Dr. Erickson received a doctorate degree in applied mathematics from MIT. He has worked as an operations research analyst attached to Headquarters. Naval Underwater Systems Center, and he is currently the head of the Naval Tactical Applications Unit of the Evaluation and Planning Program at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He is the author of “Balancing the Nuclear Attack” published in the September 1984 Proceedings.
fytilitary Justice in 1984
Eugene R. Fidell
Ilrt
If ■
1 naval history can be divided inti
I, n ---------- ill
lp “• Court of Military Appeals—an j r°fo of lawyers, both as military uu8es and as prosecutors and defense . asel, achieved new prominence. The
ihird
has just begun. Military justice-
ages (sail, steam, and nuclear), sc a Can military justice. The first age ol ih |Cr'can military justice came to an end . 951 when the Uniform Code of Mili- ^ Justice (UCMJ) and the 1951 Man- sq ^°r Courts-Martial took effect and i,Jlp*antcd the disciplinary systems that grown up separately in each of the forces.
er). second period began in 1951 and prj ed in 1984. During that phase, the "ciple0f civilian review of courts- (j^al took root—in the shape of the
the jiid
CQU „'•'nding naval justice—will never be
e same.
late 1983, Congress passed the firsi
comprehensive amendments to the UCMJ since 1968. The Military Justice Act of 1983 worked more dramatic changes in the military justice system than any legislation since the UCMJ was enacted more than 30 years earlier. The new legislation, much of which took effect on 1 August 1984, includes provisions that reduce substantially the power of court- martial convening authorities, who will no longer have to pass on legal issues in acting on courts-martial; their only obligation now will be to weigh the sentence’s appropriateness.
The new law also gives the prosecution a right of appeal from certain decisions of military judges, modeled after the government appeal provisions which apply to civilian federal prosecutions. It also eliminates certain steps in the review process when the accused affirmatively waives his appellate rights.
Many other changes were also enacted. The most important one authorizes the U. S. Supreme Court to review decisions of the Court of Military Appeals by writ of certiorari, which was never possible before. Previously, the only way a court- martial could be reviewed by the Supreme Court was if the accused applied to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus or brought an action in the Court of Claims (now the U. S. Claims Court). It is unlikely that the justices will agree to hear many court-martial appeals under the new procedure, but Congress’s recognition that military personnel should have direct appellate access to the highest court in the land will have tremendous symbolic importance. The fact that decisions of the Court of Military Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court is also likely to lead to greater care in the preparation of decisions in the military
1969
This will prevent the occurrence
longed discrepancies between the ^a al’s terms and the decisions of the c° ^ These annual updates will presurnab )
court. The new legislation brings the United States into step with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, each of which has for some time authorized appeals directly from the highest military tribunal to the highest national court.
Also significant in the new legislation is the fact that Congress has recognized the importance of public input into the military justice system. Under the 1983 act, two civilian members have been added to the so-called Code Committee, which historically consisted of the three judges of the Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates General. Congress empowered the Secretary of Defense to name these public members and suggested that the committee should meet publicly at least some of the time. The
Accused Vietnam deserter PFC Robert Garwood: Is this case headed for the Supreme Court?
Code Committee had refused to do this in the past.
While the 1983 legislation was working its way through Congress, the services were laboring on a massive revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial. This task was completed with issuance of a 1984 manual which is the first new Manual for Courts-Martial since 1969 and, in many respects, the first fresh look at the subject since the 1951 Manual. The drafters produced a tome that largely draws on the civilian federal model, providing the background discussion and analysis that service lawyers will require in order to provide high quality legal assistance, whether as trial or defense counsel.
The 1984 Manual abandons any pretense that it is addressed to lay officers, which confirms a change in military justice in the years since the UCMJ was enacted. The system is one in which personnel who are not lawyers have a far more limited role to play than in the past. Opinions on this evolution are certain to vary, but the new Manual and the 1983 amendments to the code combine to confirm the primacy of lawyers in the administration of military justice. Despite the changes, non-legal personnel cannot wash their hands of military justice. Far
from it, since the military jury system will continue—unless Congress change* that, too—and commanders will sti have a substantial role in deciding ho* cases should be treated. Now every of1 cer will have reason to familiarize him self or herself with the arrangements.
From the lawyers’ point of view, 1984 Manual will almost certainly ^ easier to use once the military bench an bar become familiar with it through expe rience. Its introduction will have a ‘ Ieve ling” effect, since more senior personn who have had long years of experten with the 1969 edition will now be on a equal footing with junior judge adv cates. The junior judge advocate may even have a practical advantage m 1 the legal doctrines articulated in the Ma ual more closely resemble the clV1’ federal procedures and substantive a^ the junior officer studied more recently law school.
The new Manual subtly, and Per^a^e unintentionally, expands the power ot Court of Military Appeals. Although “discussion” can be accepted or rejec by the courts. Because the doctrines were previously found in the oblig3' portions of the 1969 Manual have 110 ^ been relegated to the “discussion P ^ tions of the new manual, the Court Military Appeals and the service C°u of Military Review arguably have m° freedom to announce rules of decisi The process by which the new Man^ emerged is as important as the end-pr uct. Although the Military Rules of ^ dence were circulated for public c ^ ment before they were promulgated President Ronald Reagan, the 1984 Ma^ ual is the first complete manual to be leased to the public for comment- Carter and Reagan administrations serve to be commended for this reto Like the addition of public members^ the Code Committee, the change ret c a recognition on the part of those resp sible for administration of the mm justice system that the public has an i est in the system and has somethin? , contribute. While the comments recei on the draft of the 1984 Manual V fewer than might have been hoped, did have an impact on the final pr° s. Also, the Executive Order by which ident Reagan promulgated the new **
ual calls for automatic annual upda
of Pf0
Serious questions have arisen in con- g",l0n w*th the urinalysis testing proper ®ne disturbing case that reached alio 0Urt °f Military Appeals involved an . gation that a command had abused shi'C*e ^ by transferring a sailor to a I>ad an<^ tI’en taking him to mast after he den I)reva'Ied on a suppression of evi- )„ C.e motion at a general court-martial divvi °re' aPPeals court judges were tj ' ed as to whether they had jurisdic- acl: and declined to take corrective Cn- ^he opinions leave little doubt, lot eVer’ t*lat the underlying facts were Of *n keeping with the highest traditions aaval justice.
eS(. Unal area of current litigation inter- fra-ln each branch of the armed services is itemization. Perhaps because of the °th 6aSe °I women in uniform, or for incr rfasons, such cases are becoming easingly common. One wonders
C|rculated both within and outside the arttled services for comment.
A third important development is the change of personnel on the Court of Mili- jfty Appeals. On a court that has only ee members, any change of judges can .ave a significant and often unpredictable ^Pact on legal doctrine. The Court of aitary Appeals has been particularly ard hit by personnel turbulence over the 'eears- In 1984, Judge William H. Cook hred, reducing the court to a bare quo- jrm- Another judge, Albert B. Fletcher, sr > was taken ill, and Cook agreed to .rve for several more months as a “se- a’r judge” to fill in until Walter Thomp- ^n Cox III was appointed by President cea8an during the summer. Because the 0jUrt has been closely divided on issues l 8reat importance, the new judge will hatched closely.
ext^16 military Justice system is facing (L ra°rdinary challenges. In addition to Institutional changes, difficult legal d policy questions are arising with a Sep,dity and urgency that have not been l9sV°r many years- F°r example, in late v.. ’ the Court of Military Appeals in- er jdated the murder death penalty; sev- Jj montIls Iater the Manual was fee°ded in an effort to remedy the de- tQCt vahdity of that change is open ^Question. Allegations of command in- ence are no longer as rare as they once q re and are being scrutinized closely.
Cqestions of ethical conduct by both 0unsel and judges are being raised; in (^ capital case, a judge of the Navy “tine Corps Court of Military Review to Parently improperly caused a secretary e ®nter surreptitiously the appellate gov- cre?ent counsel’s office to obtain set* y a copy of the counsel’s oral argu- ent notes.
lectj
whether the criminal process is the most appropriate way of dealing with officer- enlisted relationships.
The period of ferment is not over. As part of the 1983 legislation, Congress called for establishment of an advisory commission, consisting of both military and civilian members, to make recommendations on a broad range of additional suggested changes to the military justice system. The commission held several days of hearings and disseminated a questionnaire eliciting suggestions from the field. Among other things, the commission has been asked to address the desirability of providing some form of tenure in office for military judges, a high priority reform which has been suggested by many observers over the years and which Congress is likely to enact next time it focuses on the subject. Also under review is the need to expand sentencing powers of the special court-martial and possibly authorize courts-martial or military judges to suspend sentences.
No one has a crystal ball telling the future of the military justice system, but I would like to offer a number of predictions and one suggestion. It seems likely that the process by which military and civilian criminal law have come to resemble one another will continue. The only questions are whether the process will gain speed and what role the Supreme Court will take given its new powers. Unfortunately, it is likely that the civilian community, including the bar, will continue to pay little attention to the military justice system except in those isolated cases which attract the media.
The various branches of the service will probably consolidate certain of their legal functions. Do we really need a separate law review for each armed service? Cannot basic military justice instruction of judge advocates also be consolidated?
I believe the entire fabric of military justice will become less fixated on rote trial procedures and more concerned with achieving substantial justice and ensuring the sound exercise of discretion, particularly once some of the weaker institutional aspects of the system have been shored up (namely, conferring tenure upon our military review and the Court of Military Appeals).
Eventually Congress can be expected to centralize in the Court of Military Appeals review of certain military actions outside the military justice sphere, such as administrative discharge matters. Finally, greater attention will probably be paid in the coming years to what might be called the “back end” of the military justice system—military correctional programs. This area has received little out
side attention in the past, and the Court of Military Appeals has, even more than the federal district courts, resisted efforts to be drawn into matters of prison administration.
Only time will tell whether these prophecies are sound. What seems clear is that the process of change will continue, and those responsible for administration of the military justice system will need all the tools available to make sure any changes are sensible and appropriate. An appellate court cannot do the job simply by salting its options with suggestions to the Judge Advocates General and Congress. Nor should the judges become involved in shaping legislation. The Judge Advocates General cannot do the job without a more substantial, permanent military justice research arm—an inhouse “think tank”—than that which is currently available through the Joint-Service Committee on Military Justice.
The time has come to establish a National Institute of Military Justice with adequate legal, social science, and corrections personnel resources to do the job. Such an entity should exist at the Department of Defense level, with input, of course, from the Coast Guard, and should perform functions analogous to those performed by the civilian National Institute of Military Justice (in the Justice Department), the Federal Judicial Center and the Vera Institute of Justice (a pioneering private research foundation).
In the past, dialogue between military and civilian attorneys concerning military justice was impeded by the unwillingness of those defending the system to acknowledge its shortcomings and the reluctance of others to see its strengths. Probably this will never fully change, but the cooperation that marked the fashioning of the Military Justice Act of 1983 and the issuance of the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial offers some hope that the dialogue can be conducted on a higher plane in the future. While the latest changes tend to diminish the role of nonlawyers in the justice system, the system should no more become isolated from its larger military community than it should become isolated from the civilian legal community. Lawyers and non-lawyers alike have an obligation to prevent that from happening.
Mr. Fidell holds degrees from Queens College and Harvard Law School. He was also graduated from the U. S. Naval Justice School and served on active duty in the U. S. Coast Guard from 1969-72. He is a partner in the Washington. D.C., law firm of Boas- berg, Klores, Feldesman & Tucker, and has represented the American Civil Liberties Union in the U. S. Court of Military Appeals since 1973.