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Mth u
tea —“j icscaicncu anu pooriy wrn-
|hors |tW° j°urnaIists- Although the au- iiW- m t0 have conducted numerous 'ews as supplements to Garwood’s
Conversations with the Enemy: '"e Story of PFC Robert ^rwood
v"** Groom and Duncan Spencer. New $ifirLG p- Putnam’s Sons, 1983. 411 pp. *6-93 ($15.25).
^viewed by Lieutenant Colonel Merrill 1 artlett, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
PrisV^79> many Americans were sur- ed by the news that a U. S. Marine frc^ Private first class had emerged andm 14 years of captivity in Vietnam, Poll Wondered how this could happen, the n'"8 the u- s- withdrawal in 1973, offi • Vietnamese had assured U. S. (C's that all living prisoners of war the *7 had been accounted for. Even tgj re§'me in Hanoi continued efforts to andCe the list of those missing in action, thf. ,rfturn the remains of those killed to e United States.
,hny°ne serving an intelligence tour
OOntu uoiuicm pun or
tjjji- Vietnam in the late 1960s was fa- with the name “Bobby Garni^ ' The man was a shadowy, figure, haVpSt 3 Iegend; and although 15 years the ^assed since I first heard the name, rjesreading of this book stirs old memo- rear Garwood was a jeep driver for a be 'echelon unit—hardly in a position to 0nCgaPtUred by the enemy. More than tern ’ heard his name mentioned at in- 'v0rk^nCe briefings as an American Viet mg for the enemy- During a North c0mnat»ese Army (NVA) attack on the \ja .riland Post of a battalion in the First Opg ne Regiment, Garwood supposedly l9gg3ted with the attacking forces. By fain ’ ae was thought to be more Viet- by aS\ ^an '^rner’can> and was known U. § **e'namese name. On occasion, "'ear Servicemen reported sighting a man 'ng fatigues, acting strangely, and 'ary lngout of place near American mili- Positions. Garwood was identified Photographs as that individual. S,o:s hook is Garwood’s side of the
version of the story, they do not list their sources. The lack of evidence other than the accused’s often self-serving account suggests that the authors failed to obtain access to the Department of Defense files on Garwood and other suspected collaborators captured in South Vietnam during the Indochina conflict.
According to Garwood, he was cap-
Private First Class Robert Garwood, U. S. Marine Corps, was convicted in 1981 of collaboration with the enemy after spending 14 years behind enemy lines during the Vietnam War.
tured by a local Vietcong unit while driving a jeep from the headquarters of the Third Marine Division (then near Da Nang) to Marble Mountain. Anyone familiar with the terrain and situation must question this account of his capture, considering the stretch of road in question was a relatively safe and well-traveled route. Nonetheless, the military judge threw out the charge of desertion at Garwood’s general court-martial conducted upon his return to the United States.
Garwood spent the first of his many years of captivity in a series of jungle
camps west of Da Nang with other American and South Vietnamese soldiers, whose numbers greatly increased after the Tet Offensive in 1968. Ill-fed with little medical care, Garwood survived life in the dismal camps, while most other POWs perished. And yet, although his captors released prisoners on occasion as part of good-will propaganda gestures, Garwood turned down his opportunities to be one of those released.
At his court-martial, Garwood was accused and convicted of collaborating with the enemy. Although he claims to have received no training in the Code of Conduct (one of the first classes at Marine Corps recruit training) or in survival techniques in captivity (taught to all Marine Corps personnel during basic infantry indoctrination), Garwood demonstrated a street-wise adaptability in this life-threatening situation. He learned to eat whatever he could lay his hands on including uncooked sweet potatoes, rats, and the high protein, pungent fish sauce used on rice by natives of Southeast Asia, which many of his fellow POWs could not eat. But while Garwood may have remembered that maxim from survival training, “Eat everything no matter how bad it tastes,” he forgot another important edict: “When you make that first awful step toward collaboration with your captors, the rest is all downhill.” According to the authors, Garwood demonstrated an uncanny ability to learn the Vietnamese language. Before long, he replaced the camp interpreter, a casualty of the Tet Offensive. Interpreting led to Garwood’s elevation to that of a POW of “progressive status,” and he remained separated from his fellow prisoners, quickly becoming an outcast from the other Americans. According to testimony at his trial, Garwood operated a battery- powered megaphone to urge U. S. servicemen to come over to the side of the enemy, and at times carried a weapon, an Ak-47. Numerous American servicemen passed through the several jungle camps where Garwood served his captivity, including one U. S. Army physician who later testified for the prosecution at Gar-
wood’s court-martial.
When the United States began to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam in 1972-73, Garwood found himself being moved north along the legendary Ho Chi Minh trail to North Vietnam. According to Garwood, he never came in contact with another American POW after that time, and spent his days managing a motor pool of captured equipment. At this point, Garwood’s tangled tale becomes increasingly incredulous. It seems doubtful that an ex-Marine Corps private who only once served as a driver of jeeps and trucks would possess the skills necessary to perform in such a capacity. Yet Garwood and the authors would have us believe that was why he was never returned with the other prisoners.
Garwood claims to have become involved in the growing black market of captured U. S. goods that flourished in Vietnam after the end of the war. During these ventures into Hanoi, Garwood made two attempts to contact U. S. authorities; the second try worked. When the news of Garwood’s existence made the papers, worldwide interest and pressures ensured that the Vietnamese authorities would release him. But when Garwood walked off the aircraft in Bangkok to return to U. S. jurisdiction, he was confronted with a warning under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, instead of the warm homecoming he had expected.
During his brief return to military duty and his subsequent trial, Garwood experienced difficulty in speaking English, and in performing the most rudimentary functions common to Westerners—the years in the jungle had taken their toll. Garwood was given a dishonorable discharge and denied his back pay for the period of captivity, totaling more than $140,000, which has remained frozen by the Marine Corps. Unlike other POWs, he was never promoted in captivity, and his legal fees are unpaid. Today, he pumps gas at a service station in northern Virginia, a lonely casualty of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War.
The Garwood story could be the basis for a good book, however, this account is not a good attempt. Although one of the authors claims to have served as a U. S. Army officer in Vietnam, the writing in this book reveals an unforgivable igno-
Weary Marines of A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, participate in a search and clear mission on the south side of the Perfume River, after heavy fighting in the old Imperial capital city of Hue.
ranee about the military and the U. S. Marine Corps in particular. The lack of background information on the Vietnamese, the Vietcong, and the North Vietnamese Army is equally disturbing.
The authors’ premise is that Bobby Garwood is a hapless victim of U. S. imperialism in Southeast Asia. While they might not say it as bluntly, the message is clear. The anti-military bias is at its worst in the chapters on Garwood’s return to military control. The military lawyers involved in the Garwood case receive a criticism consistent with this general bias. Marines stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the natives of nearby Jacksonville will also not appreciate the authors’ irrelevant criticism of that area.
Despite its glaring errors and omissions, this book should be read; it is doubtful if anyone else will seize on the Garwood case and attempt to write another publishable account. Sadly, the Garwood story will probably serve to raise false hopes for the families of those servicemen still missing in action in the jungles of Southeast Asia.
The Battle for Hue: Tet 1968
Keith William Nolan. Novato, CA: Presid>° Press, 1983. 201 pp. Maps. Photos. BibInd. $14.95. ($13.45).
Reviewed by Eric McAllister Smith
The fighting that took place in the Imperial capital city of Hue during 1968 Tet Offensive was not a strictly tr^ ditional battle, but was a grinding h°uS)s to-house struggle between individua^ and small, often-isolated groups of s° diers. For different reasons, both North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and U. S. Marine Corps were unable to ploy all of their heavy weapons, and n ther side could assemble or maneu large units through the confining cl streets. . ^
The contest for Hue was atypical o ^ kind of guerrilla warfare waged in * nam. Not only was Hue an urban ba ground in a predominantly rural war’ ^ it was also the setting for one of the sustained confrontations between reg U. S. and NVA forces. ..e
As difficult as the battle is to descry ^ it is even more difficult to analyze ^ conventional military context—-a dl ma clearly reflected in this account-
In the best tradition of military h'slA ians like S. L. A. Marshall, 20-year
yet recor<fs of the attack on Hue are as c| unavailable, U. S. intelligence, in- 'nte caPtured documents and prisoner hav^0®31'011 rePorts, for instance, should roJ",been used to give a more well- ded view of the action at Hue.
by ',S seiective view is again narrowed 1 the ■ ■
author’s self-admitted bias:
>he
tAJlmjnrv • . / ’ ulJUr
Noia8 ln a historian. Consequently, Wjtfjn bas failed to provide the reader ■■ ^a truly objective, critical account of attle. He does not discuss alternative
O* that might have reduced Marine t;~ a hes at Hue and, with a few excep-
s Previously reported in detail only by
fUtlvor Keith Nolan approaches the battle v°r "ue from the infantryman’s point of >ew. Combining interviews with re- j rnec* veterans and official Marine Corps °cuments, Nolan pieces together a grip- anrig day‘by-day account of the bloody frustrating battle waged for the city nroughout February 1968.
Nolan’s colorful writing style enhances
tim rCadabllity °f tbe book, though at C(. es bis choice of words comes close to Rmicwbo°k prose; too often machine
“al^h *'0se down” tbe*r tar8ets> while alw breaks ^oose’ ’ over Marines who en ayS, manage t0 “blow away” the blv^y 1 §0°ks.” This approach is proba- auth’ to the influential jargon of the cor s interviewees, whose generation ba(ated its own vivid and distinctive com- V; Vernacular to go with and explain the le'nam War.
fiat ,°Wever’ like the battle itself, The th 1e f°r Hue quickly bogs down. Alp Ugh a war story is told best from the sto 'HCipants’ viewpoint, it is better under- be °d from a perspective more compre- to SlVe than Nolan supplies. His attempt
seai!uCe the agon'zing progress of this conf •’ confusing fight is made more siv ?SmS by his inclusion of an exces- aCre lsting of unfamiliar places, military • cnymSj an(j interesting, but frequently pVant details.
arther, the book lacks the enemy’s Nvf«>ve °n the battle. Vietcong and laj. troops appear primarily as pop-up ^ets for the Marines. Though official
lt) hen I was growing up,” Nolan says e preface, “the Vietnam War was both treated hke a dirty word. ... It ipeere(l me that so many of our country - So f Coul<f have suffered so greatly, and to s?w Care about it.” He wrote this book tip. °w what the American grunt went poSeU?h in Vietnam. Though such a pur- Nm;!? laudable in a patriot, it is disap- strat,
cas
*‘sted presents Marine officers and en- libiea men in an unrealistic light as infal-
^r-‘“6uiis oi maniai virtue, defj e.^a,t/e/or Hue is nonetheless the tv4s ’dve study to date on a battle that
the press. But details, however fascinating, are not enough; the story of an engagement is not just an accumulation of its facts. Such reporting is strictly journalism. To succeed on a historic level, the battle must be presented and evaluated from as many perspectives as the military historian is able to supply.
Nolan relates the story of Hue from an important but limited perspective, and thus his book is a success on the level of journalism, but not of history.
Eric Smith was an Army intelligence officer in Vietnam. He earned his law degree from Georgetown University in 1972 before becoming an artist and columnist for The Capital, in Annapolis, Maryland.
U. S. Naval Developments
Jan S. Breemer. Baltimore, Md: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1984. 194 pp. Notes. Ind. Tables. Illus. $19.95 ($17.95).
Warships of the U. S. Navy
Samuel L. Morison and John S. Rowe. New York: Jane’s Publishing, Inc., 1983. 242 pp. Notes. Ind. Tables. Illus. $19-95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Captain W. Spencer Johnson, U. S. Navy
These books, handsomely illustrated and printed, strive to bring the reader up to date on the development and force structure of the U. S. Navy. To the civilian reader not particularly well acquainted with the U. S. Navy, they may seem to achieve their purpose well. But to the naval professional, both will prove a disappointment.
In U. S. Naval Developments, Jan Breemer attempts to trace the development of U. S. naval policy, strategy, and force structure from the end of World War II to the present. His treatment of this broad topic includes: the internal and external forces that have shaped the Navy during the past 40 years; strategy and doctrinal development in response to a changing threat; organization, administration, operations, forces, and missions; designing and buying warships; manning the fleet; and three current issues—large- versus small-deck carriers, nuclear and conventional war at sea, and Navy-Air Force cooperation in maritime operations. To all of these subjects, Breemer devotes a mere 96 pages of text, leaving much unsaid in an effort to encompass a host of complex topics within a very short space.
Breemer employs conjecture, opinions, and less-than-objective viewpoints to set up straw men from which arguments are derived with frustratingly little
analysis. Several instances illustrate this point.
The author devotes a lengthy discussion to the disruptive, rival division of the Navy officer corps into unions of surface, submarine, and aviation communities, each attempting to shape the Navy in its respective image. He notes that the most prestigious commands have usually gone to aviators, and that the accession of a nuclear-trained submariner to the office of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) seems to blackshoes and brownshoes alike “tantamount to having the Pope run the White House.” Only one paragraph later, Breemer ends the discussion by concluding that “the informal system of checks and balances among the three unions has worked,” citing only that, “the self interest of each is tempered by a recognition that its own welfare, and that of the Navy, as a whole, is dependent on that of others.”
The author makes no mention that the Navy’s leadership has always been confronted with the same problem- producing the balanced fleet necessary to defend our national interests against a varying threat and with limited resources. Those occupying the office of CNO and other key positions in the resource allocation process have seen their duty clearly and performed it well. These leaders have placed the national interest first when making their force structure decisions, rather than supporting the parochial interests of their warfare communities—a leaning Breemer would have us believe is their natural bent.
To cite another example, Breemer notes that the 1982 Navy-Air Force memorandum of agreement on cooperative efforts in maritime operations was “greeted with skepticism,” and “is little more than empty words to allay congressional impatience with what is seen as wasteful duplication of effort for selfish and parochial reasons.” After two pages devoted to recounting the various reasons why Air Force-Navy operational collaboration may be an abortive effort (citing differences in service doctrines that contribute to resource allocation turf fights, a history of past inter-service rivalry, etc!), Breemer tells us: “The need for joint Navy-Air Force maritime operations is readily acknowledged by the unified theater commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual services, and the Department of Defense.”
What he fails to mention is that the cooperative agreement was in fact a Navy initiative to strengthen the U. S. maritime capability to thwart the growing Soviet naval air threat, and the threat posed by their surface ships and submarines armed
vember 1941, to determine “ho'v
force, compel, goad, or trick Japan
into
ssage
with
and China and break off relations
Germany—-“a drastic war ultiniatwn^
drat.
the Japanese government for the sole pu
according to Fish, in the catalog
sionist historians’ “pro-war” Pe°P.g46, In a book first published in American Foreign Policy in the , .0es
with cruise missile weapon systems. If the Air Force was capable of making a major contribution toward this end, then it was to the benefit of our overall defense interest that such an agreement be struck.
Further research or analysis would have convinced Breemer that the cooperative agreement has resulted in the development of joint doctrine, procedures, equipment acquisition, and training which has greatly enhanced our fighting posture at sea without necessitating an increase in defense expenditure. The foregoing argument has been tested and re-tested in joint exercises at sea in the Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, and Indian Ocean. The author’s skepticism is not justified, particularly since the Navy-Air Force memorandum of agreement has achieved significant results, and has served as a model for an Army-Air Force agreement concerning air-land warfare.
The remainder of Breemer’s book is devoted to appendices and tables describing the current ship, aircraft, weapons, and electronics systems that comprise the U. S. Navy. Unfortunately, many of the photographs are dated, and some of the dates provided are no longer current. This portion of the book, like previous sections, contains errors in fact and omissions that prove irritating, at best, to the reader well versed in naval affairs. U. S. Naval Developments could have been a far more enriching book had more time and space been devoted to the subjects selected, and had more careful research, analysis, and proofreading been applied.
Warships of the U. S. Navy is equally flawed. Here the authors’ intent is to provide photographs and textual data on the ships that make up the U. S. Navy and its supporting elements. Unfortunately, some of the photographs used are more than 30 years old, and many of the ships they depict no longer have the characteristics shown. For example, the full-page photograph of the Barbel (SS-580) pictures her with bow planes rather than the sail planes she has carried for more than two decades. Other ships are shown with sensors, weapon systems, and upperwork configurations that no longer illustrate their current appearance.
Accompanying data have not been cross-checked, and, consequently, cannot be relied upon for accuracy. Fleet tugs, for instance, are described as having one diesel engine rather than four, and other ships are credited as having gunnery systems that were removed long ago. A new class of nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, CGN-42, prominently occupies an entire page with a detailed description of her Aegis weapon system, and the statement that the first units of the class are projected for fiscal year 1986, with two additional units to be completed in fiscal year 1987 and fiscal year 1988. Alas, this class ship was never funded and, in fact, had disappeared from Navy planning tables well before the publication date of the book.
Commendably, Morison and Rowe have included in their book a discussion of commissioned auxiliary vessels, ships of the Military Sealift Command (MSC), both chartered and owned by the Navy, Coast Guard vessels, and ships laid up under the direction of the Maritime Administration. Unfortunately for the reader, these ships are interspersed in the chapter on auxiliaries rather than separated by category. A later chapter on the MSC lists those ships in the nucleus fleet, and those chartered for MSC operations and the Rapid Deployment Force; the latter listings comprising acknowledged perishable data. Perhaps this is where the photographs and descriptions of auxiliaries which are chartered or civilian manned should be placed. The complete coverage of service craft is limited to self-propelled units, submersibles, and other specialized craft; it is also a little surprising to find no mention of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration fleet.
While much of the descriptive textual material is informative and stimulating, some of the subject matter, such as the detailed description of the April 1981 collision of the George Washington (SSN-598) with a Japanese merchant vessel in the East China Sea, complete with the findings of the subsequent investigation, seems out of place in this book. The damaging of the Guitarro (SSN-665) while under construction at Mare Island in May 1969 is also similarly described.
In summary, Warships of the U. S. Navy is a readable, enjoyable book on U. S. Navy warships. This reviewer only wishes that the advancement of the publication deadline acknowledged in the foreword had not occurred, and thereby have allowed greater time for the authors to do a more thorough job of cross-checking and editing their material. Hopefully, the later deadline would have also helped them procure more up-to-date photographs of the ships they catalog. As a consequence, this book is not in the same class with other reliable reference works on U. S. Navy ships, such as Combat Fleets of the World (U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1984), Jane’s Fighting Ships (Jane’s, 1984), or the similar Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet (U. S. Naval Institute Press, 1984).
Captain Johnson, a 1963 graduate of the U. S. Naval
Academy, holds an MA and MALD fr0in . Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts versity, and has served as commanding officer in ^ USS Bigelow (DD-942). He is currently serving a special assistant in the Office of the Secretary o Navy, and is the Navy Fellow at the Heritage 0 dation in Washington, D.C.
Tragic Deception: FDR & America’s Involvement in Won War II
Hamilton Fish. Old Greenwich, CT: Dev'n Adair, 1983. 119 pp. $12.95.
Reviewed by Robert D. Haslach
In Tragic Deception, Mr. Han1'*1® Fish has presented slim evidence in sUP_ port of a charge that Franklin D. R00^ velt was personally responsible f°r Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Hat ^ According to the author, President sevelt held a secret meeting of his cabinet at the White House on 25
war. ’ ’ The ultimate means was a I11CS . ^ sent to Japan on 26 November w * a demanded that Japan vacate Indoc _k
pose of forcing Japan, like a cornere to fight and fire the first shot." ,r. Fish writes that FDR’s clandestine ^ eign policy “spurned the Congress created a near dictatorship. It disavo ^ our Declaration of Independence, w repudiated the divine right of any man to declare war.” Secretary ot y (during both World Wars I and II)
L. Stimson, who supposedly atte - that meeting, also holds a special P^vj.
1932-1940: A Study in Response (The Shoe String Press, 1968), al^ je, Charles A. Beard suggested that at ^ cret Hyde Park meeting held in Jjn ^ 1933, President-elect Roosevelt _ ,
Stimson, then President Hoover s ^ tary of State, came to a meeting ^js minds when Mr. Roosevelt accept6 imperialist and internationalist ' policy, especially with regard to jt and Japan. Beard wrote that R°oS ;o was compelled by domestic p0}1 _uaf- dissemble his true policies until his f antine Speech in Chicago on 5 1937, when he let the cat out of t’lt'p0o' However, Beard did not assert Mr- pearl sevelt’s personal responsibility f°r Harbor.
Fish could have rested his ca . j,ut this direct assertion in a short arti
tCg . .
\] investigate the authenticity of the documents referred to in the Ger- Book. Fish told the press, “I
?tyyn it---------- “
ork Times reporter that the greatest
°se instead to amplify his own role in 'st°ry in a book which rambles from fo°rlnt to point, but primarily is a forum r his own noninterventionist views. ^>sh suggests that:
he United States was wrong to op- lrSe *he German and Japanese shock °ops who were actually intent on de- «mg communism.
Acts of aggression among nations are a ■ ct °f history, and history has shown that he past, the United States has not in- ered when countries such as England, sefnCe’ haly, Russia, and Germany lie?ed colonies. (Fish overlooks the Al- tio 'ntervent>on *n the Russian revolu- jj-jh’ and no doubt would have approved th afan ^ seized French Indochina and rej- 'etherlands’ East Indies if they had sj lsted Japan’s attempts to seize control, plr|Ce -*apan “had no design on the Philip- ^ 50r on any of our possessions.”) tr hhe Japanese would have signed any
south and st0PPed any aggression to the 0f, ” if they had been assured peacefully cUy’ng rice and oil without which they d not exist as a first class nation.” Coot only do documents freely available Son,tradict Fish’s last two assertions, but rev- ° l^e historical facts to be found in a tjjjlew °f the decade of the 1930s. To put lot H°°k in PersPective, it should be hae° ihat this is not the first time Fish bef s°ught to take President Roosevelt •hep6 tlle court of Pnhlic opinion. When the ern>an White Book on the causes of fishWar W3S Pnhiished in March 1940, ip(r hsed that document as an occasion to °duce a resolution in Congress to Bm,ehch U. S. Ambassador William C. irta 'tl anc* President Roosevelt for havEn ,made secret understandings with the a glsh> French, and Poles in support of p?r with Germany.
on | actually introduced a resolution I(e ^Pril 1940, calling for the House of Preservatives to form a select commit- ft, ' UOCll
?chiK - ■ ■
Offj 1 conceive that the German Foreign should fabricate or forge docu- ttianS’ as it is in the interest of the Ger- iw,,. 8°vernment to maintain peaceful P'ons with us.”
HjypaPs the key to Fish’s world view e found in his search for both infor- O and allies in his battle against
> vvhUnism:
f(jre he was in Berlin just weeks be- v invasi°n of Poland, Fish told a
htigpr - -
Pr0^ Was that the communists would C an incident in connection with Unity’s Danzig question that would ash war’s furies. And this statement
was made before his meeting with von Ribbentrop, which he describes in the book.
► Six years earlier, in 1933, Fish’s name was listed as a sponsor in a book printed in Germany and distributed in the United States. The book, which contained an introductory quote from Adolf Hitler, led neatly to the main theme: the Nazis had saved Germany from Bolshevism.
► Two years earlier, in 1931, Fish was Chairman of the House Select Committee to Investigate Communist Propaganda.
► Fish’s collaboration with secret Nazi propaganda agent George Sylvester Viereck, dating from at least 1937, was revealed at Viereck’s 1942 trial, partly from the testimony of Fish’s own administrative assistant, George Hill.
There are hints in Tragic Deception that Fish believes that a fair number of Mr. Roosevelt’s advisors and officials, and perhaps Mr. Roosevelt himself, were witting or unwitting agents of international communism. If so, then Fish has succeeded only in making a tentative start to another book. But to pin his argument that Mr. Roosevelt bears personal responsibility for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the evidence he presents is a tragic deception, indeed.
Mr. Haslach is an American working as the information officer at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Washington, D.C. He is an historian specializing in Dutch studies who has published numerous articles on World War 11 and intelligence subjects.
Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920-1940
Kenneth Clifford. Laurens, NY: Edgewood, Inc., 1983. $11.00.
Reviewed by Captain Paul Melshen, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
Colonel Ken Clifford, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, the foremost historian on the developmental history of amphibious warfare, has written a classic book on the subject. Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 19201940 is a detailed account of amphibious technical and doctrinal evolutions. He assesses amphibious development in Britain and the United States during the interwar period and lays to rest several of the myths that historians have perpetuated on the subject in post-World War II writing.
One of the myths the book dispels is the idea that, because of its disastrous Gallipoli campaign in World War I, Britain had abandoned the concept of the amphibious assault against a hostile shore. In fact, the opposite was true. Immediately following World War I, students at the Staff College suggested revising the existing Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913. Subsequent revisions ultimately resulted in the Manual of Combined Operations, 1938. Also by 1938, Britain had created its Interservice Training and Development Center and had reevaluated the Royal Marines’ role.
Another myth the book shatters is that, considering the U. S. Army’s amphibious operations in Europe during World War II, there had been a separate development of the art by the different services within the United States during the interwar period. Clifford emphasizes that amphibious warfare doctrine was a responsibility assigned solely to the U. S. Marine Corps. The Tentative Landing Operations Manual, 1935, the product of U. S. Marine Corps research and development, was published by the U. S. Navy as Fleet Training Publication 167 in 1938, and was published by the U. S. Army as Army Field Manual 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores. U. S. Marine Corps-established doctrine was used by all of the U. S. services during World War II.
British and U. S. amphibious doctrine developed separately, but as Colonel Clifford concludes:
“The level of proficiency reached by the British and Americans to conduct successful amphibious assaults in any theatre were by no means a lucky wartime coincidence. What was remarkable was the fact that quite apart from one another, Britain and America, for different reasons, each developed an amphibious doctrine that fundamentally was identical to the other.”
Colonel Clifford has done meticulous research of both U. S. and British documents and has interviewed key participants of the period, plus noted historians of the two Marine Corps. These participants and historians include such men as Louis, Earl Mountbatten of Burma and Lieutenant Colonel William Parker,
U. S. Marine Corps Reserve. Clifford has written a book which is both a scholarly work and a rare insight into an important era in amphibious warfare.
Captain Melshen is currently a research student at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, and serves with Fleet Marine Forces Europe (Designate) in London.
131
gs / December 1984
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
and Arms to the Third World: An malysis of the Distribution and Impact of S. Official Transfers
the
criteria used in distributing U. S. transfer
hina Policy For the Next Decade: import of the Atlantic Council’s 0,nmittee on China Policy
Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard, and Alfred ’Ihelm, Jr., Editors. Boston, MA: Oelgeschlager, . unn, & Hain, Publishers, 1984. 445 pp. Gloss.
, “>«. Ind. $27.50 ($24.75) (hardcover). $12.50 ’■25) (paper).
0 r\
■ McKinlay and A. Mughan. New York: St. "’Win’s Press, 1984. 282 pp. Notes. Ind.
^PPend. Tables. $37.50 ($33.75).
Transfers,” as used in the subtitle, refers to ec°nomic aid, military assistance, and arms Sales provided to the so-called “Third World” na’ions of the world. Although the book concentrates on U. S. transfers, those of the °viet Union, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and France are also discussed. The book ana- the effects of transfers on the receiving na’ions and on the realization of the delivering 1a’ions’ foreign policy goals. It also reviews
assets.
^hierica Looks to the Sea: Ocean Use and the National Interest
^°uglas L. Brooks. Boston, MA: Jones and artlett Publishers, 1984. 266 pp. Notes. Ind. ^PPend. Tables. $13.00.
n #
overing a plethora of topics encompassing ’shore mineral exploration, coastal zone '’’anagement, defense aspects of the sea, mer- "ant shipping, maritime law, and environ- ental pollution, this book was written by a °rmer Executive Director of the National dvisory Committee on Oceans and Amici'®61^. Intended for use as a college textbook, ..e presentation is both factual and motiva- °nal in nature, and is a good source book for nyone with an interest in ocean science.
, Claimed by Richard Nixon as “by far the „.s’ statement on this subject I have read,” ,ls collection of writings by many experts in e field of Chinese relations is a thorough halysis of current Chinese policy that offers a hiber of cogent recommendations for the (. ’ure. Chapters include treatises on the relap Pship between the People’s Republic of Pina and Taiwan, the question of U. S. arms I *es to China, and Chinese relations with var- [3*s other nations of the world, among others. ^°nomic and political considerations are ad- ^essed in this comprehensive and relevent
Everywoman’s Guide to Military Service
Texe Marrs and Karen Read. Cockeysville, MD: Liberty Publishing Company, 1984. 169 pp. Ulus. Ind. Tables. $7.95 ($7.15).
An exceptionally candid look at what women can expect to encounter in the armed forces, this book is described by the publisher as ‘ ‘essentially pro-military yet also pro-woman.” It is designed primarily for women who are considering a career in one of the five branches of the armed services and lists more than 600 job titles available to women. The authors, with their combined 25 years in the military, discuss what the potential female recruit can expect in terms of training, discipline, pay and benefits, and other aspects of special concern to women. Comments from military men and women on life in the service are interspersed throughout the text.
Jack Tars & Commodores: The American Navy 1783-1815
William M. Fowler, Jr., Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984. 318 pp. Illus. Bib. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. $17.95 ($16.15).
During little more than the two decades following the country’s Declaration of Independence, the United States fought three wars: one against the Barbary States, one against France, and the other against Great Britain. This turbulent period was marked by the exploits of Decatur, Truxtun, Hull, and Perry. It was a time of great importance to the fledgling nation that cemented the Navy’s role in the country’s development and survival. Fowler s book captures not only the dynamics of the era, but portrays the human aspects of life aboard ship for both officers and enlisted men. Political events are fused with naval exploits in a well-researched, exciting narrative.
Little Ship, Big War: The Saga of DE-343
Commander Edward P. Stafford, U. S. Navy (Ret.). New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984. 336 pp. Illus. Chron. Bib. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
Author of the previous bestseller The Big E (Ballantine Books, Inc., 1980), Commander Stafford has once again brought his talents to bear on a new work about the U. S. Navy of World War II. This is the detailed account of the USS Abercrombie (DE-343) from her commissioning in 1944, through her battles in the Pacific theater, to her decommissioning in 1946. Although the ship “lived” a scant two and a half years, it was a period rife with action and importance. The Abercrombie and her sister ships were in the thick of operations at Leyte and Okinawa, supporting landings, dueling with submarines, retrieving downed pilots, and grappling with Japanese kamikaze attacks. Commander Stafford has recreated those events, and captured the more mundane ritual of daily life at sea in vivid and accurate detail.
A Matter of Honor: General William C. Westmoreland Versus CBS
Don Kowet. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984. 317 pp. Ind. $16.95 ($15.25).
In January 1982, CBS television aired a documentary program entitled, “The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception.” In the program, General Westmoreland, former commander of the U. S. forces in Vietnam, was accused of concealing the true size of communist forces in Vietnam prior to the Tet Offensive of 1968. A challenging article in 7V Guide (written by the author of this book), an internal investigation by CBS, and the largest libel suit in U. S. history followed. This book tells the story behind this highly controversial issue, and addresses the ethical issues surrounding the rights and responsibilities granted to the American press by the First Amendment of the Constitution. In addition, the book explores the mechanics and latitudes involved in the fdming of a television documentary, and sheds light on many of the central personalities. Most important, Kowet addresses the issue itself by going back 16 years to investigate the alleged manipulation of enemy strength estimates. A Matter of Honor is a comprehensive look at a presently unresolved, but extremely important, test case—the outcome of which could greatly affect the future
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Prices enclosed by parentheses are member prices. Members may order most books of other publishers through the Naval Institute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) Please allow for delays when ordering non-Naval Institute titles. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked ES are Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked E9 are Naval Institute Book Selections. For further information about these books (H, g]). call (301)224-3378, ext. 34. For information on the other books, call ext. 31. Use the order form provided in this section.
of the press in terms of its freedom and its responsibility.
Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Andrew J. Pierre, Editor. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984. 118 pp. Notes.
Four well-qualified authors, two American and two European, offer contrasting opinions on the controversy over the NATO deployment of nuclear Pershing II cruise missiles in Europe. Topics addressed include the role of the United States in the defense of Western Europe, conventional versus nuclear weapons strategy, and the arms control and “no-first- use” issues.
Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia
William M. Leary, University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1984. 281 pp. Illus. Gloss.
Bib. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. Tables. $22.50 ($20.25).
Shortly after World War II, General Claire L. Chennault, of Flying Tigers fame, and Whiting Willauer created the Civil Air Transport (CAT), and began playing an important role in the Chinese civil war by supplementing the efforts of the Nationalist Chinese Air Force. This is the story of CAT’s participation in that war, its subsequent secret purchase in 1950 by the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, and its roles in both the Korean and French Indochina wars. Flying their missions without the recognition or protection of military uniforms, these pilots faced not only the hazards of combat but the added dangers of capture as agents of espionage. Well researched and documented, Perilous Missions reveals in exciting detail an important but little-known chapter in American aviation history.
YA4L
Qty
l-t-i Submarine Design and Development
Norman Friedman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 192 pp. Illus. Gloss. Ind. $18.95 ($15.16).
The author of six previous works about naval ships, weapons, and sensors, Friedman has produced an authoritative book on the evolution of submarine development. With chapters on tactics, weapons, communications, sensors, and anticipated future developments, the coverage is comprehensive, and is complemented by excellent line drawings and photographs. The presentation is nontechnical in nature, yet is detailed enough to provide insight into the principles and limitations of submarine design. The “constraints and compromises imposed on the designer” is a recurrent theme in the text, as the history of submarine development is traced from the Holland- to the Ohio-class nuclear-powered fleet ballistic nus' sile submarine.
The United States and the Persian Gulf: Past Mistakes, Present Needs
Alvin J. Cottrell and Michael L. Moodie. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 198450 pp. Notes. $3.95.
Augmented by a foreword written by Admif" Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy (Retired)' former Chief of Naval Operations and Chad man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this mon°" graph explains the strategic importance of die Persian Gulf in relation to surrounding nationS and bodies of water. The authors advocate a stronger U. S. naval presence than is currently importance of supporting friends and all>e*’ such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to U- 5' security.
Vertical Flight: The Age of the Helicopter
Walter J. Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, Editors- Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution PresS' 1984. 258 pp. Illus. Bib. $10.95 ($9.85).
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Edited by the director of the National Air and Space Museum and his deputy, this book >s compilation of articles addressing the history’ current technology, and future of helicopterS_ Articles cover the early history of helicopte development, specialized uses of helicop1®1, (such as combat operations and vertical h capabilities for industry), “famous firsts’ eluding the first around-the-world flight 1982), and future trends in helicopter develop^ ment and use. Replete with photographs a diagrams, this collection of works by 15 perts in the field is a testament to a young a vital aspect of general aviation.
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