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Who hasn’t heard the story about the single Texas Ranger who responded to the call that there was a riot in progress and, when asked why he was the only one sent, answered, “You’ve only got one riot, haven’cha?”
Unlike the ranger and the riot, the single problem posed by the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates—how best to employ them strategically and tactically—may require more than just one solution.
For example, the Navy could use some ships in their original role of low-mix escorts; use others to specialize as anti-
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USS JOHN A. MOORE (FFO-19)
The John A. Moore and her 50 sisters have much work to do before they sail into the horizon of obsolescence. Perhaps the best way to use their talents is to divide them into specialty forces of ASW, AAW, and ASUW ships.
submarine warfare ships (as has been planned for several of this class already); and still turn others into antiair warfare ships and cruise missile platforms.
An initial suggestion is to team 16 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates with eight Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates to escort the Navy’s four underway replenishment groups. Half of the FFG-7s could fill their magazines with a majority of Standard missiles, while the other half would carry more Harpoon missiles. With this combination, two Knox frigates can serve as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships, two FFG-7s with Standard missiles as antiair warfare (AAW) ships, and two FFG-7s with Harpoon missiles as antisurface warfare (ASUW) ships for each underway replenishment group.
Second, assign four FFG-7s with LAMPS-III helicopters and tactical towed array sonars as ASW ships to escort amphibious forces. With LAMPS-III and towed arrays, these ships may be more capable in detecting and prosecuting subsurface contacts than the FF-1052s.
Finally, ten task units of three FFG-7s apiece should be formed. Ten of these 30 ships would be the FFG-7s as they are currently built, with a magazine of Standard missiles; these would be the AAW ships for the task unit. Ten other ships would carry LAMPS-III and TACTAS, performing the ASW function. The remaining ten frigates would be modified versions with lengthened hulls, and carry antiship missiles in vertical launchers aft of the helicopter flight deck for ASUW. These ten task units would deploy to search out and prosecute submarines. These task units could cover a large amount of ocean space and therefore have a better chance of finding the enemy’s submarines. The reasoning behind this portion of the proposal is that our most likely enemy, the Soviets, concentrate their fleet around their submarines, and therefore we should concentrate our efforts against their submarines.
The argument against generalization is fought by a bit of specialization. In terms of ASW, the ships with LAMPS-III and TACTAS will be effective ASW platforms. The only other modification for these ships would be to replace the Mk-32 torpedoes with Mk-48s. All of the FFG-7s will have some ASW capability because they will each have either LAMPS-I or LAMPS-III helos to augment their sonars.
For the AAW ships, the forward battery will be armed mainly with Standard missiles. These ships will defend themselves with LAMPS-I, the Phalanx close- in weapon system, and the Oto-Melara 76-mm. gun. Unfortunately, these frigates will not have the advantage of a three-dimensional air search radar.
On the ASUW side, the ships would follow a design recommended by Patrick Rogers and Donald Palermo in their proposal which was published in the August 1980 Proceedings, “Will Our Ships Have Enough Cruise Missile Firepower?” Their suggestion is to lengthen each hull by 20 feet, and to add a vertical launch bay for antiship missiles aft of the helicopter flight deck. This modification could be made to those ships whose keels have not yet been laid. Individual ship redundancy does not exist under this proposal; however, task unit—therefore mission—redundancy does.
Logistic support could be simplified by having each ship in a task unit carry different replacement modules and spare parts. Space could also be reserved on board the underway replenishment ships to carry support equipment for their accompanying FFG-7s. A similar arrangement would also be made for those FFG- 7s operating with amphibious groups- The LAMPS-III Seahawks on board the Oliver Hazard Perry-class ships could double in the role of vertical replenishment to transport parts among ships.
There have been several criticisms of the FFG-7s in the areas of quantity, limited crew size, lack of redundancy, logistic support problems, and limited loiter capability and endurance. To counter these criticisms, several proposals have been made to change this ship and her mission, or to get rid of the class. But this is not a constructive solution; the answer lies in diversification of the Oliver Hazard Perrys into specialized warfare missions. In this manner, these frigates would be fulfilling the primary mission of the Navy—power projection and sea control—which is still a “numbers game.”
Midshipman Gillies is a first classman at the U. S. Naval Academy; last fall, she served as deputy brigade commander for her class. She will be commissioned an ensign in the U. S. Navy this spring.
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Proceedings / April 1984