War, Morality, and the Military Professional

 

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Since the detonation of the first nuclear weapons

developed that in these parlous times, the tradition' Judeo-Christian doctrine of the just war has been rendere obsolete. That doctrine, as it emerged over two mill^enia’ regards force, both defensive and offensive, as josh fied—in fact, required—but conscience adds qualify'¹¹^ factors in resort to war. The doctrine, in brief, holds that-

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In Plato’s Apology, Socrates reminds us that “the just man concerns himself far more with whether he does right or wrong than with whether he lives or dies.” The military professional sees himself in somewhat the same framework. He is morally bound by an ethic of ser­vice to his country and accepts the risk of ultimate sacri­fice in war as part of that obligation. His morality follows two main threads: first, virtues such as loyalty, obedience, selflessness, and integrity are crucial to performing the military function; second, the profession is ennobling be­cause its purpose in a morally sound nation involves man­kind’s highest virtues. If an officer is to function within the highest ethic of his profession, the policies of his na­tion must be morally sound.

The enigma today arises from nuclear armaments de­vised by society for its protection, but which, if used, risk destruction of society itself. The threatened use is morally just only to prevent the greater evil of actual use. If war is a legitimate instrument of national policy, as Clausewitz believed, then limitations must be placed on nuclear weap­ons to retain a legitimate and moral means of defense.

Either way, the military officer’s obligation to his con science and to his military duty may be in conflict. If ^s°’ how can he fulfill either obligation? Furthermore, how csfl the civilian or military planner devise policies adequate t the nation’s security that are not in conflict with mor* principle?

Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a consensus may ha''¹'

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►  The war must be initiated by competent authority waged to meet a verified, serious injury.

►  The use of force must have a reasonable chance of sue^- cess. A nation defending in a hopeless cause, such as Fin land against the Soviet Union in 1939, may risk fighting for a limited success if the cost to the aggressor can more disproportionate to any reasonable gain.

clear

era? The power of nuclear annihilation gives the

ful ^Use of force must offer a better situation, if success­- than would have prevailed in its absence. A war is ^°tntless if its ends can be attained by less painful means, b . force used must be proportional to the objectives ^lng sought or the evil being repressed. Peaceful means ^ tedress must have failed.

^orce must be used with the intention of sparing non- ► r^{atUntS anc}* ^w*^t^^{1 a reasona}'^:,l^e prospect of doing so. War is legitimate only if pursued for a moral intention. ^{ar W3}ged out of hatred is immoral. The World War II _e°^a °f “unconditional surrender,” when less fanatic and dually valuable goals could have been achieved faster r ^{a c}heaper, was irrational, as are punitive clauses that . ^ster instead of heal the wounds of the defeated. A valid ^ention contributes to a settlement that is more stable ^^eoause it is less vindictive.

j ^3e means of waging war must be moral. Noble ends , ⁿ°t sanctify ignoble means; the evil may not be done ^at good may come of it.

^s this traditional just war doctrine relevant in the nu- power to prevent war by the threat of annihilation. Under the duress of war with a ruthless enemy in World War 11, questions of morality or rationality were almost entirely overlooked at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the war was over, each of the U. S. military services wanted the pres­tige of a nuclear capability. The issue on the nuclear weapon was technological, who should deliver it? Not moral, whether or not to deliver it. Nor strategic, for what objective? Acute “roles and missions” crises dominated policy considerations and decoyed the military arms into concepts of strategy that increasingly fell under the domi­nation of weaponry.

The conduct of war was left to the admirals and gener­als, but new concepts of strategy became captive of the civilian scholars either in “think tanks” or surrounding the Secretary of Defense. The mystique of nuclear policy acquired a litany built around “finite” and “minimum” deterrence, “balance of terror,” “massive retaliation,” and “countervalue.” Early and widespread acceptance of deterrence by the threat of massive retaliatory raids ruled out lesser alternatives. Considerations of nuclear warfare

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gious leaders have an obligation to provide members wit the help they need in forming their consciences. The d^e sire is not to create problems for Catholics in the arflie services. The conclusions in the pastoral letter reach tn heart of defense policy, however, and pose a special cha - lenge and opportunity for those in the military profession^ We are urged to develop battle plans and weapons tha reduce violence, destruction, suffering, and death, esp^e dally of noncombatants.

The military officer at sea or ashore must be able ¹⁰ reconcile his responsibilities with his conscience. Morality guides his conduct whether in command of a squad or ³ squadron, whether in the strategic planning warrens of in Pentagon or in an operational role abroad. As a staff as­sistant in the Office of the Joint Chiefs some years ago. found my thoughts on nuclear war and my responsibility

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in situations less than total war needed no deep thought. The moral question was ignored. We believed that deter­rence would work. The weapons would not be used, and there would be no moral issue. The relative inflexibility of nuclear strategy soon became evident, but the basic dogma made this relatively unimportant.

The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 brought the strategic straitjacket into focus. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara lamented, “Massive retaliation had given us no usable power to prevent the USSR from expanding its interests into Cuba.” The crisis not only brought into question the issue of usable power—conventional pow­er—but also the rationality and morality of uncontrolled power. President John Kennedy’s threat to use the “full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union” panicked Pre­mier Nikita Khrushchev, and he backed down. But it was realized that massive retaliation lacked credibility in lesser crises. Less credibility meant greater likelihood of use; the morality of nuclear war was based on the success of deter­rence and hence of nonuse. The anomaly appears to be unresolved today.

Few would question that total nuclear war is both irra­tional and immoral. Therefore, how do we employ irratio­nal power with the best chance of staying within the bounds of rationality? A high percentage of observers ap­pear to believe that use of any nuclear weapon, if it does not bring immediate capitulation, will inevitably escalate to massive attacks on both sides. Many in Western Eu­rope, in fact, believe it necessary that any use of nuclear weapons in Europe be escalated sufficiently to involve the United States. European members in NATO, devastated twice in this century by war, do not plan to bear the brunt of nuclear incineration, while their Western Atlantic part­ners once again go unscathed. Whereas American strate­gists favor a “firebreak” theory to prevent nuclear escala­tion, European, primarily German, allies seek a seamless web of policy from conventional to intercontinental nu­clear war in order to facilitate escalation. Nor can Soviet strategists accept the possibility of the United States es­caping devastation at least equal to their own; even less do they contemplate an undevastated China as the sole victor among the great powers. More complex and potentially hazardous challenges to the policymaker have rarely been faced; the moral and ethical dimensions still lie ahead.

Fear of U. S. involvement in a nuclear war is on the public mind today. In the 1982 congressional elections, one-fourth of the electorate—the broadest ballot box test ever on a national issue—expressed support by a margin of three to two for a freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States and Soviet Union. That support is echoed widely in Congress. The moral issue of nuclear war is under heavy scrutiny by church leaders of all prominent faiths. A pastoral letter by the National Council of Catholic Bishops questioning the morality of nuclear war was issued in final form in May 1983. The letter supports U. S. deterrent strategy as a marginally justifiable interim policy subject to clearly specified limitations on nuclear targeting and on “war fighting.” Deterrence is a step toward progressive disarm­ament; it is inadequate as a long-term basis for peace. The bishops are profoundly skeptical of the moral acceptability of any use of atomic weapons. Unacceptable are “acts ⁰ vengeance”—retaliatory raids in a full exchange after ottf cities have been struck or raids against military installa­tions posing a significant risk to adjacent civilian popula­tions. Rejection of some forms of nuclear deterrence cou conceivably require a willingness to pay higher costs to develop conventional forces; this would be a proportionate price to pay if it will reduce the possibility of a nuclear war and lead to more constructive means of achieving security-

Concerning ethical questions of war and peace, as the planner in laying out the nuclear blueprint seriously troubling. The Nurnburg Trials had establishe the precedent that military officers cannot escape responsi­bility by claiming they were merely carrying out orders- They are individually responsible for war crimes irrespec­tive of state policy, their official position, or superior or­ders. And they are responsible for the actions of their sub­ordinates. How, therefore, can one reconcile l"^s allegiance to the flag with moral principles concerning nuclear or biological warfare when the two appear to be nj conflict? What obligation does an officer have to change military doctrine into policies less likely to conflict witn ethical principles?

Resolution of the moral issue in my case came via an exchange of letters with the distinguished Jesuit philoso­pher John Courtney Murray, a theologian who has written extensively on the moral problem of modern war. In h*^s view, our defense structure and the deterrent role of nu­clear weapons rests on several key premises. First, out strategy is essentially defensive. We would use nuclear weapons only in retaliation; in Europe, NATO forces are armed only for defense. On the 600-mile Central Front from the Baltic Sea to the Austrian border, alliance forces are incapable of offensive operations on a large scale-

Second, the communist enemy can be considered an international outlaw, prepared to achieve his aims by for^ce if necessary. He has doctrines on graduated use of fo^rce but, from the standpoint of security of the free world, he is prepared to go the limit under certain conditions. Any other supposition would be unwise.

Third, the doctrine of “military necessity” requires developing an equal or superior capability to counter even the threat of nuclear force. Although “military neces-

j“^ty’ developed by the elder von Moltke, is a dangerous ftn, the “necessity” is qualified by both the first and ^sec«nd premises.

our °^Urt^’ because of the nature of the communist enemy, Ij moral stance on the doctrine of the use of force need co ^m'ⁿ'^mal' This lamentable fact emerges from our icting alternatives in a choice between evils, the bily ^{est ev}il being the assumed Marxist-Leninist inevita- cal* ^ revolutionary course of history through politi- j_Ca]^an<^ military change. The danger is the neglect of polit-

0         alternatives to change, and whether we have muhtar^ed policy in recent years. There is reason to

believe _We have.

_cu ^lnaHy, every effort must be made today to alter the the ⁶⁰¹ ^^octr'^ne’ gradually increasing the moralization of m t-^USe f°^rce- This is the critical issue for the policy- itv T’ ^military ^or civilian. The question is less the moral- ^yof ^a given policy at the moment than the direction in to *^C" ^{the struc}ture of policy is moving. Are we moving IgWard increasing control of policy by moral principle and gitimate political interest over military policy? Or are we °ving toward increasing control of policy by technol- gy, where the availability of weapons controls strategy? ^e obligation is clear. Each individual must do what he ^t0 influence the ship of state toward safer waters. er.^Wo g^reat moral challenges confront the military lead- _nj^S ‘P- First, nuclear planning for so-called “war-win- q . strategies falls outside rational guidelines. The ^estion may be part technology, part semantics. Nuclear ti(^^et'ⁿ8 doctrine in the early Strategic Integrated Opera- _e ^ns Plan (SIOP) was hardly a strategic plan, in that the ^lre U. S. arsenal would be launched in a spasm re­sponse which, by Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates, would tr q^{6 to} ^25 million casualties in communist-con- _a° ^ecl countries. The current version of the SIOP contains Slno^{6 variet}y °f targeting categories and optional uses of ► P forces. The major target options are: an i°^Vlei nnc/ear forces, including missile sites, and air

1         submarine support facilities

°nventional military forces, depots, installations, and storage sites

Military and political leadership, command posts, and ^⁽⁾mmunications facilities

' anomic and industrial targets, either direct war sup- ^lng industries, or industries that contribute to eco- °mic recovery

^ach category is then divided into Major, Selected, •fitted, and Regional options. Within each of these is a ^e range of further choices, including “withholds” on Potation centers, specific countries, and “allied and are ^ral territories.” Finally, special categories of targets marked for preemptive attack in the event of unequivo- ^aq''^,aming ₀f Soviet attack.

1 Pc SIOP objectives are designed to allow adequate se- ctivity with less risk than from the unlimited plans of ^rior years_ The broad aim, as first set forth by then- ^tense Secretary James Schlesinger in 1974, is to “con- ¹ the process of escalation” with “prospects of termi- ^{d ln}g hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, P leave some possibility to restoring deterrence.”

Within the terms of the traditional doctrine of the just war, therefore, progress has been made. Much more remains to be done. Schlesinger obviously viewed the limited strate­gic options in the SIOP not as warfighting but as war- termination options. Seeking a more deliberate nuclear response was not a “warfighting strategy.” The intent of the Defense Secretary was to control nuclear war within acceptable moral limits. Interpreting the plan as a “war­winning’ ’ strategy for a protracted nuclear war is a danger­ous distortion. The abandonment of the morally objection­able massive retaliation in favor of less objectionable lim­ited options should not be subverted into a sanction for protracted nuclear war that is also clearly objectionable.

Our leaders may recognize the need for a war-terminat­ing policy as opposed to a warfighting strategy. Guide­lines in the current five-year defense plan claim to prepare the United States for a “protracted and winnable nuclear war” with the Soviet Union, but the statement was denied publicly by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Ronald Reagan stated that nuclear war “cannot be won and must not be fought.” Secretary Caspar Weinberger admitted there is no justification for the idea that a nuclear war can be won nor a likelihood that such a war, if started, could be protracted. Then-Chairman General David Jones, U. S. Air Force, publicly condemned the document, voicing se­rious doubts that any nuclear “exchange,” once started, could be controlled.

The divergent interpretations between the senior na­tional security executives and their planners suggests the

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U. S. Navy personnel responsible for launching nuclear missiles, perhaps including those in the missile control center in the USS Ohio (SSBN-726), may face a great moral dilemma in the future, as they try to fulfill their dual obligation to conscience and country.

second great challenge to our leadership. A nuclear crisis creates grave problems for the President. He always has at hand “the football,” the key to release Permissive Action Link codes to launch a nuclear attack. Day and night, home and abroad, even during private moments of family life, he is never free of his awesome responsibility. Tech­nically, he is able to act within the time of flight of Soviet missiles to their targets within the United States. But this is not the type of action he can take between the salad course and the entree at a White House dinner. Not even the President can decide to release a weapon by himself. He must confer with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Will he consult the Secre­tary of State? The Director of Central Intelligence? NATO chiefs (whether or not the crisis is in Europe)? Congres­sional leaders? Hardly.

Senator Robert Kennedy may have been the first to question the moral right of any government to bring its people under the shadow of nuclear destruction. Subse­quently, in 1976, 92 members of the House of Representa­tives submitted 12 separate resolutions that would restrict the President from first use of any kind of nuclear weapons in any situation without congressional approval.

Apart from the moral question, is it reasonable to expect the President to respond “instantaneously?” The technol­ogy is there; it is the human response that causes concern. Can a national leader be prepared to inflict upon the world, almost as a reflex action, the casualty levels in which the difference between SIOP options means mil­lions of American dead? Why, in fact, should we expect Soviet leaders to simplify the President’s decision by a massive, unambiguous missile offensive? The doctrine of hairtrigger presidential readiness, despite the technical feasibility, fails the ultimate test of human practicality.

Part of the problem facing the President is a failure to realize the distinction between technical capability and executive responsibility. The capability to respond quickly

is vital, but this is an operational requirement. The struc ture for rapid decision must be available, but executive decision requires time for deliberation and judgment under a wide scope of political and military circumstances. I¹¹ the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy had accurate and timely knowledge that the Soviets were putting mis­siles into Cuba—including the number, range, size, leth­ality, and state of readiness—and the Soviets were not aware that he knew these facts. Yet, even with near perfect knowledge, 13 days of deliberation by the best brains W government were required to determine the approp^riate response.

Thus, leadership’s two challenges with strong moral overtones are the perversion of the SIOP as a nuclear doc­trine to win a nuclear war rather than to seek its termina­tion under acceptable conditions, and the failure to distin­guish between the purely mechanical and the purely human executive responses in a crisis. A third challenge with political and ethical overtones arises from the role o the nuclear weapon itself.

The previous discussion is structured around the ”^re' markable trinity” that Clausewitz defined as intrinsic to war; political motivation, operational activity, and the “social” or popular participation. The first of these in­volves the government, the second the commander and hj^s army, and the third the character or passions inherent m the people. In his book, On War (Princeton University Press, 1976), Clausewitz concluded, “Our task is there­fore to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”

In studies of nuclear war and deterrence since 1945, the social dimension of strategy has vanished. Michael How­ard claims in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1979, p.B), th^at works about nuclear war and deterrence,

“normally treat their topic as an activity taking p'^ace almost entirely in the technological dimension. From their writings not only the sociopolitical but the opera­tional elements have quite disappeared. The technolog­ical capabilities of nuclear arsenals are treated as being decisive in themselves, involving a calculation of risk and outcome so complete and discrete that neither the political motivation for the conflict nor the social fa^c" tors involved—nor indeed the military activity of fight­ing—are taken into account. . . . Every one of th^e three elements that Clausewitz defined as being intrin­sic to war ... are completely absent.”

Reexamining current nuclear doctrine in its politicaL operational, and social dimensions raises questions o* utmost gravity. As generally visualized, a nuclear war would begin by a surprise Soviet attack on U. S. land- based missiles. The United States instantly retaliates- seeking to destroy enemy forces and military installations (counterforce targeting) or cities (countervalue targeting)- How does this theory reflect the “forgotten dimensions’’ ■ First, is a surprise attack really possible? A massive intercontinental missile strike is the most intricately coor­dinated operation in all military history, requiring precise individual timing of thousands of rockets in a system that

,^{as never} been tested operationally. Soviet rockets are tar°^St                f^uel^ed. unstable, and difficult to main-

'U- In flight across the North Pole, they are subject to nown geodetic, gravitational, meteorological, and th ^6r ^^{orces ca}hed “bias.” If the entire system is “go,” -^{ey can} reach as few as 25% of U. S. missiles—those not or sea-based. Yet, our response could reach 70% of *et missiles—those that are land-based. For good rea- ⁿ> former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified to a House Committee:

* ean publicly state that neither side can acquire a high confidence first strike capability. I want the President ⁰ the United States to know that for all future years, ^and I want the Soviet leadership to know that for all future years.”

tak ° ^ac^'^eve surprise, preparatory measures must be ^{en a}gainst satellite and other reconnaissance, electronic p r are, and communications intelligence systems. Key tty leaders must be alerted to proceed to shelters. Mass opulation must be evacuated from cities to the country- _c-..^e. ^Unaided by interurban or private transportation fa­> ies. Warsaw Pact forces and other Soviet forces world- fro ^{C mUSt a}'^ertetf■ All these actions must be screened st ff ³ ^a'f'million foreigners, diplomatic and consular “us, and the eyes of the world’s intelligence systems. ^P°ssible? Not likely

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an₍j'°P^{S classif}Y ^such retaliatory attacks as “ therefore immoral, a violation of the print

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nation and proportionality.

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Q_r — would the Soviets gain by a surprise attack?

“ⁿted, our land-based missiles are vulnerable, but the _0u^{Vlets w}ould be irrational to attack these missiles when _ar^{r air}- and sea-based missiles, up to 75% of our arsenal, ^re beyond their reach. Land-based missiles therefore ^e deterrent value, even if they are vulnerable. The haz- , fhe land-based missiles is that they act like lightning ^{s> a}ttracting the enemy firestorm to our cities. ^s there really a difference between “counterforce” and p^ountervalue” doctrines? The atom bomb dropped on t ^r°^shima was a counterforce attack on the Japanese mili­^ary district headquarters. The “ground zero” of the burst ^as th^e center of the parade ground. The military head- ^arfers was vaporized, as were nearby port facilities, a w Japanese Army aircraft carrier, and two army subma- -^s fitting out at the piers.* But the 100,000 people j ^ed by the bomb were mostly civilians in the surround- lf city- All this destruction was the work of a single off ■¹°^t0n fi°^mh- The STOP today, Defense Department ^ ^1Clals informed Congress, includes 50 megatons of ^uibs “counterforce” targeted on military installations in to7^c°w. Normally, 50% of these bombs can be expected ^a*f within the target area, the other 50% we know not _v ,^ere- Any distinction between counterforce and counter- j_t . ^e under such circumstances is theoretical, not actual. 1^ ^not difficult to understand why the U. S. Catholic

vengeance” principles of dis- ^need H^{tenSC Was} -*^aP^anese interservice rivalry that the Japanese Navy refused badly off . ^,actical air support for the army or logistic support for isolated garrisons cut n_Urt)e^{y t}*'^e U. S. advance. The army therefore built its own aircraft carrier and ^r°ns crude cargo-carrying submarines for these purposes.

The growing political self-awareness in societies, espe­cially in the West, including such leadership elements as the clergy, and these societies’ insistence on political par­ticipation, have made the nontechnological dimensions of policymaking too significant to be ignored. Because that participation does not yet extend into Soviet and Chinese societies does not mean it can be neglected. War planning in the West simply becomes much more difficult and therefore much more important. These added dimensions to Western defense policy present grave challenges to the strategist.

The campaign for a freeze on Soviet and U. S. develop­ment and testing of nuclear weapons finds wide support among the leadership in all walks of society. A similar public outcry in the past over air pollution by Strontium- 90 produced the limited test ban treaty after five years of debate. Popular resistance to ballistic missile defense stimulated negotiation of the antiballistic missile treaty after ten years of debate. The American and European concern now centered on the Soviet SS-20 and the U. S. Pershing missiles in Europe will further complicate the ongoing START negotiations and the strategic debate in the West. The freeze is not a gimmick, nor is it, even with support in Congress, a negotiable instrument. It is a set of principles upon which negotiation may be based, a vote for a shift in arms policy. Soviet leaders indicate their interest in a policy change, not for military reasons but to ease their political and economic strain during the chang­ing of the guard from Leonid Brezhnev to Yuri Andropov. Our leaders must achieve balanced, verifiable reductions and sustain those reductions within morally sound and adequate policy decisions.

When dealing with modem weaponry, the military pro­fessional, whatever his branch of service, must fulfill his dual obligation to conscience and to country. He wel­comes the assistance of religious leaders in defining his moral obligation. But he recognizes that the theologian providing advice on strategic matters, or the theologian who fails to account for the amorality of the communist enemy, may be of limited help in easing the burden of his responsibility. Nor is the military professional at ease with the realist who, by a cost benefit analysis, determines what is necessary to “prevail” in an unwinnable nuclear war. For the professional seeking, as a recent Chief of Naval Operations suggested, “to do what’s right because it’s the right thing to do,” John Courtney Murray offers the practical alternative—a minimum morality in the use of force, subject to conscientious efforts toward gradually increased moralization in resort to force.

Captain Schratz graduated from the Naval Academy in 1939, received his MA from Boston University,-and his PhD from Ohio State Univer­sity. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College, the National War College, and the Air War College. Before retirement from active duty in 1969, he was assigned to OpNav, the Joint Staff, JCS, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense. He then became the Director of International Stud­ies at the University of Missouri, a member of the joint White House- Congressional Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institu­tion, and a professor at Georgetown University and the Air War College. Captain Schratz is widely known as a writer on foreign policy and na­tional security affairs.