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Submarines sink. That’s their thing. But surface ships aren’t supposed to. What might they look like if they were designed to submerge? One artist envisions a pair of “semi-submersibles,” below, resembling the old Confederate ironclad, CSS Virginia. Their watertight hatches would permit full immersion, at least to shallow depth, thus permitting them to evade cruise missiles and ballistic nuclear weapons.
We must reassess our basic premises about the functions of various types of maritime platforms. Surface ships are becoming vulnerable to jnoclern weapons, and they are too costly to be expenda- e- Submersibles are less vulnerable. Gradually assigning 0re °f the traditional surface ship functions to subma- tQne^ or semisubmersibles may be the evolutionary answer he revolutionary threat posed by precision guided mu- 1'0ns and nuclear weapons.
. ''lcc 1945, the average surface ship has grown in size . las become more vulnerable to detection by a greater shanety °f sophisticated sensors, making today’s surface 'Ps more susceptible to direct hits by precision guided munitions (PGMs).1 The Falklands War demonstrated 194s1 W^at S- Navy experienced at Okinawa in
W'th ’ *^'n'tinned surface ships are vulnerable to PGMs 1 conventional high-explosive warheads. n the 1930s, the trade-offs between armor and arma- ]aent wcre carefully defined, debated, and designed into r8e combatants. Battleships, cruisers, and aircraft car- l^ers all had some degree of armor protection against '§ 'explosive shells and bombs. Since 1945, despite the
lessons of World War II, cruiser designs have not included any investment in hull hardness. Aircraft carriers are the only ships to have been armored; they also have many passive defense and damage control features.
An armored surface ship is-an expensive ship. As the costs of sophisticated antiair warfare (AAW) and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) electronics soared, armor plate became a luxury reserved for carriers. As a result, no post-World War II surface combatants have armored hulls comparable to the /owa-class battleships or Baltimore- class cruisers; nor are they designed to withstand near misses by nuclear warheads. In terms of hardness, our postwar cruisers are little more than overgrown destroyers. In fact, the Ticonderoga-class cruiser is a modified Spruance-class destroyer. Discussions about warship design have centered on the hi-lo mix issue. The debate has been largely whether group defenses are best provided by numerous, cheap, small, soft surface ships or a few, costly, large, less-soft surface ships.2
U. S. warship designers have not entirely ignored defense against nuclear attack. There has been attention to radiation fallout defense with water washdown systems,
decontamination facilities, and airtight interior spaces. This concentration on radiological defense is common to all major navies. Other navies have also largely neglected hardness as a feature of surface ship passive defenses. The Soviet Navy, like ours, has produced surface ships that would not survive nuclear near misses; they too have concentrated on nuclear-, chemical-, and biological-defensive suites.3 However, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov is building a navy to satisfy Soviet purposes, and Soviet purposes do not include maintaining intercontinental sea lines of communications for a maritime alliance in the event of war. Admiral Gorshkov’s navy is primarily a submerged navy.
First use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in defense of NATO Europe has been a keystone in the structure of NATO strategy. The U. S. Navy pressed ahead in the 1950s with a program to build and deploy a large family of tactical nuclear weapons for offensive use at sea and ashore and for active air and ASW defense. In spite of this effort, the U. S. Navy has developed an ostrich approach to nuclear war at sea, which has been reflected in U. S. surface warship design during the past 40 years.4 The question of vulnerability to nuclear war at sea has been raised in congressional hearings.5 The answer has been that ships are mobile, hence at least as survivable as fixed bases ashore. True. A corollary theme has been that any object, no matter how hard, would succumb to direct hits by nuclear weapons. True. Another recurring theme has been that today’s goal is to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war altogether, and to do so demands forces that are capable of fighting and surviving in conventional war. True. But is this line of thinking relevant to the task of preparing for war with a nuclear superpower at sea?
The potential vulnerability of surface warships and merchantmen makes nuclear warfare at sea a favorable option for a continental power attempting to deny Allied sea control. Ocean reconnaissance systems could locate surface ships at sea, and ballistic missiles or cruise missiles could provide prompt destruction. Horizontal escalation to nuclear war would probably favor the side seeking to interdict at sea, thus the Soviet Union would be favored in any scenario on the Eurasian continent. Successful Allied use of the sea surface would be difficult in the face of a Soviet interdiction campaign employing nuclear weapons.
Leakproof active air and cruise missile defense using current surface ship defensive weapon systems would be difficult to establish and maintain in conventional war and almost impossible in nuclear war. A few enemy aircraft or cruise missiles would likely penetrate our defenses; ballistic missiles could penetrate at will. The SALT I (antiballistic missile) treaty has left the United States without active defense against nuclear ballistic missiles. These missiles would have a free ride against exposed military forces, on land or at sea. The treaty limits U. S. military defenses against ballistic missiles to passive means—mobility, hardness, and deception. Naval vessels are inherently mobile. Unfortunately, the potential benefits of hardness and deception have not been exploited by the U. S. Navy.
Strategic deception is still possible, but hiding large groups of ships at sea is certainly not as easy as it was in
World War II. Today, large surface ships generate too many observables. It would be difficult to continuously blind a Soviet ocean surveillance system, consisting o various types of sensors distributed on satellites and a mu - titude of other platforms, linked to a central information processing facility. Disruption of Soviet space survei - lance would be critical to the defense of Allied surface ships. Short of promptly destroying Soviet satellite sys terns or attacking their ground control stations, U. S. strategic deception would entail combining sophisticated jamming with numerous decoys. Individual Allied ships might escape detection for prolonged periods. Large ship formations or dispositions would have more trouble hi ing, especially if neutral shipping were to vacate the oce anic war zones. Strategic deception with surface ships is certainly a capability worth considering; however, the trends in surface surveillance technology, we shou not rely on it in any conflict with the Soviet Union.
Once strategic deception failed, both active and passive air and missile defenses would be necessary; most curren Allied surface combatants and all our merchantmen are lacking in both. In conventional engagements, the de i ciency would be one of degree. Saturation raids of cru'Se missiles arriving simultaneously from many axes would most stressing. Should an attack fail to saturate, because of errors in timing, lack of surprise, or insufficient num bers of missiles, then Western ships would take hits, hu the results might not be decisively favorable to the SoVf ets. The Ticonderoga-c\ass cruisers with their Aegis AA systems will increase the carrier battle group’s capabiliheS for defense against saturation raids.6 Aegis is part ot continuing U. S. Navy emphasis on active defense againS cruise missiles and aircraft. .
Ballistic nuclear weapons change the odds dramatical y against Allied surface ships. Traditional Allied air defense ship spacings present an attractive target for nuclear barrage.7 The Soviets would intend to disable active defen ses. They could follow up a barrage with “Backfire” ra| s and attacks from submarines using both cruise missile and torpedoes. The Allies might reduce disabling damage from a ballistic barrage by adopting widely spaced disp° sitions. However, wide dispersal would prevent concen trated area defense against Soviet aircraft and cruise m|s' siles. Each ship would have to depend on her own p°in defense. Close-in point defense weapons, like Gatimg guns, might not defeat incoming nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Proximity fuses could detonate high-yield off®11 sive weapons outside the lethal range of the point defenses. The Soviets might selectively barrage U. S. high'1111* air defense ships, whose unique radars could be detecte by Soviet electromagnetic direction finders. No one can predict how well orchestrated ballistic and cruise missii e attacks would work for the Soviets, but how long can the United States afford to ignore the emerging threat of tha combination one-two punch?
The problems on land and sea are asymmetric in nature- Soviet land lines of communication to the Western Fron are vulnerable to attacks by combinations of NATO balin’ tic missile, cruise missile, and aircraft strikes. NATO, however, would be reluctant to designate nations like P°'
SpePed!!Tnent~12'000 tons
Armam 0 l<nots (surface); 35 knots (submerged) mament—20-3Q STOL aircraft; 27 IRBMs
or
exposed submarine communications antennae, but no worse than for a surface ship, and probably much less if the submarine is submerged at the time of detonation.
The traditional mode of operation for U. S. submarines has been that of the lone-wolf covert guerrilla in an area where the enemy controls the surface and the air. In a guerrilla scenario, the submariner must not expose his antenna or periscope any longer than absolutely necessary.[1][2] [3] That tactical imperative no longer applies when a submarine is in direct support of a friendly battle group. In a battle group environment, the submarine is the most sur- vivable platform. There is slim chance that enemy aircraft could visually detect a submarine, because hostile aircrews would be occupied with staying alive in the face of battle group air defenses. Furthermore, any enemy aircraft capable of penetrating the A AW defenses of a battle group would probably be ill-equipped to attack a submarine.
The nuclear-powered attack submarine might be vulnerable to over-the-horizon targeting and attack by long- range ASW standoff weapons. But an enemy would have to discriminate submarine radio and radar emissions from the myriad task group radiations. Submarine-unique transmissions could be restricted or eliminated entirely by operational procedures. Voice and data encryption devices could render submarine emissions indistinguishable from those of battle group aircraft and surface ships. The radar and visual horizon of a direct support submarine could be extended by transmission of data from battle group electronic warfare or ASW aircraft, eliminating the necessity for a submarine to use radar at all. Submarines might have to emit friend or foe identification signals, but so would friendly aircraft and surface ships. Continuous two-way radio contact would reduce the chances of inadvertent attack by friendly antisubmarine warfare forces. Submarine radio silence is not needed when in the presence of radiat
of
should be sufficient cause to reexamine the functions
ing friendly air and surface units.
The keys to nuclear-powered submarine effectiveness, either as a guerrilla or as an integral part of a battle group, are her reduced observables. Surface ship observables of greatest concern are those in the radar, visible, and infrared spectra. These are the frequencies used for homing seeker heads in antiship cruise missiles. Radar, electronic support measures, visual, and infrared are also the most prevalent means of locating surface ships with airborne or spaceborne search sensors. Even when broached, a submarine is a target with an area cross section considerably less than even the smallest frigate.
It is potentially much easier to apply “stealth” technology to the small, rounded, streamlined submarine sail area than to traditional surface combatants with their many sharp angles and appendages. Even so, battle group submarines do not even need to broach. Periscope and antenna mast exposure is sufficient to permit a submarine to perform as an integral part of a battle group with radio communications. Stealth technology can be applied to periscopes and antenna masts also, further reducing observables.
Low observables permit effective decoy tactics. Chaff rockets have been installed on surface ships as last-minute decoys against cruise missiles with radar seekers. Decoys could also be used against search sensors. Creating decoys that look like periscopes or a broached submarine is much easier than simulating a frigate or a cruiser. Periscopesized decoys could be cheap, expendable, small, easily stored, and rapidly deployed in quantity by aircraft. If decoys were used, the enemy might know the general 1° cation of a task group, but he might not be able to discs'1’ its disposition or composition. Targeting of individu' submersibles would be difficult, if not impossible. A bar rage attack might be his only option, and the cost in MIR ballistic warheads would prohibit this option from beinfc exercised, given the low probability of damage to a har ened submerged vessel when at shallow depth.
These potential advantages provided by submersible
surface ships to identify systems or partial systems tha could be submerged, and to determine if functions n easily submerged could be transferred to airborne spaceborne platforms. Or functions that could not be f® allocated might be packaged in numerous, small, sped3 purpose surface vessels, whose design would incorporate extra protection against blast, radiation, and electromag netic effects of near-miss nuclear detonations. .
A semisubmersible hull might be best for packaging those functions. The semisubmersible would expose a pr° portion of hull similar to a nuclear-powered attack subma rine on the surface or an iceberg.9 The exposed shape might resemble that of the CSS Virginia. Flat planar radar antenna arrays could be mounted on her sloping freeboar • Armored hatches might protect SPY-1-type radar arrays from weapons effects. Watertight hatches would pen111 full immersion, at least to shallow depths, to evade cruis® missiles and ballistic missiles or to facilitate rapid trans by reducing the drag inherent in surface operations. Ho'*' ever, she would broach for functions such as radar searcm
did r radar picket submarines of the 1950s-60s
a f 'if ut.un**ke the old submarine pickets, she could have defU SU'te surface_t0~a*r missiles (SAMs) for area air
or ballistic missile defense if treaties permitted.
tj/C ln Pr°ducing quiet nuclear-powered attack and ballis- ste ^sile submarines could readily be applied to a
haU, ^ submarine tanker. The SSAON’s great size, per- noPs '00,000 tons, would facilitate reducing the radiated 'Se of the nuclear power plant. pr , | raging dry stores ships would present a few more aCII)S than would “sinking” an oiler. Dry stores and ish*111111'1'011 S^'PS (SSAENs) would not be able to replen- Usi Under way while submerged. Vertical replenishment tran f eaVy lifl helicopters would be the likely means of cral) Cr P*e"C0Pters would probably be based on an air- rine Carrier’ hut a hangar in the pressure hull of a subma- ste 1 if n0t out °P lhe Question. SSAENs would be as the as submarine fleet tankers while en route, hence y Would not require a complement of escorts. silessuhmarine equipped with SAMs or antiballistic mis- tech ^V°u^d require the longest design lead time, but the def niCa* r'sk *s not excessive- Submarine-mounted point tp eriSe against aircraft is feasible today. Submarine- Cou,nted wide-area SAMs and ballistic missile defenses tpj. he operational in a decade, given strong Navy com- eut and congressional support.
y . uaiusut imssne ueiense n ireanes p< ball'- 'aunc'* tubes have been submerged for years on to hS*'C m'ss"e submarines. SAM launchers do not have ro , e above the waterline; Tomahawk and submarine tuh Ct m*ssdes can be launched from submerged torpedo Sees- Submarines or semisubmersibles with SAMs might i 6r^ ^ar in the future, but surface ships now on the draw- SA 0ards are as well. There is no technical reason why vessels could not be produced within the next few rs. The problem may be bureaucratic rather than lechnical 10 Th
se move to a fleet composed of more submarines and 0Ve]!submersibles should be a carefully planned evolution s next two decades. Three near-term missions for
tmarines seem attractive, each with slightly greater Ond n,Ca* r*S^’ ^*rst’ submarine fleet auxiliary tankers; sec- thi h su*3rner8e<i ammunition and dry stores ships; and ’ submarines for AAW and ballistic missile aefense.n
The fleet tanker mission would be the easiest to imple- frQnt' Submarines for transport of North Slope crude oil sm Alaska to East Coast refineries via the north polar no/ WCr^ ProPosed over a decade ago.12 The proposal was and C°ns'dered cost competitive with the Alaska pipeline supertankers, thus it was not implemented. Submarine toet °'ters (SSAONs) might well be cost-effective relative ren|Ur^aCe ^eet auxiliaries, because a submarine underway Wo n'shment SrouP would not require escorts. This a(u d either save the cost of perhaps four to six new frig- in / ant^ destr°yers> or't would free that number of exist- Sub C0ItS ^0r ot^er tasks, such as merchant ship escorts. Camarine tankers could deliver jet fuel to nuclear aircraft r !crs from a position under the keel or submerged di- Wo / astern the carrier. The only threat to such a tanker u d be another submarine. The U. S. technical advan-
Other missions could be repackaged in submersibles. For example, the ASW ocean surveillance ship (T-AGOS) might be more survivable as a diesel submarine. The submerged T-AGOS would certainly be less vulnerable to Pueblo-type piracy, as well as less susceptible to being killed from nuclear barrage. Operations on diesel propulsion might be possible for extended periods if the only threat was long-range barrage. Decoys could be constructed to simulate diesel exhaust heat and ASW data transmissions, thus degrading any over-the-horizon targeting tactic. Battery propulsion would permit fully submerged evasion against traditional ASW forces.
Finally, we should consider the case for submersible aircraft carriers. The high-low mix debate has centered on small decks versus large decks.11 The large-deck advocates have carried the day so far; in conventional war scenarios, they are probably justified. The ability to convert merchant containerships to V/STOL carriers has been well demonstrated by the Royal Navy. The United States is designing the LHD-1 to be convertible to a V/STOL sea control ship. The LHA and LPH amphibious force hulls could be used for V/STOL aircraft operations. Given this wide range of hull options available for wartime transport of V/STOL aircraft, it is logical to concentrate peacetime shipbuilding efforts on large-deck supercarriers so long as high-performance conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft are essential to sea control and power projection in conventional war scenarios.
In nuclear scenarios, the case for surfaced aircraft carriers is not as strong, whether the carriers are large or moderate in displacement. Aircraft exposed on a flight deck are vulnerable to blast and heat damage from ballistic barrage.14 In 1963, Proceedings published a proposal for a submarine aircraft carrier, complete with catapults and arresting gear.15 Now that V/STOL technology is beginning to mature, the submersible aircraft carrier may be more feasible than she was 20 years ago. The first step toward a “sinkable” carrier might be a helicopter hangar installed in a submersible fleet auxiliary.
The U. S. Navy, now subordinated to the Department of Defense, faces even greater organizational challenges to successful innovation than did the Navy between the World Wars. The roles and missions of the other services are more of a factor now than they were in the days of Admiral William Moffett and General Billy Mitchell. Adopting the changes considered here could have a marked influence on the composition of the U. S. officer corps. The effect might well be as significant as the introduction of aircraft carriers in the 1920s-30s. Visionary and traditional naval officers of good will together were able to manage the integration of aircraft into the old battleship- centered organization, which gradually gave way to the carrier task groups of World War II. We need to emulate past U. S. Navy successes in organizing for innovation. In this and the next decade, organizational problems might be more difficult to solve than the technical problems. The British and Japanese navies were not as successful as the U. S. Navy at integrating the carrier and paid a price for this in World War II. Important lessons can be learned from these past experiences in adaptation to change.
Passive defense is a neglected area of naval warfare, just as it is in the air and ashore. PGMs with conventional high-explosive warheads are reason enough to reconsider passive defense as an alternative or adjunct to distributed offense in surface ships and layers of active defenses at sea. But besides that, the nuclear weapon is here to stay. We would be remiss to not do all our political leaders will allow to prepare maritime forces for defense against nuclear attack. The SALT I treaty has limited the value of all types of active defenses by prohibiting them against ballistic missiles. Unless or until that prohibition is lifted, we should concentrate on passive defenses. The submersible ship is easier to defend passively. We should use submers- ibles to package functions now performed by vulnerable surface ships. The process of transition to submersibles can be an evolutionary process, thus the technical risks are low. The bureaucratic risks are high if the last 30 years are indicative of Navy willingness to adapt to the realities of revolutionary changes in warfare.
The challenge is to carefully and deliberately sink the U. S. Navy. If we fail to meet that challenge, Admiral Gorshkov or his successor might attempt to do it for us.
4J. D. Douglass and A. M. Hoeber, “The Role of the U. S. Surface Navy i» Nuclear War,” Proceedings, January 1982, pp. 57-63. T. Wood Parker, Comme and Discussion, Proceedings, May 1982, pp. 45-46. ^
5The themes are generic. For a specific example, see “Hearings on the CVA Aircraft Carrier,” Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee (Washing ton, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, April 1970). .
6A. M. Bowen, Jr., “A Modified Operational Concept for the Surface Warship- Proceedings, May 1981, pp. 132-149. ,*
7Carl H. Clawson, Jr., “The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs—Round Two, Proceedings, March 1980, pp. 64-71. .
8See Robert J. Carlin, “Communications with the Silent Service,” Proceeding December 1981, pp. 75-78, for a thorough review of current and prospective co munications systems. .
9This semisubmersible is not to be confused with the semisubmersible propose > Leon P. Brooks, Jr., “The Impact of Technology on Fleet Structure,” Procee ^ ings, February 1981, pp. 46-52, which was more similar to a catamaran than submarine.
10See Bowen, pp. 132-149, concerning wide-area SAM considerations for su aC combatants.
111 ignore the legal restrictions of SALT I for purposes of this discussion.
12General Dynamics Corporation, Unpublished Fact Sheets on Submarine Sup tankers; also an undated brochure portraying 700,000-ton submarine liquid natu gas tankers. *
13Gerald O’Rourke, “CVNs Forever! Forever?” Proceedings, July 1982, PP- [4][5] [6] 26.
14Clawson, pp. 64-71.
15Clark C. Abt, “The Submarine-Aircraft Carrier,” Proceedings, October 1 '
pp. 149-153.
Captain Pease is a graduate of the Naval Academy, the Naval Postgrad0 ate School, and the Naval War College. His primary operational experl ence has been in antisubmarine warfare as a pilot and tactical coordina in land-based patrol aircraft. He commanded Patrol Squadron 16 in J°c sonville, Florida, and served as assistant navigator in the USS Hawk (CV-63) during the Vietnam War. He has had staff t°urs 3 CinCSouth and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, System Analysis Division. Captain Pease is currently Military Assistant to t Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
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stri^as nuclear barrage zones for purposes of interdiction; of ,s at Warsaw Pact would be constrained because no s°‘j!Cal and m°ral necessity. The Soviets would have lines** 1 * * * r against barrage attacks on NATO sea
•j, communication.
cent en^S *n convent>onal warfare at sea also provide in- as ]*Ves /or the West to submerge fighting ships, as well pQj^lst'c^ bottoms, to counter the growing threat from ta](ess' Existing surface combatants are simply too soft. It heads'11'11101' l^ate t0 defeat direct hits by conventional war- stand ’ as We*i as nuclear near misses. The ability to with- our s P5essures of up to five pounds per square inch, as hard Ulaace combatants are designed to do, is not enough °f eaess against PGMs or proximate nuclear detonations of Den small yield. Passive protection must be hundreds Hul|n^S per scluare inch to be effective. waveshapes designed to deflect projectiles or shock armor °^er better protection than designs using only f0rrrir and structural reinforcement. Current surface hull Plate ’ Wlt^ high freeboards and large thin vertical flat
it1iSsj]areas’ are the wrong configurations for deflecting
Vj>„ - CS 0r shock waves. The Confederate ironclad, CSS
shapg!,a iex'USS Merrimac), with her low pyramid
clear ’ C°U^ Reflect the pressure wave of a near miss nu-
someWeap°n ‘hchunst just as she deflected Union shells. In
siVe (,Ways> she had a more optimum hull profile for pas- SurflenSe than the modern Uss Virginia (CGN-38).
cnhan3Ce ships offer little protection against the effects of
Seaw t etonati°n because neutrons are rapidly absorbed by effect* 6r Pahout and residual radiation would have little sphe0n submerged vessels with self-contained atmo- es- Electromagnetic pulse could be a problem for
could CKedradiation weaP°ns (ERWs). Just as tank crews
crew 6 * *ncaPacitated and killed by ERWs, so could ship
ERW h ^ Amarine would be essentially safe from an
‘For a discussion of surface ship vulnerability to detection, use of off-ship sensors, and smart missiles vice semiactive homing missiles, see Robert C. Powers, “The Offensive-Passive Ship,” Proceedings, January 1982, pp. 46-49.
[5]See Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., “Naval Battles We Could Lose,” International Security Review, Summer 1981, for one view of the problem. See also Honorable Bob Wilson, “Before We Build, Let’s Decide Which Navy is Right,” Washington Star, 18 March 1981, p. 14, for a typical review of the issues as Congress sees them.
[6]James W. Kehoe, Kenneth S. Brower, and Herbert A. Meier, “U. S. and Soviet Ship Design Practices, 1950-1980,” Proceedings, May 1982, pp. 118-133.